30. Extensive, detailed calculations were performed in the ancestral temple prior to mobilizing for a campaign, and presumably similar, although more limited, calculations were performed by the commander before individual engagements in the field. These calculations apparently were based on quantified estimates that assigned numerical values to the strength of systematically examined aspects (as discussed in note 32 below and listed especially in the first chapter of the book itself) for both the enemy and oneself. (Cf. Lau, "Some Notes on the Sun-tzu," pp. 331-332; and Hsu Wen-chu, Sun-tzu yen-chin, pp. 168-169.)
31. Sun-tzu's discussion of the critical qualities that should mark a general is viewed as evidence that professional commanders had already appeared on the historical stage, displacing personal field command by hereditary rulers (see note 19 above; and STPF SY, p. 12). Further confirmation is provided by his insistence that the ruler should not interfere with the commander once the latter has assumed the mantle of authority and ventured forth, as is illustrated by the famous incident from his biography.
32. Sun-tzu's descriptive method for analyzing the tactical aspects of battle is founded on around forty paired, mutually defined, interrelated categories. (This may reflect Taoist thinking about names and their mutual, interrelated definitions, as is sometimes claimed, or simply be the product of his own analytical reflection.) Among these are Heaven-Earth, offense-defense, advance-retreat, and unorthodox-orthodox. (Cf. T'ang Ching-wu, Sun-tzu ping-fa tsui-hsin-chieh, self-published, Taipei, 1981 [rev. ed.], pp. 25-27 for an extensive list.)
33. The military concepts and applications of the unorthodox (ch'i) and orthodox (cheng) probably originated with Sun-tzu, although the Art of War does not discuss them extensively. (Note that the text always orders them as ch'i/cheng, unorthodox/ orthodox, rather than as prioritized in the West-orthodox/unorthodox. The implications, if any, remain to be explored, although against a background of correctness and uprightness, the choice seems deliberate. The military was generally regarded as ch'i, in accord with Lao-tzu's dictum: "With the orthodox govern the state; with the unorthodox employ the army.") The later military classics-such as the Wei Liao-tzu, Six Secret Teachings, and especially Questions and Replies-devote considerable energy to discussing ch'i and cheng and their employment.
Although the subject clearly requires a separate article or book, in essence "orthodox" tactics include employing troops in the normal, conventional, "by-the-book," expected ways-such as massive frontal assaults-while stressing order and deliberate movement. "Unorthodox" tactics are realized primarily through employing forcesespecially flexible ones-in imaginative, unconventional, unexpected ways. Therefore, instead of direct chariot attacks, unorthodox tactics would mount circular or flanking thrusts. Instead of frontal assaults, they would follow indirect routes to stage unexpected, behind-the-lines forays. Their definition, of course, is dependent on normal expectation within a particular battlefield context as well as on the enemy's actual anticipations; therefore, they are mutually defining, mutually transforming, and circular in essence. Thus, as discussed in the other military classics, the orthodox may be used in unorthodox ways, and an orthodox attack may be unorthodox when it is unexpected precisely because it is orthodox-whereas a flanking or indirect assault would thereby be considered normal and therefore orthodox. A frontal feint by a large force, designed to distract or lure an enemy, would be unorthodox.
The concept lends itself to extreme complexities of thought and has often been misunderstood throughout Chinese history or dismissed as simplistic, when in fact it is quite the opposite. However, in essence it remains a descriptive tool for tactical conceptualization, for characterizing and manipulating forces within and exploiting an enemy's matrix of expectations, rather than a transformational mode to be actualized in the concrete reality of men and weapons the way a military formation is deployed. (There is nothing mysterious or mystical about ch'i and cheng and their mutually pro ductive realtionship, yet later commentators and strategists have sometimes become seriously confused. Under such circumstances, a useful tactical conceptualization becomes an unnecessary obstacle to clear, strategic thinking.)
The concept's origins remain unclear, although speculation tends to identify it with the conflation of thought that crystalized as Taoism or as originating in divinatory practices. The interrelationship of ch'i and cheng mirrors that of yin and yang, and at least one writer attributes the concept's roots to the yin-yang principles found in the I Ching. The orthodox is identified with the firm or hard, whereas the unorthodox correlates with the soft or yielding. (See Hsiao T'ien-shih, Sun-tzu chan-cheng-lun, Tzuyu ch'u-pan-she, Taipei, 1983 [reprint; original, 1942], pp. 197-199.) The observation that reversal characterizes the natural world figures prominently in the Tao Te Ching, which is traditionally ascribed to Lao-tzu. Cheng turns into ch'i, things revert to their opposites (in complementary, dynamic tension) after reaching their pinnacle, as do yin and yang. (Cf. Hsu Wen-chu, Sun-tzu yen-chiu, Kuang-tung ch'u-pan-she, Taipei, 1980, pp. 206-208. Hsu observes that although Sun-tzu speaks about the mutually productive relationship of ch'i and cheng, he emphasizes the unorthodox. Also see Kagakuraoka, "Sonsi to Roshi," especially pp. 44-46.)
In the introduction to his translation, General Griffith states that cheng forces engage or engage and fix the enemy, whereas ch'i forces defeat him, often through flanking and rear attacks (see The Art of War, pp. 34-35). He also characterizes cheng forces as the normal or direct and ch'i forces as extraordinary or indirect; similarly, as fixing and flanking (or encircling) or again as "the force(s) of distraction and the force(s) of decision" (see p. 42). He goes onto stress that ch'i operations are always strange, unexpected, and unorthodox and also notes the reciprocal relationship between ch'i and cheng. Finally, Griffith adds that the realization of ch'i and cheng is not confined to tactical levels but may also be implemented on strategic ones (p. 43).
D. C. Lau's criticism of Griffith's translation emphasizes the abstract nature of these two terms, as opposed to invariably identifying them with forces, and suggests that they might best be translated as "straightforward" and "crafty" (see "Some Notes on the Sun-tzu," pp. 330-331).
Benjamin E. Wallacker-in a brief, often-cited etymological article--concludes that cheng refers to military operations that pin down or "spike" an enemy, whereas ch'i operations are maneuvers that force the enemy off balance and thus bring about his defeat. (He further speculates that Sun-tzu's "formulations" seem likely to have been derived from experience with cavalry forces. This would require revising the date of composition to roughly the dawn of the third century B.C.) See "Two Concepts in Early Chinese Military Thought," Language, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1966), pp. 295-299.
Roger T. Ames conceptually translates the terms as "irregular deployments" and "regular deployments" (The Art of Rulership, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1983, p. 68). "Irregular" is perhaps an unfortunate choice because it is inherently burdened with adverse military connotations. Extreme order and control are necessary to employ forces in ch'i maneuvers. Thus Rand's choice of "extraordinary" and "normal" seems to be better phraseology (see "Chinese Military Thought," p. 118).
The Chinese secondary literature on Sun-tzu is overwhelming; however, for ch'i/ cheng most analysts essentially repeat the definitions found in the Art of War and later military classics, emphasizing the realization of these abstract concepts in concrete forces. Flexibility, maneuverability, and swiftness are stressed especially when discuss ing ch'i forces, although in Sun-tzu's view they should equally characterize all military units. (For example, see the anonymous Ming dynasty work, Ts'ao-lu cheng-lueh, reprinted as Chung-kuo ping-hsueh t'ung-lun, Li-ming, Taipei, 1986, pp. 107-110; and Hsiao T'ien-shih, Sun-tzu chan-cheng lun, pp. 197-199. In the Ming dynasty Chao Pen-hsueh noted that very few generals excelled at employing the unorthodox [Suntzu-shu chiao-chieh yin-lei, Chung-hua shu-chu, Taipei, 1970 (reprint), p. 79]).
34. Note that Wu Ju-sung believes it is not generally recognized that the Art of Wa
r, as with some Taoist writings, discusses means and methods for wresting victory with a small force and fewer numbers (see STPF CS, p. 17).
35. The concept of ch'i is both integral and fundamental to many aspects of Chinese thought, ranging from metaphysics to medicine and science through religion. One popular view holds that the character originally represented the vapors rising from cooking rice and is thus symbolic of nourishment in every sense. Unfortunately, this critical concept lacks any comprehensive or systematic Western language study. However, two extensive works (cited in note 59 of the translation of the Six Secret Teachings) have appeared in Japanese.
36. Sun-tzu's materialistic concept of Heaven and his opposition to consulting omens are seen by Wu Ju-sung as evidence of a new attitude and approach, in contradistinction with the old concepts held by the Chou nobility and the earlier Shang (see STPF CS, p. 18). However, yin-yang and such other concepts as five phase theory, which also appear in the Art of War, thereafter developed into an influential school of thought-apparently affecting military theory and even command practices although they were condemned in such other Seven Military Classics as the Six Secret Teachings and the Wei Liao-tzu.
37. The concept of shih figures prominently in both ancient military and Legalist thought, perhaps originating with the former. Although many contemporary monographs on the Legalist thinkers attribute its origin to Shen Tao and then trace its appropriation and integration in Han Fei-tzu's systematized thought, studies of ship in the military works are just beginning to emerge. (Among the best of the former are Wang Pang-hsiung, Han Fei-tzu to che-hsueh, Tung-ta t'u-shu, Taipei, 1977, pp. 165-179; Hsieh Yiin-fei, Han Fei-tzu hsih-lun, Tung-ta t'u-shu, Taipei, 1980, pp. 95-100; and Wu Hsiu-ying, Han Fei-tzu chiu-i, Wen-shih-che ch'u-pan-she, Taipei, 1979, pp. 8691. Roger Ames essentially initiated the study of shih as a primary, discrete concept with a lengthy chapter in The Art of Rulership [University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1983], entitled "SHIH [Strategic Advantage/Political Purchase]," pp. 65-107, which is discussed below.)
Unfortunately, shih is another topic whose complexities require a book-length study to resolve a number of fundamental questions, including: (1) the concept's definition and character in individual works, such as the Art of War (where it is used in several apparently distinct ways); (2) the evolution of the concept in the military works, especially the military classics (presuming the present tentative dating scheme is valid); (3) whether it and other, related concepts are as technically distinct as is frequently assumed, or whether the earlier stages reflect a rather generalized interchangeability of terms and concepts (such as hsing-form-and shih-power); and (4) the concept's interrelationship with developments in Legalist thought, and whether the later military classics-such as the Three Strategies-reflect new dimensions or orientations im posed on essentially tactical military vocabulary under the influence of newly formulated Legalist views.
A complicating factor is the cryptic nature of many of the texts. Statements and even complete sections are generally brief and often enigmatic and apparently represent only notes or cursive summaries of extensive, complex, systematized thoughtmost of which has either been lost or was never cohesively formulated in writing. (The development of private books may have largely coincided with the rise of specialist military studies. See note 10 above and for general background-although military books are not discussed-Burton Watson's early study, Early Chinese Literature, Columbia University Press, New York, 1962; Tsuen-hsuin Tsien, Written on Bamboo and Silk, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962; and Joseph Needham et al., Science and Civilisation in China, Chemistry and Chemical Technology, Vol. 5, Part 1: Paper and Printing, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.) Moreover, the assumption that concepts are used in a consistent and precise way in these early books, although necessary for analytical studies, is not invariably valid and also needs to be sustained.
The scope of these issues precludes incorporating an intensive examination of the nature and function of shih in an already massive book directed to presenting translations of the Seven Military Classics. However, a brief characterization of the dimensions of the concept, a short review of previous studies, and an assessment of various translation possibilities remain unavoidable. Although we must defer any systematic justification of the terms chosen to translate shih and its related concepts, some indication of our reasoning is warranted. (Additional notes that briefly explicate the concept within concrete contexts, drawing selectively on the extensive classical commentaries, are appended to the translations.)
Giles (see note 2 above) tends to be criticized severely for his mistranslation and misunderstanding of the Art of War, although not always justifiably. His English equivalents for shih include "circumstances," "energy," "latent energy," "combined energy," "shape" (where the usage is synonymous with hsing-"shape," or "form"), and "strength"; he also simply elides the term by not translating it. None of these seems particularly appropriate, although "latent energy" characterizes situational potential most accurately in several contexts.
General Griffith-an experienced military officer with expert knowledge of strategy and tactics as well as their conceptions and precise vocabulary-also uses a number of distinct, context-dependent terms. (Note that he is generally criticized by D. C. Lau for a lack of consistency in his terminology, as mentioned in note 33 above, but the sense of this term definitely varies within the Art of War.) These terms include "circumstances," "situation" (including at least one instance in which it seems highly inappropriate), "momentum," "strength," and "tactical power" (which merits serious consideration as an equivalent for shih). He also offers a valuable note to the title of the fifth chapter: "Ship, the title of this chapter, means `force,' `influence,' `authority,' `energy.' The commentators take it to mean `energy' or `potential' in some contexts and 'situation' in others" (Griffith, Art of War, p. 90). In contrast, for his 1988 translation (see note 4), Cleary selected "force of momentum," "formation," "conditions," and "forces."
The concept appears in the Book of Lord Shang and the Kuan-tzu, both of which probably (for the most part) date to somewhat after the Art of War. For the former, J.J.L. Duyvendak (The Book of Lord Shang, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1963 [reprint of 1928 edition]) translates the term as "condition," "power," and "condition of power," with the following note: "Power would really express better the sense of what is meant. Power, that is, which relies on the general condition and trend of things, as an abstract idea, and well distinguished from brute force" (p. 98; also see his general discussion, pp. 97-100). W. Allyn Rickert, in his new translation of the Kuantzu (Guanzi, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985, Vol. 1) uses "circumstances," "situation," "force of circumstances," and "'authority' derived from a specific position or situation." (See pp. 45, 58-59. He also notes that ch'i an, which is discussed separately, refers to "whatever is expedient under varying circumstances" [p. 45] and cites a passage from the Han chi that defines the temporal nature of shih [pp. 81-82].)
Other translations (with reference to Han Fei-tzu) include A. C. Graham's "powerbase" and sometimes just "power." He expands on it as "a situation of strength, or on occasion weakness, in relation to circumstances, for example, strategic position on the battlefield" (Disputers of the Tao, Open Court, LaSalle, 1989, p. 278). Others include Christopher Rand's "circumstantial power" ("Chinese Military Thought and Philosophical Taoism," p. 174); Yates's "positional advantage" ("New Light," p. 224); and Burton Watson's "advantageous circumstances" (Hsun-tzu: Basic Writings, Columbia University Press, New York, 1963, p. 57 and others). D. C. Lau, despite his incisive criticism, does not offer either a definition or a translation for the term in his review article.
Roger Ames's chapter devoted to shih traces the concept's evolution from the military thinkers (Sun-tzu and Sun Pin) through its adoption by the Legalists and into later, eclectic texts-such as the Huai-nan tzu-and provides extensive material and careful analysis. After noting the various meanings (and close relationship with
the term for form, hsing), he summarizes his findings as follows: "In the Sun Tzu, then, the term shih has at least three dimensions of meaning: (1) `circumstances' or `conditions'; (2) `physical disposition' in connection with the deployment of troops; and (3) occupation of a superior position and access to the potential advantages it confers" (Ames, The Art of Rulership, p. 68). Because of the apparently close connection between the concept and the strategic advantage derived from occupation of superior positions, Ames elects to use the interesting, if perhaps somewhat unknown, term "purchase." His analysis and arguments are well documented and readily available, so it is only necessary to note that he consciously discards "power" and "force" as being too vague; he believes that "shih usually refers to something quite different from the actual strength required to accomplish something" (note 11, p. 222).
From the foregoing it seems clear that the concept of shih is generally thought to entail the idea of advantage resulting from superior position. However, this aspect of positional advantage has perhaps been overemphasized, thus overlooking the essential role the element of mass (the army's forces) fulfills in creating impact. The paradigm example is Sun-tzu's analogy of a log or stone perched atop a hill, which, although temporarily stabilized, has great potential energy. According to the concepts of modern physics, the momentum that can be developed and thus the amount of force that can be transferred when a rolling stone collides with an object in its path depend on the original height; the final speed at the moment of impact (which will have been reduced from the theoretical maximum as it passes over objects and encounters resistance); and its weight. Clearly, a stone will transfer less energy at the moment of impact than a much larger boulder, and the total destructive potential is inherently related to the mass of the object.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 55
