21. The procedure for strategic analysis in the ancestral temple apparently assigned relative values to the various factors, including those discussed in this chapter. D. C. Lau (see "Some Notes on the Sun-tzu," pp. 331-332) suggests that counting sticks were used for each factor and then the totals taken. Some form of relative weighing was probably used because certain factors would be more significant than others, and a simple total is probably misleading. (The translation follows Liu Yin. Also compare STPF CS, p. 31; Ch'en's Chiao-shih, pp. 72-73; Kuan Feng's comments on the various factors in "Sun-tzu chun-shih che-hsiieh ssu-hsiang yen-chiu," pp. 71-75; and Yu Tsemin, "Shih-hsi Chung-kuo ku-tai to chan-lueh kai-nien," in Ping-chia shih-yiian [ed. Chun-shih li-shih yen-chiu-hui], Chun-shih k'o-hsueh ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1990, Vol. 2, pp. 221-226.) Giles errs in understanding "no points" as simply failing to perform any strategic calculations.
22. D. C. Lau ("Some Notes on the Sun-tzu," pp. 321-325) has pointed out that initial phrases in Sun-tzu passages are often captions or summaries. The five-character phrase introducing this section appears to be one of these; however, others are less clear. Traditionally, such introductory captions have simply been made the subject of a sentence, understanding a term such as "requires" to bridge the subject and its expansion (cf. ST CCCY, p. 86; STPF WC, p. 52; and STPF CS, p. 42). Our translations generally adopt Lau's insight wherever captions apparently precede material of any length.
23. Griffith (The Art of War, p. 73) and some modern Chinese editions (such as STPF WC, p. 53) insert a character meaning "to value" or "esteem" in this sentence, citing (in Griffith's case) the Seven Military Classics edition, However, neither the latter nor the ST SCC edition contains it; Liu Yin merely uses it in his commentary explaining the passage (cf. SWTCC WCCS, I:15A; and ST SCC, p. 23).
24. This and similar sentences, as discussed in the translator's introduction, are cited as evidence for the undeveloped state of offensive and siege warfare and the relative economic unimportance of cities.
25. This sentence has various interpretations. Generally, it is agreed that the campaign should be won with only a single mobilization and conscription, which would be reasonably possible given the nature and still-limited scope of warfare in Sun-tzu's era (cf. STPF SY, pp. 27-28). Not transporting provisions a third time is understood in two distinct ways: The army is provisioned only once-when about to depart-and thereafter it must plunder and forage, securing provisions on the march and in the field. Moreover, when the troops return they are not reprovisioned (cf. SWTCC WCCS, I:16B). A second, more common, and more logical interpretation holds that they are provisioned at the commencement of the campaign and supplied again on returning after recrossing the state's borders but must fend for themselves when in the field (cf. ST SCC, pp. 26-27; and SS AS, p. 54).
26. As noted in the general introduction, in the Early Chou period the "hundred surnames" were essentially the members of the aristocracy, the free men. As time passed and their status declined, they lost their privileged status and became the common people. The usage of the term in Sun-tzu reflects a period when the earlier meaning was becoming eclipsed but the term was probably not yet simply equivalent to "common people." From the context it is apparent that the hundred surnames farm the land, have the material wealth to pay taxes, and have the leisure to fulfill military obligations. Because the Art of War specifically uses this term, it is distinguished from terms that mean "the people" or the "common people" in the translation.
27. The bamboo slips have "market" for "army," with the phrase reading "the market nearby" ("the army" then being understood).
28. Military expeditions thus impose heavy direct and indirect burdens on the populace. Under the military taxation system (imposed in varying degrees and different forms) in Sun-tzu's era, hamlets and villages-depending on their classification, acreage tilled, and population-had to provide men to serve in the military effort and furnish weapons, equipment, and draft animals. If they could not obtain the weapons and supplies from their own inventory or stock, they had to be purchased. Moreover, the cost of such items for the village's own use concurrently escalated, depleting everyone's financial resources. Thus wartime inflation would strike them especially hard. (For further commentary, see Liu Yin, SWTCC WCCS I:17B; Ch'en, Chiao-shih, pp. 7879; and STPF WC, p. 64.)
29. The BS are somewhat different, reading "They will exhaust their strength on the central plains, while in the interior their houses will be empty" (cf. STPF SY, p. 30). The term for "empty" is actually the much stronger term "vacuous," or "void."
30. The BS have "six-tenths" rather than "seven-tenths."
31. The term translated as "large oxen" is literally "village oxen." The meaning seems to have originated with the reported practice of having each village of sixteen "well-fields" (with eight families to each of the latter) raise one ox, which presumably remained the ruler's property. It would be employed for military purposes when required. This might explain how such oxen were viewed as expenditures from the ruler's treasury rather than as a tax contribution from the people (cf. SWTCC WCCS, I:17B; and SS AS, p. 55).
32. "Profits," understood as profits for the state. However, the term also means "advantage," as in military advantage, and the sentence could equally well be understood as "What [stimulates them] to seize advantage from the enemy is material goods." Wang Hsi views this sentence as referring simply to the establishment of rewards as incentives because "If you cause the masses to covet profits and take them for themselves, then perhaps they will violate the constraints and [military] discipline" (ST SCC, p. 31).
33. The translation follows Liu Yin's commentary on the Seven Military Classics and expresses the traditional viewpoint-namely, that preserving the enemy's state is the primary objective; destroying it is only second best. This accords with Sun-tzu's overall emphasis on speedily wresting victory and subjugating one's enemies without engaging in battle if at all possible. (Modern Chinese commentators cite the example of Germany nourishing its rancor and hatred subsequent to World War I until militarily reasserting itself in World War II. See, for example, STPF WC, pp. 76-83.)
However, D. C. Lau ("Some Notes on the Sun-tzu," pp. 333-335) argues that the sentence should be translated as "It is best to preserve one's own state intact; to crush the enemy's state is only a second best." Although he advances a cogent argument, the traditional understanding appears more appropriate. Whether from a Confucian, Taoist, or Legalist perspective, the idea of gaining victory while inflicting the least amount of damage on the enemy is generally fundamental. Except perhaps when blindly exacting revenge, all commanders seek to minimize their own losses while maximizing the gains that can be realized. Occupying a thoroughly devastated state was never espoused by any ancient Chinese military thinker, although scorched earth policies were prominently exploited by "barbarian" tribes later in Chinese history, and mass slaughter accompanied by wartime rampages that resulted in the wholesale destruction of cities did characterize the late Warring States period.
34. Unit force levels are discussed in Appendix E.
35. These earthworks are variously identified as mounds for overlooking and assaulting the city and as protective walls that allow the besiegers shielded movement outside the city's walls, beneath potentially withering fire (cf. STPF SY, p. 44).
36. This continues the thought of the first passage because a ruler whose objectives include "preserving" others is more likely to be welcomed by the populace. (It also accords with the Confucian ideal of King Wu, previously noted.)
37. Following Liu Yin, SWTCC WCCS, 1:24B-25A; and SS AS, p. 74. D. C. Lau ("Some Notes on the Sun-tzu," p. 320) believes this sentence refers to dividing the enemy, which is equally possible. However, with double strength, as Liu Yin (following Ts'ao Ts'ao) notes, one can mount a frontal assault with one part to fix them and then employ a flanking (i.e., unorthodox) attack to overwhelm them. This understanding also seems more congruent with the next sentence, which still allows for engaging the enemy if you are merely
equal in strength. Forcing the enemy to divide his troops is a hallmark of Sun-tzu's thought. By dividing one's forces to launch a secondary front, the enemy would be forced to respond or face the loss of his other position. Thus he would also have to divide his forces, thereby accomplishing Sun-tzu's objective. (See Tu You's commentary and also the divergent views in ST SCC, p. 44, and Chu's analysis, STPF SY, pp. 47-49.)
38. Such as by assuming a desperate position to fight to the death or mounting a defense when flight would be appropriate.
39. As discussed in the translator's introduction, Sun-tzu is writing after the early rise of the professional commander and the increasing estrangement of many rulers from field command. The distinction between the forms of administration, discipline, and temperament appropriate to the civil and the martial is more pronounced in the other Military Classics, such as the Ssu-ma Fa. (For discussion, see the introductory section to the translation.) However, even here Sun-tzu is already warning of the dangers posed by inappropriately intermixing them.
Some editions have ssu-"direct" or "manage"-rather than t'ung-"the same as"-which resolves a somewhat awkward passage. However, both the Sung and Ming editions have t'ung, which can be understood as translated. (The next sentence also contains "same as [the civil]," which has been left untranslated because it can also be understood as the ruler uniting the authority for the joint command in his own hands. Cf. STPF SY, pp. 51-52; and STPF CS, p. 47. Also note the explanations in SS AS, pp.79-80.)
40. The BS have chip, "to know" or "to understand," rather than "recognizes."
41. The BS read "Thus, in warfare, one who knows them (the enemy) and knows himself..."
42. The BS contain two versions of this chapter, the second basically somewhat shorter than the first.
43. "Unconquerable" rather than "invincible" because the latter tends to connote a permanence inappropriate to fluctuating battlefield conditions. The invincible are never conquerable, whereas an army-due to its disposition, exploitation of terrain, and other factors-may be temporarily unconquerable.
44. The BS lack "in warfare."
45. Contrary to our usual practice, in this rare case the translation is based on the Han bamboo text rather than the traditional Seven Military Classics. The latter has perturbed commentators because of its apparent inconsistency with Sun-tzu's thought and the logical development of the paragraph. The traditional text simply reads: "If one defends then he is [or will be] insufficient; if he attacks then he will [have] a surplus." This is understood by commentators such as Liu Yin to mean that one defends because his strength is inadequate and attacks because his force is more than abundant (cf. SWTCC WCCS, 1:30). However, this contorts the grammar because it requires that the term be reversed: "If insufficient one defends" (cf. ST SCC, p. 56; STPF CS, p. 59. Also note Chu Chan's balanced appraisal, STPF SY, pp. 58-59).
46. The phrase "One who excels at offense" does not appear in the BS. The sentences would then be elided to read: "One who excels at defense buries himself away below the lowest depths of Earth and moves from above the greatest heights of Heaven." There are also unimportant, minor variations in the BS versions (cf. STPF CS, pp. 60-6 1; STPF SY, p. 60).
47. The BS lack "the ancients."
48. From the two BS versions, the original sentence apparently read: "Thus the battles of those who excelled did not have unorthodox victories, nor fame for wisdom, nor courageous achievements of courage" (cf. STPF CS, pp. 58-59; STPF SY, p. 60).
49. The BS have "Thus one who excels cultivates the Tao."
50. "Tao" is variously explained by the commentators as referring to such Confucian virtues as benevolence and righteousness-implemented to attract the people-or the military principles essential to being unconquerable. Cf. SWTCC WCCS, 1:32B; ST SCC, pp. 61-62.
51. The BS have cheng-"upright," "to rectify," "to regulate"-instead of cheng"government." However, as Chu Chun notes, the former could have been a loan for the latter because the two were somewhat interchangeable at that time. He therefore rejects the emendation suggested by the bamboo slips. The translation reflects the traditional text, but with the character for government understood as "regulator," rather than following commentaries that read it as "government" and produce a translation that reads "Therefore he is able to conquer defeated governments" (cf. STPF CS, p. 59; STPF SY, pp. 60-61; and ST SCC, pp. 61-62).
52. The caption for this sentence, literally "military fa," is considered to be a book title by Tadokoro Yoshiyuki (SSTY, p. 118) and Ch'en Ch'i-t'ien (Chiao-shih, p. 105), translatable as the "Art of Methods." This is the same title as the Art of War (which is best translated as "Military Methods," but we have adopted the traditional rendering). Fa encompasses the meanings of "laws" and "methods," with the latter more appropriate here. Rather than the title of a preexistent book or section of a work (which is also referred to in several other military classics), it should be understood as the fundamental methods for warfare, the measures that then follow (cf. STPF SY, p. 61; SS AS, p. 104). In the BS only the term fa appears, but Chu Chun retains "military methods" (STPF SY, p. 61).
53. "Measurement" is generally understood by the commentators as referring not only to the extent and dimensions of the terrain but also its classification according to the categories advanced in the various chapters that follow.
54. "Estimation" is variously described as referring to types of forces suitable for segments of the terrain, such as crossbowmen for the hills, or the quantities of materials required to sustain the battle. All these terms are not otherwise discussed in the Art of War, and their referents thus remain a matter of speculation.
55. The BS add "weighing" and "the people" to the traditional text, producing "weighing the victory of a combative people." Although this is accepted by Wu Jungsung (STPF CS, p. 58), Chu Chun appears correct in opting for the traditional text (and thereby avoiding an awkward grammatical construction). Cf. STPF SY, p. 61.
56. As D. C. Lau has pointed out ("Some Notes on the Sun-tzu," pp. 332-333), the use of hsing (shape, configuration) here is nearly identical to shih (strategic power).
57. The BS merely have Shih, "Strategic Power," for the title.
58. The terms translated as "configuration" and "designation" are hsing-"form" or "shape"-and ming-"name." Within the context of Sun-tzu's thought, the first seems to indicate the form or configuration of forces, as in formations and standard deployments. The second appears to refer to naming the units, designating them in some fashion-such as by flags with specific symbols. However, the earliest commentary, which is by the great general Ts'ao Ts'ao, equated hsing/form with flags and ming/name with gongs and drums. Liu Yin and others extrapolate on this thought, but some scholars-such as Tu Mu-identify hsing with deployments and ming with flags (see SWTCC WCCS, 1:35; ST SCC, pp. 66-67; STPF CS, pp. 67-68; and Wang Chientung's overview, STPF, WC, pp. 144-146). Robin D.S. Yates ("New Light," pp. 220222), based on his extensive research on the Mo-tzu, believes both terms refer to flags and that the historically and philosophically significant term hsing-ming originates with the military thinkers. (For an early discussion of hsing-ming-often translated as "performance and title"-as well as the issue of which character is appropriate for the term hsing, see Herrlee G. Creel, "The Meaning of Hsing-ming," reprinted in What is Taoism, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970, pp. 79-91.)
59. For "invariably" the BS have "entirely/altogether." (Cf. STPF CS, p. 65; and STPF SY, p. 74. Chu Chun [STPF SY] does not accept the revision.)
Unorthodox (ch'i) and orthodox (cheng) are discussed in the notes to the translator's introduction. An intriguing view is also advanced by Kuan Feng, equating the orthodox with movements designed to realize advantage and the unorthodox with actions that turn disadvantageous situations into advantageous ones. See "Sun-tzu chiin- shih che-hsiieh," pp. 81-82.
60. See note 17 for an explanation of the vacuous and substantial.
61. The BS have "Heaven and Earth" rather than just "Heaven."
62. The BS have "riv
ers and seas" or "Yellow River and the seas" rather than the "Yangtze and Yellow rivers."
63. The Sung and Ming editions have keng rather than fu. Although Sun-tzu does not continue the explicit comparison, all the commentators make it clear that the unorthodox and orthodox are mutually related just like these further examples of cyclic phenomena (SWTCC WCCS, I:36B; ST SCC, p. 69).
64. Although the character pien, "change," has generally been translated as "transformation," we have opted to preserve the (possibly artificial) distinction between pien ("change") and hua ("transformation") throughout our translation of the Seven Military Classics. As a tentative basis for employing "change" rather than "transformation," it might be observed that musical notes are not transformed in substance when producing new sounds, only changed in effect. Similarly, the composition of a military force is untransformed when its employment is changed from orthodox to unorthodox. However, this is a topic that requires further study, and an illuminating paper by Nathan Sivin should appear coincident with the publication of this book.
65. The BS version is slightly different; it lacks the character shun but adds another huan, so it would read: "The unorthodox and orthodox in circle [fashion] mutually produce each other, just like an endless circle" (cf. STPF CS, p. 65; and STPF SY, p. 75).
66. The BS lack "pent-up" (or "accumulated") water. Most translators use the term "torrent" to describe the flow, but the essential idea in the Sung/Ming edition is that water has been restrained and has accumulated and then-when suddenly releasedflows violently, turbulently, carrying even stones along. (This is not to deny that some very swift currents can tumble stones, but the pent-up water image is more appropriate to the idea of potential power unleashed and is used in many other military writingsperhaps quoted from Sun-tzu-in this fashion.)
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 57
