122. The BS lack "is said to be certain of victory," so the sentence is read as being linked with the start of the next passage (cf. STPF SY, p. 137).
123. Chu Chun points out that observing the presence of bubbles or foam on the river, which indicates rain upstream, exemplifies Sun-tzu's approach to analyzing and fathoming the enemy and battlefield situations. From the bubbles one can deduce that it has rained and can anticipate a surge in the river's flow and level. Such a surge could prove disastrous for an army encamped too close to the shore or caught suddenly in midstream (STPF SY, p. 137).
124. Although the commentators differ somewhat on the details of this and the following dangerous, natural configurations of terrain-several of which are concrete cases of Sun-tzu's more general classifications-their defining characteristics are clear (cf. SWTCC WCCS, II:38B-39A; ST SCC, pp. 151-153).
Heaven's Well is so named because it is a significant depression, such as a valley, surrounded on four sides by hills or mountains. It is dangerous because the runoff of rainwater from unexpected storms can inundate the lowlands.
125. Heaven's jail is a valley with steep hills or mountains on three sides. Forces that carelessly enter it can be easily bottled up, unable to ascend the sides to escape.
126. Heaven's Net refers to any area of extensive, dense growth-including heavy forests or dense vegetation (including jungle-like growth of underbrush and vines) that will obstruct the passage of vehicles or entangle the men.
127. Heaven's Pit refers to an area characterized by soft, probably muddy terrain, perhaps marked by wetlands, that will mire both men and vehicles.
128. Heaven's Fissure refers to terrain that suggests a fissure in the earth. Therefore, it encompasses long, narrow passages constrained by hills or forests from which an enemy might advantageously dominate the passage.
129. The BS have "small forests," or woods.
130. The BS have "which could conceal hidden (forces)" right after "entangled undergrowth" and "places of evildoers" at the end of the sentence. (Neither the STPF CS nor the STPF SY takes note of these.)
131. The occupation of ravines was of particular interest to the classical strategists (as evidenced by material in both the Six Secret Teachings and Wei Liao-tzu); this is generally seen as indicating weakness and the need to avail oneself of advantages of terrain.
132. Easily visible obstacles have been made deliberately detectable in order to create the suspicion of ambush or the emplacement of entangling devices and thereby beguile the ordinary commander to divert his forces to the enemy's advantage.
133. Presumably, to define the field of battle and pre-position for the infantry advance.
134. They lack military discipline, grumble and move about, are noisy, and obey orders reluctantly.
135. The translation follows the Seven Military Classics edition. Other editions (cf. ST SCC, pp. 161-162) are somewhat different, combining this and the following sen tence to read: "If they feed grain to the horses and eat meat while the army does not hang up its cooking utensils nor return to camp, they are an exhausted invader."
136. These are all signs that they are preparing to launch a desperate attack; otherwise, they would need the horses and draft animals as well as their cooking utensils. (In Chapter 11 Sun-tzu advises breaking the cooking utensils and similar measures to dramatically impress on the soldiers the hopelessness of their situation and increase their determination for a last-ditch engagement.)
137. The commander, through his ill-conceived measures, has lost control over them and fears they will revolt.
138. This sentence probably refers to one's own troops. That is, it is not important that you be more numerous than the enemy because if you are not, you merely have to conceive good tactical measures. The BS lack "esteem," which accordingly is understood. "Aggressively" or "in martial fashion" (wu) is thought here to refer to actions taken without basis, manifesting bravado without forethought (cf. ST SCC, pp. 164165; STPF SY, p. 147).
139. Another dimension to the civil-martial relationship.
140. Generally translated as "certain victory" or "certain conquest," the characters do not contain "victory/conquer." Rather, this is the term encountered previously for easily seizing the enemy (see note 16 above).
141. Configurations (hsing) of terrain, with their tactical implications. Unfortunately, the configurations are named rather than defined; parts of the text have apparently been lost, and none are preserved in the BS. Each configuration correlates the topography with the basic maneuvers possible in the situation on the assumption that two armies are confronting each other.
142. "Suspended," or "hung up." Although the text seems simple enough, there is a hidden question of perspective that the commentators have not noticed. If the situational analysis refers to the army's present position, when it goes forth it will not be able to return. Accordingly, the terrain it initially occupied would best be termed "irrecoverable." From the perspective of the position to which it advances, it becomes "hung up." Presumably, the "suspended configuration" encompasses both the initial and final positions across the terrain. (Cf. ST SCC, pp. 169-170; STPF SY, p. 154; SS AS, p. 246; and STPF CS, p. 105.)
143. "Stalemated" describes the tactical situation, although the exact character is chih-"branch," or "to support." Both sides are supported, so they are in a stalemate. The commentators suggest a lengthy standoff (cf. ST SCC, p. 170).
144. This might also be understood as to "draw off (our forces) to make them (i.e., the enemy) depart." That is, by withdrawing one compels the enemy to depart from his entrenched, advantageous position. Withdrawing one's forces and departing is the means through which the enemy's departure is accomplished in either case, but the conclusion-of stimulating them to movement-is implicit in the text translation and is necessary for the next sentence-striking when the enemy is half out.
145. "Constricted" configurations are generally described as extensive mountain valleys. Others also identify them with river or lake crossings. (Cf. SWTCC WCCS, II:48B; STPF SY, p. 154; STPF CS, p. 106; and ST SCC, p. 171.) Furthermore, the commentators generally understand the sentence as referring to occupying the mouth; however, there is no textual reason to so restrict it because the sentence simply advises to "fully" occupy it. (By leaving the entrance unobstructed, enemy forces can be lured into the killing zone created by deploying forces on both sides throughout the valley, as in several famous historical battles.)
146. "Precipitous," invoking the image of steep mountain gorges or ravines ("ravines" being the translation in other contexts). It is difficult terrain to traverse; therefore, occupying the heights is paramount. (Cf. SWTCC WCCS, II:48B, STPF SY, p. 154; ST SCC, pp. 171-172.)
147. Following Liu Yin, taking "strategic power being equal" as an additional condition. (See SWTCC WCCS, II: 49a. Cf. STPF CS, p. 106.)
148. The odds are so insurmountable that any sort of direct attack can only result in failure and the retreat of the forces so foolishly flung at the enemy (SWTCC WCCS, II:49B).
149. Following SWTCC WCCS and ST SCC. The T'ung-tien has "estimating the fullest extent of the difficult and easy, advantageous and harmful, distant and near" (cf. ST SCC, p. 176; and Lau, "Some Notes on the Sun-tzu," p. 328). "Ravines" is the same character translated previously as "precipitous" for the configurations of terrain.
150. Here-unlike the earlier passage, which is open to some interpretation-the text clearly means "with" rather than "for" him (refer to note 5 above).
151. Following the Sung, Ming, and SCC editions. However, some others have "inexhaustible" rather than "complete" (cf. STPF SY, p. 153; SS AS, pp. 261-262).
152. The nine terrains analyzed in this chapter appear in two sequences, with some variation. In addition, some of the terms appeared previously in Chapters 8 and 10; others are new but apparently overlap with earlier configurations. This suggests that essential materials have been lost, the text has been corrupted, or the concepts were in a state of flux and not yet rigidly defined.
153. Following Giles and Griffith, who use the appropriate term "dispersive." The commentators generally understand "dispersive" as referring to the tendency of the men, while fighting within their native state, to be thinking of their homes and families and to be inclined to return there. Consequently, they are neither unified nor aroused to a fighting spirit. (Cf. SWTCC WCCS, II:56A; ST SCC, p. 182; and STPF SY, p. 168.) Note that later in the chapter the commander must unify their will on dispersive terrain (before invading enemy territory), and Sun-tzu also advises against engaging the enemy on dispersive terrain. This was perhaps a strategy designed to vitiate an invader's strength before engaging him in battle.
154. Apparently, the soliders still do not regard the enterprise too seriously and continue to think about home and family. Because it remains relatively easy to withdraw but dangerous to forge ahead, it is termed "light" terrain. (Cf. SWTCC WCCS, II:56Aa; STPF SY, p. 168; and ST SCC, p. 183. Griffith uses "frontier," Giles "facile.")
155. This is ground for which one contends, therefore "contentious" terrain. (Giles also translates as "contentious," Griffith as "key ground," and it is unquestionably a strategic point.) The configurations of terrain previously warned against in the last chapter are probably prime objectives under this category because of their great tactical potential if they can be seized and exploited. (Cf. ST SCC, pp. 183-184; STPF SY, p. 169.)
156. In Chapter 10 this is termed "accessible" terrain. Army movement is unhampered.
157. Following Griffith's apt term, "focal." Presumably, this is territory in which major highways intersect and is accessible to major powers on various sides. Its occu pation is the key to controlling vast territory. (See note 110 above, where the term first appears. Also compare ST SCC, p. 185; and STPF SY, p. 170.)
158. Griffith translates as "serious." This term contrasts with "light terrain," the severity of their situation now being clearly apparent to the soldiers. Their minds are unified, their courage united. (Cf. SWTCC WCCS, II:57A; and ST SCC, pp. 185-186.) Chu Chun sees the critical element as the cessation of food supplies, with the soldiers suddenly having to forage and plunder to sustain themselves, as stated slightly later in the chapter. This weighs heavily on them (STPF SY, pp. 170-171).
159. This seems to also encompass Heaven's Pit and Heaven's Net. The term is first discussed in Chapter 8.
160. "Constricted" is the same term as that used for one of the configurations in Chapter 10. (It can also mean a "gorge.")
161. The term for "encircled" can also be translated as "besieged" in other contexts and clearly carries such implications (see ST SCC, p. 186). The emphasis here is on the necessity to pass through a narrow opening or along a narrow passage, which constrains the flow of men and materials and thereby makes them vulnerable to being surrounded and attacked by even a small force.
162. Sun-tzu consistently advocates exploiting "ground of death" because when troops are deployed on it, the situation forces them to fight valiantly. The commentators think it would be terrain with solid obstacles to the front-such as mountainsand water to the rear, preventing a withdrawal. (Cf. ST SCC, pp. 187-188; and STPF SY, pp. 171-172.)
163. If you cannot occupy it first, do not attack an entrenched enemy. (SWTCC WCCS, II:58A; and ST SCC, p. 189.)
164. In Chapter 8 it states, "Unite with your allies on focal terrain."
165. In Chapter 8 it states, "Do not encamp on entrapping terrain."
166. Chapter 8: "Make strategic plans for encircled terrain."
167. Some commentators take this as referring to "uniting with the enemy in battle." However, the general import of the paragraph does not restrict the techniques stricly to combat measures.
168. There is disagreement over what is actually obtained without being sought (cf. ST SCC, p.187).
169. The BS have "deaths" instead of "lives," but the difference is ignored by the STPF CS and STPF SY.
170. This phrase, which is implicit in any case, appears in the BS.
171. Following Chao Pen-hsueh, Sun-tzu-shu chiao-chieh yin-lei, II:36B. Liu Yin (SWTCC WCCS, II:64B-65A) cites one commentator who emends the character translated as "fetter" to "release," understanding the sentence to refer to "releasing the horses."
172. Some commentators incorrectly equate "hard and soft" with "strong and weak." The two pairs are clearly distinguished in the Military Classics.
173. Literally, "keeping them stupid." Chu Chun believes this merely refers to preserving all plans in total secrecy rather than being a policy to keep the soldiers stupid (STPF SY, p.176).
174. Especially the enemy.
175. Analogous with releasing the trigger of a cocked crossbow. In some editions, such as the ST SCC (p. 203), the following sentence appears: "They burn their boats and smash their cooking pots."
176. This paragraph again discusses the nine types of terrain, but from the perspective of acting as an invader. Some commentators believe it is redundant or erroneous, but others-such as the modern military historian General Wei Ju-lin-stress the difference between principles for general combat and those for invading another's territory (see ST CCCY, p. 222-224).
177. The BS are somewhat different: "If you have strongholds behind you and the enemy before you, it is `fatal terrain.' If there is no place to go, it is `exhausted terrain."'
178. Some commentators take this as referring to the enemy's rear, but the context of the preceding statements indicates it should refer to actions taken with regard to one's own army. (Cf. STPF CS, p. 115; and STPF WC, p. 370.) The BS have "I will cause them not to remain."
179. The actions to be taken for four of the terrains are somewhat reversed in the BS. In this case the BS have the conclusion to the next sentence: "I solidify our alliances."
180. The BS have "I focus on what we rely on."
181. The BS have "I race our rear elements forward."
182. Liu Yin explains this as meaning that the general closes off any openings deliberately offered by the enemy to lure his forces out of their encirclement (SWTCC WCCS, II:69A). Leaving such an opening was a common way to keep the defenders from mounting a last-ditch, pitched defense. (Both the Six Secret Teachings and the Wei Liao-tzu discuss this technique.)
183. The BS preface the sentence with a fragment that apparently means "It is the nature of the feudal lords...."
184. Reading pa wang as two distinct terms rather than "hegemonic king" (cf. STPF CS, p. 115).
185. This is sometimes understood as not contending with others to form alliances, which would miss the main point of the passage.
186. This sentence is somewhat problematic. Most of the commentators interpret it in the light of Sun-tzu's policy of being deceptive, and in fact the character for "details" might also be an error for a similar character meaning "to deceive." Thus they understand it as "accord with and pretend to follow the enemy's intentions." (Cf. SWTCC WCCS, II:73A; ST SCC, p. 212.) The translation essentially follows STPF SY, p. 184. Wu Ju-sung (STPF CS, p. 115) understands it as simply finding out the details of the enemy's intentions.
187. Literally, "grind (it out)" in the temple, which presumably means somberly work out the plans and estimations. The SCC text has "incite" rather than "grind." (SWTCC WCCS, II: 73B-74A; ST SCC, p. 214. Compare STPF SY, p. 183.)
188. The fifth objective is variously interpreted as shooting flaming arrows into an encampment, burning their weapons, or attacking their formations, as translated (cf. ST SCC, p. 218).
189. When the deceit is discovered, they are murdered or executed.
190. The BS have "relationship" rather than "affairs."
191. The BS add "Shuai Shih-pi in the Hsing. When Yen arose, they had Su Ch'in in Ch'i." Because Su Ch'in was active in the second half of the fourth century B.c.-al- most two centuries after Sun Wu presumably advanced his tactics-this is obviously a later accretion.
Wu-tzu
Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Books
Notes to the Translator's Introduction
1. Lord
Shang reportedly studied in Wei and served as a household tutor around four decades after Wu Ch'i left. Accordingly, he may have been influenced by Wu Ch'i's thought and political heritage. See WT CCCY, p. 1; Kuo Mo-jo, Kuo Mo-jo ch'uan-chi, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1982, Vol. 1, pp. 506, 526 (the "Shu Wu Ch'i" chapter in the original 1943 work, Ch'ing-t'ung shih-tai).
2. Although the Harvard-Yenching Index Series contains references to Wu Ch'i in several works, the most important are found in the Han Fei-tzu, Lu-shih ch'un-ch'iu, Chan-kuo We, Huai-nan tzu, and Shuo yuan. However, little material from the actual text is preserved in these or other books, and only a handful of passages are found in the T'ai-p'ing yu-lan (hereafter TPYL).
3. For example, see T'ao Chi-heng's comment as recorded in the Wei-shu t'ungk'ao, entry for the Wu-tzu, p. 802. Typical condemnatory remarks deprecating Wu Ch'i's lack of virtue and reliance on harsh realism are found in the Huai-nan tzu, 9:21A and 13:7A, and in his Shih chi biography (translated below). However, as Kuo Mo-jo has pointed out, most of these were probably fabricated by his detractors because he was committed to the values of Confucianism as well as to creating a well-ordered state. See "Shu Wu Ch'i," pp. 527-528.
4. The most systematic analysis of the Wu-tzu's composition date and authorship is found in Li and Wang's WT CS, pp. 3-12. In brief, they attribute the book to Wu-tzu himself, with allowances for serious losses, revisions, and accretions across the years and the recognition that his disciples obviously penned the portions describing his activities. Justification for this view is claimed from both historical references and the book's content and (somewhat rearranged) can be summarized as follows:
First, the works of Sun-tzu and Wu-tzu were known to be in wide circulation in the late Warring States period, based on Han Fei-tzu's comment that "Within the borders everyone speaks about warfare, and everywhere households secretly store away the books of Sun and Wu." Furthermore, his book was obviously studied and discussed throughout the ages, including by Han dynasty writers and famous Three Kingdoms' generals. (Ssu-ma Ch'ien makes a comment similar to that of Han Fei-tzu [which is found at the end of Wu Ch'i's translated biography in the translator's introduction], thereby attesting to the Wu-tzu's circulation in the Former Han dynasty.) The fact that it was the focus of such attention provides evidence for the book's continuous transmission through the centuries, starting with the original work composed by Wu Ch'i and his disciples. (Constant interest should have ensured that the book was preserved in exemplary condition, but the bibliographic descriptions in successive dynasties indicate that either a major portion was lost or it was continually edited and revised, perhaps deliberately producing a very compact edition.)
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 59
