The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China

by Ralph D Sawyer

  165. An outspoken, apparently irascible but highly capable and successful general and administrator in the early T'ang.

  166. Another high-ranking, meritorious official and general who eventually-apparently out of dissatisfaction-became caught up in the internecine intrigues between Ch'eng-ch'ien and Li Tai to succeed the T'ai-tsung and was executed. He was particularly noted for his tenacity and success in the desert campaign against Karakhoja and the T'u-yu-hun (in conjunction with Li Ching).

  167. As a strategist and commander, Han Hsin had been among those instrumental in Liu Pang's rise to power; but that same talent and success endangered him, and he eventually became entangled in rebellion. (See his biography in Burton Watson's translation of the Shih chi, "The Biography of the Marquis of Huai-yin," Records of the Grand Historian of China, Vol. 1, pp. 208-232.)

  As a commoner, P'eng Yueh gathered a band of men who sought to capitalize on Ch'in's disintegration. Eventually, he supported Liu Pang, and after several years of varying degrees of success, participated in the decisive battle against Hsiang Yu. Finally, he suffered the inescapable fate of the successful-he was accused of plotting to revolt and was executed. (See his biography in Watson, Records of the Grand Historian of China, "The Biographies of Wei Pao and P'eng Yueh," Vol. 1, pp. 191-195.)

  Hsiao Ho began as a minor, but apparently conscientious and successful official under the Ch'in. His position allowed him to assist Liu Pang, and he later governed the Han dynasty's primary area of recruitment and supply, sustaining Liu Pang through his darkest days (thus the reference later in the text to his skill in utilizing the water transport system). Among his other achievements was seizing the charts and maps of the empire when Liu Pang first entered the Ch'in palaces, guaranteeing vital strategic information when others were greedily fighting over riches and jewels. Ironically, in his efforts to avoid even the appearance of becoming a threat to the emperor, he was eventually imprisoned. (See his biography, "The Hereditary House of Prime Minister Hsiao," in Watson, Records of the Grand Historian of China, Vol. 1, pp. 125-133.)

  168. Liu Pang-eventually Han Kao-tsu-and Hsiang Yu contended for the empire following the destruction of the Ch'in dynasty in perhaps the most famous conflict in Chinese history between two men of dissimilar backgrounds, talents, and personalities. (For background, see Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, eds., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. I: The Ch'in and Han Empires, Cambridge University Press, London, 1986, pp. 110-119; and Watson, Records of the Grand Historian of China, Vol. 1, "The Basic Annals of Hsiang Yu," pp. 37-74, and "The Basic Annals of Emperor Kao-tsu," pp.77-119. )

  169. Ch'en Ping, a strategist who switched his allegiance to Liu Pang after Hsiang Yu failed to employ him, had significant tactical impact.

  170. Ts'ao Ts'an served as a minor police official in Kao-tsu's native area and staunchly supported him from the early days. He participated in numerous battles and major campaigns and later held high civil positions. (His biography is found in Watson, The Records of the Grand Historian of China, Vol. 1, "The Hereditary House of Prime Minister Ts'ao," pp. 421-426.)

  Fan K'uai and Kuan Ying both rose from menial backgrounds to become closely associated with Liu Pang very early in the revolt and dramatically assisted his campaign to gain control of All under Heaven. (Their biographies appear together in the Shih chi, chiian 95.)

  171. The Six States Ch'in had systematically extinguished, as discussed in the general introduction. Members of their vanquished royalty still harbored hopes of restoring their houses to their former glory, and the inhabitants had closer emotional ties and regional identification with their local states than with an abstract empire. The restoration of these former states and the question of reestablishing feudal kingdoms as regional bastions for imperial support were heatedly debated topics and adumbrated events in the history of the Former Han. (There were similar echoes in the T'ang.)

  In the "chopsticks incident" that follows in the text, Chang Liang reportedly borrowed Liu Pang's chopsticks when the latter was at dinner. It might be imagined that he thereby illustrated the dangers of reestablishing the Six States because without them, the future emperor suddenly lacked the means to eat and should have realized dramatically the inherent dangers in restoring diffuse power bases. However, the historical record offers no explanation; perhaps, as Watson suggests, he somehow used them to punctuate his points. (Possibly there were enough chopsticks to "score" the estimation of the various factors raised in his discussion, as in Sun-tzu's first chapter, "Initial Estimations.") For the incident, see Watson's translation of Chang Liang's biography, Records of the Grand Historian, Vol. 1, "The Heriditary House of the Marquis of Liu," pp. 143-144.

  172. Fan Tseng skillfully plotted military strategy for Hsiang Yu, providing him several times with opportunities to slay Liu Pang. However, he eventually lost favor as the result of deliberate disinformation and became disaffected. (For the latter, see ibid., Vol. 1, "Prime Minister Ch'en," pp. 157-158. He is also mentioned numerous times in the Annals cited in note 168, above.)

  173. Two other famous generals and confidants from Liu Pang's early days.

  174. The extant Six Secret Teachings includes four chapters that focus on the qualifications, selection, and commissioning of generals. The quotation, which is slightly different, comes from Chapter 21, "Appointing the General." (For the types of axes used, see the notes to the original translation.)

  175. The ceremony sketchily preserved in the Six Secret Teachings does not contain any reference to pushing the hub of the general's chariot (understanding "ku" as "hub" rather than "wheel" or "axle," based on Hayashi Minao, "Chugoku sen-Shin jidai no basha," Toho Gakuho 29 [1959], pp. 216-222).

  176. The practices or techniques of yin and yang encompassed classifying natural phenomena, including astronomical events and stellar objects, within a matrix of auspicious and inauspicious indications. (Some of this material survives in the traditional almanacs published annually in several Asian countries.) In addition, various divinatory practices were integral to these beliefs, including the interpretation of cracks induced on tortoise shells and animal bones and the use of milfoil stalks to cast the I Ching hexagrams.

  177. Within the cyclic classification of days, one day was considered particularly baleful for initiating military engagements; it was a "going to perish" day. In the inci dent raised, when advised that he was about to act on such an inauspicious day, the future emperor retorted, "We will `go' forth, and they will `perish'; how is this not advantageous?" (The quotation marks are added to emphasize the word play by which he contemptuously dismissed such beliefs.)

  178. This battle marked a dramatic reversal of fortune for Ch'i because through it, Ch'i extricated itself from near-extinction and went on to defeat Yen's forces and restore its own ruling house. T'ien Tan, who had been besieged at Chi-mo-one of the two strongholds to which Ch'i had been reduced by the onslaught of forces from five other states-managed to have Yueh I, commander of the joint expedition, removed through a subterfuge. He then used "fire oxen"-in what was to become a famous historical stratagem-to break out of confinement. Up until that moment, Yen believed Ch'i was withering away in a hopeless situation and thus never expected a bold counterattack. T'ien Tan had the thousand oxen within the fortress decorated with multicolored images of dragons and then affixed knife and sword blades to the horns. Thereafter, they tied oil-soaked kindling to the tails, breached holes in the walls, and in the middle of the night-while setting up a great clamor-drove the oxen toward the enemy's encampment, simultaneously igniting the kindling to force the animals to race wildly about in terror. Naturally, the Yen forces were startled, terrified, overwhelmed, and then easily massacred by the five thousand experienced troops-the final remnants of Ch'i's forces-that pressed the attack. (These tactics and their implications are discussed in our upcoming work on famous battles within the historical context of military development in ancient China.)

  179. It seems clear that T'ien Tan accorded with popular belie
fs (even though he deliberately manipulated them to his own ends), whereas the T'ai Kung dramatically ignored them and thus went contrary to them. However, Liu Yin understands it in contrary fashion, for unknown reasons (LWK WCCS, II:21B).

  180. Again, San I-sheng's actions-which expressed his desire to discover their prospects before initiating action-should thus be in accord with the common practice of divining before an undertaking, and the T'ai Kung's bold course should be contrary to the use of divination to assess prospects and make decisions. However, Ts'eng Chen understands it in opposite fashion (cf. LWK CCCY, p. 229).

  181. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 4, "Military Disposition."

  182. The WCCS edition has Chin attacking Ch'in, as translated, and Liu Yin's notes on the engagement. However, other editions vary, and the editors of LWK CC would emend the text to have Ch'in attack Chin. (Cf. LWK WCCS, 111:23; LWK CC, p. 64.)

  183. Ssu-ma Fa, "Obligations of the Son of Heaven."

  184. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 7, "Military Combat." The order is reversed from the original.

  185. Ibid., Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance."

  186. Ibid., Chapter 5, "Strategic Military Power." The original has shih rather than pen, "main force."

  187. The section demarked by brackets does not appear in the Ming edition of the Seven Military Classics and is restored from the Sung edition.

  188. A sentence found in the Hsi tz'u, one of the famous commentaries deriving from the Confucian school that is appended to the I Ching.

  189. Mencius, IIB:1. The terms appear at the very beginning of the chapter, introducing a rather interesting passage that emphasizes the importance of man over Heaven and Earth. The initial sentence reads, "The seasons of Heaven are not as [important] as the advantages of Earth [terrain]; advantages of Earth are not as [important] as harmony among men."

  190. Yueh I, a man of Yen, was commander of the joint forces of the five states that attacked and largely vanquished Ch'i. He was eventually displaced though T'ien Tan's clever use of spies, and his victories were reversed (see note 178, above).

  191. One of the joint commanders of the Chin forces at the Fei River battle in which they defeated Fu Chien and his Ch'in armies.

  192. This saying appears in Pai Ch'i's biography in the Shih chi and probably does not stem from the Taoists (cf. LWK CCCY, p. 243).

  Notes to the Appendixes

  Appendix A: The Chariot

  1. See Hayashi Minao, "Chugoku sen-Shin jidai no basha," Toho Gakuho 29 (1959), p. 225.

  2. Cf. Edward L. Shaughnessy, "Historical Perspectives on the Introduction of the Chariot into China," HJAS, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1988), p. 190.

  3. Cf. ibid., pp. 192 and 208.

  4. Cf. Cheng Te-k'un, Chou China, W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd., Cambridge, 1963, pp. 265-272.

  5. Cf. Stuart Piggott, "Chariots in the Caucasus and in China," Antiquity 48 (1974), pp. 16-24.

  6. Cf. Shih Chang-ju, "Yin-hsu tsui-chin chih chung-yao fa-hsien," Chung-kuo k'ao-ku hsueh-pao, No. 2 (1947), p. 20.

  7. See, among others, Shaughnessy, "Historical Perspectives," p. 198.

  8. Cf. Ku Chieh-kang and Yang Hsiang-k'uei, "Chung-kuo ku-tai ch'e-chan k'ao- lueh," Tung-fang tsa-chih, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1937), pp. 52-53; and also the descriptions in the Six Secret Teachings.

  9. Cf. Shaughnessy, "Historical Perspectives," pp. 199, and 213-221; Herrlee G. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970; p.271; and Hayashi, "Kasha," p. 278.

  10. Cf. Ku and Yang, "Ch'e-chan," pp. 39-54.

  11. Cf. Shaughnessy, "Historical Perspectives," p. 217; for Creel's doubts about barbarians employing chariots, see Statecraft, p. 266.

  12. Cf. Cheng, Chou, p. 266; Kawamata Masanori, "Higashi Ajia no kodai sensha to Nishi-Ajia," Koshi Shunju 4 (1987), pp. 38-58; for a dissenting opinion, see Shih Chang-ju, "Yin-shu," p. 22.

  13. Cf. Ku and Yang, "Ch'e-chan," p. 49.

  14. Cf. ibid., p. 44; and Shaughnessy, "Historical Perspectives," pp. 224-225.

  15. Cf. Creel, Statecraft, pp. 262-269.

  16. Cf. Yang Hung, "Ch'e-chan yu chan-ch'e," WW 1977, No. 5, pp. 82-90 (also incorporated into his book, Chung-kuo ku-ping-ch'i lun-ts'ung, Wen-wu ch'u-pan- she, Peking, 1980).

  17. Cf. Shaughnessy, "Historical Perspectives," pp. 222-223.

  18. Cf. Yang Hung, Ku-ping-ch'i, p. 126; Li Xueqin, Eastern Zhou and Qin Civilizations, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985, pp. 198 and 272.

  19. See Creel, Statecraft, pp. 256-262.

  20. Cf. Yang Hung, Ku-ping-ch'i, p. 100.

  Appendix B: The Horse and Cavalry

  1. Creel, Statecraft, note 61, pp. 262-263.

  2. Shaughnessy, "Historical Perspectives," p. 227.

  3. See Shih, "Yin-shu," pp. 21-22.

  4. Cf. Chan Li and Chou Shih-ch'u, "Shih-t'an Yang-chia-wan Han-wu ch'i-ping- yung," WW 1977, No. 10, p. 22.

  5. E. G. Pulleyblank, "Tribe and State: Prehistoric and Historic Times," in The Origins of Chinese Civilization (ed. David N. Keightley), University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983, p. 450.

  6. W. Perceval Yetts, "The Horse: A Factor in Early Chinese History," Eurasia Septentionalis Antiqua 9 (1934), p. 236.

  7. These passages are discussed in the footnotes to the translations. For a summary of the current view, including comments on Sun Pin's brief statements, see Chauncey S. Goodrich's article, "Riding Astride and the Saddle in Ancient China," HJAS, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1984), pp. 280-281.

  8. Pulleyblank, "Tribe and State," p. 450.

  9. Cf. Yang Hung, Ku-ping-ch'i, pp. 28-29.

  10. Cf. Yetts, "The Horse," pp. 231-236; Herrlee G. Creel, "The Role of the Horse in Chinese History," in Creel, What is Taoism and Other Studies in Chinese Cultural History, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970, pp. 160-186; and Friedrich Hirth, "The Story of Chang K'ien, China's Pioneer in Western Asia," JAOS 37 (1917), pp. 89-116.

  11. Cf. Chan and Chou, "Han-mu," pp. 26-27.

  Appendix C: Armor and Shields

  1. A summary based primarily on Yang Hung, Ku-ping-ch'i, pp. 4-96; Chou Wei, Chung-kuo ping-ch'i shih-kao, Ming-wen shu-chu, Taipei, 1980, pp. 169ff.; and Albert E. Dien, "A Study of Early Chinese Armor," Artibus Asiae 43 (1981-1982), pp. 566.

  Appendix D: The Sword

  1. See, among many others, Yang Hung, Ku-ping-ch'i, p. 93; Noel Barnard, "Did the Swords Exist," EC, No. 4 (1978-1979), p. 62; Kuo Yu-kou, "Yin Chou to ch'ingt'ung wu-ch'i," KK, No. 2 (1961), pp. 114-115; and Max Loehr, "The Earliest Chinese Swords and the Akinakes," Oriental Art 1 (1948), pp. 132-136.

  2. Cf. Barnard, "Did the Swords Exist," p. 62.

  3. T'ung En-cheng, "Wo-kuo Hsi-nan ti-ch'u ch'ing-t'ung-chien to yen-chiu," KK 1977, No. 2, pp. 35-55. Also see Cho-yun Hsu and Katheryn M. Linduff, Western Chou Civilization, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1988, pp. 77-81.

  4. Yang Hung, Ku-ping-ch'i, pp. 125-126.

  5. Cf. Chou Wei, Chung-kuo ping-ch'i ship-kao, pp. 88-98.

  6. Cf. Yang Hung, Ku-ping-ch'i, p. 126.

  7. Cf. Kwang-chih Chang, "The Chinese Bronze Age: A Modern Synthesis," in Wen Fong, ed., The Great Bronze Age of China, Knopf, New York, 1980, p. 45; Chang, Chung-kuo ch'ing-t'ung ship-tai, Chung-wen Ta-hsueh ch'u-pan-she, Hong Kong, 1982, p. 13.

  8. Cf. Emma C. Bunker, "The Steppe Connection," EC 9-10 (1983-1985), pp. 7273.

  9. Cf. Loehr, "The Earliest Chinese Swords," pp. 132-142.

  10. Cf. Chou Wei, Chung-kuo ping-ch'i shih-kao, pp. 112-116.

  11. Cf. Yang Hung, Ku-ping-ch'i, p. 129.

  12. Hayashi Minao, Chugoku In-Shu jidai no buki, Kyoto Daigaku Jimbun Kagaku Kenkyosho, Kyoto, 1972, pp. 199-236.

  13. Chou Wei, Chung-kuo ping-ch'i shih-kao, pp. 109-157. The number of articles that have appeared in PRC archaeological publications since 1970 is too great to list in detail. However, a number of important ones are listed in the bibliography.

  Appendix E: Military Organization

  1. Tu Cheng-sheng, "Chou-tai feng-chien chieh-t'i-hou to chun-c
heng hsin-chih- hsu-pien-hu ch'i-min to yen-chiu chih-erh," BIHP, Vol. 55, No. 1 (1984), p. 75.

  2. Yang K'uan, "Ch'un-ch'iu Chan-kuo-chien feng-chien to chun-shih tsu-chih ho chan-cheng to pien-hua," Li-shih chiao-hsueh, No. 4 (1954), pp. 7-8.

  3. For discussion, see K. C. Chang, Shang Civilization, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1980, pp. 195-196; Hsu and Linduff, Western Chou Civilization, p. 85.

  4. Cf. Yen I-p'ing, "Yin-Shang ping-chih," Chung-kuo wen-tzu, NS 7 (1983), pp. 24-28; and Chung-kuo chun-shih-shih, Vol. 4: Ping-fa, Chieh-fang-chun ch'u-pan- she, Peking, 1988, pp. 7-13.

  5. Cf. Yen I-p'ing, "Yin-Shang ping-chih," p. 38.

  6. Hsu and Linduff, Western Chou Civilization, p. 164.

  7. Lao Kan, "Chan-kuo shih-tai to chan-cheng fang-fa," BIHP 37 (1967), p. 48.

  8. Chin Hsiang-heng, "Ts'ung chia-ku pu-ts'u yen-chiu Yin Shang chun-lu-chung chih wang-tsu san-hsing san-shih," Chung-kuo wen-tzu 52 (1974), pp. 7B-14A; Pingfa, p. 14. Chin believes chun represents an expansion of shih and that the Chou only used the term shih.

  9. Tu Cheng-sheng, "Hsin-chih-hsu," p. 78.

  10. Cf. ibid., pp. 75 and 78.

  11. Cf. Ping-fa, pp. 15-25, for a discussion of basic deployment principles. Additional comments are found in the footnotes to the translations.

  12. Cf. Yen I-p'ing, "Yin-Shang ping-chih," p. 24. A decade-based system is found in the Wei Liao-tzu, as discussed in the footnotes to the translation.

  13. For Western terms, see John I. Alger, Definitions and Doctrine of the Military Art, Avery Publishing Group, Wayne, N.J., 1985.

  14. Cf. Chang, Shang Civilization, p. 195.

  15. Cf. Lao Kan, "Chan-kuo shih-tai," p. 47.

  16. Cf. Tu Cheng-sheng, "Hsin-chih-hsu," p. 92. The term designates the armies of the left, center, and right; but when more than three armies are fielded, then it refers to the left and right flanks and the center force, depending on how they are integrated and commanded.