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Henry Sidgwick- Eye of the Universe

Page 15

by Bart Schultz

be unstable. Manuscripts are doubtful, records may be unauthentic, criticism is

  feeble, historical facts must be left uncertain. Even in like manner my own personal

  experience is most limited, perhaps even most delusive: what have I seen, what do

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  I know? Nor is my personal judgement a thing which I feel any great satisfaction

  in trusting. My reasoning powers are weak; my memory doubtful and confused;

  my conscience, it may be, callous or vitiated. . . . I see not what other alternative any sane and humble-minded man can have but to throw himself upon the great

  religious tradition. But I see not either how any upright and strict dealer with

  himself – how any man not merely a slave to spiritual appetites, affections and

  wants – any man of intellectual as well as moral honesty – and without the former

  the latter is but a vain thing – I see not how anyone who will not tell lies to himself, can dare to affirm that the narrative of the four Gospels is an essential integral

  part of that tradition.

  Arthur Hugh Clough, The Religious Tradition

  This Socratic prelude to the discussion of Sidgwick’s struggles with reli-

  gious faith is important because, after all, as Sidgwick agonized over the

  corrosive effects of religious doubt and skepticism in his own time, his

  chief anthropological and sociological sources for thinking about the role

  and meaning of religious belief were derived from his classical training.

  Socrates and the fate of Athenian democracy were ever before his mind,

  much more so than any other historical precedent – say, the period of

  the Reformation or the Enlightenment, or even the French Revolution,

  important though that undoubtedly was. And both Mill and the Apostles

  would have inspired him to deploy this historical material for the cause of

  reason and reform, however acute his historical sensibilities might have

  been. And they were very acute.

  It is very helpful to think of Sidgwick as taking his point of departure in

  ethics from the (Apostolic) Socratic method, while trying to develop the

  more constructive side of it, just as Plato and Aristotle had done. Unlike

  Plato and Aristotle, however, Sidgwick was never able to convince himself

  that philosophy could deliver ultimate and final ethical truth. Progress, yes,

  but clear and certain truth, no. This led to considerable worrying on his

  part, since he seemed always in danger of lapsing back into a naive Socratic

  acceptance of common sense in the large, while treating it to merciless

  critical dissection in the small. And science itself, the chief evidence of

  intellectual progress, often seemed to threaten rather than to buttress the

  claims for ethical progress. In short, he was often on the verge of doubting

  the meaning of progress altogether, which was a most heretical thought

  for an era so apt to confuse evolution with progress, and a most painful

  one for an individual whose mission was to impart truth to the rustic

  brain.

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  Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe

  In fact, Sidgwick’s entire classical orientation also came in for something

  of a jolt during the sixties, when he both expanded his linguistic interests

  considerably and developed a keen sense of the questions raised by textual

  criticism. Or rather, one could say that in struggling with the historical

  Socrates, he was also brought to struggle with the historical Jesus, and to

  employ many of the very same scholarly techniques. After all, did not the

  problem of determining just what measure of inspiration one might take

  from the historically distant Socrates translate into a similar problem with

  the historically distant Jesus?

  In the “Autobiographical Fragment,” Sidgwick recounts how in  he

  was powerfully impressed by Renan’s Etudes d’Histoire Religieuse, and derived from Renan’s eloquent persuasions the conviction that it was impossible really to

  understand at first hand Christianity as a historical religion without penetrating

  more deeply the mind of the Hebrews and of the Semitic stock from which they

  sprang. This led to a very important and engrossing employment of a great part

  of my spare time in the study of Arabic and Hebrew. I may say that the provisional

  conclusions I had formed with regard to Christianity are expressed in an article

  on “Ecce Homo.” . . . My studies, aimed directly at a solution of the great issues between Christianity and Scepticism or Agnosticism, had not, as I knew, led to

  a really decisive result, and I think it was partly from weariness of a continual

  internal debate which seemed likely to be interminable that I found the relief,

  which I certainly did find, in my renewal of linguistic studies. (M –)

  The effort was a daunting one, for from September of , when he

  “devoted every day and the whole day for five weeks in Dresden to the

  study of Arabic with a private tutor,” until , he gave over the “greater

  part” of his spare time “to the study of Arabic and Hebrew literature

  and history” and even considered putting in for one of the Cambridge

  professorships in Arabic. This latter seemed an attractive plan because,

  although he was still lecturing in classics, his interests had shifted, and

  the more appealing alternative seemed closed: the sole chair in moral

  philosophy at Cambridge also included moral theology, and “it seemed

  most probable that a layman would not be appointed to it – still less a

  layman known to be unorthodox.” No such difficulty would attend an

  Arabic professorship.

  To his credit, Sidgwick came to see that “the study of Arabic, pur-

  sued as it ought to be pursued by one who aimed at representing it in

  the University, would absorb too much time” – drawing him “inevitably

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  away from the central problems which constituted my deepest interest”

  (M ). That those problems, religious and metaphysical, did constitute

  his deepest interest had been forcibly brought home to him by another

  employment opportunity, an  offer of a position at Rugby. Despite

  the enthusiasm of his family, and his own initially positive response to this

  warm tribute from his alma mater, Sidgwick was blocked by “one plain

  fact” – namely, that he knew his “vocation in life to be not teaching but

  study” (M ). True, he would often deny that he was sufficiently pious

  to believe that “destiny has placed me among mod
ern monkery to do in it

  whatever the nineteenth century, acting through me, will” (M ). But

  it was a rather Apostolic thought.

  Although Sidgwick’s projected “comparison of the Hebrew develop-

  ment of religion with Arabic Mohammedanism” never saw the light, the

  intensive linguistic study (which also included German, the better to read

  the latest biblical criticism) was clearly of great importance to his intel-

  lectual growth. In the Essays and Reviews, Jowett had confidently urged

  that the Bible be read in just the same way as any other book; its value

  would withstand the effort. But figures such as Renan, and the even more

  formidably erudite David Friedrich Strauss, had done just that, treating

  scripture to textual and historical criticism that raised serious scholarly

  questions about its historicity, consistency, accuracy, and coherency. The

  results were extremely discomfiting to orthodox Christians.

  Earnest Renan was a renowned scholar and linguist, and it is not sur-

  prising that his work made a deep impression on Sidgwick, who had been

  trained by both Benson and Cambridge to appreciate the minute and care-

  ful study of language. Renan was born in a small village in Brittany in ,

  and rose from these very humble origins to become one of the most con-

  troversial and provocative of French scholars, with such productions as his

  Vie de Jésus (). His early education had been at Catholic seminaries,

  with the expectation that he would go into the priesthood, but as with

  Sidgwick, a corrosive intelligence and love of free inquiry led him astray.

  In one of his autobiographical writings, he recalled how a so-so teacher of

  metaphysics turned out to be a good judge of Renan:

  My argumentations in Latin, given with a firm and emphatic air, astonished

  and disquieted him. . . . That evening he took me aside. He pointed out to me eloquently what was anti-Christian in the commitment to reason and the harm

  that rationalism did to faith. In strange agitation, he reproached me with my

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  Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe

  passion for study. Research! What good was that? Everything essential for us is

  known. Science saves no souls. And, his excitement rising more and more, he said

  to me with a deeply felt emphasis: “You are not a Christian.”

  In the end, most French Catholics would probably have agreed with

  Renan’s hapless instructor, though Renan, like Sidgwick, always remained

  a model of personal rectitude. He rejected all claims to the supernatural,

  to the miraculous, and sought to show how the life of Jesus might inspire

  even if he were regarded as no more than human. He accepted a fully

  scientific worldview, in which all of nature works in accordance with causal

  laws, and he regarded history and criticism as working within just such

  an understanding. His own contributions were primarily linguistic. As

  Blanshard has explained, Renan “was not a genius in philosophy; he was

  a genius in language.” That is,

  He read the book of Isaiah, and saw that there was not one Isaiah, as the church

  had taught, but two. He read the book of Daniel, whose prophecies were ac-

  cepted by the church as inspired, and concluded that it was too unreliable to

  have a place in Scripture at all. He read the Pentateuch, which was accepted by

  the church as written by Moses, though Moses could hardly have written the

  account of his own death. It was thus not the metaphysical difficulties of two

  worlds of truth that finally settled the balance; it was rather the drip, drip on the soil of his mind of hundreds of these incidents of contradiction, of the historically incredible, of parallels with pagan religion, that wore his creed away by their attrition.

  Such was his scholarship, but his life of Jesus sought more. Written

  mostly while he was on a tour of Palestine, and without any scholarly

  apparatus, it was a sustained attempt to present a demystified Jesus who,

  while he did not work miracles, was an ethical teacher of such force and

  greatness that it was perfectly understandable how he could have altered

  the course of the world. Jesus had founded religion just as Socrates had

  founded ethical philosophy; if he was mistaken about a supernatural King-

  dom of Heaven or God, he was nevertheless right about universal love as

  the absolute ethical ideal. Such an expression of faith and hope was im-

  mortality enough.

  However, as Edward Said has emphasized, Renan’s philological mission

  was fundamentally orientalizing. Renan “did not really speak as one man

  to all men but rather as a reflective, specialized voice that took . . . the inequality of races and the necessary domination of the many by the

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  few for granted as an antidemocratic law of nature and society.” This

  vision of philology, opening the way to Nietzsche and certainly relevant for

  understanding the larger dimensions of Sidgwick’s religious and linguistic

  struggles, may seem puzzling:

  [H]ow was it possible for Renan to hold himself and what he was saying in such a

  paradoxical position? For what was philology on the one hand if not a science of all

  humanity, a science premised on the unity of the human species and the worth of

  every human detail, and yet what was the philologist on the other hand if not – as

  Renan himself proved with his notorious race prejudice against the very Oriental

  Semites whose study had made his professional name – a harsh divider of men

  into superior and inferior races, a liberal critic whose work harbored the most

  esoteric notions of temporality, origins, development, relationship, and human

  worth. . . . Renan had a strong guild sense as a professional scholar, a professional Orientalist, in fact, a sense that put distance between himself and the masses. But

  more important . . . is Renan’s own conception of his role as an Oriental philologist within philology’s larger history, development, and objectives as he saw them. In

  other words, what may to us seem like paradox was the expected result of how

  Renan perceived his dynastic position within philology, its history and inaugural

  discoveries, and what he, Renan, did within it. Therefore Renan should be charac-

  terized, not as speaking about philology, but rather as speaking philologically with all the force of an initiate using the encoded language of a new prestigious science

  none of whose pronouncements about language itself could be construed either

  directly or naively.

  The idea of spelling out the direction of history, be it progress or decay,

  through the esoteric and elite (not to mention Eurocentric) analysis of

  language was scarcely a foreign one to Sidgwick and his Apostolic circle.

  Naturally, his p
ositivist, Comtean tendencies – shared and stimulated by

  his intimate friend Dakyns – would incline him to hunt for laws of reli-

  gious and moral historical development. Interestingly, however, another

  particularly close friend from this period, Noel, did a great deal to stim-

  ulate his orientalist interests. The aristocratic Noel, who was the fourth

  son of the earl of Gainsborough and whose godmother was none other

  than Queen Victoria, was four years older than Sidgwick, though he had

  joined the Apostles a year later, in . Upon graduation, as Desmond

  Heath has observed, “Roden went to Egypt with another friend, Cyril

  Graham – in fact they reckoned they were the first Europeans to reach

  the oasis of Kur-Kur, in the Libyan desert, with its forests of petrified

  palms. For two long years, he continued in the East . . . visiting Nubia and

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  Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe

  the Holy Land, Palmyra, then Lebanon, Greece and Turkey.” Noel’s

  accounts inflamed Sidgwick’s imagination:

  You take me through a number of dream-like scenes and experiences, investing

  them with a reality that they did not before possess, as clustering round you,

  whom I have actually seen and known and talked to and shared anchovy toast

  with! . . . Your account of Palestine and Palmyra almost recalled the old feeling of half-pleasant, half-painful longing (like a hungry man’s reading about a feast)

  with which I used to devour Eothen and The Crescent and the Cross. . . . Well, I wish you freedom from fevers, conquest over bronchitis, and that you may quarry

  countless treasures of learning from the neglected mines of the Royal tombs. If

  you throw any light on Platonic mysticism, bring out any esoteric doctrines that

  our uninitiated eyes are now blind to, why, we shall be proud of you as a man and

  a brother. (M )

  Curiously, though, Noel tended to be less unorthodox than Sidgwick at

  this time, much less in the grip of the new criticism:

  I confess I know nothing of the processes of historic criticism by which all our

  beliefs in any past events are so skilfully hocus-pocused away. Of course I am aware

 

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