Collision Course

by William Cook

  The other part of Cousy’s strategy was a continual focus on winning. “I told my college players unless they were ready to be sore losers, they should drop off the team,” said Cousy. “But you’ve got to be able to reach your leaders. Oscar and Luke are the key guys. They’re the best players. The guys respect them. It’s as simple as that.”6

  Cousy had heard a rumor that Oscar Robertson and Jerry Lucas didn’t get along. Both Robertson and Lucas were present for the news conference at the Cincinnati Club to announce Cousy as the new Royals coach. Cousy intended to immediately investigate the matter. He told Robertson and Lucas to meet him in a private room. There Cousy put it on the line, asking both Robertson and Lucas if there was any truth to the rumor of there being friction between the two of them. Each said they got along fine.

  About six months after that meeting took place, Jerry Lucas remarked about it during an interview with Milton Richman of UPI. “Cousy had a meeting with Oscar and myself and said to us we’d be the key to anything that would happen in Cincinnati,” said Lucas. “That’s the way things began, but they deteriorated from that point.”7 Lucas went on to say that as soon as they got into training camp, Cousy decided he wanted a different type of play; he told management that it might take three years to get where he wanted to be and that he needed certain power to get there.

  Bob Cousy brought with him an assistant coach by the name of Draff Young, a black man who had played college ball and with the Harlem Globetrotters. Cousy felt since the Royals would be the first team he had coached that had a majority of black players, that Young could function as a liaison between the black players and him, possibly advocating for issues that they might be reticent to discuss with a white coach. While it is more speculation than established fact, Young’s primary role may have been to be an intermediary between Cousy and Robertson, who Cooz just didn’t seem really comfortable being in a coach-player relationship with.

  With a new general manager, coach, and assistant coach on board, Max Jacobs decided to spend some cash on a few upgrades at Cincinnati Gardens. The original scoreboard from 1949 was still being used. So, Max splurged on a new scoreboard that provided fans with player’s totals for points scored and rebounds.

  The previous season, there had been no radio coverage of Royals games. So, prior to the 1969–70 season, Max Jacobs sold the radio rights, and then one of Cousy’s acquaintances from Boston, Dom Valentino, was hired to do play-by-play for the Royals over 50,000-watt WLW radio. Jacobs then began a campaign to increase the Royals’ TV coverage, and Cousy agreed to make several pre-season appearances on TV and radio shows to promote the Royals.

  On the first day of practice, Cousy demonstrated that he would be more of a drill sergeant than a coach. He accused veteran players of being out of shape and threatened those he felt were not working hard in practice. He seemed to be especially critical of Jerry Lucas. Cousy felt that Lucas was not giving all he had and quickly reached the conclusion that he was out of shape and too slow for his offense.

  While Jerry Lucas is regarded as one of the game’s all-time rebounders, he was a run-and-gun type player, who did not play like the power forwards in today’s game who play above the rim. Although he made three first-team All-NBA teams and two second-teams in his first five years in the league (1964–1968), Cousy was critical of him.

  Bob Cousy was of the opinion that Jerry Lucas lacked the fire in his belly necessary to become a great basketball player in the NBA—a superstar. He felt Lucas used only 80% of his massive individual ability and lacked the competitive spirit necessary to excel in an emotional game such as basketball. According to Cousy, “people with less talent could shut-off Lucas, nullify him and Lucas seemed unwilling or unable to get that other 20% out of himself to get by those people. Luke came to play basketball the way a lot of people go to the office: they punch in at nine, sip coffee and eye the clock, then leave promptly at five.”8

  It appeared to Cousy that Lucas was more interested in talking about his fast-food business than the Royals’ fast breaks. Often, before a game, Lucas would be in the Royals locker room talking about business rather than basketball. That left a very poor taste in the coach’s mouth. It was clear that Lucas’ days as a Cincinnati Royal were numbered.

  Jerry Lucas was a very good basketball player and an excellent, unselfish team player. But he was also a very intelligent person, and as much as he loved the game, he didn’t see a need to live, breath, and die for it. Lucas had a broader agenda in life.

  It’s clear that Cousy’s displeasure with Lucas was personal. Cousy’s maligning of Lucas as a basketball player borders on the compulsive-obsessive when it is taken into account that in his book, The Killer Instinct, published a few years after he had quit coaching in the NBA, nine pages into the very first chapter, he cites Jerry Lucas as the poster boy for the epitome of a player that never used his full potential.

  Jerry Lucas would not be the only Royals player that would be in Cousy’s doghouse. During training camp in 1969, Walt Wesley was traded to Chicago for Norm Van Lier who had just been drafted by the Bulls out of St. Francis College (PA).

  In an exhibition game against Chicago at Illinois State University, Norm Van Lier got into a fight with the Bulls’ Jerry Sloan that became so fierce the two combatants rolled off the court into the halls of the arena and knocked over a popcorn maker. Meanwhile, while play continued at the other end of the court, the other players were looking for Van Lier and Sloan. Cousy was thrilled with the rookie Norm Van Lier’s competitive nature and admired him more than any other player he had ever coached. Still, Van Lier would eventually fall into Cousy’s disfavor and be traded back to the Chicago Bulls during the 1972 season.

  It wouldn’t be long before Cousy would start having problems with Oscar Robertson, who he would conclude had gained weight, slowed down, and was incapable of leading his fast-break offense for 48 minutes and without him, the team had a tendency to stall. He and Joe Axelson had decided that Norm Van Lier, just 22 years old, could take over the older Robertson’s job of running the offense, and almost immediately The Big O was controlling the ball less. Cousy wanted Robertson to shoot less and pass more as he wanted to shift the emphasis of the Royals’ offense from the guards to the front line.

  Bob Cousy did inherit some serious competitive problems with the Royals, but he immediately created a problem by trading 6′11″ Walt Wesley for Norm Van Lier. It left Jerry Lucas with his bad knees as the big man in the Royals forward wall, and after him, there wasn’t much strength around or under the basket. So, it begged the question, who did Bob Cousy think was going to lead his fast-break offense or take all those passes from Robertson and Van Lier after he traded Walt Wesley?

  The Royals’ backup center was Cincinnati Gardens crowd sentimental favorite 33-year-old Connie Dierking. A former University of Cincinnati Bearcat, Dierking was a 12-year professional veteran, having played three years in the defunct ABL and nine in the NBA. While Dierking was 6′9″, gutsy, capable of scoring, and gave everything he had, he was flatfooted, slow, and incapable of playing above the rim.

  The NBA game was increasingly going above the rim and Connie Dierking, playing his early 1950s-style basketball, was going to be pitted against players in the middle, such as Lew Alcindor, Willis Reed, Zelmo Beaty, Elvin Hayes, Nate Thurmond, Luke Jackson, Wes Unseld, and Wilt Chamberlain; all younger men, bigger, stronger, and more agile.

  Bob Cousy and Joe Axelson determined that the solution to the dilemma faced by the Royals upfront was to sign 6′5″ veteran forward Johnny Green, who had just been cut by the Philadelphia 76ers. While Green could jump like he was four inches taller, he was 36 years old and incapable of playing 48 minutes any longer.

  The NBA was looking towards its 24th season in 1969–70 with great anticipation of a banner year. A rookie superstar, Lew Alcindor, (soon to become Kareem Abdul-Jabbar), was about to start his career playing for the Milwaukee Bucks, and Connie Hawkins, an ABA All-Star who had been barred from playing in
the NBA since 1962, had jumped leagues to join the Phoenix Suns.

  In addition, the NBA continued to expand adding three new teams: the Cleveland Cavaliers, Buffalo Braves, and Portland Trailblazers, to make it a 14-team league.

  Also, there were five new coaches, including Tom Heinsohn, who would be taking over for Bill Russell, who, after leading the Boston Celtics to their 11th NBA championship in 13 years, retired. Lenny Wilkins became player-coach at Seattle. In Los Angeles, after failing to win with Jerry West, Elgin Baylor, and Wilt Chamberlain, Butch van Breda Kolff hung it up and moved on to take the coaching job in Detroit. His was being replaced in LA by former Providence College coach Joe Mullaney. And, of course, Max Jacobs had thrown so much money at Bob Cousy that it forced him out of retirement to become coach of the Cincinnati Royals.

  On September 13, with the season about a month away from starting, Bob Cousy surprised everyone when he announced his intention to seek permission to return as an active player for the Royals. Everyone was asking the same question—what the hell is going on with Cooz? Former Celtics teammate Frank Ramsey asked him if he was crazy. He was a middle-aged man with two teenage daughters, and if he would be successful in receiving permission from the Boston Celtics, who had him listed on their voluntary retired list, he would be the oldest player to ever play in the NBA at 41 years old.

  Cousy explained that he would not be attempting to play half of a game or make a major contribution, but there were two reasons he wanted to be reactivated as a player. First, said Cousy, “There are certain changes I have to effect here—both defensive and along the lines of fast-breaking. I feel if I can somehow move up and down the court quickly enough, I can affect the changes more quickly—especially with the younger players.”9

  The second reason was that he was of the opinion that he could add to the box office appeal of the Royals both at home and on the road.

  So Cousy had the romantic notion in his head that he could be “hands-on” while running up and down the court on his 41-year-old legs to teach Oscar Robertson, Jerry Lucas, Adrian Smith (all NBA All-Stars), and his other Royals how to play fast-break basketball, while at the same time, attracting scads of fans willing to pay to witness such a spectacle.

  It was not only the stuff of pulp fiction but the epitome of egocentricity for Cousy to attempt to activate himself at 41 years old. If Boston simply agreed, which was unlikely, the Royals needed only to notify NBA commissioner Walter Kennedy of the move. But the reality was that seeking active status for Cousy came with consequences. Red Auerbach hadn’t become some kind-hearted old fool! Cousy’s former coach in Boston was now the Celtics’ general manager and wanted compensation to release his name from the retired list.

  The fact that Red Auerbach would want to be compensated by the Royals in such a matter had precedence, and Cousy should have been aware of it. Auerbach had attempted to pull the same trick in 1960 when Lakers owner Bob Short, who had just moved his team from Minneapolis to Los Angeles, inquired about the Celtics releasing Bill Sharman from his contract so that he could become coach of the Lakers. The deal fell apart when Auerbach demanded Jerry West, who had just been the Lakers number-one draft choice, be sent to Boston in the deal.

  The deal would eventually be done when Royals general manager Joe Axelson sent some of Max Jacobs’ cash to Boston and threw in a player for good measure, 26-year-old Bill Dinwiddie, a 6′7″ forward who was recuperating from a knee operation.

  However, the process had caused some hard feelings between Bob Cousy and his long-time friend Red Auerbach. It had taken eight weeks of posturing and back-and-forth bickering between the two to reach an agreement. While Cousy was attempting to convince Auerbach that his expected playing time of two minutes a game would really be promotional and that he didn’t expect to make any significant contribution, Auerbach wasn’t buying it. Auerbach was of the opinion that in those two minutes, Cousy could get the ball to Oscar Robertson for one shot that might win a game.

  While waiting for resolution on his active status, on October 15, 1969, Bob Cousy made his NBA coaching debut at Madison Square Garden, losing to the New York Knicks, 89–94, before a small crowd of just under 6,000 fans.

  The Royals then traveled to Boston to play Cousy’s old Celtics team. A huge crowd of 13,755 turned out in Boston Garden to welcome Cooz home. Later, Cousy would say he was more nervous about this game than any in his career. The Royals were triumphant, 110–108, giving their coach his first win in the NBA.

  At halftime, the Royals headed to the locker room with a 50–42 lead, only to see the Celtics, led by John Havlicek, score 39 points in the third quarter to take the lead, 81 to 75. But with two minutes remaining, jump shots by Oscar Robertson, who finished with 25 points, and Luther Rackley, who scored 17, put the Royals ahead for good. Also, for the Royals, Tom Van Arsdale scored 22 points and Johnny Green, 19 points, but Jerry Lucas scored just 5.

  For the Boston Celtics, Larry Siegfried and John Havlicek both scored 20 points, and Henry Finkel, a big lumbering 7′0″, 240-pound center, who was Bill Russell’s replacement, scored 21 points before fouling out.

  Four games into the season, the Royals, with a record of 1–3, were in sixth place in the Eastern Division. Jerry Lucas was averaging 10.3 points per game, 2.3 assists, and 11.3 rebounds.

  For six years playing with the Cincinnati Royals, Jerry Lucas was averaging 19.9 points per game and held almost every club rebound record. He had also been an All-Star every year and was named the 1964 All-Star game MVP. At that time, Lucas was the eighth leading rebounder in NBA history.

  Bob Cousy has maintained that at that point in the season, Jerry Lucas came to him and said that he had reached the conclusion that with his bad knees he couldn’t play defense the way he wanted him to. Then, Lucas asked to be traded—preferably to San Francisco. Cousy states that he told Lucas he would talk to Joe Axelson and see what could be done.

  According to Cousy, it was a mobility problem with Lucas, if one man can’t keep up with the pace, the whole system breaks down.

  “He was doing the job off the boards,” says Cousy. “And he was doing it well—although he did not have the height or awesome strength of some of the truly ‘big men’ in pro basketball. But we needed a lot more speed out of him.”10

  In an interview for this work, Jerry Lucas denies that scenario. “I didn’t ask to be traded,” said Lucas. “I was shocked when I found out that I had been traded. I don’t think Joe Axelson had anything to do with my trade. I didn’t really know him, and I never met Max Jacobs. Cousy wanted to change everything. It was agreed that when he took over, he could make all the decisions and that included getting rid of players of All-Star caliber.”

  In regard to Bob Cousy’s opinion that he only gave 80% on the court, Lucas responded, “I was motivated to play in every game I ever played in at all levels, high school, college, the Olympics and the pros.”11

  Cousy rubbed salt in any wounds Jerry Lucas may have had over being traded when he stated, “I had concluded that Jerry wasn’t physically or psychologically capable of playing the fast-breaking offense and aggressive defense I wanted. I didn’t want to bring in young players who might absorb his attitude.”12 It really annoyed Cousy that Lucas talked about outside interests in the locker room; he wanted his players to come into the arena talking basketball.

  But Cousy really throws the knockout punch in insults toward Lucas when he states in his book, The Killer Instinct, that he and Joe Axelson began looking around the league for a team to trade Lucas to, but only the San Francisco Warriors showed any interest in him—the team where he wanted to go in the first place.

  When Bob Cousy was asked in early 2015 to recall the circumstances involved with trading Jerry Lucas, he sort of took the 5th Amendment approach, stating he’s now 86 years old and his long-term memory is no longer sharp. “I could attempt to answer some questions, but my testimony would not be accepted in court—I’d be faking,” said Cousy.13

  That being the cas
e with Cousy, it sets up a huge dichotomy in seeking the truth of the matter when taking into consideration the assertion of Lucas that he never asked to be traded.

  If there was ever an athlete who personified the trait of having a photographic memory, it was Jerry Lucas. Teammates were constantly amazed at how he was capable of keeping game statistics in his head. It’s a fact that later in his playing career, Lucas memorized the first 200 pages of the New York City telephone directory. Lucas could even take any word and then instantly reorganize the letters in it into alphabetical order. Following his basketball career, Jerry Lucas would write a series of books to help readers memorize things. Lucas’ first book, The Memory Book, was published in 1974.

  On October 24, 1969, Bob Cousy traded Jerry Lucas to the San Francisco Warriors. The Cincinnati fans were shocked and so was the most of the NBA. The trade seemed bizarre because, in return, the Royals didn’t receive a player anywhere near the All-Star caliber of Lucas.

  Bob Cousy maintained that he and Joe Axelson attempted to get Jeff Mullins, a guard who was averaging 22.8 points per game, from the Warriors. But what they got was Jim King, a 6′2″ guard, who was a veteran of seven years in the NBA, and Bill Turner, a 25-year-old, 6′7″ forward, who had been a reserve on the Warriors for the past three seasons. Unfortunately, Jim King would make no contribution to the Royals because shortly after reporting, he broke his leg.

  The assertion of Cousy, that no team other than the San Francisco Warriors wanted Lucas, was not accurate. Gene Shue, coach of the Baltimore Bullets, was very interested in acquiring Jerry Lucas. Shue said that he had been listening to radio broadcasts of Royals games and realized that Lucas was not fitting into Bob Cousy’s plans for running a strong defensive team. He said that he had talked to Cousy two days prior to the trade and offered him Ray Scott for Lucas.

  Ray Scott was a 6′9″ center-forward drafted by the Detroit Pistons out of the University of Portland in the 4th round of the 1961 NBA draft and later traded to the Baltimore Bullets. He had played in the NBA for ten years and was never selected as an All-Star.