The World Is Flat

by Thomas L. Friedman

  Multiple Japanese restaurants in Bentonville?

  The demand for sushi in Arkansas is not an accident. It has to do with the fact that all around Wal-Mart’s offices, vendors have set up their own operations to be close to the mother ship. Indeed, the area is known as “Vendorville.” The amazing thing about Wal-Mart’s headquarters is that it is so, well, Wal-Mart. The corporate offices are crammed into a reconfigured warehouse. As we passed a large building made of corrugated metal, I figured it was the maintenance shed. “Those are our international offices,” said my host, spokesman William Wertz. The corporate suites are housed in offices that are one notch below those of the principal, vice principal, and head counselor at my daughter’s public junior high school—before it was remodeled. When you pass through the lobby, p. 131 you see these little cubicles where potential suppliers are pitching their products to Wal-Mart buyers. One has sewing machines all over the table, another has dolls, another has women’s shirts. It feels like a cross between Sam’s Club and the covered bazaar of Damascus. Attention Wal-Mart shareholders: The company is definitely not wasting your money on frills.

  But how did so much innovative thinking—thinking that has reshaped the world’s business landscape in many ways—come out of such a Li’l Abner backwater? It is actually a classic example of a phenomenon I point to often in this book: the coefficient of flatness. The fewer natural resources your country or company has, the more you will dig inside yourself for innovations in order to survive. Wal-Mart became the biggest retailer in the world because it drove a hard bargain with everyone it came in contact with. But make no mistake about one thing: Wal-Mart also became number one because this little hick company from northwest Arkansas was smarter and faster about adopting new technology than any of its competitors. And it still is.

  David Glass, the company’s CEO from 1988 to 2000, oversaw many of the innovations that made Wal-Mart the biggest and most profitable retailer on the planet. Fortune magazine once dubbed him “the most underrated CEO ever” for the quiet way he built on Sam Walton’s vision. David Glass is to supply-chaining what Bill Gates is to word processing. When Wal-Mart was just getting started in northern Arkansas in the 1960s, explained Glass, it wanted to be a discounter. But in those days, every five-and-dime got its goods from the same wholesalers, so there was no way to get an edge on your competitors. The only way Wal-Mart could see to get an edge, he said, was for it to buy its goods in volume directly from the manufacturers. But it wasn’t efficient for manufacturers to ship to multiple Wal-Mart stores spread all over, so Wal-Mart set up a distribution center to which all the manufacturers could ship their merchandise, and then Wal-Mart got its own trucks to distribute these goods itself to its stores. The math worked like this: It cost p. 132 roughly 3 percent more on average for Wal-Mart to maintain its own distribution center. But it turned out, said Glass, that cutting out the wholesalers and buying direct from the manufacturers saved on average 5 percent, so that allowed Wal-Mart to cut costs on average 2 percent and then make it up on volume.

  Once it established that basic method of buying directly from manufacturers to get the deepest discounts possible, Wal-Mart focused relentlessly on three things. The first was working with the manufacturers to get them to cut their costs as much as possible. The second was working on its supply chain from those manufacturers, wherever they were in the world, to Wal-Mart’s distribution centers, to make it as low-cost and frictionless as possible. The third was constantly improving Wal-Mart’s information systems, so it knew exactly what its customers were buying and could feed that information to all the manufacturers, so the shelves would always be stocked with the right items at the right time.

  Wal-Mart quickly realized that if it could save money by buying directly from the manufacturers, by constantly innovating to cut the cost of running its supply chain, and by keeping its inventories low by learning more about its customers, it could beat its competitors on price every time. Sitting in Bentonville, Arkansas, it didn’t have much choice.

  “The reason we built all our own logistics and systems is because we are in the middle of nowhere,” said Jay Allen, Wal-Mart’s senior vice president of corporate affairs. “It really was a small town. If you wanted to go to a third party for logistics, it was impossible. It was pure survival. Now with all the attention we are getting there is an assumption that our low prices derive from our size or because we’re getting stuff from China or being able to dictate to suppliers. The fact is the low prices are derived from efficiencies Wal-Mart has invested in—the system and the culture. It is a very low-cost culture.” Added Glass, “I wish that I could say we were brilliant and visionary, [but] it was all born out of necessity.”

  The more that supply chain grew, the more Walton and Glass understood that scale and efficiency were the keys to their whole business. Put simply, the more scale and scope their supply chain had, the more things they sold for less to more customers, the more leverage they had p. 133 with suppliers to drive prices down even more, the more they sold to more customers, the more scale and scope their supply chain had, the more profit they reaped for their shareholders. . .

  Sam Walton was the father of that culture, but necessity was its mother, and its offspring has turned out to be a lean, mean supply-chain machine. In 2004, Wal-Mart purchased roughly $260 billion worth of merchandise and ran it through a supply chain consisting of 108 distribution centers around the United States, serving the some 3,000 Wal-Mart stores in America.

  In the early years, “we were small—we were 4 or 5 percent of Sears and Kmart,” said Glass. “If you are that small, you are vulnerable, so what we wanted to do more than anything else was grow market share. We had to undersell others. If I could reduce from 3 percent to 2 percent the cost of running my distribution centers, I could reduce retail prices and grow my market share and then not be vulnerable to anyone. So any efficiency we generated we passed on to the consumer.”

  For instance, after the manufacturers dropped off their goods at the Wal-Mart distribution center, Wal-Mart needed to deliver those goods in small bunches to each of its stores. It meant that Wal-Mart had trucks going all over America. Walton quickly realized if he connected his drivers by radios and satellites, after they dropped off at a certain Wal-Mart store, they could go a few miles down the road and pick up goods from a manufacturer so they wouldn’t come back empty and so Wal-Mart could save the delivery charges from that manufacturer. A few pennies here, a few pennies there, and the result is more volume, scope, and scale.

  In improving its supply chain, Wal-Mart leaves no link untouched. While I was touring the Wal-Mart distribution center in Bentonville, I noticed that some boxes were too big to go on the conveyor belts and were being moved around on pallets by Wal-Mart employees driving special minilift trucks with headphones on. A computer tracks how many pallets each employee is plucking every hour to put onto trucks for different stores, and a computerized voice tells each of them whether he is ahead of schedule or behind schedule. “You can choose whether you want your computer voice to be a man or a woman, and you can choose p. 134 English or Spanish,” explained Rollin Ford, Wal-Mart’s executive vice president, who oversees the supply chain and was giving me my tour.

  A few years ago, these pallet drivers would get written instructions for where to pluck a certain pallet and what truck to take it to, but Wal-Mart discovered that by giving them headphones with a soothing computer voice to instruct them, drivers could use both hands and not have to carry pieces of paper. And by having the voice constantly reminding them whether they were behind or ahead of expectations, “we got a boost in productivity,” said Ford. It is a million tiny operational innovations like this that differentiate Wal-Mart’s supply chain.

  But the real breakthrough, said Glass, was when Wal-Mart realized that while it had to be a tough bargainer with its manufacturers on price, at the same time the two had to collaborate to create value for each other horizontally if Wal-Mart was going to keep driving down costs
. Wal-Mart was one of the first companies to introduce computers to track store sales and inventory and was the first to develop a computerized network in order to share this information with suppliers. Wal-Mart’s theory was that the more information everyone had about what customers were pulling off the shelves, the more efficient Wal-Mart’s buying would be, the quicker its suppliers could adapt to changing market demand.

  In 1983, Wal-Mart invested in point-of-sale terminals, which simultaneously rang up sales and tracked inventory deductions for rapid resupply. Four years later, it installed a large-scale satellite system linking all of the stores to company headquarters, giving Wal-Mart’s central computer system real-time inventory data and paving the way for a supply chain greased by information and humming down to the last atom of efficiency. A major supplier can now tap into Wal-Mart’s Retail Link private extranet system to see exactly how its products are selling and when it might need to up its production.

  “Opening its sales and inventory databases to suppliers is what made Wal-Mart the powerhouse it is today, says Rena Granofsky, a senior partner at J. C. Williams Group Ltd., a Toronto-based retail consulting firm,” in the 2002 Computerworld article on Wal-Mart. “While its competition guarded sales information, Wal-Mart approached its suppliers as if they were partners, not adversaries, says Granofsky. By implementing a colp. 135laborative planning, forecasting, and replenishment (CPFR) program, Wal-Mart began a just-in-time inventory program that reduced carrying costs for both the retailer and its suppliers. ‘There’s a lot less excess inventory in the supply chain because of it,’ Granofsky says.” Thanks to the efficiency of its supply chain alone, Wal-Mart’s cost of goods is estimated to be 5 to 10 percent less than that of most of its competitors.

  Now Wal-Mart, in its latest supply-chain innovation, has introduced RFID—radio frequency identification microchips, attached to each pallet and merchandise box that comes into Wal-Mart, to replace bar codes, which have to be scanned individually and can get ripped or soiled. In June 2003, Wal-Mart informed its top one hundred suppliers that by January 1, 2005, all pallets and boxes that they ship to Wal-Mart distribution centers have to come equipped with RFID tags. (According to the RFID Journal, “RFID is a generic term for technologies that use radio waves to automatically identify people or objects. There are several methods of identification, but the most common is to store a serial number that identifies a person or object, and perhaps other information, on a microchip that is attached to an antenna—the chip and the antenna together are called an RFID transponder or an RFID tag. The antenna enables the chip to transmit the identification information to a reader. The reader converts the radio waves reflected back from the RFID tag into digital information that can then be passed on to computers that can make use of it.”) RFID will allow Wal-Mart to track any pallet or box at each stage in its supply chain and know exactly what product from which manufacturer is inside, with what expiration date. If a grocery item has to be stored at a certain temperature, the RFID tag will tell Wal-Mart when the temperature is too high or too low. Because each of these tags costs around 20¢, Wal-Mart is reserving them now for big boxes and pallets, not individual items. But this is clearly the wave of the future.

  “When you have RFID,” said Rollin Ford, the Wal-Mart logistics vice president, “you have more insights.” You can tell even faster which stores sell more of which shampoo on Fridays and which ones on Sundays, and whether Hispanics prefer to shop more on Saturday nights rather than Mondays in the stores in their neighborhoods. “When all this information is fed into our demand models, we can become more efficient on p. 136 when we produce [a product] and when we ship it and then put it on the trucks in exactly the right place inside the trucks so it can flow more efficiently,” added Ford. “We used to have to count each piece, and scanning it at [the receiving end] was a bottleneck. Now [with RFID], we just scan the whole pallet under a bubble, and it says you have all thirty items you ordered and each box tells you, ‘This is what I am and this is how I am feeling, this is what color I am, and am I in good shape’—so it makes receiving hugely easier.” Procter & Gamble spokesperson Jeannie Tharrington talked to Salon.com (September 20, 2004) about Wal-Mart’s move to RFID: “We see this as beneficial to the entire supply chain. Right now our out-of-stock levels are higher than we’d like and certainly higher than the consumer would like, and we think this technology can help us to keep the products on the shelf more often.” RFID will also allow for quicker remixing of the supply chain in response to events.

  During hurricanes, Wal-Mart officials told me, Wal-Mart knows that people eat more things like Pop-Tarts—easy-to-store, nonperishable items—and that their stores also sell a lot of kids’ games that don’t require electricity and can substitute for TV. It also knows that when hurricanes are coming, people tend to drink more beer. So the minute Wal-Mart’s meteorologists tell headquarters a hurricane is bearing down on Florida, its supply chain automatically adjusts to a hurricane mix in the Florida stores—more beer early, more Pop-Tarts later.

  Wal-Mart is constantly looking for new ways to collaborate with its customers. Lately, it has gone into banking. It found that in areas with large Hispanic populations, many people had no affiliation with a bank and were getting ripped off by check-cashing outlets. So Wal-Mart offered them payroll check cashing, money orders, money transfers, and even bill payment services for standard items like electricity bills—all for very small fees. Wal-Mart had an internal capability to do that for its own employees and simply turned it into an external business.

  Too Much of a Good Thing

  Unfortunately for Wal-Mart, the same factors that drove its instinct for constant innovation—its isolation from the world, its need to dig inside p. 137 itself, and its need to connect remote locations to a global supply chain—also got it in trouble. It is hard to exaggerate how isolated Bentonville, Arkansas, is from the currents of global debate on labor and human rights, and it is easy to see how this insular company, obsessed with lowering prices, could have gone over the edge in some of its practices.

  Sam Walton bred not only a kind of ruthless quest for efficiency in improving Wal-Mart’s supply chain but also a degree of ruthlessness period. I am talking about everything from Wal-Mart’s recently exposed practice of locking overnight workers into its stores, to its allowing Wal-Mart’s maintenance contractors to use illegal immigrants as janitors, to its role as defendant in the largest civil-rights class-action lawsuit in history, to its refusal to stock certain magazines—like Playboy—on its shelves, even in small towns where Wal-Mart is the only major store. This is all aside from the fact that some of Wal-Mart’s biggest competitors complain that they have had to cut health-care benefits and create a lower wage tier to compete with Wal-Mart, which pays less and covers less than most big companies (more on this later). One can only hope that all the bad publicity Wal-Mart has received in the last few years will force it to understand that there is a fine line between a hyperefficient global supply chain that is helping people save money and improve their lives and one that has pursued cost cutting and profit margins to such a degree that whatever social benefits it is offering with one hand, it is taking away with the other.

  Wal-Mart is the China of companies. It has so much leverage that it can grind down any supplier to the last halfpenny. And it is not at all hesitant about using its ability to play its foreign and domestic suppliers off against each other.

  Some suppliers have found ways to flourish under the pressure and become better at what they do. If all of Wal-Mart’s suppliers were being squeezed dry by Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart would have no suppliers. So obviously many of them are thriving as Wal-Mart’s partners. But some no doubt have translated Wal-Mart’s incessant price pressure into lower wages and benefits for their employees or watched as their business moved to China, whence Wal-Mart’s supply chain pulled in $18 billion worth of goods in 2004 from five thousand Chinese suppliers. “If Wal-Mart were an individual economy, it would rank as China’s eight
h-p. 138biggest trading partner, ahead of Russia, Australia and Canada,” Xu Jun, the spokesman for Wal-Mart China, told the China Business Weekly (November 29, 2004).

  The successor generation to Sam Walton’s leadership seems to recognize that it has both an image and a reality to fix. How far Wal-Mart will adjust remains to be seen. But when I asked Wal-Mart’s CEO, H. Lee Scott Jr., directly about all these issues, he did not duck. In fact, he wanted to talk about it. “What I think I have to do is institutionalize this sense of obligation to society to the same extent that we have institutionalized the commitment to the customer,” said Scott. “The world has changed and we have missed that. We believed that good intentions and good stores and good prices would cause people to forgive what we are not as good at, and we were wrong.” In certain areas, he added, “we are not as good as we should be. We just have to get better.”

  One trend that Wal-Mart insists it is not responsible for is the offshoring of manufacturing. “We are much better off if we can buy merchandise made in the United States,” said Glass. “I spent two years going around this country trying to talk people into manufacturing here. We would pay more to buy it here because the manufacturing facilities in those towns [would create jobs for] all those people who shopped in our stores. Sanyo had a plant here [in Arkansas] making television sets for Sears, and Sears cut them off, so they decided they were closing the plant and going to move part to Mexico and part to Asia. Our governor asked if we would help. We decided we would buy television sets from Sanyo [if they would keep the plant in Arkansas], and they didn’t want to do it. They wanted to move it, and [the governor] even talked to the [Japanese owning] family to try to persuade them to stay. Between his efforts and ours, we persuaded them to do it. They are now the world’s largest producer of televisions. We just bought our fifty millionth set from them. But for the most part people in this country have just abandoned the manufacturing process. They say, ‘I want to sell to you, but I don’t want the responsibility for the buildings and employees [and health care]. I want to source it somewhere else.’ So we were forced to source merchandise in other places in the world.” He added, “One of my concerns p. 139 is that, with the manufacturing out of this country, one day we’ll all be selling hamburgers to each other.”