Imperial Reckoning
Page 41
For validation, the colonial government relied heavily on the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) delegations that traveled to Kenya to observe and report on the Emergency conditions. These delegations were composed of MPs from Britain, though the selection process was dictated by the CPA with influence from the Colonial Office rather than by independent nomination by each political party. With painstakingly choreographed itineraries, colonial officials would escort the MPs through the colony and introduce them to various members of the local government responsible for overseeing Emergency policies. The first of these two-man CPA delegations set off in 1956 and was made up of Hugh Fraser, the same Conservative MP who earlier directed Baring to emphasize “rehabilitation,” and R. W. Williams. When they completed their work, Fraser and Williams followed the stated rules of the CPA and filed their report for the association’s private review only.
In 1957, with the outcries about the Fletcher and Meldon allegations reaching a crescendo, Lennox-Boyd needed a positive report on Kenya. More to the point, he saw the CPA delegation as a way to sidestep an all-out independent investigation. In place of a two-person envoy, Lennox-Boyd lobbied the United Kingdom branch of the CPA to send a larger committee, presumably because with more people its report would carry more credibility. If the colonial secretary’s intentions were not transparent, the head of the Colonial Office’s East Africa Department, Will Mathieson, plainly spelled them out when he wrote, “A CPA delegation was a goodwill delegation and by this definition could not be as searching as a delegation chosen by the ‘Shadow Cabinet.’” 81 Another one of Lennox-Boyd’s men, Gorell Barnes, went on to underscore the political importance of the situation: “If the delegation can be brought to recognize and endorse the principles on which our policies rest, the visit will clearly pay important dividends here for Kenya.” 82
The CPA did move forward with an expanded delegation, but one which hardly represented all sides of the political spectrum. None of the Labour MPs who were most knowledgeable, and critical, of the Emergency were included in the delegation, a point which hardly escaped members of the Labour Party. One of its MPs, James Johnson, bluntly told Mathieson that “had Parliament been sending a delegation to produce a report which would represent the views of both parties on the situation in Kenya, the delegation from the Labour side would have been very differently composed and would have been led by a Privy Councillor and contain at least one Q.C. probably Mr. Elwyn Jones.” The Labour MP went on to add that “what Kenya needed was a thorough going over not a pat on the back.” 83 In the end, there were three Labour MPs and four Conservatives in the delegation, including Thomas Dugdale, who was appointed as leader. Granville Roberts, the public relations officer for Kenya, conveniently served as the delegation’s secretary when it toured the colony during the month of January 1957.
Not surprisingly, when the CPA delegation returned to Britain it issued a positive report. An issue remained, however. CPA reports were not supposed to be published. Lennox-Boyd relentlessly lobbied the association to take exception in this instance and to allow the findings to be circulated. In light of the biased composition of the delegation, the Opposition protested vehemently. An agreement was eventually reached whereby the delegation would publish a report for “Private Circulation Only.” A few weeks after the report was privately circulated, an anonymous source leaked it to the Times. Lennox-Boyd seized on this turn of events by pressing the CPA to reconsider the association’s policy of not publishing delegation reports. He said that “he felt bound to raise [the issue of publication] because the Report’s wider distribution would be helpful not least to the Kenya Government.” 84 The CPA capitulated, and in July 1957 the delegation’s report was offered in full to the public. In turn, the Colonial Office used this allegedly bipartisan document as unimpeachable evidence that the system of detention without trial, the conditions in the Emergency villages, and the suppression of Mau Mau generally were all devoid of the alleged brutalities and injustices.
The colonial government benefited greatly from the relative silence and outright support of many of the local Christian missionaries. At one extreme, the Catholics largely threw their weight behind the British forces of law and order, some going so far as to serve on armed patrols. 85 The response of the Protestant churches to the Emergency, however, was much less clear-cut. Most believed Mau Mau had cast a specter of evil over Kenya and that it had to be eradicated. But when it came to the increasing allegations of colonial injustice, their reactions were complicated by a host of competing loyalties and interests.
The most controversial church figure by far was Leonard Beecher, the Anglican Church’s archbishop of Mombasa. In response to the Church Missionary Society’s earlier publication of Kenya—time for Action, the archbishop quite astonishingly expressed his “embarrassment and bewilderment” at the pamphlet. 86 This despite the fact that he had befriended Police Commissioner Young and had promised him that the story behind his resignation would not be buried. 87 At first Beecher kept his word, issuing a joint statement with other Christian leaders in Kenya, notably the Reverend David Steel, the colony’s moderator of the Church of Scotland, declaring, “It is important that a full explanation of the reasons for the difference between Government and Colonel Young should be given to the public.” 88 For his part, Steel followed up the joint release with a scathing broadcast sermon in Nairobi, where he stated, “A judicial commission of experts in constitutional law is called for to pronounce on the legality of much of our emergency legislation….[They] give the appearance of legality to practices not only unjust in the eyes of God but illegal by the accepted law of man.” He went on to say, “During the emergency we have taken some very dangerous steps along the road [to tyranny]. It is time to retrace.” 89 But when Anglican Church representatives in Britain stepped forward to denounce the actions of Kenya’s colonial police force, the archbishop balked. Virtually overnight he became the star witness for the Conservative government’s defense against the onslaught of allegations. In his sparring with Lord Jowitt in the House of Lords, for instance, the parliamentary undersecretary of state for the colonies declared:
I am very sorry that a Society [i.e., Church Missionary Society] for which I have such great respect, a society which has co-operated with us in the Colonial Office in so many fields and which has done such wonderful work in Africa and elsewhere, should have published this document. My own views on this pamphlet were well expressed by the Bishop of Mombasa, Bishop Beecher, a man of the highest reputation in Africa, with deep knowledge and experience of its problems and an acknowledged expert on the Kikuyu tribe. The Bishop, after making it clear that the document was published without his knowledge, criticised it as being “one-sided and particularly unfortunate.” I do not want to question for one moment the sincerity of those who wrote this pamphlet, but I cannot help feeling that in a delicate situation of this kind those concerned might have come to the Colonial Office before publication, to hear the other side of the story, or that at any rate they might have consulted the Bishop on the spot. 90
What explains this apparent about-face by the Anglican archbishop? Certainly, he had sufficient accurate information about the brutalities and deprivations not only from Young but from his missionaries in the field, as well as from other Protestant church leaders in Kenya. Within months after the Declaration of Emergency the Christian Council of Kenya (CCK), the umbrella organization for Protestant churches in the colony, began privately lobbying Governor Baring to stop the abuses and the breakdown of the rule of law, as well as to reconsider his government’s position on loyalty. Countless numbers of devout Kikuyu converts were being rounded up and detained, despite repeated protests from the missionaries that these Africans constituted the most loyal foundation of a future Christian community in Central Province. 91 Indeed, just prior to Beecher’s denunciation of the CMS pamphlet he wrote to Baring’s office on this very issue, stating, “I have repeatedly made it clear that the Church desire[s] to co-operate wh
oleheartedly and to offer its fullest support to the Government. I should hope that there might be sufficient reciprocity.” 92
Deputation after deputation of missionaries went to express their growing concern to the governor over the abuses being perpetrated against the Mau Mau population, demanding that he take action to stop them. This strategy, however, proved ineffective, and in November 1953 the CCK struggled with “whether to continue to urge Government privately to correct abuses or to take direct action through the press.” Ultimately, the council agreed “to continue to press privately for the correction of abuses,” and if that did not succeed, appeals would be made to the Colonial Office through the missionary societies at home. Surely, the council reasoned, they “could count on [the Colonial Office’s] good will.” 93 Less than a fortnight later the various Protestant church leaders in Kenya, including Beecher, published a joint petition titled “An Open Letter from Leaders of Christian Churches in Kenya.” The publication was a clear indication that the Colonial Office had fallen short in its “good will.” The letter expressed dismay over the general breakdown of law and order in Kenya and urged all Africans and Europeans in the colony, “In spite of seeming provocation or even in face of apparent encouragement to indulge in cruel abuse of power, do not do so. You are Christians, and such action is un-Christian.” 94 A month later the churches published a second letter clarifying their position, in part because of the widely published court-martial case of Captain Gerald Griffiths. This settler and army officer reputedly mutilated prisoners, kept a scoreboard of Mau Mau kills, and took a liking to shooting them with an automatic weapon until, according to one witness, bullets “practically poured out of the man’s stomach.” 95 In light of this case, the church leaders now declared:
In our [first] statement we referred to repeated representations at the highest level concerning abuses of power by certain members of the Forces of Law and Order. These were based on incidents adequate in number and sufficiently well authenticated to warrant such representations. It was only after certain aspects of abuse had been publicised as a result of recent trials and courts-martial that the public statement became, in our view, necessary. The Churches have a particular responsibility in that in the African areas they are the only independent observers of the situation. 96
But it was over two years before the CCK and Archbishop Beecher would issue another statement that questioned the conduct of the colonial government in Kenya, and even then it would be framed in careful language. 97 Clearly, the missionaries were struggling between their moral obligation to step in and put a stop to the atrocities and their need to maintain the goodwill of the local colonial government. Beecher, Steel, the CCK, and all of their local missionaries were in Kenya at the pleasure of the governor. Although the likelihood of Baring actually sending all of the missionaries packing was slim, he could make their jobs exceedingly difficult, and, if he chose, he could further reduce the already minimal access that the churches had to the camps and Emergency villages. Moreover, if the missionaries were one of the few relatively impartial observers in the field, who would be left behind to hold the already beleaguered moral compass in Kenya if they were dismissed? There was also the self-interest of these men of God to consider. While Mau Mau, with its anti-Christian message, was certainly an indictment of previous missionary activity in Kenya, its suppression also offered the churches an unprecedented opportunity for conversions, something upon which they were all eager to capitalize. Furthermore, Christian salvation during the Emergency was not just a means for redeeming Mau Mau sinners; it was also a form of personal and institutional redemption for the missionaries themselves, who clearly saw in Mau Mau a reflection of their own past failures. Undoubtedly, all of these considerations weighed on Beecher when he expressed his “embarrassment and bewilderment” in early 1955. A heavy burden too was his widely acknowledged close personal friendship with Governor Baring, as well as their privileged religious relationship—Beecher gave Baring communion daily before breakfast. 98
Despite these public ambiguities, private deputations to the governor continued in earnest, and each one reflected more clearly the missionaries’ inside knowledge. At the same time that Beecher denounced the CMS pamphlet, he, along with several other church leaders, filed a petition with Baring condemning the continued detention without trial of Christians, the violence in the camps, the absence of police reform, and the inability of the government to ensure that its stated policies were carried out on the ground. 99 Three months later the missionaries issued another private petition, declaring, “The disquiet expressed in our earlier memorandum and at our interview [with the governor] has not been removed or allayed by subsequent events.” 100 They went on to list yet again their concerns over Emergency abuses, as well as to alert Baring to the fact that “starvation, with its consequences of malnutrition and crime, is on the increase; a spirit of apathy, frustration and hopelessness prevails; there is utter perplexity as to government’s policy.” 101 Rehabilitation, or the lack of it, was also a focal point of their complaints, as well as the need to extend Christian reform to the agents of British colonialism.
It has been admitted to us on more than one occasion that a major impediment in the way of a constructive policy in Kenya is the difficulty experienced in ensuring its implementation by the executive officers, European or African, at the local level. Some, at least, of these openly adopt an attitude toward Africans or towards Christianity, which runs counter to government’s declared policy. Others, by their habits of life, show a deplorable example to the African population. 102
Other than the local realities that these deputations brought to light, their most striking feature was their utter futility. Like Lennox-Boyd, Baring had pat answers for every charge, either declaring them unfounded or assuring that every effort was being made to look into them. Despite this stonewalling, the missionaries did not change their approach. Despite the fact that nothing was being done, despite the fact that the church leaders continued to hear of new incidences of abuses, and despite the fact that one of their own independent deputations “said that there was good evidence of distress, sickness and even death from lack of food” in the Emergency villages, the missionaries continued to stay their course. 103 This despite the fact that various internal reports indicated that the missionaries’ knowledge of atrocities was overwhelming. “Evil seems firmly entrenched,” began one letter by Reverend Peter Bostock to the Church Missionary Society in London. He went on, “Europeans on the spot back one another up, don’t report things, lie readily to cover up investigations, and there seems no way of breaking through this…. The European lies and says the African was trying to escape, but reports are too numerous and too varied for us to be able to give credence to the bona fides of the European in many cases.” 104 Anglican Church officials in Kenya later compiled a compendium of some of the atrocities in the camps and reserves.
Africans have been beaten to extract information.
Africans have been shot and left to die in agony without any semblance of trial and on mere suspicion.
Africans have been arrested and taken to the Forest and shot there in cold blood. In one case their arrest had been ordered and not their death. In another case they were driven into the Forest so that they could be shot. Shooting in the forests is “legal.”
Men have been known to boast of “scores” and of taking no prisoners and asking no questions.
The hands of men shot have been cut off and used not merely to identify the victim but also to extract information from their relatives. Is mutilation of the dead permissible?
Men have been tortured to reveal what they knew often only on the merest suspicion:
A. had his legs broken with a stone because he would not speak
B. had his private parts laid on a table and beaten till the scrotum burst because he would not speak.
C. was beaten on the soles of his feet till he could not walk because he would not speak.
D. Was arrested on
a Saturday night and by Sunday night or Monday was dead. True the cause of death has not yet been established but he was buried at once without his relatives being informed and without his property being returned to them.
E. Has been castrated and claims it was the work of the police. 105
The archbishop of Mombasa knew some of these details, for they were contained in the private petitions that he and other members of the Christian Council of Kenya sent to Baring. Even after the Young affair passed without sufficient answer from the British colonial governor, and after Fletcher and Meldon stepped forward with their allegations, these Christian leaders continued to believe, in the words of one missionary, that “the Churches and Missionary Societies in Kenya must exercise the greatest care in not bringing unnecessary embarrassment to the Government, since in fact the British Press is well able to take care now of unlawful happenings by police or military.” 106 This statement was made in early 1954. Had the British press enough empirical evidence to mount an effective challenge against the Conservative government, presumably the brutalities and the starvation would have at least abated, and presumably Young, Fletcher, Meldon, and the Labour MPs would have had very little to report in subsequent years. Instead, the situation only became worse, and when Anglican Church leaders in London decided to step in, their own missionaries on the spot did not support them. Had they wanted to intervene and put an end to the horrors, the local church leaders could have gone public with precise details, or they could have provided information to a public figure like Barbara Castle. This the CCK in fact considered in late 1954, though it ultimately decided—according to its general secretary, Sam Morrison—that “before the help of Members of Parliament is invoked representations should first be made to responsible authorities in Kenya, whose difficulties deserve the most sympathetic understanding.” 107 The Protestant churches never reconsidered this position. Instead, in July 1956, the Protestant Church leaders in Kenya decided, rather than stepping forward with specific allegations, to issue yet another of their carefully worded statements that contained almost as much praise as criticism.