World War Trump

by Hall Gardner

  Trump has, however, maintained at least one presidential campaign promise. He has sustained his hardline stance against the Islamic State (IS). The proof is the Pentagon's decision (most likely approved by Trump, although denied by the White House) to pulverize a network of Afghan caves that were occupied by IS fighters, with the use of the massive “Mother of all Bombs.” Trump has thus demonstrated his potential to deploy massive force in the Global War on Terrorism by dropping the most powerful non-nuclear bomb in American arsenal. Not only will the use of such a weapon make it more likely that innocent people will be killed as so-called collateral damage, but it also lowers the threshold for the possible use of nuclear weaponry.

  “AMERICA FIRST” NATIONALISM AND PROTECTIONISM

  Trump has called his right-wing revolution “America First.” But it is not certain what this means in a highly interdependent world—even if that interdependence is highly uneven. The United States may still remain the predominant or hegemonic power for a decade or more, but its global interests are being challenged in different regions of the world. It is a situation in which Washington cannot manage all complex political, economic, security, and ecological issues singlehandedly. Truly global problems cannot be managed or resolved without the full cooperation of other states.

  By claiming that the whole world has been “ripping off”5 the United States over the years, Trump has begun to criticize not only US rivals but US allies as well. He has threatened to place high tariffs not only on China but also on the US allies Germany, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, and other countries that have large trade deficits with Washington. These protectionist policies, if implemented, could result in new global and inter-allied trade and currency wars—and could potentially lead to an even deeper long-term recession/depression.

  Trump's major economic concern has been the competition from China, with which Washington has a $310 billion trade deficit. Prior to becoming president, Trump attacked what he saw as unfair trade competition due to China's low wages, lack of environmental restrictions, and purported currency manipulation. These, he believed, were the major cause of the loss of an estimated 5 million US manufacturing jobs since 2001.6 The Trump-Pence administration consequently threatened to counter China's (formerly) cheap labor advantage by raising tariffs.

  The key issue, however, is how much of the US job loss is actually due to manufacturing import competition from China or from NAFTA or other trade pacts—and how much of the job loss is actually due to technological innovation and automation that reduce the need for manpower. It is not at all certain that an America First protectionist policy will help regain the considerable amount of manufacturing jobs lost since 2001; this is due to the fact that job loss has also been caused by technological modernization and automation. Another issue is that while import substitution does impact manufacturing and other jobs, those jobs cannot easily be shifted into other sectors. Assuming that US firms cannot fully enter the China market, they could then seek out low-cost trade with other countries. Putting up protectionist barriers on China or other countries could then cause dangerous trade and monetary wars as a result of globally interconnected industries and technologies.7

  On the one hand, the US turn toward protectionism will press other states to also search for ways to reduce the types of interdependence that leaves them most vulnerable to economic coercion and financial sanctions. In this way, the search for new markets could be positive, in that it will provide states with greater freedom to pursue new markets other than the huge American market. On the other hand, it could also be negative, in that states might be less willing to abide by international laws, technical standards, and coordinated regulations—assuming that they can break somewhat free from corporate or technological interconnections. And by not forging multilateral trade agreements, states and their major corporations may have great difficulties in finding new markets and guaranteed access to increasingly scarce or expensive resources—hence opening the doors to both domestic and international conflict.

  Trump's complaints about excessive Chinese imports, lack of US access to Chinese markets, and Chinese currency manipulation, not to overlook China's significant holdings of the US debt, represent a sign of major tensions between the two countries. With respect to Chinese imports, many goods are produced in China by US firms, to the greater profit of the latter. Both Washington and Beijing can be seen as manipulating their currency ratios, but these rates tend to fluctuate in differing cycles anyway, so that one side tends to criticize the other only when the terms of the exchange rate are not in that side's favor.8 So in April 2017, when the dollar was at a relatively high value versus other currencies, Trump no longer accused China of currency manipulation. Yet the issue has not suddenly disappeared; either country could still opt take strong measures by devaluing their currencies against the other if there is no formal monetary cooperation between the two sides.

  The possibility of a trade and monetary war with China is further augmented by the significant growth of the American national debt (over 100 percent of GDP since 2012) that has made the United States dependent, at least in part, on Chinese finance, along with that of Japan. Beijing has been the major foreign purchaser of US government bills, notes, and bonds, and it holds even more debt than the amount owned by American households. As such, Beijing owned $1.24 trillion of the US debt as of September 2016, but has begun to slowly sell its holdings.9 The rest of the $19.5 trillion US gross federal debt (not including the fifty states and localities) is owned by either the American people or by the US government itself, in part in the form of trust funds for Social Security and for other programs such as retirement accounts. Combined with high levels of personal debt, the massive US debt could eventually impact the future well-being of the American population if the US economy goes into yet another tailspin after that of 2008. And a very large percentage of the US gross national debt is due to US investments in nuclear weaponry and infrastructure since the beginning of the Cold War, plus borrowing for the US-led military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq since the September 11, 2001, attacks. (See discussion, chapter 2.)

  The general danger is that the significant dependence of the United States upon foreign capital (primarily Chinese and Japanese), coupled with a substantial US current account and trade deficit, has historically resulted in an increase in domestic protectionist pressures. And this dependence on foreign capital could mean that the United States will be impacted by the vagaries of Chinese governmental policies—since China is not an US ally.10 Beijing's control over a significant portion of the US debt accordingly makes it difficult for Washington to challenge Chinese policies and provides Beijing with considerable political-economic leverage over the United States, given its occasional threats to sell its dollar holdings.

  It is true that, at the present time, Beijing's threat to sell its US dollar Treasury holdings would lead the value of the US dollar to drop and the price of Chinese exports to the United States to rise. So it is dubious that Beijing would act on those threats any time soon. But in the not-so-long term, Beijing could opt to sell its US Treasury holdings—likely only once it had sufficiently expanded China's domestic consumption for its own products by augmenting incomes, while also expanding its exports to the markets of countries other than the United States.

  In this regard, China is, in fact, expanding its regional and global markets though its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and through the funds invested by the Chinese Investment Corporation and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (which Beijing sees as a means to counter to the US-dominated World Bank and International Monetary Fund, or IMF). And, given Trump's own hastily conceived decision to dump the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), China will be able to more easily pursue its major new trade accord, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes Russia and possibly India—and which could soon become the largest trading bloc in the world.

  The danger is that this US political-economic battle with China coul
d soon play itself out in real battle zones in the Indo-Pacific region. Such a scenario could prove plausible once China develops sufficient military capabilities, with Russian backing, to protect its political-economic interests throughout the Indo-Pacific and overseas, including in Latin America and the Caribbean. It also depends on how Japan will react to the Chinese quest for regional, if not global, hegemony. Already there are signs of increasing Japanese militarization in response to both China's burgeoning military capabilities and North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons provocations. And Tokyo could, somewhat like Beijing, try to use its own holdings of US debt as leverage to draw the United States to defend Japanese interests. (See chapter 6.)

  FOCAL POINTS OF CONFLICT AND ALLIANCES

  Trump believes that he will be able to preserve American hegemony by engaging in one of the greatest military buildups in US, if not in world, history. Such a major US military buildup, combined with a NATO and Japanese military buildup, Trump believes, will preserve peace with Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and other states and anti-state movements that might attempt to challenge US hegemony in their specific regions. As he put it, “nobody will dare question our military might again. We believe in peace through strength, and that's what we'll have.”11

  Yet the situation is not quite so simple. Trump's foreign-policy flip flops over Crimea and Taiwan are extremely significant in that the primary geo-strategic, military, and political-economic tensions between the United States/NATO and Russia and between the United States, Japan, and China, revolve to a large extent around these two focal points respectively. In terms of geo-strategic and political-economic interests, both Crimea and Taiwan appear as crucial as the island of Gibraltar or the Falkland Islands for the United Kingdom, or the Panama Canal for the United States. In this perspective, Russian claims to Crimea appear to parallel Chinese claims to both Taiwan and islands in the South and East China Seas—as stated by US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in his testimony before Congress.12

  Focal points of conflict represent areas where differing powers struggle for access to raw materials and markets, seek to secure spheres of influence and security, and attempt to establish geostrategic positions for defense or attack. In addition to Taiwan and Crimea, other focal points include Russian-controlled Kaliningrad, which most immediately impacts Poland, the Baltic states, Sweden, the European Union, and NATO. Disputes in the Black Sea region and Caucasus (Russia vs. Georgia; Azerbaijan vs. Armenia; pan-Islamist movements in Dagestan and elsewhere in the Russian-controlled Caucasus) similarly impact directly or indirectly the global geo-economic interests of the United States, the European Union, NATO, Turkey, and Russia. Disputes over differing islands in the South China and East China Seas impact the United States, Japan, and China, as well as the neighboring countries.

  This is not to overlook how the burgeoning tensions over North Korea's nuclear program impact South Korea, Japan, and the United States, as well as China and Russia. The ongoing proxy wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and elsewhere throughout the wider Middle East between Saudi Arabia and Iran, represent focal points that have already drawn Russia, Iran, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, France, and the United States into the conflict in Syria, with many of the anti-Assad militias financed by Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states or Turkey. US and NATO intervention in Afghanistan, and Indian-Pakistani rivalry over Kashmir, is beginning to draw in China and Russia. There is furthermore a real possibility that sociopolitical conflicts in Mexico and Venezuela, and other countries in Central America and the Caribbean, in part related to drug wars, could begin to draw the United States—if not NATO for the first time as well—into different forms of police or military intervention, as occurred during (and before) the Cold War.

  The above areas all represent focal points of conflict that could either spark a major power war or else become theaters of conflict once a major power war breaks out. New regional or major power wars could soon be sparked if the geo-strategic, military, and political-economic disputes that surround these territories are not managed carefully and prudently. And in the background behind each of these conflicts there are deeper geostrategic and political-economic concerns that are often combined with politico-economic instability and domestic crisis. One of these major issues that could generate major power war is the potential breakup of the Russian-led Collective Security Pact (CSTO), as feared by Moscow, and the potential breakup of NATO, as feared by Washington.

  RECIPROCAL FEARS OF THE POTENTIAL BREAKUP OF NATO, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE RUSSIAN-LED CSTO

  After seeking to check the NATO and EU double enlargement into Ukraine by annexing Crimea and by supporting “autonomist” forces in the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, Moscow now fears the “loss” of Belarus and the potential breakup of its Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Moscow likewise opposes the further encroachment of NATO influence into Russian-proclaimed spheres of influence and security in the Black Sea region. At the same time, Moscow fears the possibility that Russian Federation itself will begin to disaggregate in the face of the NATO and EU double enlargement, combined with the rise of pan-Islamist secessionist movements within Russia itself. This is not to overlook the pressure of so-called democracy movements inside the Russian Federation or else regional secessionist movements in Kaliningrad and in Siberia. (If the latter, for example, were to secede from the Russian Federation, Moscow would not be able to benefit from Siberia's significant oil and gas wealth.13)

  The possible disaggregation of the Russian Federation itself is exacerbated by the fact that certain regions are nearly bankrupt, a factor that caused protest in 2017 throughout the country, and not just in Moscow.14 And unlike the disaggregation of the Soviet Union, the feared disaggregation of the Russian Federation could lead Moscow to engage in a full-scale Russian political-military buildup, which could involve more vengeful Russian actions that are intended to undermine US interests. Given the rise of a new Russian nationalism, it appears dubious that a new Russian reformer, somewhat similar to former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, will be able come to power once Vladimir Putin eventually steps down.

  While Moscow fears the eventual breakup of the CSTO, Washington somewhat similarly fears the potential breakup of NATO but for differing reasons. As Turkey becomes an illiberal democracy, it could potentially break away from NATO, for example. Some NATO members, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria, are beginning to seek closer relations with Moscow, while NATO member Poland appears to be sliding toward authoritarianism—even if it is a strong supporter of NATO. Most problematic, both the French far right and far left strongly oppose NATO membership, as do most far-right and far-left groups in Europe.

  On the one hand, Trump-Pence administration pressures on NATO members to raise defense spending to 2 percent of their GDP could lead some states—specifically those that are in a dire financial situation—to drop out of the alliance. On the other, even an economically powerful state, such as Germany, could drop out of NATO if Berlin enters into a trade war with the United States over sanctions on Russia, among other disputes, and in the effort to forge an all-European system of security and defense. A relatively more independent Europe could then seek a separate accord with Russia or, more likely, with China. In fact, Trump's June 2017 decision to drop out of the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 21), coupled with major disputes with Russia, could help press the Europeans into closer political-economic and technological relations with China. Ironically, Trump's decision against the COP 21 appears to contradict his own concept of America First—that is, if that concept can be defined to mean that the United States should take leadership in innovation. (See chapters 4 and 10.)

  Added to the US fear of a breakup of NATO is the potential breakup of the European Union after the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union (Brexit). Trump's proclaimed indifference to the European Union after Brexit—coupled with his ideological support for anti-EU, anti-NATO nationalist movements, combined with v
ery strong criticism of Germany as the political-economic leader of the European Union—have risked undermining the European Union, even if Trump has attempted to backtrack from his previous positions.

  One of the major reasons for the Trump-Pence administration to so suddenly reverse course and no longer call NATO “obsolete”—and to speak so highly of both NATO and the “wonderful” EU—is precisely to whip US allies into line. In effect, US efforts to boost NATO defense spending is intended to tighten the defense relations of NATO allies against their common foes. But high levels of defense spending will not resolve the financial crisis impacting European economies. Instead, high defense spending could exacerbate that crisis through increased government borrowing to pay for military capabilities. As the Trump-Pence administration seeks to press US allies (in Europe, in Asia, and in the wider Middle East) to spend more on defense (generally expecting those allies to “buy American”), Trump's America appears to be acting somewhat like ancient Athens as the latter tried to force its allies to pay their dues in the struggle against Sparta during the Peloponnesian War.

  In effect, both Washington and Moscow have been attempting to whip their respective NATO and CSTO allies in line—while concurrently probing the weaknesses of the rival alliance. For its part, Moscow has sought to strengthen its ties to China and Iran while also boosting its own defense capabilities in an effort to strengthen the defense relations of its CSTO allies against their common foes. Moscow has also hoped to counter US nuclear and conventional force superiority by asymmetrical military means—leading to a new arms race.

  THE NEW ARMS RACE

  Initially, during his presidential campaign, and in the early days of his presidency, Trump had proposed to reduce US and Russian nuclear weaponry—in the optimistic assumption that he would be able to make an arms deal with President Putin that would then eliminate economic sanctions placed on Moscow after its annexation of Crimea in 2014, for example. Yet once becoming president, Trump has planned to surpass Obama's own nuclear and conventional force military buildup—in order to pressure Moscow and other recalcitrant states to make deals on US terms in accord with the maxim: Peace through Strength.15 Trump wants the Pentagon to engage in a much larger and costlier conventional and nuclear weapons buildup than that which Obama had reluctantly initiated in the midst of his second term.16