World War Trump

by Hall Gardner

  The concern raised here is that nationalist America First Trump-Pence administration ideology tends to undermine the crucial need for concerted multilateral diplomatic efforts to achieve global peace through international organizations such as the United Nations, the OSCE, and even more practically through multilateral Contact Groups, among other intergovernmental and nongovernmental inter-social and inter-religious forums that can help find solutions to disputes and conflicts between differing states and societies. The option of joint sovereignty arrangements, for example, backed by the United Nations, the OSCE, or a proposed Asian OSCE-like forum, may represent options that can help resolve interstate disputes over islands in the Indo-Pacific, if not over Crimea or elsewhere.

  If the Trump-Pence administration continues to spout America First nationalism—in such a way that Washington might not envision where and when it is absolutely necessary to compromise or concede on presumed vital interests—World War Trump could well be the result.

  Most Americans—if not most of the world—were not expecting Donald Trump to be elected as the forty-fifth president of the United States.1 Trump nevertheless obtained a solid victory in the electoral college by gaining the majority of Midwestern and Southern states. His rival, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, actually won the popular vote by a colossal 2.8 million votes. Yet Clinton's electoral college votes, primarily from coastal states, were not sufficient to win the presidency. Had she obtained roughly 80,000 votes to win a few key states, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, she might have won the election.2

  Much as was the case for the victory of George W. Bush, who had won his second presidential term in 2000 against his Democratic opponent, Al Gore, after winning the electoral college votes by a slim majority, Trump's victory once again raised significant questions as to whether the American system of democracy needs major reforms. Even though it was only the fifth time in US history that a president had won the election without winning the popular vote,3 some form of electoral reforms appear necessary in the short run. In the longer term, a restructuration of the fifty-state system may prove necessary—given significant federal, state, and local debts and huge imbalances in the population sizes and industrial/rural areas across the fifty American states. (See chapter 10.)

  PROTEST AT THE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION

  Trump's inauguration festivities were confronted by a predominantly peaceful protest of an estimated 500,000 demonstrators (with some estimates as high as 2 million) in Washington, DC—out of an estimated 4.5 million people also protesting throughout the country and much of the world. There were some acts of violence: in Washington, DC, some 209 of the 230 individuals arrested, including journalists, medics, and legal advisers, were charged with felony rioting. This raised fears that Trump could engage in a future crackdown on journalistic freedom.4

  These inauguration protests attracted many more people than initially expected—and many more than those who came to hail Trump on the day of his inauguration—although this latter fact was denied by the Trump administration as “fake news.” The demonstrators had marched on Washington to protest Trump's proposed policies with respect to women, ethnic minority groups, the LGBTQ communities, and in opposition to his campaign pledges to eliminate key environmental programs, develop highly polluting shale energy, and to make deep budget cuts in governmental programs that deal with social issues. (This is not to overlook opposition to his plans for funding a major military buildup.) The protests put Trump on warning that he does need to address the concerns of all Americans—even those who proclaim, “Trump is not my president!”

  TRUMP'S DECREES

  Once in power, Trump almost immediately launched an attack on the “progressive” or “egalitarian” domestic American policies that are generally demanded by both radical and liberal Democrats. In opposition to President Obama's essentially liberal policies, Trump's nationalist America First policy has generally opposed multilateralism, international trade pacts, arms control, high taxes on corporations and wealthy individuals, and strong federal-government regulation with respect to environmental protection, healthcare, gun control, and US-government backing for the political and legal rights and entitlements of women, minority groups, and immigrants.

  Assuming Trump can eventually push his agenda through a Republican-dominated Congress—which will not be so easy, given the fact that not all Republicans necessarily support his policies—some of his proposed reforms appear to promise a boon for a number of corporations (depending on the sector), the banks, and the military-industrial complex in particular. In essence, Trump seeks to dismantle many federal government programs—in seeking budget cuts of up to $3.6 trillion over the next decade—while seeking to boost military spending considerably.

  Trump's decrees are generally—but not necessarily—seen as welcome by a number of private enterprises and corporations, particularly given his promises to reduce corporate taxes significantly.5 Trump initially promised major corporate tax cuts (down to 15-20 percent from 35 percent); cuts in federal regulations (including the banking/finance sector) by 75 percent, if not by more; and a controversial protectionist import or border tax of 20 percent to 35 percent. Yet Trump's tax cut proposals could increase the national debt by $3 to 7 trillion over the next decade.6

  In order to reduce competition in the name of “economic nationalism,” Trump furthermore promised to place a high tax on products from countries such as Germany, Japan, Mexico, China, and others. Trump likewise criticized American automobile firms that build cars in lower-cost foreign factories. Trump's proposals appeared to ignore the fact that many of these countries are highly dependent on the US market, and that many of these products are manufactured abroad by US-based multinational corporations. Moreover, his initial plans to tighten immigration controls were not necessarily seen as positive for agro-industrial firms, food services, restaurants, and retail concerns, as well as short-term construction projects or agricultural needs that often seek out both authorized and unauthorized immigrant labor. Here it has been argued that US firms need the influx of migrant labor, given the fact that the US harvest requires between 1.5 million and 2.2 million workers annually and at least 50–70 percent of farm laborers in the United States are unauthorized. If the United States did not actually face a shortage of labor in agricultural production, the US GDP would have grown by almost $12.4 billion in 2012 and would have produced almost $4.9 billion more in annual farm revenues.7

  In his first hundred days of office, Trump issued more executive orders than any president since Harry Truman—despite previously criticizing Barack Obama for engaging in “major power grabs of authority.”8

  THE GROWING GAP IN WEALTH

  One of the issues that is beginning to delegitimize the American system of governance both at home and abroad is the growing gap between the very wealthy in the United States and the rest of population. In a word, as it takes either tremendous wealth—or else access to finance—just to run for office, the United States is beginning to look like it is being run as a plutocracy. In the United States, the median top 5 percent of households possess more than ninety times the wealth of the median US family.9 In his presidential campaign, despite his own considerable wealth, Trump himself had denounced outrageously high CEO pay. The chief executive officers (CEOs) of America's biggest companies can earn at least three times more than they did twenty years ago and at least ten times more than thirty years ago.10 Some estimates put CEO pay at 373 times the average worker's pay.11 Once he became president, however, Trump's proclaimed concerns with income inequities were quickly forgotten.

  Ironically, the independent political machine of Donald Trump, the billionaire, actually spent less money to win the election than did the well-oiled Democratic machine of Hillary Clinton. The total amount spent for the election process is outrageous. Clinton spent almost $1.2 billion, and lost—because of the electoral college. Trump won the electoral college but spent only a little over half of what Clinton spent, rou
ghly $650 million. Trump also needed less money because he was able to use some $66 million of his own money, his own private jet, and other Trump facilities.12

  Trump has furthermore surrounded himself with wealthy advisers—showing a nepotistic penchant for members of his own family.13 Trump has packed his Cabinet and administration with a number of individuals who are highly successful in financial terms but who do not necessarily possess significant (or any) governmental and political experience. Trump prefers to support those whom he believes represent real world “success”—as opposed to the input from academic and policy experts. And if Trump's appointees are not wealthy individuals, then they often possess considerable military experience—as has been the case with his National Security Council.14 The careers of many of the latter individuals (including John Kelly as chief of staff, Jim Mattis as head of the Pentagon, and H. R. McMaster as National Security Advisor) appear heavy on military experience yet lighter on expertise in the areas of diplomacy and diplomatic engagement. Trump's dual emphasis on leadership from the corporate world and from military is taking place at the same time as he seeks to cut funding for the State Department and foreign service—all in a global situation in which effective diplomacy is most needed. At the time of Trump's first one hundred days of office, there were still about two hundred positions at the State Department that required Senate confirmation. The United States lacked ambassadors to NATO, the European Union, France, Germany, and Russia. For some very important diplomatic positions, Trump has been very slow to name nominees, while some of his appointments have questionable or politically biased qualifications.15

  Yet the very fact that Trump has put the new captains of industry, high tech, and finance, and high-ranking military, in charge of governmental affairs, symbolically puts the capitalist system and the military-industrial complex on trial for the American population and the world.16 In other words, Trump's success or failure could prove symbolic for the success or failure of capitalism and the American democracy as well. (See chapter 10.)

  From this perspective, the very nature of the Trump administration serves as evidence that the United States is ruled by a wealthy plutocracy—and not by the neo-liberal myth of meritocracy.17 Moreover, Trump's policies of high defense spending—what is called military Keynesianism18—appear to advocate a new form of supply-side trickle-down economics for the greater benefit of the defense-sector industries that are spread across most of the fifty US states. Trump has promised that the tremendous benefits accrued by the wealthy through tax reductions and for the military-industrial complex will eventually be passed down to the middle class and poor—but without any political guarantees whatsoever that that will prove to be the case.

  POST-OBAMACARE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR DOMESTIC SOCIAL PROTEST AND VIOLENCE

  In many ways, the growing gap in wealth in the United States is clearly illustrated by the lack of healthcare for many Americans. Trump's policies include the abolition of “ObamaCare” (the Affordable Health Care Act, or ACA), which is generally seen as very costly for business.19 And while Trump has promised to remake the Affordable Care Act, given its costs, he also, at least initially, promised not to cut Social Security, Medicare, and other entitlements. Because Medicare and Medicaid provide coverage for around 70 million poor, disabled, and elderly people, it is politically risky to touch; but this has not stopped some Republicans from so doing. Yet the potential failure of Trump to deliver on his promises to achieve a more effective healthcare system could substantially augment social discontent in the United States—at the same time that federal, state, and local debts continue to skyrocket to over $23 trillion—which is now over 100 percent of the US GDP.20

  By the end of September 2017, the predominantly Republican Congress was not able to find a way to replace the ACA. Influential Republicans such as Susan Collins, John McCain, and Lisa Murkowski, and libertarian Rand Paul, all opposed the Graham-Cassidy repeal measure to replace it.21 Saner individuals realized that Republicans had not put together a viable option. Following the publication of the first version of Republican (GOP) healthcare plan in March 2017, it had been projected by the Congressional Budget Office that 14 million more people would be uninsured under the GOP legislation than under current law by 2018. Then, following the additional proposed changes to subsidies for insurance, the increase in the number of uninsured people relative to the number under current law was expected to rise to 21 million in 2020 and then to 24 million in 2026 under the March 2017 GOP proposal. If it had passed, the GOP plan could have meant that millions of people with preexisting conditions could find themselves priced out of the market.22

  Those who supported the proposals argued that the first GOP plan would reduce the federal deficit by $337 billion in first decade—but most likely at the price of considerable domestic American discontentment and protest.23 The failure to replace Obama's ACA divided the Republican Party and represented a major defeat for Trump. But this defeat will not prevent future efforts to reform ObamaCare, hopefully more prudently, with the advice of experts from both nongovernmental advocacy groups and healthcare providers, and with greater consideration for all political perspectives. Job insecurity and lack of health insurance are both factors that can undermine ideological support for the American system of democratic governance, resulting in social protest, if not increasing drug abuse, criminality, and violence. Washington must eventually work out a more fair and equitable deal on these issues.

  US GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE

  The Obama administration had to manage a number of mass urban protests and violence, somewhat reminiscent of urban protests of the 1960s and early 1970s. These protests were often in response to police killings of unarmed individuals—one factor that helped to generate the sociopolitical movement Black Lives Matter, among others. In the current situation, race relations appear to be deteriorating even further. And depending in part on the general level of employment, unemployment, and underemployment,24 the situation could deteriorate even further.

  It is consequently not surprising that a significant April 2017 opinion poll indicated that 36 percent of those interviewed believed that racism and bigotry are an imminent threat to the country (up from 29 percent from two years ago), while 23 percent thought it was serious (up from 22 percent). In other words, almost 60 percent of those interviewed believed racism was on the rise.25 The poll also expressed concern that Americans believed that they were losing their rights to freedom of speech. If accurate, this poll forewarns of greater domestic American violence ahead. Such violence could be mixed with acts of differing forms of race-related “terrorism” for and against minority groups—combined with both pro- and anti-Islamist “terrorist” actions. And the poll had been taken prior to the violent clashes in which white supremacists, neo-Nazis, and the Ku Klux Klan took the offensive against peaceful counterprotesters in Charlottesville, Virginia, in a counterprotest that took place in August 2017 during a “Unite the Right” demonstration.26

  The issue of dealing with protest and social discontent is complicated by the some of the completely understandable difficulties that the American police force will confront in dealing with new spates of urban protest. The problem is that even initially peaceful urban protests will tend to be tainted by fears of acts of terrorism. These fears could in turn generate excessive reactions by law enforcement officers, thereby resulting in unnecessary police violence and acts of repression. Trump's often crude, blatantly chauvinistic, and vociferous style of public speech has not done much to calm the situation, and a number of far-right groups and white supremacist leaders, such as former imperial wizard of the KKK David Duke and Richard B. Spencer, the president of the National Policy Institute (a white supremacist think tank), believe that they possess Trump's tacit support, given his refusal to strongly condemn their movements.27 This belief is also due to Trump's ongoing relationship with his right-wing former National Security Advisor, Steve Bannon.28

  In the effort to prevent police violenc
e from reoccurring, Trump has promised to provide local police with sufficient resources to be able to build better relationships in their immediate community. At the same time, Trump has also threatened to engage in tougher measures than did the Obama administration in order to control urban violence, drug use, and crime. One of his proposals is to adopt the controversial and dubiously effective “stop-and-frisk” practice nationwide. This, however, implies an expansion of police powers that could be deemed unconstitutional, depending on the way the stop-and-frisk procedure is carried out.29

  Backed by the National Rifle Association (NRA), one of the most powerful lobbies in the country, Trump has been a strong opponent of gun control, although he has publicly opposed the sale of assault weapons.30 Yet if accepted into law, his proposed policies could make it easier for both “good” and “bad” guys to obtain weaponry and then carry that weaponry across the country.31 Permission to take weapons across state lines is thus being proposed in an era in which mass shootings for different personal and ideological motives—and not only Islamist—appear to be becoming more frequent and more lethal in terms of the number of people killed, as illustrated, for example, by the October 1, 2017, mass shooting in Las Vegas.32 (See chapter 3.)

  At the same time, however, handguns and rifles are not the only problem. In the new age of hybrid warfare, everyday technologies and chemicals/substances can become weapons. Airplanes (as on September 11, 2001), trucks (as in Nice, France, on July 14, 2016 and in New York City on October 31, 2017), and fertilizer bombs soaked in diesel fuel and other chemicals (as in the left-wing bombing of the University of Wisconsin-Madison Army Mathematics Research Center in protest of the Vietnam War in 1970 and the right-wing Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 1995), can also be used for purposes of mass killing—whatever the social or political cause might be.