World War Trump

by Hall Gardner

  Much as Aristotle pointed out more than two thousand years ago, it is when the “distant threat” can be brought home, and into one's daily life, that the possibility of war with a distant power or powers becomes much more viable.66 And once the distant threat is brought home, then the burdens of militarization, if not the sacrifices of war, can be met with greater toleration by the society once the general population can actually see how that otherwise “distant threat” actually challenges their safety and way of life. And the possibility of war abroad is then further exacerbated by the perceived threat of “enemies” at home—who are seen as opposing, whether peacefully or violently, the politics and goals of those in power—thus undermining the legitimacy and effective ability of the powerful to rule.

  There is a real risk that a number of Trump administration policies that tend to encourage US protectionism and “economic nationalism” will likewise help to legitimize both far-right-wing and far-left-wing anti-EU and anti-NATO political parties throughout Europe. And if Trump continues to push for increased military expenditure for an ongoing NATO enlargement, coupled with a policy of strong US and EU sanctions on Moscow that are seen as harming European political-economic interests, such a policy could backfire. This could cause some states to abandon EU and/or NATO membership—without necessarily implementing constructive and viable alternatives. Wolfgang Ischinger, head of the Munich Security Conference, and a former German senior diplomat, warned: “Is President Trump going to continue a tradition of half a century of being supportive of the project of European integration, or is he going to continue to advocate EU member countries to follow the Brexit example?…If he did that, it would amount to a kind of nonmilitary declaration of war. It would mean conflict between Europe and the United States. Is that what the US wants? Is that how he wishes to make America great again?”1

  Likewise, the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, warned that the collapse of the European Union could, for example, lead to war in the western Balkans. Juncker further stated that Trump's America First doctrine was scaring Europeans into thinking that the United States no longer cared for Europe.2 Soon after, Trump suddenly changed tune and claimed that the European Union was a “wonderful” organization.3

  Prior to becoming president, Trump initially claimed to be “indifferent” to the European Union—in addition to asserting that NATO was “obsolete.” But he nevertheless appeared to be actively seeking to undermine the European Union by encouraging states to leave that international regime, given his strong support for the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union (Brexit). Trump also engaged in strong attacks on Germany, which he sees as the major global economic competitor to the United States, given Germany's roughly $65 billion trade surplus with the United States. The risk is that Trump's America First policies could eventually open the door for Beijing and Moscow to play their own games of offering finance and trade (China) and energy and resources (Russia) to needy countries—in their effort to obtain greater political-economic influence inside Europe. And in destabilizing Europe—coupled with Russia's overt and covert backing for anti-EU and anti-NATO movements—Trump's policies could destabilize much of the world. (See chapter 1.)

  With respect to NATO, Trump had initially argued that NATO was obsolete due to the fact that it had been created during the Cold War, and because of its ostensible lack of relevance for the Global War on Terrorism, combined with the fact that not all of its membership spends the expected 2 percent of its GDP on defense. From Trump's perspective, this has forced Washington to remain the predominant provider of European and global security; the United States contributes some 70–75 percent of NATO's military capabilities—a fact that implies that the Europeans were free riders, paying for only 25–30 percent of total defense costs. Trump therefore made the provocative argument that the United States might not defend allies who did not pay their fair share of the NATO defense burden. Trump's statements accordingly appeared to downplay NATO's Article V defense commitment.

  Trump's negative positions toward NATO and the European Union appeared, at least on the surface, to reverse themselves by February 2017, once Vice President Pence spoke up for both NATO and the European Union. Countering European fears that Trump would abandon NATO and the European Union, Vice President Mike Pence rushed to Brussels in late February 2017 to declare “unwavering” US support for NATO and “unequivocal” support for the European Union—in a speech before an audience of skeptical European elites. The Belgium capital, Brussels, ironically, houses the offices of both the European Union and NATO. But the two rarely speak together, and when they do, they generally cannot find a common understanding!

  Vice President Pence accordingly gave a resounding “yes” to three crucial questions from EU Council-Consilium President Donald Tusk. The first question was whether the Trump administration was committed to maintaining an international order based on rules and laws. Tusk's second question was whether Trump was committed to NATO and to “the closest possible trans-Atlantic cooperation.” The third question was whether Europe could count, “as always in the past, on the United States’ wholehearted and unequivocal, let me repeat, unequivocal support for the idea of a united Europe.”4 By mid-February 2017, Trump himself suddenly changed tune, stating his strong support for the European Union and claiming that it was a “wonderful” organization.5

  Nevertheless, the Trump-Pence administration continued to warn that the alliance might cease to function altogether if allies did not contribute their share of the defense burden. This possibility was due to the fact that underspending on NATO eroded “the very foundation of our alliance,” in Mike Pence's words.6 Secretary of Defense Gen. James Mattis, put it this way: “America will meet its responsibilities, but if your nations do not want to see America moderate its commitment to the alliance, each of your capitals needs to show its support for our common defense.”7 At the May 2017 NATO summit in Brussels, Trump argued that even 2 percent of GDP (roughly $119 billion) would be “insufficient to close the gaps in modernizing, readiness, and the size of forces. Two percent is the bare minimum for confronting today's very real and very vicious threats.”8

  Vice President Pence likewise stated that some of the largest US allies still lacked “a clear and credible path” in order to build up their military capabilities to 2 percent of GDP.9 Here Germany, the main political-economic power in Europe, and major arms exporter to Qatar and Saudi Arabia (along with the United States10) is still below the mark and is considered “short of everything” from manpower to military equipment.11 And even though France spends more for defense than other NATO members, it has nevertheless reduced its actual capacities by roughly 50 percent under Presidents Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande.12

  Yet the problem is that even an increase in European defense spending will only prove helpful if is better coordinated by a European defense organization. Of the five countries that spend more than 2 percent of GDP on defense—the United Kingdom, Estonia, Poland, Greece, and the United States—Greece is more concerned with NATO member Turkey than it is with Russia. For its part, the United Kingdom still retains a global empire, as does the United States—so that European NATO is not its only defense and security concern. Romania has declared that it will reach 2 percent of GDP in 2017, while Latvia and Lithuania will also reach 2 percent. All three of the latter are primarily concerned with a potential Russian “threat,” as are Estonia and Poland. At the same time, it is not clear whether all NATO allies, including Germany, can or will fall in line with US demands to increase defense spending.13

  The real problem is that the two sides, the United States and Europeans, continue to divide on a number of key political and strategic questions. These questions involve the nature and costs of a NATO/European defense buildup, the Global War on Terrorism, as well as policies toward Russia, Ukraine, Iran, and China, and others. Here there are many issues where the United States and Europeans disagree and where the Europeans themselves disagree,
as eastern European states generally want NATO and the European Union to focus on Russia, while states such as France want NATO and the European Union to focus on the issues confronting the Mediterranean and the Global War on Terrorism. The question as to whether or not Ukraine and Georgia should become NATO members, for example, remained the unspoken “elephant in the room” in the NATO summit of May 2017. And, as to be argued, another option to forcing individual NATO countries to augment their defense spending would be to implement a post-Brexit European defense entity that would better coordinate defense spending. (See chapter 9.)

  TRUMP AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

  The new American nationalism risks playing with fire if Trump continues to engage in policies that would even indirectly support “economic nationalism” in Europe. The demise of the European Union risks the return of rabid nationalist rivalries inside Europe. This is because the rise of the European Union has played a historical role in helping to bring rivals France and Germany into cooperation with other the European powers—following the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1957 and the Franco-German decision to forge a common currency, the Euro.

  Trump had fully supported the British exit from the European Union (Brexit), and he stated his belief that other countries could soon leave the European Union as well.14 The so-called PIIGS states of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain—whose political economies need significant reforms in order remain in the Euro monetary system—could possibly drop out of the European Union. Greece is still suffering after reaching a crisis point at which it almost left the European Union.15 European austerity measures have resulted in cutting public expenditures, high unemployment, loss of pensions, the sale of public assets, plus efforts to raise taxes—in a situation in which the Greek economy has lost 25 percent of its former value. International efforts to bail Greece out have been promised only after Athens engages deep structural reforms and further austerity measures.16 Having already accumulated over €300 billion in bad loans, the possible collapse of Italian banks could impact much of Europe, including Austria, Greece, Spain, and Portugal.17 And if Italy fails, France may be next.

  Despite the election of the liberal-centrist and pro-EU Emmanuel Macron as president of France in April 2017, there is still a real possibility of a French exit from the European Union in the next five to ten years. If so, this would risk tearing apart the remaining Franco-German-EU political-economic and defense relationship. In dividing Europe, such an option is even more dangerous than the British exit—as the United Kingdom never shared a common currency with the European Union. Brexit and Frexit are not the same thing!

  While the United Kingdom will most likely continue to work with the Europeans through bilateral national security accords and through NATO, even if it is no longer a member of the European Union, it is highly unlikely that other states that leave the European Union will necessarily remain in NATO. Unlike the British conservatives, like Theresa May who backed Brexit, but who underscored the importance of NATO in her meeting with President Trump in January 2017, many continental Europeans, on the left, right, and even center, are anti-NATO.

  BREXIT AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

  Brexit nevertheless opens up a number of complex questions with respect to the United Kingdom's security and defense relationship with Ireland and Scotland and with the European Union as a whole; questions that indirectly impact NATO. As of September 2017, London plans to leave the European Union by March 2021—at a cost of about £40 billion and a slight loss of Britain's credit status thus far.

  First, the United Kingdom, which accounted for roughly 20 percent of European defense, will no longer be able to block all-European defense plans. This theoretically permits EU to press ahead with an all-European defense system, if France and Germany, the next two major EU actors, can gradually coordinate policies.18 At the same time, however, bilateral UK-French strategic nuclear accords reached at the 1998 Saint Malo agreement indicate the continuing need for bilateral UK-French nuclear-strategic and defense cooperation.19 In 2016, London and Paris agreed to deepen their joint efforts to develop missile technology. How Brexit will politically impact these bilateral UK-French accords, which are outside the NATO and EU context, remains to be seen.20

  Brexit also opens up a number of questions for Ireland and Scotland as members of the United Kingdom. Brexit raises border questions with Ireland, and once again raises the question of Northern Ireland's independence, given the fact that hundreds of thousands of Irish live in the United Kingdom and hundreds of thousands of UK-born and eastern European citizens reside in Ireland. Brexit also raises the issue as to how to regulate trade and traffic along the border of UK-controlled Northern Ireland and EU member Ireland. This concern led to UK Prime Minister Theresa May and Irish Prime Minister (the taoiseach) Enda Kenny reconfirming the 1998 Good Friday accords in Northern Ireland, which has led to peace through power-sharing between the Unionists (who want to remain in the United Kingdom) and the Irish nationalists.

  The issue of border controls has brought back memories of the Troubles—as British military outposts and customs posts were often attacked by the Irish Republican Army. If new border controls are implemented, and if the borders are not perceived to be free and “fluid,” they could once again become targets of new violent anti-UK movements by Irish militants who still hope to leave the United Kingdom—particularly if the aforementioned power-sharing arrangement reached in the 1998 Good Friday agreement continues to break down periodically, as it did in January 2017, for example.21

  Brexit could also lead to Scottish independence from the United Kingdom. This was proposed by Scottish Prime Minister Nicola Sturgeon, who has planned a second independence referendum for the fall 2018 to the spring 2019. Scottish nationalists have generally wanted to remain in the European Union, but not necessarily in the NATO “nuclear alliance”—given the Scottish National Party's (SNP's) opposition to nuclear weaponry. The Scottish independence issue impacts the future of the United Kingdom's Trident nuclear submarine system, which is based on the Clyde. Many Scots oppose Trident, as well as NATO/UK airbases in Scotland.

  An independent Scotland may also need to reapply to join the European Union, which could open monetary questions concerning the Scottish use of the British pound after Brexit. And if Scotland wants to remain in NATO, it might need the approval of the all NATO members. This could possibly be opposed by some states that do not want to encourage independence movements. NATO members Spain, Greece, Romania, and Slovakia, for example, did not want to recognize Kosovo independence, which was backed by the United States. Some sort of intermediary arrangement could possibly be worked out with both NATO and the European Union—but not without time-consuming negotiations.

  Brexit has also opened questions as to whether the United Kingdom or EU member Spain will control Gibraltar, which guards the gates of the Mediterranean. Like the people in Northern Ireland, the population in Gibraltar fears the possibilities of economic instability once they leave the European Union's external border. In addition, UK disputes with Argentina over the Falkland Islands appear to be returning. This is because Argentina believes that the European Union may no longer back British control over the islands after the 1982 UK-Argentine war. Argentina may seek to bargain post-Brexit bilateral accords with Britain in exchange for a return of the islands to Argentina. The region around the Falklands is rich in fishing, resource deposits, and oil. These concerns were responsible, at least in part, for the 1982 sea battle over the Falklands between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Just prior to that conflict, the option of joint sovereignty had been proposed as a way to forge a compromise and prevent war—but it failed to be implemented. (See chapter 10.)

  GERMANY

  Trump has argued that the European Union represents an “instrument of German domination designed with the purpose of beating the United States in international trade.”22 And largely because he sees the European Union as a mere instrument of German political-economic power
, Trump claims that he is basically “indifferent” as to whether or not the European Union will break up. Germany does represent a major economic competitor of the United States (in automobiles, for example, and given Germany's huge $65 billion trade surplus with the United States). But while it is true that Germany may dominate the economy of the European Union, that by itself is more reason to engage in political and economic reforms of the European Union, rather than lending support to those who want to break up it entirely. (For EU reform options, see chapter 9.) After discussions with Chancellor Angela Merkel, Trump stated: “Nevertheless, Germany owes vast sums of money to NATO & the United States must be paid more for the powerful, and very expensive, defense it provides to Germany!”23

  The issue raised here is that Trump's harsh criticism of Germany's immigration policy, plus his demands that Germany spend at least 2 percent on defense (Germany spent roughly 1.19 percent of GDP on defense in 2016), combined with threats to impose up to 35 percent border taxes on German products,24 could unleash a wave of thus far hidden anti-American nationalist forces in Germany and elsewhere, particularly after the right party, Alternative for Germany party (AfD), entered the Bundestag with roughly 13 percent of the vote in September 2017. (See discussion on right-wing parties, this chapter.)

  Although Germany hopes to diversify its energy sources, it has opposed strong US sanctions on Moscow that might interfere with the construction of Nord Stream 2, an energy pipeline that would run through the Baltic Sea, circumventing Ukraine. US sanctions could also hurt the financing of European firms doing business in Russia. Berlin has called the sanctions imposed by the “Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act” in August 2017 as illegal and has urged the European Union to take countermeasures—a step that could enter into a trade war if the United States and the European Union do not coordinate sanctions policy and negotiate the eventual lifting of sanctions together.25