World War Trump

by Hall Gardner

  Yet China's approach is not altogether altruistic. While China claims that its investment deals do not come with political strings attached, countries that want to trade with China must drop their recognition of Taiwan. China can drive hard bargains on interest rates for loans. And Chinese investment projects, which Beijing insists on controlling, often bring in Chinese labor via “gated communities” of workers who live and eat on the premises—instead of hiring local workers.

  When he had signed the TPP, Obama stated,

  Today, these countries signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership—a new type of trade deal that puts American workers first. Right now, the rules of global trade too often undermine our values and put our workers and businesses at a disadvantage. TPP will change that. It eliminates more than 18,000 taxes that various countries put on Made in America products. It promotes a free and open Internet and prevents unfair laws that restrict the free flow of data and information. It includes the strongest labor standards and environmental commitments in history—and, unlike in past agreements, these standards are fully enforceable. TPP allows America—and not countries like China—to write the rules of the road in the 21st century, which is especially important in a region as dynamic as the Asia-Pacific.26

  In effect, despite Obama's warnings and Trump's anti-Chinese rhetoric, it looks like Trump's anti-TPP policy will actually permit China to write the rules of the future as it develops the BRI and RCEP step-by-step in an effort to dominate world trade by 2050. This appears true unless India, Japan, South Korea, and Indonesia stall the RCEP, and if Japan and New Zealand can put together a revised TPP to counterbalance China. But here, the proposed participation of Taiwan in a revised TPP could spark tensions with China, as Taiwan could escape from Beijing's efforts to force countries not to recognize Taipei and thus isolate Taiwan in the global economy. Taiwan has formal state-to-state relations with only twenty countries, after Panama shifted to recognize Beijing in June 2017.27

  The question remains: if Trump does convince Beijing to invest heavily in the United States in the near future, and augment US exports to China, what political strings will be attached?

  MEXICO, LATIN AMERICA, AND CHINA AND RUSSIA

  From a global standpoint, America First protectionism also opens the door for Mexico to sell its products to China, and for China, India, and Russia to enter the Mexican market—in addition to obtaining greater political-economic influence in the rest of the Caribbean and Latin America—as is already the case in the highly unstable country of Venezuela.

  Trump's threats to expel Mexican immigrants, for example, and make Mexico pay for a US border wall/fence, in addition to threatening to place a “border tax” on imports from Mexico, could further destabilize a highly inequitable Mexican society.28 Such threats could exacerbate the drug and mafia wars inside Mexico and on the streets in urban America. They could furthermore force Mexico to look toward China, India, and Russia for trade, aid, and assistance.29 A Chinese geo-strategic foothold in Mexico, Venezuela, or elsewhere in the region could eventually be regarded as a challenge to the US Monroe Doctrine—particularly if China, backed by Russia, is eventually seen by Washington as trying to go too far.

  Beijing has rapidly extended its influence in Latin America. In 2000, the Chinese share of Latin American trade was merely 2 percent, while the US share was 53 percent. By 2010, the Chinese share had grown to 11 percent of the total; the United States share dropped to 39 percent. By 2016, the United States was still Latin America's overall top trade partner, but China became the top trade partner of Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. China has also been expected to overtake the European Union as the second largest trade partner of Latin America and the Caribbean in 2016.30 China has, for example, already initiated a new multilateral forum in 2014 with the CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States)—a forum that excludes the United States. And in addition to looking to China for trade, investment, and finance, Latin American states such as Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Argentina have begun to import Chinese arms.

  CHINA'S EFFORTS TO CONTROL GLOBAL SHIPPING

  In addition to its port investments in Asia (see discussion in this chapter), Beijing has sought to expand its interests in the geo-strategically sensitive region of the Panama Canal zone, acquiring Panama's largest seaport, Margarita Island Port, in May 2016. Margarita Port is part of the Colón Free Trade Zone, the largest free-trade zone in the Western Hemisphere and one of the world's major cargo distribution centers with sea-land-air-rail multimodal transport.31 Chinese elites are also looking to Nicaragua, given the proposed canal through the latter despite difficulties involving domestic opposition and environmental concerns.32 Chinese shipping companies have likewise been investing in Darwin, Australia; Athens, Greece (the Port of Piraeus in Greece is a gateway to Asia, eastern Europe, and North Africa); Istanbul, Turkey; and Venice, Italy—all as part of its BRI.

  The concern raised here is that Chinese shipping and port investment ventures raise questions in a global situation in which geostrategic/security issues and political-economic issues are becoming intertwined. The close ties between the Chinese government and Chinese shipping and investment firms raises questions as to whether these firms are operating in Beijing's military interests or strictly in China's economic interests.33

  CHINA AND RUSSIA ARE STILL IN CUBA

  With respect to China and Russian influence in Cuba, President Putin signed ten bilateral economic and commercial agreements in Cuba in July 2014 and then promised to forgive more than $35 billion in Cuban debt to the former Soviet Union, during a time when President Obama was seeking to formally recognize the country (the latter was achieved one year later, on July 1, 2015). Russia announced that it would invest in Cuban offshore oil exploration, while hoping to help other Caribbean countries develop energy sources as well. It has been reported that Moscow could also be seeking basing rights to refuel its long-range bombers in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Moscow and Havana have purportedly been seeking a deal to permit Russian intelligence-gathering vessels to operate off of the US East Coast and in the Gulf of Mexico through proposed logistical outposts for resupply, shore leave, and repairs.34

  Russian and Chinese backing for the Cuban government represents one factor in leading Trump to reverse some of Obama's policies that were intended to open US relations with the country. As of November 2017, Trump intends to restrict the ability of American citizens to engage with those Cuban businesses, restaurants, and hotels that possess close ties to Cuban government officials and the security services, as determined by the State Department.35 Yet such policies are likely to strengthen, not weaken, Cuban ties to China and Russia.

  THE CRISIS IN VENEZUELA

  Since 2007, China has loaned as much as $60 billion to Venezuela alone, out of more than $120 billion in Chinese loans and investments over Latin America as a whole. Access to Venezuelan oil has been the focal point of Chinese investment. Without Chinese finance, it is unlikely that the governments of Hugo Chavez and Nicolás Madder could have paid for their welfare and social programs that helped them to stay in power. Beijing has also been able to obtain many of the legal rights to Venezuelan oil and other natural resources throughout Latin America. In such a way, China has become the new social imperialist—once critiqued by Maoists.36

  The burgeoning civil war in Venezuela, has begun to impact the entire region. President Donald Trump labeled Venezuela's ongoing political and economic turmoil “a very very horrible problem” and placed sanctions on a number of corrupt government officials.37 Criminal human- and drug-trafficking organizations have begun to take advantage of black-market activities and the flight of refugees from the country. In a presumed effort to help provide stability in the region, NATO has been considering making Venezuela's neighbor, Colombia, NATO's first Latin American partner. NATO's rapprochement comes just after the historic peace deal between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FARC that ended th
e five-decade war that had killed more than 220,000 people and had left nearly eight million people as internal refugees. In addition to seeking to shield Colombia from sociopolitical instability from Venezuela, and securing the peace, NATO could seek to counterbalance Chinese and Russian influence in the near future.38

  Now that Venezuela is embroiled in civil conflict, it is not certain how either China, Russia, or the United States will react to the possibility of growing instability there and throughout the region. As the state collapses, Venezuelan finance from its oil exploitation will no longer provide funding for mismanaged countries in the region—thus exacerbating social tensions throughout Central and Latin America and the Caribbean. For its part, Moscow sees Venezuela as a strategic partner in the area, while China seeks Venezuelan oil and holds significant amounts of Venezuelan debt, which are generally repayable in oil and other forms of investment. At the same time, one can expect more problems in the Caribbean, which represents a major entry point for terrorist and drug financing.39

  In his September 2017 speech at the United Nations, President Trump threatened to intervene militarily, ostensibly in the effort to help Venezuelans “regain their democracy.”40 Yet a much better option would be for Washington to negotiate a domestic peace settlement in Venezuela by working with Havana, even if Trump may have spoiled relations with Cuba by placing sanctions on the country, as previously discussed. If the United States and Cuba can work together to resolve the domestic crisis in Venezuela, that approach may help the United States and Cuba to make amends as well.41 But if Trump does not attempt, or cannot obtain, a negotiated domestic settlement in Venezuela, his threats to intervene militarily could further polarize the world into rival alliances, with Latin America destabilized and Venezuela looking to Russia and China for arms.

  INDIA: THE KEY PIVOT STATE

  In addition to Latin America, Moscow and China appear to be working somewhat in tandem particularly in Eurasia. Moscow had initially hoped to work with China in the Chinese-inspired Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), founded in 2001, which seeks to expand security cooperation in Eurasia. The SCO is expected to include India and Pakistan as new members in 2017.42 This prospect has been symbolized by the annual trilateral summit between India, China, and Russia.43

  At the same time, however, Chinese-Russian strategic and energy ties today have become far more extensive than Russian-Indian ties as Russia and China increasingly coordinate their global policies. This has raised a question that will impact the global strategic balance: Will a presently neutral India reach out to a possible Eurasian alliance with China and Russia? Or will India move closer to the United States, Europeans, and Japan in opposition to China and Pakistan in particular? Or can India remain neutral and a potential mediator between the two blocs?

  Both China and Russia have been attempting to counter the tightening US-French-Japanese-Australian alliance, but China has been checking Russian efforts to draw India into a closer three-way defense collaboration despite Russian, Chinese, and Indian summitry; for example, Russia itself has moved closer to China than to India. China has vetoed India's application to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), despite Russia's request. As membership in the NSG would help legitimize New Delhi as a nuclear power, India sees China's attitude as representing an effort to keep India down as a major global actor. China also refused to permit India from participating in an April 2017 defense meeting with Russia.44 And a highly protectionist India has been hesitant to join the Chinese-backed RCEP, making it the potentially largest trade bloc in the world.

  In response to Russian efforts to forge a closer trilateral defense relationship with China and India, the United States and France have hoped to draw India away from Russian political-economic influence through arms sales. In addition, the United States, Japan, and Australia hope to work with India to deal with common security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad). For its part, India has only slowly begun to expand its defense ties with Japan and southeast Asian states. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi renamed India's policy toward the region from “Look East” to “Act East” in 2014. India is now the largest recipient of Japan's $35 billion overseas assistance for infrastructure development and for its “Make-in-India” manufacturing programs. Overall, India is seeking high technology to boost its defense-industrial base.45

  In March 2016, India held one of its largest military exercises on its territory, involving all ten ASEAN member states. ASEAN possesses close economic relationships with both India and China, yet the ASEAN countries generally remain wary of what they see as a Chinese policy of counter-encirclement through its “string of pearls” strategy. And China is the largest arms supplier for most of India's neighbors.

  The aforementioned “string of pearls” expression refers to port construction along the Indian Ocean, from Chittagong in Bangladesh, to Colombo Port City and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, to Gwadar in the Baluchistan province of Pakistan, and to the Maldives. Fears of China's military usage of these ports were raised in 2014 when a Chinese military submarine docked at the Chinese-owned facility at Colombo Port City, Sri Lanka—which represents a key trading hub between East Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, and thus one of the most prominent financial and commercial centers on China's Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road (or BRI).46 New Delhi has additionally been highly critical of Beijing's efforts to check freedom of the seas and has protested Chinese nuclear submarine patrols in the Bay of Bengal.

  India is additionally reaching out to Mongolia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Brunei—in part in an effort to establish maritime patrols to counter terrorism, piracy, and smuggling, and in part to counter Chinese influence.47 The Thai and Indian leadership have, for example, stated their intent to “enhance the ASEAN-India Strategic Partnership.”48 Thailand had reached out to China in 2015, yet relations with India appear to be taking priority. The two governments intend to prioritize the completion of the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway. This would establish a land route to Southeast Asia through India's northeast and help to counter Chinese political-economic influence in Pakistan.

  To counter China's influence in Southeast Asia and to affirm India's status as a rising global power, New Delhi needs to secure sea lines of communication, enhance security in the Malacca Strait trade route, and strengthen its trade relations with ASEAN. The problem, however, is that India, as compared to China, lacks the infrastructure that is required to support more trade with ASEAN. Until India enacts land and labor reforms to encourage manufacturing investments, China's trade with ASEAN will continue to surpass that of India. India likewise possesses difficulties in competing with China in Nepal, Bhutan, and other regional countries. China is the top source of imports for Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, for example, as well as for India; between 2010 and 2015, China's exports to Pakistan doubled.49

  In the summer of 2017, the Chinese and Indian militaries engaged in a face-off over the Siliguri “Chicken Neck” corridor in western Bhutan where the Chinese were constructing a mountain road seen as a potential strategic threat to India. New Delhi fears that if China would bring tanks and troops to the corridor, it could cut off India from its northeastern states in case of war. Tensions, however, calmed by the time of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) summit in September, but the issue of burgeoning Chinese political, economic, and military influence in Bhutan, Pakistan, and other regions remains.

  RUSSIAN AND CHINESE RELATIONS WITH INDIA

  Throughout the Cold War and immediately after, Moscow has largely sought to counterbalance the interests of India with those of China. In the past, Moscow wanted to make certain that India had a favorable military-technological balance vis-a-vis China. Now, however, Russia appears to be switching toward support of China, if not Pakistan as well. In terms of joint exercises, for example, Russia's military exercises with India tak
e place in the context of international UN peacekeeping operations. By contrast, Chinese-Russian military exercises have included maneuvers in which China and Russia have engaged in potentially offensive exercises.50

  Moscow thus appears to be tilting somewhat away from India as its preferred partner in defense sales and military cooperation. As previously discussed, Russia has been selling relatively more advanced weaponry systems to China—a fact that aggravates Indian security concerns.51 Yet as the United States and France and other arms suppliers have begun to enter the India defense market, Russia risks losing not only its arms market in India but also contracts for high technology. India has recently sought American economic and technological assistance to expand its own military and naval position in the Indian Ocean region. And it has purchased some $14 billion worth weapons and technology from the United States over the past decade, in seeking to augment its capabilities vis-à-vis China on the Himalayan border and in the Indian Ocean.52

  Given India's importance in Russian arms sales and foreign policy, Moscow accordingly fears that the Americans, French, and Japanese are beginning to cut Russia out of arms markets and other deals in India.53 This appears true even if the French Rafale may not hold up against China's (Russian-made) Su-35s, according to some experts.54 In short, both Moscow and Beijing have begun to support Pakistan more strongly, with Russia beginning to step back from its previous strong support for India.