World War Trump

by Hall Gardner

  For its part, Moscow, since its entry into the war in support of Bashar al-Assad's regime in September 2015, but which is not a member of the Global Coalition against Daesh, targeted not only the Islamic State but also most of the Syrian opposition forces. The latter have been backed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United States, and other states, plus Syrian Kurds, as they fight the regime of Assad. Yet the Trump-Pence administration upped the ante by bombing a Syrian airbase in April 2017 after the Assad regime had allegedly used chemical weapons in a region largely controlled by Jabhat al-Nusra (or al-Nusra Front).

  President Donald Trump's April 2017 decision to engage in so-called limited Tomahawk cruise missile attacks represents yet another flip-flop in Trump foreign policy. In September 2013, before Obama ruled out the use of airstrikes against Syria in the aftermath of the Assad regime's alleged use of chemical weaponry in favor of diplomacy with Russia, Trump had tweeted: “Again, to our very foolish leader, do not attack Syria - If you do many very bad things will happen & from that fight the US gets nothing!” Then, two days later, Trump tweeted: “President Obama, do not attack Syria…. There is no upside and tremendous downside. Save your ‘powder’ for another (and more important) day!”5

  On April 7, after months of domestic American criticism for being “soft” on Putin and on Russian allies, including Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, Trump opted to strike a Syrian airbase with fifty-nine Tomahawk cruise missiles—after ostensibly weighing all of the options in his new National Security Council cabinet.6 Trump, as he later admitted, reversed his previous opinions about Assad and Syria—to the chagrin of some of his strongest supporters and to the praise of his political opponents. Trump's adviser, Steve Bannon, had purportedly opposed the strikes, but was apparently overruled by Jared Kushner.7

  But in firing fifty-nine Tomahawk cruise missiles (at roughly one million dollars each8) at an airbase used by Russian military aircraft, Trump took the tremendous risk that he would not provoke some form of a Syrian or Russian retaliation at some point in the future. Putin's style is not to react immediately but to wait until conditions are in Russia's favor before he strikes back. And without UN Security Council backing, or even a legal justification on the grounds of self-defense, the Tomahawk strike nevertheless represents a unilateral decision that could open the door to additional unilateral and illegal actions—with potentially unexpected and dangerous consequences.

  The Pentagon is now engaged in at least seven very different, yet increasingly interrelated, wars in the “wider Middle East” in Afghanistan/Northern Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Somalia, while also imposing sanctions on Iran. Trump's actions (and particularly his backing for Israel and Saudi Arabia against Iran, as to be argued) risks a further widening of these conflicts. The problem is that even the use of more massive airstrikes will not address the root causes of these wars. A real strategy involving concerted diplomacy is needed. (See chapter 9.)

  In many ways, Trump's cruise missile attacks were intended to send a message that the United States is back in the game of global geopolitics, and that Washington would now be able to negotiate with Syria and Russia and other states from a “position of strength.” Washington hoped it would help press Moscow to reconsider its support for the Assad regime.9 (See discussion of US policy, this chapter.)

  Yet this ostensibly “limited” US military action has showed no sign of drawing Syria and Russia to the bargaining table: Moscow has not shown itself to be less willing to back the Assad regime. And the Tomahawk cruise missile strikes have definitely not changed North Korean, or even Iranian, policies. The question remains: why did Trump not ask for congressional or UN authorization?10 How will this action help to achieve peace—if it was intended to do so?

  One of the major reasons that President Obama had pulled backed from military intervention in Syria in 2013, after the Syrian regime allegedly used chemical weaponry at that time, was the fear that the intervention could result in the collapse of the Assad regime and rise of radical pan-Islamist forces without an effective government to take Assad's place. This issue has been made more complex by the fact that a number of so-called moderate forces (generally backed by Saudi Arabia or other Arab Gulf states) nevertheless possess ties with the militant Jabhat al-Nusra (which is linked to al-Qaeda), among other militant partisan movements that may oppose the United States, Europeans, Russians, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Because al-Nusra, among other militant Islamist groups, often possesses the best trained and effective fighting forces against the Assad regime, both Qatar and Saudi Arabia have often been seen as turning a blind eye to the private networks that support these groups financially. This was true at least in the past, before Riyadh and Doha joined the Global Coalition against Daesh in 2014. At the same time, suspicions between Qatar and Saudi Arabia still remain.11 (See discussion on the rupture of Saudi-Qatar relations, this chapter.)

  Not so ironically, Trump's Tomahawk cruise missile attacks in April 2017 were accordingly supported by the Islamic State and al-Nusra. One member of the Jaysh al-Islam faction argued that a single strike was “not enough”—as there were twenty-six airbases that strike civilians. In addition, IS appeared to take advantage of the strikes in a failed effort to retake the ancient city Palmyra in Syria's Homs Province. The Shayrat Airbase, located southeast of Homs city, which was attacked by the United States, was ironically the airbase that was being used by the Syrian Army to protect Palmyra against its destruction by the Islamic State, which had razed at least three temples and destroyed or tried to sell ancient artifacts from the World Heritage Site protected by UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization).

  Other non–al-Qaeda, non-IS groups, such as the Southern Front, saw the attacks as “political” and aimed primarily at Russia. A member of a Turkish-backed Sultan Murad group stated that it would “welcome any action that will put an end to the regime that is committing the worst crimes in history.”12 The National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces welcomed the strike and urged Washington to neutralize Syria's ability to carry out air raids. In general, the strikes were seen by opposition forces as much too limited to really engage in regime change—but regime change was evidently not the goal.

  Yet now that Trump (and not Obama) is in command, will there be “no upside and tremendous downside,” as Trump himself had previously warned when he had urged Obama not to engage in a military response to the alleged Syrian use of chemical weaponry? What would happen if the Syrian regime is accused of using chemical weapons again or else engages in a major massacre? Would this represent another “red line”? What would Trump do then?

  The major issue raised here is that even the use of force by the Trump-Pence administration will not necessarily bring about diplomatic compromise with either Syria, Russia, or other countries. In fact, after the cruise missile strikes, the Syrian regime purportedly offered the United States access to the airfield that the Pentagon had bombed; this was done only on the condition that the rebels likewise offer access to the site where the poisonous sarin gas was deployed, but which lies in territory held by the rebels.13 In addition, the Syrian regime was believed (although it was unclear which planes did the actual bombing) to have attacked the same opposition positions in Khan Shaykhun the very next day, from the same airbase that had just been hit by US cruise missiles. These attacks were aimed at the very same positions where the Syrian regime had allegedly used chemical weapons less than a day before.14

  The first issue is that Trump's attack blocked the possibility that the United Nations could rapidly begin to investigate who was actually behind the use of deadly chemicals. Some experts argue the evidence at the site of the attack tends to show that the regime did do it.15 The October 2017 Seventh Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism was “confident that the Syrian Arab Republic is responsible for the release of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017.”16 Yet the evidence prov
ided by the latter UN report is not absolutely verified.17

  Even though the Trump-Pence administration has claimed that it had intercepted Syrian messages that stated the plans to use chemical weaponry, Trump still could have waited and exposed the horror to the world. And Trump's action has not stopped the Syrian regime from continuing to kill by other means (including chemicals used in barrel bombs) in opposition to UN Resolution 2139, which had ordered all parties to the conflict in Syria to end the indiscriminate use of barrel bombs and other weapons in populated areas.18 The point is that a more concerted international approach to the use of chemical weaponry could have put even more diplomatic pressure on the Syrian regime.

  The second issue is the question, Why didn't Moscow use its advanced S-400 Triumph antimissile systems, which it had installed in 2015 on the Syrian coast in Latakia and that have raised Israeli security concerns? Could Putin have actually been complacent with Trump's decision to use force, after Trump gave Moscow notice of the cruise missile attacks? Or, more likely, did Moscow not want to demonstrate the S-400 system's capabilities—or its lack of capabilities? This issue raised a debate in Iran as to whether Russia's S-300 and S-400 air defense systems were even capable of thwarting the US Tomahawk missiles.19 And it also raises questions whether the US attack could now pressure Moscow to deliver more advanced weapons systems to Iran and other countries if US-Russian relations sour even further. Since 2014–2017, Moscow has considered sales of its advanced S-400 Triumph antimissile system to Iran,20 to China and India, as well as to close US allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia, as the latter hope to diversify their arms suppliers and not rely only on US weapons systems. With regard to both Iran and Saudi Arabia, the eventual deployment of more advanced Russian antimissile systems and other weaponry to these two countries could intensify Iranian proxy wars with Saudi Arabia in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

  US unilateral actions certainly made Moscow look weak. Moscow then cut off the US-Russian “hotline”—but then restored it after Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's discussions with Putin in April 2017. Yet despite the reinitiation of US-Russian talks in April, Moscow has nevertheless promised to bolster defenses with deployment of its most advanced Black Sea “carrier-killer” frigate into the eastern Mediterranean, which is to be deployed at its Tartus naval base. Moscow has increased the size of its naval and air force in the eastern Mediterranean—but these deployments are still not sufficient to counter US and NATO deployments.21

  The other issue is whether this attack represented an opening salvo for more attacks. Some congressional spokespersons have claimed that this was “one-time attack”22—a symbolic attack. But the US ambassador to the United Nations contradicted that statement. Ambassador Nikki Haley threatened Moscow with the following: “[The United States] is not going to have you cover for this regime anymore. And we're not going to allow things like this to happen to innocent people.”23 Haley further stated that the United States took a “moderate approach” but is still capable of doing much more. The question remains whether this action represents a first step toward “regime change,” perhaps more like Libya in 2011 than like Iraq in 2003. Or will Moscow be able to hold Assad in power?

  National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster has called for Moscow to rethink its support for the Syrian president, to reevaluate its actions, and to see that Russia could actually be part of the “solution” instead of part of the “problem.”24 But if the United States does not soon show how it can lead Moscow out of its Syrian debacle by means of a general settlement over all of the issues that divide the two sides—from Crimea to tactical nuclear weapons and missile defenses—then the confrontation between the United States, Europe, and Russia will only continue to augment, particularly if the two sides do not effectively coordinate strategy and end up “accidentally” striking each other's forces.

  INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS

  The US attack on Syria was met with strong public support from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, and much of the Sunni world, plus Japan, Australia, NATO, and the European Union. It was condemned by Russia, Belarus, Venezuela, Bolivia, Iran, and North Korea, while Brazil, Ireland, Switzerland, and China urged UN diplomacy.

  German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President François Hollande, for example, had issued a joint statement that declared that Bashar al-Assad “bears sole responsibility” for the US strike following the suspected chemical attack.25 But by contrast to the French and German positions, Washington pointed to Russian responsibility for not enforcing a 2013 agreement it brokered with Syria to eliminate its chemical weapons—in an effort to shame Moscow. As Rex Tillerson put it bluntly: “Clearly, Russia has failed in its responsibility to deliver on that commitment from 2013…. So either Russia has been complicit or Russia has been simply incompetent in its ability to deliver on its end of that agreement.”26

  The issue raised here is that the American position appears to put Putin in a bad light. Blaming Russia could make it more difficult for Putin to save face. The Trump-Pence administration may hope that Putin would put the blame on Assad for the use of such weaponry, in which case the United States and Russia could put joint pressure on Assad to step down. Yet so far this does not appear to be the case.

  For its part, Beijing warned against the “further deterioration of the situation”27 while also opposing the use of chemical weaponry under any circumstances. Nevertheless, Beijing stated that it would have preferred that the Trump administration conduct a complete investigation under UN auspices before engaging in the use of force. Beijing insisted that all parties continue to search for a “political solution.”28 Yet President Trump probably made too much over the fact that China abstained on the UN Security Council vote that dealt with the alleged use of chemical weaponry by the Syrian regime in April 2017. China has vetoed six UN resolutions related to Syria since the civil war began in 2013. But even if China did turn away from joining Russia in vetoing UN resolutions, it did not oppose Moscow's position either. At the same time, Beijing was worried that Trump might engage in cruise missile strikes against North Korea—given the fact that Bashar al-Assad's Syria is not the same as Kim Jong Un's North Korea. (See chapters 1 and 7.)

  UN Secretary-General António Guterres called for a diplomatic settlement. Guterres warned that there was “no other way to solve the conflict than through a political solution.” He continued, “Mindful of the risk of escalation, I appeal for restraint to avoid any acts that could deepen the suffering of the Syrian people.”29 The diplomatic dilemma has been how to get Moscow to withdraw support from Assad—but also to find a way to ensure a stable transition to an effective and more inclusive and legitimate new government.

  THE ISRAELI RESPONSE TO THE CRUISE MISSILE ATTACKS

  Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, stated that Trump had “sent a strong and clear message” that “the use and spread of chemical weapons will not be tolerated”; Israel has feared that such “game-changing” weapons, and more than 100,000 short-range missiles, armaments, could reach Hezbollah based in Lebanon.30 Israel has also engaged in military strikes in Syria when it believed that Syria or Iran was backing Hezbollah. Yet Israel is also aware of the fact that the US focus on the conflict in Syria tends to deflect criticism away from Israel—which has not yet made any progress toward resolving its conflict with the Palestinians. Yet lack of progress in peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, coupled with a Saudi-Israeli rapprochement, helps to fuel the propaganda machines of differing Islamist movements. (See chapter 9.)

  THE SAUDI RESPONSE

  A Saudi foreign ministry official praised Trump as “courageous” for taking action when “the international community has failed to put a halt to the regime's actions.”31 Riyadh not only has supported Syrian opposition forces but also has been involved in a proxy war with Iran throughout the wider Middle East, in Iraq and Yemen, while secretly seeking closer strategic cooperation with Israel.

  In Y
emen, Riyadh has been accused of severe human rights violations in its battle against Iranian-backed Houthis. As of 2016, more than ten thousand civilians have died in the conflict in Yemen, which has been confronted with a major cholera epidemic that has infected over 600,000 people and mass starvation as a result of the Saudi embargo.32

  In effect, Riyadh fears Iranian efforts to infiltrate Yemen through its support for Houthis. Riyadh's brutal military intervention is intended both to cut off the Iranian arms supply and to make the Houthis think twice about aligning with Iran. The Saudis fear that Iran could ultimately gain a geostrategic foothold in the Gulf of Aden. The UN Special Envoy to Yemen, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, has hoped to convince Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, president of Yemen, that a UN-sponsored peace agreement, “including a well-articulated security plan and the formation of an inclusive government, is the only way to end the war that has fuelled the development of terrorism in Yemen and the region.”33 The UN plan would strengthen the powers of the vice president, who would oversee elections that would lead to a coalition government that would provide Houthi representation on the basis of power-sharing. A domestic political settlement could then help to end Saudi-Iranian rivalry over which state controls Yemen and the narrow Bab el-Mandeb maritime chokepoint, which in turn oversees naval access and trade to and from the Red Sea. Riyadh fears an Iranian or an al-Qaeda foothold in the region that could potentially block the passage of commercial shipping through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, in which approximately 3.3 million barrels a day of oil cargoes pass from the Gulf to Western ports.34