The Peace of Amiens

by Nicholas Sumner

  ​It was decided to encourage Oman to proceed to full independence within the Commonwealth while the British retained the Musandam Peninsular which jutted out into the Persian Gulf forming the southern ‘lip’ of the bottleneck of the Straits of Hormuz. Ra’s Musanda, an arid rock that would have been an island were it not connected to the mainland by a narrow isthmus, had several natural harbours suitable to be turned into small naval bases, the most promising of which seemed to be Kumzar.

  ​By controlling, Kuwait, Bushier, Bahrain, Qatar, the Musandam peninsular and Aden, the British also controlled the passage of oil to the Suez Canal. This further mitigated against the suggestion by the Mosley committee to build a pipeline across Iraq and Jordan to Palestine.

  ​As previously noted, Aden and Bushier were already Crown Colonies. Iraq was self-governing and had essentially achieved independence in 1932. However, as the Iraqi revolt of 1941 had shown, the country was being wooed by Germany and Britain retained its protectorate status to warn the Germans off. In spite of this, Iraq was regarded as a territory to be got rid of as soon as the German issue was resolved. Jordan was economically backward but Britain retained protectorate status rather than court the possibility of the country falling into the orbit of the Axis powers.

  ​This left only Italian-occupied British Somaliland. While the outgoing Labour Administration seemed content to accept the status quo, Eden declared that ‘Somaliland would be returned to British Administration as soon as was practicable.’ a statement of intent that attracted an outburst of derision from Benito Mussolini.

  THE MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL

  The recommendations of the committee were followed for Malta and Gibraltar – the two territories were too strategically important to forego. Cyprus presented an altogether more difficult problem. It was estimated that 16% of the population of the Island was of Turkish origin and this minority were bitterly opposed to the implementation of enosis (union) with Greece. British withdrawal from Cyprus would mean that four unpleasant prospects would have to be contemplated, these were;

  1.) Civil war

  2.) Invasion by Turkey

  3.) Invasion by Greece and

  4.) Invasion by another hostile power (most probably Italy).

  None of these were deemed to be acceptable outcomes, and Cyprus was retained as a British colony ‘for the time being’.

  ​While Egypt without the Suez Canal was a largely worthless territory economically, there was no prospect of British withdrawal from any part of it with the Italians in Libya ready to pounce.

  ​Palestine was perhaps the knottiest problem of all. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 had bound the hands of successive British Governments by committing Britain to actively supporting the setting up of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. This had caused growing immigration to the Territory by Jewish people, many of whom had been driven from other parts of Europe by hostile regimes and endemic anti-Semitism. However, before this immigration began, Jews were in a minority in Palestine, making up approximately one-sixth of the inhabitants and the majority Arab population viewed the influx with disquiet. The Balfour declaration read as follows

  I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

  “His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”

  I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

  Yours sincerely,

  Arthur James Balfour

  The Arab revolt of 1936 to 39 had been suppressed and Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, one of the instigators of the revolt and a Nazi sympathiser, had been driven out. He had found refuge in Nazi Germany where his anti-Semitic views received a warm welcome and he became a leading advocate of the ‘Final Solution’.

  ​It was believed by the British Government that the way to proceed was by dividing the country between its Jewish and Arab populations. The Mosley Report had intimated that there was no prospect of reconciliation between the two sides and had basically taken the view that Britain should wash its hands of the entire territory and let them fight it out until one or other emerged as the stronger. This radical, indeed cynical approach, was characteristic of much of the Mosley Report. It seems that the former Prime Minister, freed of the responsibilities and restraints of office, allowed his broad imagination, love of conflict and overwhelming respect for strength to have free rein in guiding the committee’s recommendations. However, this was too extreme a measure for the British Government to support.

  ​Once again the British decided that the best way to proceed was to divide a population along religious lines. As in Ireland and India, this meant that population transfer would leave fractious and discontented minorities in place. However, as in Ireland and India, it was a sincere attempt to avoid the worse problem of civil war.

  ​For the Palestine/Trans-Jordan issue, the Government largely ignored the conclusions of the Mosley Committee and drew heavily on the plan that had been discarded by Winston Churchill in 1922 when he was Secretary of State for the Colonies. This fulfilled, at least in part, the promise of the Balfour declaration by the creation of a Jewish homeland west of the River Jordan (including Gaza) while Jordan (the nation) became the Arab Moslem homeland with its capital in Amman.

  ​Of course the Zionist movement had not contemplated that they would share the new state with Arab Christians also. To minimise the inevitable friction the British decided to encourage immigration by Christians and by Jews into separate parts of the country. By and large the Christians were encouraged to move into Galilee and Eastern Samaria while the Jews moved into Western Samaria and Judaea.

  ​The Moslem Arabs were largely to be resettled in Jordan except for the Moslem Arab population of Jerusalem, which would be left in place to care for the Moslem holy sites (such as the Dome of the Rock) in that city. Jerusalem would become a free territory under international mandate (which in the short term meant the British) with Christian, Moslem and Jewish quarters. There were to be no restrictions on pilgrimage to the holy sites of all three religions.

  ​The policy marked a decision by the British to come down on the side of the Jews and Christians and to act on the spirit of the Balfour declaration rather than attempt to satisfy all three competing factions. This carried three potential advantages. Firstly, it gave strategic depth to the British base on the Palestinian coast at Haifa. Secondly, it was designed to implant a pro-British population in that strategic zone. Thirdly, it publicly punished the Arab groups who had sponsored the Arab revolt of 1936-39 and then openly sided with the Nazis in 1939-40. The other Arab countries in the region raised no complaint about the Arab population displacement out of the Jewish zone, in part because they were able to evict their own Jewish populations into both it and later the new British Colonies of the Persian Gulf. [163] The new state was to be called Israel and was established in 1943.

  Conclusions – The Implementation of the Policy in the Middle East

  Much of the policy set out by the British government in light of the Mosley Report was of a long-term nature and could not be implemented in full while the world situation remained unstable. Nevertheless, it provided a blueprint from which the British proceeded in the post-war era.

  ​The British immediately began the task of persuading the rulers of the small Gulf States to allow the territories over which they reigned to become British Crown Colonies. The process moved slowly, required considerable patience and was a mixture of persuasion, coercion and finesse that would have gladdened th
e heart of Lord Palmerston himself.

  ​Firstly, the British made much of their plans to withdraw from the region, making a convincing case that peace had only reigned on the Arabian peninsular because of British suzerainty. This was an argument that had considerable force, considering that it was only the British who succeeded in restraining the Saudis in their attempts to subjugate the entire region in the 1920s. The British made it known that they had every intention of granting Iraq complete autonomy and intimated darkly that they would not attempt to restrain any subsequent Iraqi regime should they be asked to forego the sovereignty of the areas minor states. There was also the problem of the German occupation of the Caucasus and the possibility that the Nazis might continue their expansion southward.

  ​The force of these arguments was lent weight by the British withdrawal from India, the granting of Dominion status to the former ‘Jewel of Empire’ and the subsequent lack of British intervention in the resulting Indian civil war. If the British would allow India to ‘sink or swim’, what would they do to the rest of their territories?

  ​The British offered the sheiks much the same deal they had offered the Sultan of Brunei, under British overlordship they would reign but not govern, their accumulated personal wealth would remain under their control, they would continue to receive revenue from taxes and trade but foreign policy, defence and internal administration would be undertaken by Britain through the medium of a colonial government structure and the lion’s share of the country’s revenues would be retained by the British Crown.

  ​This outwardly generous offer did not, however, prove to be enough to overcome the sheiks resistance and the British fell back on some old-fashioned gunboat diplomacy. Using the valid pretext of the necessity to counter the menace of piracy along the Trucial Coast, a problem that had existed since time immemorial but had never been fully eradicated, the British moved large forces into the region and began the construction of bases at Kumzar on the Ra’s Musanda peninsular in Oman, at Manama in Bahrain and at Fintas in Kuwait.

  ​There was some opposition to the new direction in British Middle East policy from the Willkie administration in Washington, but these objections were overcome by a firm British response backed by the always powerful voice of American business interests. These were extensive in the Gulf region, particularly in the oil business, and supported the British stance because of the continuity and stability British governance would bring.

  ​In the end it was not so much British diplomacy that helped usher Kuwait and the Trucial states into the fold of the British Empire so much as the racially-charged pronouncements of the Nazi leadership. But this was only to occur under the pressure of war.

  ANNEX 7: THE PARTITION OF INDIA

  From ‘The Indian Independence Movement’ by Herbert D’souza, Hamish Horton, 1995

  In December 1941, a senior member of Britain’s Liberal Government departed London, bound for India. This was Frederick Pethick-Lawrence who, dismayed by what had happened to the Labour Party, had resigned the Labour whip before the 1941 election and returned to the Liberal Party that he had been a member of in his youth. [164] He led a cross-party delegation and was accompanied by two younger MPs, one Liberal and one Tory who were to assist him. The political situation in the UK meant that the Prime Minister could spare only one senior man for the job that had to be undertaken.

  ​Pethick-Lawrence had been appointed Secretary of State for India by the incoming Coalition government in 1941; he possessed a brilliant mind and was a man of high principle. The task of his mission was to give away Britain’s empire on the Indian sub-continent, but he was to find his every offer, idea and proposal blocked and frustrated by the intended recipients. For the next six months, Pethick-Lawrence and his team tried to talk the representatives of the various Indian political parties they met with into reaching an agreement. But as one observer put it ‘He is no man to negotiate with the tough Hindu politicians. He is no poker player.’ [165]

  ​India’s politicians might have been good at poker, but they could also be egotistical and naive. Jawaharlal Nehru, leader of the Congress Party, said: ‘When the British go, there will be no more communal trouble in India.’ An assertion denied by Indian history both before and after British rule. Also around this time Mohamed Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League, made a remarkable comment for a man who ruthlessly employed religious feeling for his political ends.

  “You may belong to any religion or any caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the state . . . Indeed, if you ask me, this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain freedom and independence and but for this we would have been free peoples long, long ago.”

  In addition to this misconception, Jinnah completely failed to see what would happen if the country was split, despite the fact that the British were telling him of the danger on every occasion that he deigned to meet with them.

  ​Pethick-Lawrence was outmanoeuvred in negotiations by all the Indian politicians. They had no time for his woolly idealism and Britain’s chief negotiator was a man who thought in terms of little else. They would put up with a few minutes of tedious platitudes about the ‘welfare of the world’ or ‘the welfare of the Indian people’, without showing the slightest sign of interest before changing the subject. The only thing the two sides could agree on was that the British should go away. This left the country ripe for serious trouble.

  ​India’s Hindus and Moslems had mostly lived separate lives, usually in separate villages and clearly delineated areas of the major towns and cities. They had their separate faiths and followed their separate customs. It is a myth that the Moslems and Hindus had got on peaceably for centuries before the British arrived. The British had done little to unite India’s peoples over the centuries, but then it was an impossible task. Divide and rule was not a deliberate policy of the British Indian Empire. Rather than being a result of deliberate planning, it had evolved because of the exigencies of circumstance. British military and political strength had held India together for two centuries, suppressing communal violence and moderating racial and religious hatred. It was about to be removed.

  In the end, the British quit India as quickly as they could. The British plan to quit India was called Operation Madhouse. [166] Only strong rule could unite India, this was provided by the Moghuls and then, for a time, by the British but the increasing reluctance of the British to govern forcefully combined with Gandhi’s notion of peaceful non-violence extrapolated to become an Indian political philosophy, doomed the country to break up and propelled it toward civil war.

  ​In conflicts between groups, it is invariably true that if one side is willing to use violence and the other is not, the side willing to use violence will prevail. The view that the Indian independence movement proceeded solely in a spirit of peaceful non-violence is quite incorrect. It is certainly true that Mahatma Gandhi propagated this idea and that many Indians followed it, but the Indian Nationalist movement had a radical wing that was quite willing to use brutality to further its ends.

  ​When the war of 1940 began, the British Government promised the Indian National Congress (INC) that India would be granted Dominion status as soon as the war was over. However, at this time, the INC was far from unified. In fact, the British promise of independence and the rapid steps towards that end that were taken in 1941 did much to fragment it. The separation of the Muslim League under Jinnah was one example of this.

  ​Subhas Chandra Bose was from a wealthy Bengali family that hailed from Cuttack in Orissa. He attended Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge and in 1920 took the Indian Civil Service entrance examination placing fourth overall – a considerable achievement. But in April 1921 he resigned from the Indian Civil Service and joined the Indian National Congress. Bose’s political outlook stood in stark contrast to that of Gandhi. In particular, he had no time for the notion of non-violent resistance to British rule.

  ​Bose became the President of the Haripura branch of t
he Congress party in 1938. This was contrary to Gandhi’s wishes, and he commented “Subhas’ victory is my defeat”. His continued opposition led to Bose’s resignation and subsequent formation of an independent party, the All India Forward Bloc.

  ​The formation of the Forward Bloc was announced at a rally in Calcutta on 3rd May 1939, Bose believed that a free India needed authoritarianism, on the lines of Kemal Atatürk’s Turkey. Bose was elected as the President of the party and advocated a programme that would take advantage of the political instability caused by British engagement in the war. This was contrary to the view of Gandhi, Nehru and the rest of the Congress Party leadership at the time who were content to wait for the British to grant India independence after the conclusion of hostilities. But the Forward Bloc passed a resolution urging militant action against British colonial rule and on the outbreak of war in September of the same year; Bose advocated a mass campaign of civil disobedience against the British.

  ​On July 2nd 1940, Bose was arrested and detained for a time in a Calcutta Jail, though later this was reduced to house arrest. In January 1941 he escaped and fled India travelling to the Soviet Union via Afghanistan. He sought Soviet support for the Indian independence movement but Stalin rejected his request, so he then travelled to Germany. The German Ambassador in Moscow, Count von der Schulenburg, had him flown to Berlin in a special courier aircraft at the beginning of April where he received a warm welcome from Joachim von Ribbentrop and other Nazi leaders. There he set up the Special Bureau for India with Adam von Trott zu Solz and began broadcasting on the German-sponsored Azad Hind Radio. He also founded the Free India Centre in Berlin and became greatly enamoured of the Nazi party and its leadership who informed him that they saw Indians as Aryan. They didn’t mention that they saw Indians as debased Aryans, and appeared to welcome him into their circle enthusiastically.