George Washington's Surprise Attack

by Phillip Thomas Tucker

  Additionally, because the Hessian troops were so rigidly trained, they were less inclined to individually take protective action to ensure that muskets could fire. Therefore, even if some of Rall’s more savvy grenadiers and fusiliers were now worried about their firearm’s condition, they merely continued to stand up straight and tall in line as ordered with muskets held upright by their sides as during a routine inspection. All the while, the musket barrels of Rall’s men pointed skyward in neat rows, and remained wide open, with no protective covering (musket tompions)to protect black powder charges in loaded muskets from the incessant falling moisture from the winterstorm.18

  Nevertheless, Rall’s two regiments were now in good positions to take the offensive. And they were poised to strike back. In obedience with the colonel’s frantic orders, the Rall Grenadier Regiment had already advanced a short distance north up King Street to a point adjacent to Rall’s headquarters near the town’s center. Even though an increasingly number of Hessian muskets were inoperable, this grenadier regiment, and especially the even tougher von Lossberg fusiliers aligned in Church Alley, was yet formidable. Consequently, Rall’s two regiments possessed not only more than ample strength, but also its most renowned offensive capabilities with its most lethal weapon that had always reaped victory in the past: the bayonet. Indeed, nothing had proved more effective in thoroughly shattering American confidence, resolve, and fighting spirit on one past battlefield after another than a bayonet attack, especially by these same crack German troops.

  Colonel Rall’s professional soldiers were masters in the grim art of bayonet usage. In fact, Rall now possessed a rare opportunity to not only defeat but also to perhaps destroy Washington and his band of revolutionaries with one blow, if first Greene’s Second Division and then Sullivan’s First Division could be kept separated and then defeated one by one. After all, Washington was now isolated on the Delaware’s east side, with his back to a swollen river, after the twin failures of Ewing and Calwalader to cross the Delaware. If the closing of Washington’s two pincer arms was not soon achieved, then disaster might yet result.

  Washington had long realized that he must “prevent them from forming in the streets” to negate the possibility of a determined counterattack from surging up King Street to inflict a significant setback on Greene’s northern, or upper, arm of the pincer movement, before Rall could then turn south to deal with Sullivan’s Division in a classic case of divide and conquer. Therefore, Washington’s task of reaping a decisive success was daunting because the Hessians also possessed another weapon (besides the bayonet) that neither snow, ice, nor rain would negate the firing capabilities of: artillery. The six guns of the Rall brigade were concentrated in the King Street sector, and not assigned to each regiment as usual in battle, because the Hessians had been so surprised by Washington’s onslaught: a significant disadvantage for the Knyphausen Regiment and the defense of the Queen Street sector.

  Thanks to a fluke of luck with Dechow’s cancellation of the morning patrol that would have taken these two guns south of the Assunpink and all the way to South Trenton Ferry sector, the Rall Regiment’s cannon had been the first hurled into action on King Street, while the von Lossberg artillery, which had been separated from the von Lossberg Regiment’s fusiliers who had been quartered just slightly north of Rall’s headquarters, were yet positioned in the Anglican Church’s rear. The Knyphausen guns, near the von Lossberg cannon, were now located closer to the Rall Regiment than either the von Lossberg Regiment, and especially their proud owners, the Knyphausen Regiment. Clearly, this was an overall convoluted situation for Rall’s “long-arm” that resulted in the von Lossberg Regiment eventually gaining the Knyphausen Regiment guns. But more importantly, Rall’s disadvantageous situation meant that half a dozen bronze six-pounders would never be united this Thursday to meet Washington’s main threat from the north with a concentrated fire.

  However, under the circumstances, the Rall Regiment’s artillery had responded to the challenge with a surprising alacrity; two little bronze three-pounders would now have to accomplish what all six guns should have attempted to achieve on King Street: not only regaining the initiative but also the advantage for the first time today. Commanded by Englehardt and Fischer, the eighteen well-trained artillerymen had brought the Rall Regiment’s guns up King Street upon Rall’s urgent orders. But these two Hessian cannon—possessing only half the firepower of two of Forrest’s big six-pounders—were yet out of range of the Pennsylvania artillery that continued to blaze away from the high ground at King Street’s head.

  Most importantly, Washington’s guns bellowed angrily without anything slowing the rapid rate of fire maintained by hard-working and seasoned gunners, who sought to exploit their advantage to the fullest. Aligned in a lengthy row along the snowy heights that frowned menacingly upon Trenton and the Rall brigade, Knox’s cannon maintained a high rate of fire completely unimpeded, because they were out of range of not only Hessian muskets but also the Rall Regiment’s two bronze three-pounders on King Street. Thinking aggressively, Rall realized that his regiment’s two light guns could best support his upcoming counterattack only by moving farther north within closer range in an attempt to knock Forrest’s booming field pieces out of action before it was too late for Hessian fortunes.19

  Chapter VI

  Rall Counterattacks

  Against all expectations, therefore, Rall continued to make last-minute preparations to unleash his own counterattack to reverse the tables and catch Washington himself by surprise. In the past, many historians have incorrectly viewed this upcoming offensive effort as sheer folly, stemming from Rall’s alleged incompetence and inability to develop a sensible tactical solution. In truth, Rall had made one of the best tactical decisions that he could have possibly made under the circumstances in a no-win situation. Napoleon, the ultimate master of the art of war, long emphasized the wisdom of early attempting to turn the tables on an opponent as soon as possible in a seemingly no-win situation: “When you are occupying a position which the enemy threatens to surround, collect all your force immediately, and menace him with an offensive movement.”1 By this time, Rall had not only rallied but also organized his own regiment and the von Lossberg Regiment, which were now poised with a steely resolve and fixed bayonets for a counterattack. But most of all, Rall knew that the best way to disrupt the closing of the arms (Greene’s Second Division and Sullivan’s First Division) of Washington’s pincers was by attacking one of the two divisions with everything he had so that these upper and lower arms could not close shut.

  Amid the blinding flurries of sleet and snow, one Hessian suddenly grabbed the bluish-green colors of the Rall Regiment, while other determined grenadiers snatched the equally colorful company banners, or the “Camagnie-Fahne,” from the front of Potts’s house, Rall’s King Street headquarters, to inspire the troops in the upcoming offensive effort. Rall now envisioned more than simply breaking out of what he believed was Washington’s clever encirclement. He desired most of all to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.

  Amid the din, Lieutenant Colonel Brethauer barked out for all of the silk battle flags of Rall’s own regiment to be placed at the head of the grenadier formation, now taut and tense, in preparation for attacking up straight up King Street and into the teeth of the storm and Knox’s row of roaring artillery. As prescribed by regulations, all five flags of the Rall Regiment were now positioned before the lengthy line of bristling bayonets before the formation’s center. Instilling a greater sense of pride and confidence in Rall’s veteran grenadiers so far from home, these cherished war banners now flapped in the biting northeaster blowing off the heights like a windy April day along the wide Rhine River, which was more than double Delaware’s size. To protect the colors snapping in the Arctic-like gusts pouring down the broad, open stretch of King Street that sloped down gradually to the river, an elite “block” of blue uniformed fusilers, or musketeers, stood in place, without moving a muscle, on either side of the massed
clump of colorful war banners, the Fahner-Peloton. Hessian officers had drawn their Prussian infantry sabers and they were more than ready to lead their troops north to the high ground.

  Hoping to reverse the day’s fortunes by first pushing Washington’s fast-working guns off the high ground and to still achieve a glorious victory for German arms as so often in the past, a mounted Colonel Rall galloped to his grenadier’s front on dramatic fashion. He then ordered his troops forward up the broad slope of King Street, while “men [were] falling on every side” of him. Emboldening the grenadiers who longed for this opportunity to return punishment upon the detested rebels, Rall’s regiment lurched up the lengthy slope leading to King Street’s head. Young Hessian drummer boys beat their drums until it seemed as if they would burst, sounding the charge for all to hear. In almost perfect step and flags flying in the December cold, the stoic grenadiers, perhaps with some men now saying silent prayers to themselves, marched with discipline up the gradual slope of King Street. They also surged forward with the firm conviction that nothing could resist a Hessian bayonet attack. Rall had now regained the initiative.

  Inspiring his troops, shouting encouragement, and waving his saber, Rall led his grenadier regiment straight up icy King Street toward the fiery eye of Knox’s artillery storm. With renewed faith in hurling Washington’s troops and cannon off the commanded heights in part because they were bolstered by the two three-pounders under Lieutenant Engelhardt, the densely packed Hessian ranks marched with precision through the cascading flakes of snow with firm resolution. Undeterred by the prospect of coming to close-range grips with the row of roaring American artillery, the Rall Regiment pushed up the gradually ascending ground and toward more guns than the Hessians had ever encountered before.

  Leading the way as a vanguard for the lengthy formation of grenadiers in blue uniforms, Lieutenant Johann Heinrich Sternickel and his “watch-guard” company advanced before the Rall Regiment. All the while, the fast-paced pounding from more than half a dozen German drummer boys echoed through Trenton’s snowy streets, keeping time for the steadily advancing grenadiers in a scene reminiscent of the glorious assault on Fort Washington barely a month before. All the while, the Hessians maintained perfect discipline, almost as if they believed that this threatening, formidable display alone would be sufficient to once again unnerve Washington’s men as so often in the past.

  Above all else at this crucial moment, Rall clearly understood that the true key of defense was the unleashing of the tactical offensive. To add more muscle to the infantry counterstroke by his beloved grenadiers who had never failed to taking a tactical objective, Rall ordered all the companies of the von Lossberg Regiment, in Church Alley, which the Rall Regiment had just advanced past in pushing north up King Street, to follow his grenadiers in support of the desperate offensive effort to hurl Washington off his high ground perch only around 430 paces north of his King Street headquarters. Led by Lieutenant Colonel Scheffer who now drew upon more than three decades of solid experience, hundreds of von Lossbergers filed west and out of Church Alley’s relative safety, after Rall’s confident grenadiers swept past them farther north up the slope.

  Then, with a mechanical-like drill field precision, Scheffer’s fusiliers quickly fell into an assault column just behind the Rall Regiment rank’s now surging north up the lengthy expanse of King Street. Then, appreciating the importance of artillery as much as Washington and Knox whose visions of victory this cold morning depended upon the artillery, Rall bellowed to Lieutenant Engelhardt, “My God, Lieutenant Engelhardt, the picket [Captain Altenbockum’s men now retiring down King Street] is already coming in! Push your cannon ahead!”

  Thinking like an experienced aggressive artillery commander partly because of the tactical development of the innovative German practice of assigning artillery to infantry regiments expressly for active service in America, Rall knew that his regiment’s two cannon had to be advanced much farther up King Street to be truly effective. Therefore, he now wanted these two guns deployed relatively close to King Street’s head in order to get within easy range for any chance of knocking out Washington’s blazing cannon, before they could blunt his counterattack’s momentum: another gamble and race with time, because the Hessian guns had to inflict sufficient damage upon the Americans before they themselves were silenced in what was to become a showdown of respective wills.

  With Rall’s urgent directive, Lieutenants Engelhardt and Fischer shouted orders for their two three-pounders to advance north up King Street. Artillery drivers whipped horses to pull the two cannon faster up the ice-covered street and much closer to Knox’s rapidly firing artillery. On King Street, the heavily breathing artillery horses strained in hauling the artillery pieces, each gun barrel and wooden carriage weighing nine hundred pounds, up the sloping ground that ascended more sharply than it initially appeared to the eye. German drivers vigorously lashed the animals of the two four-horse teams to get the two bronze guns up the slope as quickly as possible.

  Shouting orders above the tumult, Lieutenants Engelhardt and Fischer led their eighteen gunners and the two bronze three-pounders, which were lighter and more mobile than Washington’s iron guns because of size and weight differences between iron and bronze, straight up King Street. Staking everything on one throw of the dice, Rall was now betting that he could get his two guns rapidly moved up the slope and situated into an advanced position relatively close enough to inflict sufficient damage upon Captain Forrest’s Pennsylvania guns to give his blue-coat grenadiers a chance to turn the tide with a bayonet charge. Rall envisioned that punishment inflicted by the three-pounders might open the way for his two infantry regiments to hurl Washington’s guns off the high ground: a concentrated, hard-hitting one-two infantry-artillery punch that American troops had never withstood before on any battlefield of this war.

  For the first time all morning, consequently, Rall felt added confidence at the sight of four stout and fresh artillery horses, evidently shod with ice-horseshoes, pulling the two three-pounders up the ascending ground of King Street. Finally, the two three-pounders reached an advanced position just north of Petty’s Run, after clattering nosily across the little wooden bridge on the double. Here, only about 260 paces north of Rall’s headquarters and more than halfway to the head of King Street, Lieutenant Engelhardt screamed orders for his two three-pounders to set up only around 175-180 paces south of Washington’s high ground position.

  However, this advanced artillery position represented an overly ambitious placement of guns and actually much too close to Washington’s concentration of well-manned artillery, but this crisis situation called for desperate action and risk-taking. Indeed, with his visibility yet reduced by the snow and ice lashing into his face and because of his own inexperience, Engelhardt had placed his guns in an overly exposed position. Revealing their excellent training and nerves of steel, German artillerymen worked smoothly together as a well-oiled team, preparing their guns to fire back at their tormentors and a vastly superior array of cannon.

  Perhaps Colonel Rall, therefore, would have been wiser to have merely maintained a defensive stance in town to confront Mercer’s brigade to the west, because the closer his counterattack pushed north and beyond the town’s center, the more vulnerable it became to Washington’s greatest strength, Knox’s furious artillery fire from the heights. Rall’s counterattack that emerged so suddenly out of the swirling snowstorm was early ascertained by Washington and Knox. They continued to benefit from the tempest at their backs. The dense ranks of the Hessians drew nearer. With the Rall’s Regiment grenadiers advancing in front and the von Lossberg fusiliers, in blue and scarlet grenadier uniforms, close behind, from north to south respectively, standing out in the open as ideal targets outlined against the white background, Washington shouted orders for Forrest’s Pennsylvania gunners to prepare to warmly receive Rall’s bold counterattack up the snowy slope.

  All in all, Washington and his troops on the high ground must have been amaze
d at the imposing sight presented below them. What they now saw was a solid Hessian wall of so-called walking muskets, a Frederick the Great legacy, surging with typical Teutonic precision up King Street. When seemingly no hope remained to reverse the day’s fortunes, Rall was now relying upon his grenadier’s aggressiveness, accurate artillery-fire from his two three-pounders, and, most of all, the bayonet to yet win the day. Clearly, by both nature and instinct, but tempered by well-honed experience and sound tactical judgment, Rall was clearly an enthusiastic devotee of the tactical offensive. Capable and aggressive, this grizzled veteran of more than thirty years of service knew exactly how and where to play his high card in his own tactical gamble to win not only victory, but also to reap glory, as he had demonstrated so often in the past: a well-timed coordination of close-range artilleryfire, volley firing from musketry, and a bold frontal assault with the bayonet.

  However, Rall would have been wiser to have turned all six of his cannon upon Washington’s infantry—especially Mercer’s brigade and Haslet’s regiment, north of Mercer, now hovering on his left flank and inflicting punishment—rather than attempting to engage in a lopsided artillery duel with only two little three-pounders. Handicapped on lower ground along Petty’s Run and outgunned by both the number of Knox’s guns and their caliber size, Rall possessed little hope of blasting far too many American cannon off a commanding position with too little firepower. But it was not Rall’s style to relinquish the initiative without a determined attempt to regain it.

  Therefore, he now relied upon what he knew and did best, the seemingly invincible formula of unleashing the frontal assault with the bayonet. In overall tactical terms, the two three-pounders, bolstered by Rall’s two veteran infantry regiments, now presented the first serious obstacle for any American advance down King Street to deliver a knock-out blow to the Rall brigade by not only barring the way, but also threatening to upset the all-important closing of the two pincer arms of Washington’s double envelopment. By delivering his own surprise attack straight up King Street, Rall hoped to steal the momentum already gained by the Virginian’s surprise attack before it could be fully exploited, while keeping Washington’s two pincer arms from closing tight.