George Washington's Surprise Attack

by Phillip Thomas Tucker

  Instead of drunkenness, one often overlooked factor that explained the relatively low American casualties was the shortage of dry ammunition among the Hessians. In fact, the muskets of von Lossberg Regiment members were able to fire by the time of the surrender, according to the frustrated regimental commander, Scheffer. In contrast, Washington’s troops were blessed with an “overwhelming numerical superiority of artillery and muskets,” especially Knox’s eighteen “water-proof” cannon. Indeed, the splendid performance of Washington’s artillery “had a tremendous amount to do” not only with the victory, but also with the low American casualties from the battle’s beginning to end.39 In conclusion, Lieutenant Piel lamented how: “Our muskets could not fire any more on account of the rain and snow” unlike the weapons of most Americans. Consequently, there was “Nothing therefore was left to us but to surrender as prisoners of war,” wrote an embittered Piel, who hailed from Bremen, in northwest Germany, on the Weser River and not far from the North Sea.40

  In one of the most forgotten and ironic stories of the battle of Trenton, Rall’s own cousin, a Maryland Continental officer and a former cobbler of Washington’s German Regiment, Fermoy’s brigade, accepted the informal surrender of the mortally wounded Rall, perhaps even acquiring the colonel’s sword to keep it in the family. Rall felt some comfort from words spoken in German by his Teutonic relative, who wore the ragged uniform of a Continental, concerned about his personal welfare. Almost all members of the crack Hessian brigade “understood not a word of English.” Before he died of his wounds, Rall might have been stunned to hear officers and enlisted men of Washington’s German Regiment and other commands, especially those from Pennsylvania, speaking in perfect German as if they were back in the fertile Rhineland, along the picturesque Neckar and Leine Rivers, or in Hesse-Cassel.41

  Ironically, the feelings and emotions of some German soldiers in Washington’s Army were mixed because they had killed their own countrymen at Trenton. Colonel Haussegger deserted Washington’s German Regiment, joining the Hessians at Princeton on January 1, 1777, after the town’s evacuation. But this veteran German-born colonel acted alone, while hundreds of Germans and German American Continentals continued to faithfully serve in the German Regiment’s ranks year after year. Unfortunately, however, the colonel’s actions, which resulted in the confiscation of Haussegger’s home, business—a hatter’s shop—and property in Lebanon, Pennsylvania, by angry patriots, placed a dark stain on the reputation of the hard-fighting German Regiment, which played such a key role in reaping victory at Trenton. Captain Alexander Graydon theorized in regard to Colonel Haussegger: “Thinking that our cause was going down rapidly, he saw no reason” to continue to struggle for America’s liberty.42

  A forgotten factor that diminished overall morale by the time of the battle, Rall’s troops at Trenton found themselves in a surreal situation in which Germans had fought and killed fellow Germans in what was essentially a civil war. Beginning at the battle of Long Island in late August, Rall’s grenadiers were astounded that among their many American prisoners was a combat unit “mostly composed of Germans recruited in Pennsylvania.”43 Therefore, Hessian soldiers had gradually began to view themselves as engaged in something far more complex and contradictory than simply the usual nasty business of crushing yet another rebellion of rural peasants as in Ireland or Scotland. To their shock, the Hessians discovered that they had been thrown into the midst of a nightmarish civil war against their own people, who had previously migrated to America, including from the very same regions and communities of Germany where they themselves hailed. Consequently, captured Hessians were early astounded by the presence of so many German-speaking American soldiers, who were “men of our own blood,” including former comrades who they had served beside in European Wars, wrote one perplexed German in a letter.44

  Enlightened German intellectuals and liberals criticized the exploitation of their own citizens who were dying in faraway America as mercenaries. Likewise, the inspirational example of the common people of America battling for their liberty bestowed new insights to many German soldiers, who were never exposed to Age of Enlightenment ideology, especially in rural areas, like Americans. Back home, larger numbers of progressive Germans began to condemn a “oriental tyranny” of the despotic ruling princes of the German states.

  And the greatest autocratic abuse committed by the petty princes, especially the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, was the hiring out their mostly lower subjects from impoverished peasant families to England to wage war against largely middle-class Americans of primarily humble origins for sheer profit that was then reinvested, including in the lucrative Dutch stock market, to reap greater gains. Very little of the profits trickled down to lower-class soldiers’ families struggling to survive: a classic case of a rich man’s war and a poor man’s fight. Consequently, Rall’s men began to realize that they had been sent to suppress a free people at a time when Germans possessed little of the same liberty that these Teutonic warriors now sought to deny Americans. Ironically, had the Landgrave not been a cousin of King George, Colonel Rall and troops would never have found themselves at Trenton on the frigid morning of December 26.45

  Contrary to the stereotype of unthinking pawns, the Hessians in America were not immune to the rise in either liberal thought or egalitarian longings by the time of the climactic showdown at Trenton. Liberty’s ample blessings were readily seen by the Hessian soldiers in the New World’s seemingly endless prosperity that contrasted with their impoverished homelands, especially Hesse-Cassel. Another little-known factor that also partly undermined Hessian morale at Trenton was a rumor that emphasized the wisdom of personal preservation, rather than fighting to the bitter end on December 26, because the German homeland shortly needed to be defended by these troops: circulating news of the pending “recal [sic] [of] the Hessian troops, for the dominions of the prince of Hesse were invaded by the French king.”46

  By the time of the battle of Trenton, consequently, increasing numbers of Hessians began to realize that they were in fact fighting on the wrong side by opposing basic human progress, freedom, and equality for the common man. And Rall’s men had already read or heard about the August 14, 1776 proclamation from the Continental Congress, which sought to “seduce” the Hessians who served on American soil: the “states will receive all foreigners who shall leave the armies of his Britannic majesty in America and shall chuse [sic] to become members of any of these states; that they shall be protected in the free exercise of their respective religions, and be invested with the rights, privileges and immunities of natives . . . And, moreover, that this Congress will provide, for every person, 50 acres of unappropriated lands in some of these states. . . .”47

  This powerful appeal that offered the tantalizing possibility of a lower-class German of few prospects rather suddenly becoming a prosperous United States citizen and starting a new life in a bountiful land with a pretty young American girl certainly was an almost irresistible lure to lonely, Hessian farm boys far from home. Such factors, even if only on an unconscious level, played a forgotten role in undermining Hessian morale even before the final confrontation at Trenton.48

  Chapter XI

  A Most Remarkable Victory

  At age forty-five, Washington’s most surprising and amazing success of his military career to date in achieving his “lucky stroke,” in his own understated words, was primarily due to another factor, however. Washington’s remarkable victory lay primarily with his brilliant battle plan that would not have been possible without the strength of the commander-in-chief’s own moral and spiritual leadership and his fierce determination to reap victory at any cost. He was the only leader in America who could have inspired his troops to do the impossible on December 25.

  From deep within himself during the supreme moment of crisis, Washington drew upon his own moral will and religious faith in taking the great risk of deciding to attack a formidable brigade of elite soldiers who had never known defeat. Washington’s bli
tzkrieg assault, a hard-hitting pincer movement or double envelopment, succeeded because it was so masterfully calculated to catch the enemy by surprise and destroy the opponent’s will to resist by delivering an overpowering moral, physical, and psychological blow that could not be resisted: the essence of what later became Napoleonic warfare.

  But, of course, Washington’s tactical plan could not have succeeded without the heightened resolve and determination of his common soldiers, who saw their finest day on this freezing morning at Trenton and rose to their greatest challenge like their commander-in-chief. Never before had American soldiers served with more discipline or with greater determination to succeed than on this single New Jersey morning: qualities attributed directly to Washington’s superior leadership qualities, which reached new heights during the arduous Delaware crossing, the long, nighttime march on Trenton, and throughout the furious urban battle that presented a host of daunting challenges. From the beginning, Washington made sure that the battlefield’s most strategic points were held by his finest infantry and artillery commands and leaders, matching crucial assignments with the most formidable combat capabilities of his best units.

  Like Napoleon, Washington demonstrated an uncanny ability to get his often-defeated troops to perform at a lofty operational and personal level not seen before. In his report to John Hancock, the president of the Continental Congress, on December 27, a thankful Washington summarized without exaggeration: “In justice to the Officers and Men, I must add, that their Behaviour upon this Occasion, reflects the highest honor upon them [and] when it came to the Charge, each seemed to vie with the other in pressing forward, and were I to give a preference to any particular Corps, I should do great injustice to the others. . . .”1

  Born of sheer desperation at the most desperate of times when another setback could no longer be afforded by America, this stealthy transformation from losers to winners was almost miraculous. Barely three months before at the Kip’s Bay fiasco when hundreds of American soldiers fled for their lives without offering even token resistance, including against Hessian troops, and ignoring the Virginian’s desperate appeals to rally, a disgusted Washington had thrown his hat to the ground and exclaimed in anguish, “Are these the men with which I am to defend America!”2

  Most importantly, Washington effectively orchestrated and skillfully utilized his Continentals, state troops, and militia in a masterful balanced manner throughout this vital campaign that simply could not be lost because America’s survival was at stake. Even the much-ridiculed militia, especially from New Jersey, rose to meet this seemingly insurmountable late December challenge. And one high-ranking officer of Washington’s Army wrote how: “Great credit is due to the Philadelphia Militia; their behaviour [sic] at Trenton . . . was brave, firm and manly.”3

  Yet another forgotten factor that played a part in Washington’s amazing victory: the bitter rivalry existing between the British and their German allies. Hessian successes, especially at Fort Washington, had only fueled greater British resentment and jealousy. As revealed in a letter published in a London newspaper: “The defeat of the Hessians at Trenton was primarily owing to a dispute which subsisted between the English and the German troops. Col. Rhall [sic] apprehending he should be attacked by superior numbers, required of lord Cornwallis a reinforcement. Two regiments, under col. Grant [in his cozy quarters at New Brunswick] were detached for the purpose. The English troops showed a reluctance to assist the Hessians [and] They halted for a few hours, during which interval col. Rhall was defeated.”4

  Thanks in part to this ongoing and quite heated rivalry, the redcoat cavaliers of the Sixteenth Light Horse at Trenton took no part in the battle. They early deserted their German allies as soon as they sprang out the wooden doors of the nondescript, two-story Quaker Meeting House, where they were quartered, and “made off on our first appearance,” wrote one of Washington’s amused officers. The British horsemen then dashed out of Trenton to eventually reach the road leading to Princeton. In fact, these twenty British light horsemen had earlier refused to patrol the area, including the key Delaware River crossings (especially without adequate Hessian infantry support), for fear of ambush. As Rall’s only cavalry, consequently, these Britons indirectly played a part in allowing Washington to cross the Delaware undetected and unmolested.5

  Minimizing Washington’s generalship, another popular stereotype developed that sought to explain the systematic surrender of so many crack Hessian troops. Two investigating British captains, not without prejudice, reported to London how the Hessians “behaved indifferently, having an eye to the preservation of their plunder [taken from citizens] more than to fighting.”6 No admirer of his brigade commander, Lieutenant Wiederhold later accused Rall of having launched the final counterattack into the heart of Trenton from the desire to regain the brigade’s lost baggage. However, this denunciation—or character assassination in this case—was just another effort to blame Trenton’s loss on Rall, who had been determined to recapture his lost guns, flags, and the brigade’s reputation, and win the day by launching his final counterattack to King Street. Therefore, like the popular tale of German drunkenness at Trenton, the myth was born that the Hessians had failed at Trenton because of Rall’s incompetence, “hot-headedness,” and “great rashness” stemming from an excessive concern for their baggage, or plunder.7

  In truth, Washington’s attack was successful because he fully exploited not only the element of surprise but also the physical, mental, and psychological exhaustion of worn, stressed-out German soldiers, who only thought about winning the battle instead of the safety of their baggage. Just before the attack, one Hessian officer at Trenton felt that his troops “can endure no longer” the constant duty and stern demands. In psychological terms, Rall brigade members had expected in vain to spend the winter in a captured Philadelphia rather than in a half-deserted, bleak Trenton, causing Hessian morale to plummet to an all-time low by December 26. In overall terms, Hessian spirits had been partly crushed when they received orders to winter at Trenton instead of at New Brunswick, which was “famous in peacetime for its beautiful women and good Madiera wines.” But instead of enjoying good times in a quiet sector and with young ladies, either virgins or experienced, unfaithful wives whose husbands off to war regardless on which side they fought, Rall and his troops soon discovered at Trenton that they were surrounded by an escalating insurgency of a good many angry New Jersey patriots, who possessed plenty of scores to settle with a foreign invader. For the average Hessian soldier, this profound shock resulted from suddenly facing a new kind of war, a full-blown insurgency, and one that they were not adequately prepared to fight.8

  Additionally deep class divisions resulted in the overall poor performance by the German officer corps at Trenton. After the battle, both upper-class and middle-class officers of the Rall brigade, representing the nobility and their prince, banded together to transform Rall, the man and friend of the common soldiers, into the scapegoat for Trenton’s loss. Class fissures had long existed in the upper class officer ranks which partly explained why the Rall brigade failed to function at its best on December 26. Just before the battle along the Delaware, upper-class representatives Dechow and Scheffner, commanding the Knyphausen and von Lossberg Regiments, respectively, had sent a long list of complaints against Rall, a middle-class product, to German headquarters in New York City.

  Equally crippling was the fact that the entire Hessian command structure had been severely decimated by disease, death, and wounds. By December 26, top Hessian commanders of the German expeditionary force were either dead, wounded, sick in the hospital, or retired from the most arduous service. Even those experienced commanders who led their units at Trenton were in bad shape: Lieutenant Colonel Scheffer, commanding the von Lossberg Regiment, was so ill that he was lying in a sickbed at the attack’s beginning, and Major Dechow, leading the Knyphausen Regiment, had yet to fully recover from previous wounds. Therefore, two of Rall’s three regimental commanders should ha
ve been in the hospital instead of leading their troops in action during the confused combat that swirled through Trenton’s streets.

  Other factors explained why Rall was not adequately supported by his subordinate officers at Trenton. Because of sedentary years of garrison duty in Germany, many Hessian officers were in overall poor condition for the challenges of vigorous campaigning in America. Quite simply, the Rall brigade was led by an aging officer corps. In the von Lossberg Regiment, many officers and noncommissioned officers were in their forties and fifties, sickly and even frail, limiting stamina and overall leadership abilities to engage in a lengthy battle under winter conditions. Nevertheless, the officer corps of the von Lossberg Regiment—more than its sister regiments—rose splendidly to the Trenton challenge, and more so than in any other Rall brigade regiment.

  By December 26, this aging Hessian officer corps and their units had been decimated by the ravages of disease during the long summer and fall 1776 campaign. Barely a week before the attack on Trenton, only one hundred men per regiment in the Rall brigade of around 1,400 men were fit for duty. A bitter Grenadier Johannes Reuber charged that no Rall Regimental officer possessed sufficient “courage to take up the half-lost battle” at the decisive moment, after Rall’s mortal wounding on King Street. But in fact, this was only primarily the case only after Rall fell mortally wounded, because the overall valor of the German officer corps was fully verified by the long list of officer casualties and well-documented heroics.9

  However, not only had some officers let Rall down, but also a good many common soldiers failed to live up to their lofty reputations, including the much-touted grenadiers. After all, more than 40 percent of the Trenton garrison, including officers, fled the battle hardly before it began. Instead of the stereotypical hardened professionals of European Wars, the vast majority of the young men and boys of Rall’s brigade were actually quite different, contradicting stereotypes that emphasized ferocity and savagery. Upon closer investigation, even the Rall Regiment’s grenadiers were much less ruthless Teutonic warriors than has been commonly portrayed by American historians, however.