Between the Great Divide

by Anam Zakaria

  During the course of writing this book, the situation in Indian-administered Kashmir turned more violent, with one of the bloodiest conflicts ensuing in recent history in the aftermath of the killing of Burhan Wani, commander of the militant outfit Hizbul Mujahideen, by Indian forces. Soon after, India blamed Pakistan for the murder of eighteen Indian soldiers in a terrorist attack in Uri in Indian-administered Kashmir,24 and in September 2016, claimed to have carried out surgical strikes in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, targeting ‘terror launch pads’ supported by the Pakistani state. Though the claims of surgical strikes were strongly denied by Pakistan,25 the LoC has since become a flashpoint of aggression and animosity again. Both countries assert that the other party has launched ‘unprovoked firing’ and that they have had no option but to give a ‘befitting’ response—a term used by state officials on both sides to convince their respective citizens of the effectiveness of their policy actions. In the process, by November 2016, reportedly 200 schools had been shut, thirty-two civilians had died, 115 had been injured26 and hundreds had been forced out of their homes in ‘Azad’ Kashmir. Overall, the AJK State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA) reported that forty-one persons were killed in 2016.27 Livelihood and infrastructure was destroyed due to mortar shelling on both sides, and bunkers that had gone rusty had to be renovated for protection. Even the brief window of peace that had visited some areas like Neelum Valley between 2003 and 2015—and which I had documented—had given way to violence and bloodshed, something all too familiar to the ‘Azad’ Kashmiris I had spoken with over the past four years.

  According to Pakistani reports, 2017 saw the highest number of ceasefire violations since 2003. According to the AJK SDMA, forty-six civilians were killed in 2017 in shelling incidents.28 In January 2018, a statement issued by the Pakistan Foreign Office stated that there were 1,900 ceasefire violations in 2017,29 and that the Indian forces had carried out more than 125 ceasefire violations along the Line of Control and the working boundary (referred to as the international border by India)30 in just the first nineteen days of the new year (2018).’31 Indian authorities also stated that Pakistan had ‘breached the truce over 100 times in January (2018) alone’.32 According to former Indian Air Vice Marshal Kapil Kak, the death toll in ceasefire violations by Pakistan in January 2018 alone equalled that of the entire 2017, ‘a year which itself witnessed a six-fold increase… as compared to 2015’.33

  Though certain parts of the LoC, such as Neelum Valley, are now relatively calmer, the constant threat of mortar shelling continues to pervade the valley. As I visited the renovated bunkers on my last visit to Neelum in May 2017, I could smell the fear in the atmosphere. The stability that had come to the region a few years ago had been thwarted. No one knew what to expect any more.

  Still, the momentary window of peace, which went undocumented by mainstream media, has found space in this book. The stories of ordinary women, men and children rebuilding their lives, amid the fear of the conflict being reactivated, which it has, have also made their way into this book. The history of peace is perhaps as imperative to record as the history of conflict, for both narratives must learn from each other to understand what is at stake each time the LoC becomes a flashpoint.

  As stated in my Author’s Disclaimer, in this book I will be referring to both parts of Kashmir as Pakistan-administered and Indian-administered territories rather than ‘held’ or ‘occupied’. However, since Pakistan-administered Kashmir also includes Gilgit-Baltistan, which is not the focus of this book (for reasons outlined below), I will particularly be using the term ‘Azad’ Kashmir because that is the common phrase used by ‘Azad’ Kashmiris and Pakistanis to refer to the particular region I have written about. Where I have used the term ‘Azad’ Kashmir or ‘Azad’ Kashmiris, I have placed ‘Azad’ within inverted commas (unless I am quoting someone or using an excerpt which implies otherwise) to denote that the label of freedom in itself needs to be deconstructed to fully explore the state of ‘azadi’—or lack thereof—enjoyed in the region. ‘Occupied’ and ‘azad’ are both loaded terms and, as a Pakistani, my hope is to understand what constitutes ‘freedom’ and ‘occupation’ for Kashmiris, without imposing labels of my own. I would also like to clarify that when I say Kashmiri or Kashmir I am referring to ‘Azad’ Kashmir, unless stated otherwise.

  Furthermore, it is important to note that when Indians use the term ‘Pakistan-occupied Kashmir’, they do not distinguish between AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan, the two regions under Pakistan’s control, whereas when Pakistanis say ‘Indian-occupied Kashmir’, they are usually referring only to the Valley, with little focus on Jammu and Ladakh.34

  According to the United Nations resolutions, ‘Azad Kashmir is neither a sovereign state nor a province of Pakistan, but rather a “local authority” with responsibility over the area assigned to it under a 1949 ceasefire agreement with India.’35 Official reports of the Government of AJK declare that it is an area of 13,297 square kilometres,36 with a population of 4,045,366 persons (as per 2017 census reports).37 AJK is divided into three divisions—Mirpur, Muzaffarabad and Poonch—which are further divided into ten districts. The districts include Muzaffarabad (capital of AJK), Neelum, Hattian Bala, Bagh, Haveli, Poonch, Sudhnutti, Kotli, Mirpur and Bhimber. Parts of the Kashmir Valley (the Muzaffarabad division) and Jammu province (Mirpur and Poonch division) fall in ‘Azad’ Kashmir.

  Gilgit-Baltistan is also divided into ten districts: Ghanche, Skardu, Gilgit, Diamer, Ghizer, Astore, Hunza, Nagar, Kharmang and Shigar.38 Gilgit-Baltistan covers an area of more than 72,000 square kilometres with an estimated population of 1.9 million people.39

  In 1949, when representatives of the Government of ‘Azad’ Kashmir, ‘the “local authority” or provincial government of Azad Kashmir as established in October 1947’,40 met with officials of the Government of Pakistan to sign the Karachi Agreement—which defined the governing relations between the two parties—they decided to give Pakistan the administrative control of Gilgit-Baltistan until a final decision was made about the accession of the state of Jammu & Kashmir, primarily because it was going to be geographically easier for Pakistan to govern the region rather than the resource-starved ‘Azad’ Kashmir. ‘A separate ministry was created by the Pakistan government; the Federal Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas was to run Gilgit and adjoining areas. No leader from Gilgit was included in this agreement, and a handover of power took place without the consent of the people of Gilgit.’41 This meant that while AJK, at least in principle, had its own government and could enjoy some autonomy, Gilgit-Baltistan was handed over to Pakistan to control. Many ‘Azad’ Kashmiris I met with feel that this was a mistake, that it pushed the people of Gilgit-Baltistan away from them. While some in Gilgit-Baltistan continue to identify with the state of Jammu & Kashmir, others have formed their own identities and have their own grievances.

  Although parts of Gilgit-Baltistan touch the LoC, the region has been spared the mortar shelling that has marred the lanes and alleys of ‘Azad’ Kashmir. Instead, a bloody Shia-Sunni conflict has ensued in Gilgit-Baltistan, where Shia Muslims, including Ismailis, are in a majority (approximately 70 per cent of the population),42 as opposed to ‘Azad’ Kashmir, where Sunni Islam holds dominance.43

  Out of all the main languages spoken in Gilgit-Baltistan, which include Shina, Burushaski, Balti, Wakhi and Khowari,44 only Shina is spoken in ‘Azad’ Kashmir, and that too by a handful of villages in Neelum Valley. Conversely, in AJK, Gojari, Pahaari, Pahaari-Pothwari and, to some extent, Koshur (commonly referred to as Kashmiri) are spoken. Neelum Valley in particular exhibits the greatest linguistic diversity. Alongside Shina, Gojari and Koshur, Pahaari, Hindko, Pushto and Kundalshahi are also spoken there.

  This, among other historical, geographic, political and cultural differences between ‘Azad’ Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, highlights that a proper study of Gilgit-Baltistan is imperative to fully understand the local politics and cultural realities of the region. This is a r
esearch I would like to undertake one day. For this book, I found it unfair to dilute the complications of Gilgit-Baltistan by merging it with the conversation on ‘Azad’ Kashmir. The two regions have followed unique trajectories, which must be explored in detail.

  Before moving forward, it is important to highlight that today, Kashmiri identity tends to hold two meanings, the first of which is linked to the Kashmiri language spoken by people of the Kashmir Valley—specially in Indian-administered Kashmir. If this is upheld as the definition of being Kashmiri, the people of Jammu, Ladakh, Gilgit-Baltistan and even ‘Azad’ Kashmir are not Kashmiri in the linguistic or cultural sense. According to a study conducted by a faculty member at the AJK Medical College, about 35 per cent of the population in the state of J&K (as per its undivided geographic status in 1947) speaks Kashmiri. In ‘Azad’ Kashmir, Pahaari and Gojari are the dominant languages. According to the study, about 35 per cent of the population speaks Gojari in Muzaffarabad and Hattian Bala districts and 30 per cent speaks it in the Haveli district of ‘Azad’ Kashmir. Fifty per cent of the population in these districts speaks Pahaari. Pahaari is also spoken by 63 per cent of people in Neelum district while only 20 per cent of Neelum’s population speaks Kashmiri.45

  In the Valley (in Indian-administered Kashmir), though the majority of people speak Kashmiri (approximately 96 per cent in Srinagar and Shopian), the same study confirms that Pahaari and Gojari languages are also dominant. About 30-35 per cent of the population in Kupwara and Baramulla speaks Pahaari and 20-25 per cent speaks it in Anantnag. Similarly, 15 per cent of the population in Kupwara district speaks Gojari and 7.50 per cent speaks it in Anantnag. In the Jammu region, Dogri is spoken by the majority in six districts: Udhampur, Kathua, Ramban, Samba and Reasi.46

  Further research estimates that 75 per cent of the refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir currently living in ‘Azad’ Kashmir speak Pahaari. They hail from different places in Indian-administered Kashmir, including Keran, Machar, Kurnah and Uri. Meanwhile, about 20 per cent of the refugees, mostly from Poonch and Rajauri from Jammu in Indian-administered Kashmir, speak Gojari.47 Most of these refugees perceive themselves to be as Kashmiri as the Kashmiri-speaking people of the Valley. Of course, this definition also excludes other parts of J&K as a whole—such as Ladakh and Gilgit-Baltistan—where diverse languages are spoken.

  The second way of looking at Kashmiri identity is by exploring the political identity, which goes beyond linguistic limitations and has heightened since the ‘azadi’ sentiment against the Indian state gained ground in the late 1980s. Here, the Kashmiri identity is used to dissociate itself from the hegemonic powers, and to denote a distinct identity, that is, Kashmiriness. Hence, the ‘azadi’ movement is not just limited to the Kashmiri or Koshur-speaking residents of the Valley but rather includes communities that speak their own local languages, be it Gojari, Pahaari, Pothwari or Shina. The fact that ‘Azad’ Kashmir retained the name Kashmir after 1947 perhaps further denotes that the political identity has triumphed the cultural and linguistic identity of Koshur as a language and continues to define the people of this region.48 In this book, ‘Azad’ Kashmiris then denote the political rather than the linguistic identity.

  I have used secondary sources as well as oral histories in this book, conducting in-depth interviews with approximately eighty people between 2014 and 2017. The names of most of the interviewees have been changed. This has been done to protect the identities of the interviewees, given the sensitive nature of the research in a conflict zone.

  I must mention that as a Pakistani, the research for this book was a complicated and difficult process. Many ‘Azad’ Kashmiris saw me as a representative of the state and this resulted in two common responses. First, they were hesitant to delve into any criticism of state policies. Second, being a Pakistani also meant that many Kashmiris questioned my ability to understand Kashmir from a Kashmiri’s perspective. In both cases, it was only when I spent more time with them that the layers of defence slowly started to peel away and they became more open to speaking.

  Further, I learnt that while researching in conflict zones, the ‘truth’ often does not reveal itself at the onset of the conversation. It may emerge in pauses, silences and contradictions rather than in spoken words. In conducting these interviews, I also had to be conscious of ethical considerations. The conflict I have explored is ongoing and the tragedies are still raw in many cases. In certain interview sittings, therefore, I had to stop myself from pushing for details.

  While many intellectuals in Pakistan have written about and protested against the Kashmir conflict, in many cases ‘Azad’ Kashmiris are only mentioned in contrast to Indian-administered Kashmir. As I have mentioned earlier, their individual identity, their local politics and their demands have frequently been overlooked. I must emphasize that through this book, I do not wish to use stories and statistics to juxtapose the two Kashmirs against each other and evaluate their respective conditions. I particularly do not wish to equate the two parts of Kashmir or undermine the ongoing conflict or the grievances of the people in Indian-administered Kashmir by discussing the problems that ‘Azad’ Kashmiris face. Rather, my hope is that by writing this book I will bring some ‘Azad’ Kashmiri voices to the forefront so that readers can understand how the conflict has also affected them. As discussions about the future of Kashmir are held, they too need to be brought into the fold of these conversations as long-standing affectees of that conflict.

  (As this book goes to press, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has ‘released its first-ever report on alleged rights violations committed by both India and Pakistan in the disputed territory’.49 While the report’s main focus is on the human rights violations in Indian-administered Kashmir, it also highlights human rights abuses in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, stating that ‘the human rights violations in this area are of a different calibre or magnitude and of a more structural nature’.50 The report also notes the difficulties in accessing information in Pakistan-administered Kashmir due to ‘restrictions on the freedoms of expression, opinion, peaceful assembly and association…’51 In a region where information and access is so difficult to come by, oral histories and interviews of everyday lived experiences, as this book documents, can unearth a meaningful understanding of what it means to survive in a prolonged and protracted conflict.)

  In Pakistan, the only narrative one hears from—and about— ‘Azad’ Kashmir is the one that conforms with that of the Pakistani state. Doing research in the face of these meta-narratives has been arduous. It has been particularly difficult to get numbers, statistics, ‘undistorted’ facts and unbiased reports on the region, especially because not enough has been written on ‘Azad’ Kashmir. Given the dearth of material on the area, I do not believe that any one book or research project can fully explore and present the complete state of affairs in ‘Azad’ Kashmir. I recognize that my sample size is small and my research is limited to particular geographical locations within ‘Azad’ Kashmir due to this being a self-funded project. I thus do not claim that the oral histories I have documented describe the experiences of all ‘Azad’ Kashmiris. However, I believe that these narratives are as important as any other narratives that have or will emerge from the region, for these Kashmiri voices are as legitimate as any other Kashmiri voice. As a writer, I believe that my job is not to question my interviewees’ truth but rather understand the way they have chosen to remember and retell their stories. This approach, I think, provides deep insights into how they imagine and make sense of events, histories and politics in and around them. As Urvashi Butalia writes in her book, The Other Side of Silence, ‘There has been considerable research to show that memory is not ever “pure” or “unmediated”… (however), the way people choose to remember an event, a history, is at least as important as what one might call the “facts” of that history, for after all, these latter are not self-evident givens.’52

  These personal narratives and memories then mu
st be understood as one expression of that history and as a reflection of what my interviewees consider their truths and facts. Though I have had to translate many of the interviews from local languages to English and have had to rephrase and realign certain parts to make them coherent and more accessible for the readers, I have tried to present the narratives as closely as possible to how they were presented to me. Additionally, while I have interspersed these narrations with my own analysis, these oral histories are not a reflection of my opinions but rather of the way my interviewees chose to narrate their truth to me.

  Navigating these limitations, I do not claim to fully explain the Kashmir conflict or ‘Azad’ Kashmir. In fact, if anything, through the process of writing this book, I have understood that the more one explores the Kashmir dispute, the less one feels one has comprehended it in its entirety. Perhaps the greatest learning through this research process has been that there is no one linear narrative, no singular identity and no one movement that can embrace the complexities of this region. It is only within the contradictions and dichotomies, only within the layers of narratives and competing politics of each stakeholder, that one can attempt to reveal any ‘truth’. It is these nuances that I hope to deliver to the readers of this book by highlighting some of the voices from the region.

  PART ONE

  Conflict

  1

  THE BEGINNINGS

  When Kishanganga became Neelum

  It is 15 August 2015, the sixty-eighth anniversary of Indian independence. My husband Haroon and I leave our home in Islamabad early in the morning to make our way to ‘Azad’ Kashmir. I am told that a ‘black day’ is being observed on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC) today. Kashmiris are holding placards and chanting slogans with one message: How can India celebrate azadi without giving us our azadi? But most of the activity in ‘Azad’ Kashmir will be limited to a few protests in the morning. My Kashmiri friends tell me that ‘the Kashmiris in Pakistan-administered Kashmir already have their azadi’. They are merely standing up in support of their brothers and sisters who seek freedom from Indian control. By the time I reach, everything would be back to normal. I am assured that no rallies or strikes would obstruct our journey.