Between the Great Divide
Page 19
‘…. If we had managed to get there and stay there, we would have had an enormous advantage but to my mind, that couldn’t have happened because the Indians would have never accepted a situation like that. The difference between Kargil and Siachen was that Siachen was a completely uninhabited wasteland of ice. Kargil was a logistic artery for India and they would never have allowed any interference there,’ he shakes his head at the impossibility of the situation. ‘And as for bringing international spotlight on India… well, that could have worked two ways because you could have just brought attention to yourself, you could have come out very badly as the aggressor, which we did. The operation was doomed. In fact, I think the tilt the US made towards India also started at that time; it was a decisive tilt, they made no bones about that.’
I am pleased that General Karamat has brought up the US. I have always found it peculiar that the same man—General Musharraf— led the aggressive Kargil operation in 1999, initiated the ceasefire in 2003, and proposed the famous four-point formula in 2006, which continues to be hailed by many as the only peaceful resolution to the Kashmir dispute. From the ‘Azad’ Kashmiris I spoke with, I learnt that at the turn of the century, under the same leadership, the training camps, which had apparently been encouraged by the establishment, began to undergo a crackdown; the militancy came to be curbed.
This was because the 9/11 attacks in the US and the resulting scrutiny on militant groups meant that a 180-degree turn was required by Pakistan if it were to be an effective ally of the US in its War on Terror, and continue receiving aid from the Americans. As General Karamat had said, the line between terrorism and the freedom struggle had become blurred, a fact that Pakistan could no longer ignore. There were crackdowns on militant activities in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and militant outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba were banned. One former militant I met with in Kashmir told me that Pakistan’s change in policy after 9/11 caused a serious blow to militant outfits, making them largely impotent.
As a key ally in the War on Terror, Pakistan needed to centre its efforts on the western front in Afghanistan, where Al-Qaeda was operating. As the army diverted its resources, its might inevitably weakened on the eastern border and the LoC. By this time, the locals of Neelum Valley, especially the women and families I had met, had also suffered immensely and were beginning to take charge of their situation. The first women’s protests took place around 1998–99, with hundreds of women demanding an end to infiltration and the return of peace to their homes. By the early 2000s, there was mounting pressure on the establishment from the locals to combat militancy. Coupled with international pressure, this soon led to concrete measures at the state level. Meanwhile, peace was also increasingly in New Delhi’s interests. It is alleged that not only did Prime Minister ‘Vajpayee (want) to go down in history as a man who wanted peace with Pakistan… there was (also) an intense international pressure to normalize relations with Pakistan. India wanted to address the international community and the Kashmiris that it was ready to go the extra mile for the sake of peace.’76 One of the most important policy changes was the initiation of the 2003 ceasefire.
Then, in 2006, General Musharraf put forward the famous Four-Point Formula.77 Several analysts argue that this was the closest India and Pakistan have ever come to a resolution on Kashmir. The points included:
No change to the current boundaries;78
The LoC would become irrelevant (meaning that people would be able to travel back and forth in J&K);79
Demilitarization or a phased withdrawal of troops;80
Autonomy or self-governance with a joint supervision mechanism (India, Pakistan and Kashmir would all be a part of the joint supervision mechanism81 and would oversee self-governance while also discussing matters not devolved to the people on both sides.)82
In many ways, implementing the formula would have meant that both India and Pakistan were abandoning their claim on all of J&K, and in an ideal situation, Kashmiris would be given more autonomy. At the launch of his book, Neither a Hawk nor a Dove, in 2015, former Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri claimed that India had agreed to the Four-Point Formula on Kashmir. However, the political situation in Pakistan changed soon after the formula was proposed. Internal instability marred by the Lal Masjid operation by the Pakistani state against militants in Islamabad, the lawyers’ movement against General Musharraf and the subsequent assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto led to firm opposition to the continuation of military rule in Pakistan. By the end of 2007, General Musharraf’s power had diminished and the Four-Point Formula receded to the background, as did his close to a decade-long period of military rule.
Today, there are many who see the formula as the only real solution to the Kashmir dispute. Eminent Indian lawyer and columnist A.G. Noorani commented: ‘There are three tests, and four limits, to any accord on Kashmir: the Red Fort (in India), the Mochi Gate (in Pakistan) and Lal Chowk (in Kashmir) tests—acceptability to the people on all three sides must be fulfilled… all three will have to accept the four grim realities which time has cruelly created: (1) no government of India can concede plebiscite or J&K’s secession and survive; (2) no government of Pakistan can accept the LoC as an international boundary and survive, either; (3) Kashmiris will never acquiesce in the partition of their beloved land; and (4) Kashmiris will not acquiesce in the continued denial of self-rule and human rights. The four points meet the three tests as well as the four limits.’83 Indian lawyer and politician Ram Jethmalani also stated that Musharraf’s ‘proposal is a fantastic solution to the Kashmir problem’.84 Even Hurriyat leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq believes that the formula is a ‘good beginning’ for a lasting solution.85
Yet others claim that the formula was a way to divert attention from the cause of independence and enable the two nuclear powers to absorb Kashmir as part of their territories. Contrary to Mirwaiz Umar Farooq’s point of view, Hurriyat leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani termed the formula as a ‘deception’ and said that it was ‘nothing more than softening of borders, people-to-people contact and easing of travel formalities… it is a diplomatic trick of converting the “ceasefire line” into a permanent border … it is a formula of burial of the wishes, aspirations and sacrifices of Kashmiris’.86
Some of the ‘Azad’ Kashmiris who I would meet later—who wanted separation from Pakistan as much as from India—would also criticize the formula. They would complain that it was another policy advocated by hegemonic powers without allowing the Kashmiris to voice their demands, to exercise their right to self-determination. They want the option of independence from both India and Pakistan; the formula does not account for these aspirations. Pakistan and India would gain legitimate control over the respective territories of J&K under the pretext of ‘supervision’ while Kashmiris would be thrust under their domination. As these Kashmiris see it, they are the losing party in this formula.
I ask General Karamat whether he thinks the Four-Point Formula could work, given that many Kashmiris still opt for independence from both India and Pakistan.
‘Independence… in which part of Kashmir?’ he asks, surprised.
‘In Indian-administered Kashmir but there is also a nationalist sentiment on this side,’ I reply, referring to Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
‘Hmm…’ Taken aback by my response, he hesitates for a moment. The popular discourse is that ‘Azad’ Kashmiris do not have any grievances, nor do they seek freedom from Pakistan. Like other Pakistanis, General Karamat seems to have accepted this narrative as fact. ‘…Well… we’ll just have to look at the feasibility of an independent Azad Kashmir, whether it is feasible at all geographically, economically, politically… umm… I don’t think Pakistan will be willing either… I don’t think so… there are strategic interests involved there…’ he responds slowly, unsure of what to say.
I ask him about Pakistan’s changing policies in Kashmir in the post-9/11 era, about the crackdowns on militant groups and peace efforts with India over the y
ears. ‘I think Pakistan understands that the environment has changed and certain policies that were okay in the past cannot be implemented in today’s regional and international environment. We see stability in the region in our interest because there are actors in Afghanistan and elsewhere actively working against us—plus the fact that these militant organizations have access to weapons and enormous money through the drug business, bank robberies and kidnappings. So yes, I think our thinking has totally changed and we want a bilateral relationship with India. We want dialogue. We have economic interests too… there are lobbies in the business sector that want the situation to normalize between the two countries so they can travel, do business. You also have to understand that there are opportunities like the CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, hailed as one of the biggest development projects in the country), so Pakistan cannot afford instability in the area. It has had to crack down on any movements which could destabilize the region because it would be a disaster for us. We also have to be careful because there are groups like the IS (Islamic State) and Al-Qaeda, which can manipulate an unstable situation in the region. We cannot afford that.’
It is getting late; General Karamat has another meeting and I have a bus to catch back to Islamabad. I tell him I have two more questions that I would like to address before leaving. The first is regarding the periodic—and at times, frequent—ceasefire violations on the LoC. While India insists that infiltration into Indian-administered Kashmir continues, Pakistan denies such allegations and maintains that the firing by the Indian forces is entirely unprovoked. ‘Well,’ he starts, ‘the firing used to be very frequent and very damaging. We had people losing their lives in the belt near the LoC, civilians couldn’t even go to their fields or rear their animals. The ceasefire certainly improved the situation and the resulting trade agreement and the crossover points for Kashmiris helped a lot. But we need to note that there is no written agreement so far on the ceasefire, as there is between China and India, for instance, after the Sino-Indian border agreement. We don’t have anything like that. We just agreed to it and both sides are expected to respect it in good spirit. So under the circumstances, these violations take place… which are at times orchestrated by India when it is to its gain. For instance, during the state elections in Jammu & Kashmir they activated the Line of Control…’
I interrupt and ask him what purpose that would serve for India and he tells me that it is a two-pronged agenda. ‘The first reason was to rule out interference in the elections by Pakistan… which Pakistan anyway promised not to interfere in, and second, to send a message to their vote base that they have a hardline policy on Pakistan, that they won’t tolerate any transgressions. This would help them get votes, as the government would come off as strong. As for the other episodic ceasefire violations, I don’t know what that is about… some areas are rugged terrains where such activity can take place,’ he says, referring to infiltration, but then quickly catches himself and laughs, his hands up in the air, ‘I’m not saying it has taken place! But in the past there have been areas from where these people have come into this side and gone on to that side… but the Indians have a tendency of pre-empting things. They suspect something is about to happen and start firing. I don’t think Pakistan would be doing anything like that at this point, we cannot afford to do that.’
Before I leave, I ask him to comment on the military’s role in the Kashmir solution over the coming years. He tells me, ‘The military is the one that is on the ground in Kashmir, in Siachen, wherever. So the defence is firmly in their hands. The military is also at the forefront of confidence-building measures such as hot lines and communication channels between the two sides, flag meetings on the Line of Control and so on. They have agreed to the 2003 ceasefire. But as far as the higher-level negotiations are concerned, it has to be a political understanding between the two governments. If one side isn’t willing—Narendra Modi is supported by hardliners who are not for any resolution—there has to be a political resolve to settle the situation. The military, particularly in Pakistan, has to be seen to be on board with the politicians… that’s not so important in India where the military has never been upfront. But in Pakistan, the army is seen as the driving force for security policy, so they will have a say, but these civil-military relations are for Pakistan to resolve internally. And I do see a good relationship building between them (referring to civil and military institutions)—I don’t see the military interfering in a peaceful resolution with India spearheaded by the government. Regional stability is in our interest, as I said.’
Since my conversation with General Karamat in 2016, India-Pakistan relations have considerably worsened, particularly due to the Uri attack, and in response, India’s claim of carrying out surgical strikes in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. In 2017, India again ‘accused Pakistan of using terror as a state policy’87 while Pakistan called India ‘the mother of terrorism in South Asia’.88 These hostile statements have also translated into aggressive tactics on the LoC. According to Pakistani media, 2017 saw the highest number of ceasefire violations since the 2003 ceasefire came into place. The Indian media also reported the highest number of ceasefire violations in the past decade.89 In January 2018, the Pakistan foreign office issued a statement saying that 1,900 ceasefire violations had taken place in all of 2017.90 From India, The Quint reported 860 incidents of ceasefire violations by Pakistani troops in 2017.91 Meanwhile, in January 2018, both India and Pakistan summoned each other’s envoys over new ceasefire violations. Whereas ‘India called in Pakistan’s deputy high commissioner saying its soldiers had breached the truce over a hundred times in January alone,’92 Pakistan stated that ‘In 2018, the Indian forces have carried out more than 125 ceasefire violations along the Line of Control and the working boundary in just nineteen days (of the new year), resulting in the killing of four innocent civilians, while injuring twenty others.”93 The regional stability, viewed as critical by people like General Karamat, is thus far drowned out by jingoistic remarks, antagonistic policies and most significantly, by the deafening sound of mortars fired relentlessly across the LoC, mutilating bodies and snuffling life out of Kashmir.
7
WATERMELON WITH THE PRESIDENT
An encore of a core issue
I am busy buying grocery one April morning in 2016 when I get a call from the press secretary of the president of ‘Azad’ Kashmir. I am told that the president, Sardar Muhammad Yaqoob Khan, can see me in 30 minutes. I have been waiting for this call for over a month now. Due to the upcoming AJK legislative assembly elections, the president has been in and out of Islamabad, unable to give me time. I tell Basharat Mehboob, the press secretary, that I will be there and rush to meet the president at Kashmir House. It is located in the Red Zone in Islamabad, an area reserved for the Pakistani parliament, Supreme Court and various other government offices.
I had learnt from my conversations with ‘Azad’ Kashmiris that the president of AJK serves more of a ceremonial role. When I told a friend that I was going to meet him, he had laughed. ‘Why? What will he tell you? Don’t you know he’s a puppet of the Pakistan government?’ Though Kashmir has its own interim constitution and leaders (both president and prime minister), it is popularly understood that the real power lies at the centre, in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, not Muzaffarabad, the capital of ‘Azad’ Kashmir.
According to a Human Rights Watch report, ‘Azad Kashmir remains for all intents and purposes under Pakistan’s strict control, exercising no real sovereignty of its own.’1 Many of the Kashmiris I interview tell me that the prime minister of Pakistan controls decision-making in the region, while the president and prime minister of AJK serve to give the illusion of the freedom and autonomy that Pakistan once promised Kashmiris. I want to meet the president and understand how he views the situation. What are his politics like? How does the structure of the AJK government work? What is his relationship with Islamabad? How does it feel to be president and yet not have the final say?
He shares that elections will be held in July 2016, and a new prime minister and president will be sworn in. ‘The PPP (Pakistan Peoples Party) has completed five years in AJK and now it is most likely that the PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz) will come into power. The party at the centre usually wins,’ he says, referring to the leadership of the PML-N in the federal capital of Pakistan. (Indeed, it was the PML-N that won the elections in AJK a few months later.) In between calls, he tells me of the Mujahideen Battalion, present all along the ‘border’. When I ask if he means the LoC, he laughs and quickly corrects himself. ‘Yes, that’s the correct term… these battalions have the same strength as any infantry battalion and comprise 100 per cent of Kashmiris. They do eighteen years of service and can be promoted up to the major level at most.’ When I ask why they cannot climb further up the military hierarchy, he tells me it is because Pakistan likes to keep the standing army at a minimum and thus paramilitary wings, such as the Rangers, currently deployed in Karachi, or the Frontier Corps in Baluchistan, are created to bring peace and security in troubled areas without having to expand the conventional military force itself. The Mujahideen Battalion in Kashmir serves this purpose.