Crusade in Europe
Page 28
To my mind, Bradley should be the United States Assaulting Army Commander, and become Army Group Commander when necessary.
I have sent to you at Washington a long letter outlining my ideas for the American Command setup, both here and in Overlord. I hope that letter will be awaiting you when you arrive in Washington, but I summarize it here for your immediate information. The American Theater Commander here in the Mediterranean should be Devers, leaving Clark free at the appropriate time to take complete charge of Anvil.22
My high opinion of Bradley, dating from our days at West Point, had increased daily during our months together in the Mediterranean. At my request he had come to Africa in February 1943 as a major general to assist me in a role that we called “Eyes and Ears.”23 He was authorized and expected to go where and when he pleased in the American zone to observe and report to me on anything he felt worthy of my attention. He was especially suited to act in such an intimate capacity, not only by reason of our long friendship, but because of his ability and reputation as a sound, painstaking, and broadly educated soldier. Soon after his arrival in Africa he was assigned as deputy commander in the U. S. II Corps, then fighting in the Tebessa area. He was promoted to command this corps on April 16, 1943, and demonstrated real capacity for leadership. He was a keen judge of men and their capabilities and was absolutely fair and just in his dealings with them. Added to this, he was emotionally stable and possessed a grasp of larger issues that clearly marked him for high office. I looked forward to renewal of our close association in the cross-Channel operation.
I foresaw some possibility of friction in advancing Bradley to the highest American ground command in Overlord because I was also planning to use Patton in that operation, provided he concurred in the new arrangement, which would involve a reversal of the relative positions the two men had held in the successful Sicilian campaign. Both were my intimate friends of many years’ standing and I knew that each would loyally accept any assigned duty. I was hopeful, however, that Patton, who for certain types of action was the outstanding soldier our country has produced, would wholeheartedly support the plan I had in mind. I had a frank talk with him and was gratified to find that he thoroughly agreed that the role for which he personally was ideally suited was that of an army commander. At that moment he wanted no higher post. With these two able and experienced officers available for the cross-Channel operation, I foresaw little immediate need in the same organization for Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, then commanding United States forces in the United Kingdom. He had a reputation as a very fine administrator. In Africa these qualifications would be vastly important, whereas his lack of battle experience would not be critical because the American tactical operations in Italy would be under General Clark, commanding the U. S. Fifth Army. With these views the War Department agreed, and General Devers was ordered to the Mediterranean theater to serve as the senior American officer in that region.24
I also desired to take General Spaatz to England. By agreement reached in Cairo the American strategic bombers in the Mediterranean and in England were to be combined under Spaatz’s single operational command, a circumstance that made it more than ever necessary that he should be in the United Kingdom, where the principal effort was to be mounted. This was arranged by bringing Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker from the United Kingdom to the Mediterranean to serve as the air commander in chief in that theater. In the United Kingdom, Eaker’s post as commander of the U. S. Eighth Air Force was given to General Doolittle.25
While engaged in all of these details and counting on getting away to England about the tenth of January, I received a Christmas telegram from General Marshall. He urged me to come immediately to Washington for short conferences with him and the President and for a brief breather before undertaking the new assignment. I protested, on the ground that time was vital and that, moreover, I could accomplish little by a visit to Washington until I had been in London at least long enough to familiarize myself with the essentials of the problems there. General Marshall did not agree. He advised me to “allow someone else to run the war for twenty minutes,” and to come on to Washington.26 Strictly speaking, my commanders were the Combined Chiefs of Staff but, realizing General Marshall’s earnestness in the matter, I quickly cleared the point with the British side of the house and made ready to leave for the United States. After a week I planned to return briefly to Africa to complete the details of turning over the American command to General Devers, who had not yet arrived from London.27 All this would consume time, the most precious element of all.
To provide guidance to the staff in London pending my arrival, I thought it necessary to send there someone who was acquainted with my general ideas. Fortunately General Montgomery was available to leave for England at once. He came to my headquarters for a conference and I told him that some weeks earlier I had seen a sketchy outline of the proposed attack across the Channel, brought to my office by Brigadier General William E. Chambers of the American Army.28 I was doubtful about the adequacy of the tactical plan because it contemplated an amphibious attack on a relatively narrow, three-division front with a total of only five divisions afloat at the instant of the assault. I informed Montgomery, moreover, that in addition to being disturbed by the constricted nature of the proposed maneuver, I was also concerned because the outline I had seen failed to provide effectively for the quick capture of Cherbourg. I was convinced that the plan, unless it had been changed since I had seen it, did not emphasize sufficiently the early need for major ports and for rapid build-up.29
I directed him therefore to act, pending my arrival in London, as my representative in analyzing and revising the ground plan for the beach assault with special reference to the points on which I was uneasy.30 I told him that he could communicate with me quickly and easily in Washington. I gave these views also to my chief of staff, General Smith, who was to proceed to London as soon as his successor was familiar with the nature of the intricate staff work of the Mediterranean headquarters.31
While I was taking care of these details in Italy and in Algiers, the Prime Minister had become seriously ill at Tunis. He had recovered sufficiently by the year’s end to proceed as far as Marrakech, Morocco, where the doctors decided he would have to remain for several weeks in recuperation. He sent me an urgent message, asking me to a conference on my way to the United States. I joined him at that place on the afternoon of December 31.32
At this time the Anzio operation had been definitely agreed upon and the Prime Minister was, with his habitual energy and in spite of the serious threat to his health, devoting himself intensively to the task of unearthing every possible resource in order to strengthen the attack and to launch it at the earliest moment. He hoped it would immediately result in the overrunning of Italy, although I continued to voice doubts of such an optimistic outcome. The Prime Minister made the personal request that I allow General Smith to remain in the Mediterranean as chief of staff, but to this I could not agree. The relationship between a commander and his chief of staff is a very individual thing. That relationship differs with every commander and General Smith suited me so completely that I felt it would be unwise to break up the combination just as we were on the eve of the war’s greatest venture. Moreover, I felt that General Wilson would have his own ideas about such an important member of his Mediterranean team and would be resentful if someone were forced on him from the outside, even by the head of his own government. The Prime Minister was obviously ill and badly run down, but he was so interested in the Anzio venture that the conference lasted until late in the evening.
We left Marrakech about 4:45 a.m. on New Year’s Day, arriving in Washington at 1:00 a.m. the following morning. The trip was without incident except that a nervous battery of Portuguese anti-aircraft artillery tossed a few ineffective shots in our direction as we passed along the edge of one of the Azores Islands.33
Upon arrival in the United States I met with the War Department staff and later with the President. Mr. Ro
osevelt was temporarily ill with influenza but seemed quite cheerful and kept me at his bedside for more than an hour as we discussed a hundred details of past and future operations. As always he amazed me with his intimate knowledge of world geography. The most obscure places in faraway countries were always accurately placed on his mental map. He took occasion to brief me on his post-hostilities occupational plans for Germany. He definitely wanted the northwest section as the United States area but listened attentively as I voiced my objection to dividing Germany into “national sectors.” I admitted all the difficulties of true joint occupation but said we should insist upon that plan as the only practicable one—and one, moreover, which would quickly test the possibilities of real “quadripartite action.” I urged, again, that occupied territories be turned over, as quickly as possible, to civil authority. He seemed impressed but did not commit himself.
In none of the various talks I had with the President were domestic politics ever mentioned except casually. His son Elliott, whom I sometimes saw both in Africa and in England, likewise avoided politics as a subject of conversation except to refer to himself occasionally, in a jocular tone, as the “black sheep and reactionary of the family.”
As I left the President I said, “I sincerely trust that you will quickly recover from your indisposition.” He quickly replied, “Oh, I have not felt better in years. I’m in bed only because the doctors are afraid I might have a relapse if I get up too soon.” I never saw him again.
During my short stay in the United States I had a treasured opportunity of going with my wife to see our son at West Point. Later I made a hasty trip to see my mother and brothers, my wife’s parents, and a few other members of our families, all gathered for the occasion in the town of Manhattan, Kansas. These family visits were a rejuvenating experience—until then I had not fully realized how far war tends to carry its participants away from the interests, objectives, and concerns of normal life.
Of course my temporary removal from the preoccupations of war was far from complete. Telegrams arrived periodically from London, posing most serious questions and in certain instances asking me to make final determinations before I personally could familiarize myself with all the factors in the problem. However, I was pleased to find that Montgomery was definitely working on a plan for a five-division assault front, with two follow-up divisions afloat, and this knowledge kept me from worrying too much until I could reach the United Kingdom.
In the meantime a certain uneasiness developed in the British Government over the prevailing command situation in the Mediterranean. As long as I was nominally in command of all forces in that region there was a lack of decisiveness in the preparatory work for the Anzio attack, an attack which was to be executed after my own connection with the Mediterranean should be terminated. I learned that the individuals who would bear final responsibility felt some hesitancy in making decisions because my assignment had not yet been officially concluded. Therefore I instantly abandoned the plan for returning to Africa and recommended to General Marshall that prompt action be taken to terminate my connection with the theater and to place all authority in the Mediterranean in the hands of General Wilson. This involved a point of personal regret because I was thereby barred from going back to my old command to say thank you and good-by to all the people who had served with me loyally, efficiently, and devotedly. I had, however, already issued a final written farewell to the troops, predicting that we would meet again in the heart of the enemy homeland.
Chapter 13
PLANNING
OVERLORD
I LEFT THE UNITED STATES ON JANUARY 13 TO undertake the organization of the mightiest fighting force that the two Western Allies could muster. On the evening of the second day I was back in London. Now began again the task of preparing for an invasion, but by comparison with the similar job of a year and a half earlier, order had replaced disorder and certainty and confidence had replaced fear and doubt. Immediate subordinates included Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, General Sir Bernard Montgomery, Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, and Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, all tested battle leaders and all experienced in the problems of developing real allied unity in a large operation. Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory was assigned to the Allied forces, with the title of Air Commander in Chief. He had much fighting experience, particularly in the Battle of Britain, but had not theretofore been in charge of air operations requiring close co-operation with ground troops.
As on my first arrival in London in June 1942, I found headquarters staffs concentrated in the heart of the city, but this time I determined I would not be defeated in my plan to find a suitable site somewhere in the countryside. I found one, and there were protests and gloomy predictions. Once concentrated in the Bushey Park area, however, we quickly developed a family relationship that far more than made up for minor inconveniences due to distance from the seat of Britain’s administrative organization.1 My headquarters was officially called Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and taking the initials from the name, SHAEF was born.
The period of planning and preparing that then ensued will be studied in detail only by professionals and by technical schools. With respect to command and staff organization, there were several important points to consider. The first of these was determination of the most desirable composition of the headquarters staff. Ever since I had been appointed an Allied commander in July 1942, with command over ground, air, and naval forces, we had understood and studied certain desirabilities in a truly integrated staff with approximately equal representation from each of the ground, air, naval, and logistic organizations. I believed that under certain situations, where large task forces might have to carry on extensive operations at great distances from Supreme Headquarters, such a composition of the staff would be necessary. In the preparatory days of Torch in 1942 we had initially planned to organize in this way. We finally abandoned the idea as being expensive in personnel, and not necessary in our situation.
The scheme which we found most effective, where it was possible for all commanders to meet together almost instantly, was to consider the naval, air, and ground chiefs as occupying two roles. In the first role each was part of my staff and he and his assistants worked with us in the development of plans; in the second role each was the responsible commander for executing his part of the whole operation. This was the general system that we followed throughout the Mediterranean operation and I was convinced that, considering only the conditions of our theater, it should be adopted as the guide for the new organization, although certain exceptions were inescapable.
The first of these exceptions involved the air forces. It was desirable that for the preparatory stages of the assault and for proper support during the critical early stages of the land operation—until we had established ourselves so firmly that danger of defeat was eliminated—all air forces in Britain, excepting only the Coastal Command, should come under my control.2 This would include the Strategic Air Forces, comprising the British Bomber Command under Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, and the U. S. Eighth Air Force under General Doolittle. Some opposition quickly developed, partly from the Prime Minister and his chiefs of staff. The Strategic Air commanders were also unwilling to take orders from the Tactical Air commander of the expedition. Their objections, I felt sure, were not based upon personal reasons but upon a conviction that a Tactical Air commander, who is always primarily concerned with the support of front-line troops, could not be expected to appreciate properly the true role and capabilities of Strategic Air Forces and would therefore misuse them.3
A broader contention was that these great bomber units, with their ability to strike at any point in western Europe, should never be confined, even temporarily, to a role wherein their principal task would be to assist in a single ground operation. In answer we pointed out that the venture the United States and Great Britain were now about to undertake could not be classed as an ordinary tactical movement in w
hich consequences would be no greater than those ordinarily experienced through success or failure in a battle. The two countries were definitely placing all their hopes, expectations, and assets in one great effort to establish a theater of operations in western Europe. Failure would carry with it consequences that would be almost fatal. Such a catastrophe might mean the complete redeployment to other theaters of all United States forces accumulated in the United Kingdom, while the setback to Allied morale and determination would be so profound that it was beyond calculation. Finally, such a failure would certainly react violently upon the Russian situation and it was not unreasonable to assume that, if that country should consider her Allies completely futile and helpless in doing anything of a major character in Europe, she might consider a separate peace.
My insistence upon commanding these air forces at that time was further influenced by the lesson so conclusively demonstrated at Salerno: when a battle needs the last ounce of available force, the commander must not be in the position of depending upon request and negotiation to get it. It was vital that the entire sum of our assault power, including the two Strategic Air Forces, be available for use during the critical stages of the attack. I stated unequivocally that so long as I was in command I would accept no other solution, although I agreed that the two commanders of the heavy bombing forces would not be subordinated to my Tactical Air commander in chief but would receive orders directly from me.4 This imposed no great additional burden on me because my deputy, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, was not only an experienced air commander, but in addition enjoyed the confidence of everybody in the air forces, both British and American.