Crusade in Europe

by Dwight D. Eisenhower

  When General Patton’s Third Army Headquarters came into action on August 1 our ground organization expanded to four armies. On the right was the U. S. Third Army under General Patton. Next to him the U. S. First Army under General Hodges. These two, forming the U. S. Twelfth Army Group, were under command of General Bradley. On the left was the British Twenty-first Army Group under General Montgomery. His group comprised the British Second Army under General Dempsey and the Canadian First Army under Lieutenant General Henry D. G. Crerar. The British air force supporting General Montgomery’s army group was commanded by Air Marshal Coningham. General Bradley’s army group was supported by the U. S. Ninth Air Force commanded by Major General Hoyt S. Vandenberg. Subordinate to General Vandenberg were Major General Otto R. Weyland, in charge of the Tactical Air Command supporting General Patton’s Third Army, and General Quesada, who commanded the air units supporting Hodges’ army.

  In each of these armies and army groups the normal mission of the associated air forces was to carry out attacks requested by the respective ground commanders. However, all tactical air units were subordinate to Leigh-Mallory and consequently all, both American and British, could in emergency be employed as a mass against any target designated by SHAEF. A typical example of unified action was the work of the British air forces in helping to defeat the German attack against Mortain in Bradley’s sector. Owing to this flexibility in command, the Tactical Air Forces were also available, when needed, to support the big bombers, even when the bombers were proceeding to penetrations deep within Germany.

  By the end of August the approximate strength of the Allied forces on the Continent was twenty American divisions, twelve British divisions, three Canadian divisions, one French, and one Polish division. There were no more British divisions available, but in the United Kingdom were an additional six American divisions, including three airborne. The operational strength of all available air forces was approximately 4035 heavy bombers, 1720 light, medium, and torpedo bombers, and 5000 fighters. Added to all this was the Troop Transport Command, which, counting both American and British formations, numbered more than 2000 transport planes.1

  Against a defeated and demoralized enemy almost any reasonable risk is justified and the success attained by the victor will ordinarily be measured in the boldness, almost foolhardiness, of his movements. The whole purpose of the costly break-through and the whirlwind attacks of the succeeding three weeks was to produce just such a situation as now confronted us; we had been preparing our plans so as to reap the richest harvest from the initial success. But the difficulties of supply, once our columns began their forward race, was a problem that required effective solution if we were to gain our full battle profit.

  Our logistic formations had been confined in a very restricted area during the entire Battle of the Beachhead. The only operating ports were Cherbourg and the artificial port on the British beaches near Arromanches. The repair of Cherbourg had presented many difficulties. The harbor and approaches had to be cleared of hundreds of mines, many of them of new and particularly efficient types. We began using the port in July, but it did not reach volume production until the middle of August. The artificial port on the American beaches had been demolished in the June storm. From Arromanches and Cherbourg we had not been able to project forward the roads, railways, and dumps as we would have done had our breakout line actually been as far to the southward as the base of the Cotentin Peninsula, where we originally expected it to be. All our marching columns, therefore, had to be supplied from stocks located near the beaches and over roads and railways that had to be repaired as we advanced.

  These meager facilities could not support us indefinitely and there was bound to be a line somewhere in the direction of Germany where we would be halted, if not by the action of the enemy, then because our supply lines had been strained to their elastic limit.

  A reinforced division, in active operations, consumes from 600 to 700 tons of supplies per day. When battling in a fixed position, most of this tonnage is represented in ammunition; on the march the bulk is devoted to gasoline and lubricants, called, in the language of the supply officer, POL.2

  With thirty-six divisions in action we were faced with the problem of delivering from beaches and ports to the front lines some 20,000 tons of supplies every day. Our spearheads, moreover, were moving swiftly, frequently seventy-five miles per day. The supply service had to catch these with loaded trucks. Every mile of advance doubled the difficulty because the supply truck had always to make a two-way run to the beaches and back, in order to deliver another load to the marching troops. Other thousands of tons had to go into advanced airfields for construction and subsequent maintenance. Still additional amounts were required for repair of bridges and roads, for which heavy equipment was necessary.

  During the days that we were roped off in the beachhead we could not foresee the exact reaction of the enemy following upon a successful breakout on our right. His most logical move appeared to be a swinging of his troops back toward the Seine, to defend the crossings of that river. If he had chosen to do this he could undoubtedly have made a stubborn defense of that obstacle until our advancing troops were able to outflank him and force evacuation.

  If we had been compelled to fight a general battle on the Seine our lines of communication would have been relatively short and the logistic problem would have been solved gradually, conforming to the pace that our own troops could advance. However, when the enemy decided, under Hitler’s insistence, to stand where he was and to counterattack against the flank of our marching columns at Mortain the entire prospect was changed.

  We grasped eagerly at the opportunity to swing in from the south against his rear in the attempt to accomplish a complete destruction of all his forces, because, if we were successful, then the intermediate battles that we had always calculated as possibilities on the Seine and on the Somme would not be fought and our problem became a calculation of the furthermost line we could hope to reach before we completely outran supply.

  Consequently, while General Bradley was swinging the mass of his forces in toward the German rear it became necessary for me to review our entire plan of campaign to determine what major changes this new development would indicate as desirable.

  The two most hopeful probabilities then presented to us were the early capture of Marseille, far in the south, and of Antwerp, in Belgium. Possession of this latter port, if usable, would solve our logistic problems for the entire northern half of our front. Not only was Antwerp the greatest port in Europe but its location, well forward toward the borders of Germany, would reduce our rail and truck haulage to the point where supply should no longer be a limiting factor in the prosecution of the campaign, at least in the northern sectors.

  We hoped for the early use of Marseille because the Germans had already largely denuded that area of mobile divisions, and speedy capture should prevent extensive demolition. Final success in that region would afford the right flank of the Allies the best possible supply lines. Through that avenue would pour early reinforcements from the United States, and the capacity of the magnificent railway lines running up the valley of the Rhone was so great that after they were once operating we should have no great difficulty with the logistic support of any part of our lines south of the Luxembourg region.

  To make full use of these two probabilities it was, of course, important that the right flank of our own armies join up as quickly as possible with General Devers’ Sixth Army Group, which would be coming up from the south. At the same time we had to thrust toward the northeast with great strength. In this way we would, incidentally, quickly clear the area from which the V-1 and V-2 bombs had been consistently bombarding southern England. But the principal object was the early capture of Antwerp, with a line to the eastward thereof that would protect us in the use of that great port.

  All this conformed to original plans except that the prospect of a speedy instead of a fighting advance promised early use of the ports farther nor
th and lessened our dependence upon the Brittany ports. But the problem remaining to be determined was whether or not our supply system, handicapped as it had been through all the first seven weeks of the battle, could support our movements up to and including the accomplishment of these purposes.

  All units were certainly going to be short of supply. The task was to allot deficits so as to avoid stopping troops before they had accomplished their main objectives, and this in turn meant that no formation could get one pound of supply over and above that needed for basic missions.

  When action is proceeding as rapidly as it did across France during the hectic days of late August and early September every commander from division upward becomes obsessed with the idea that with only a few more tons of supply he could rush right on and win the war. This is the spirit that wins wars and is always to be encouraged. Initiative, confidence, and boldness are among the most admirable traits of the good combat leader. As we dashed across France and Belgium each commander, therefore, begged and demanded priority over all others and it was undeniable that in front of each were opportunities for quick exploitation that made the demands completely logical.

  In the late summer days of 1944 it was known to us that the German still had disposable reserves within his own country. Any idea of attempting to thrust forward a small force, bridge the Rhine, and continue on into the heart of Germany was completely fantastic. Even had such a force been able to start with a total of ten or a dozen divisions—and it is certain no more could have been supported even temporarily—the attacking column would have gradually grown smaller as it dropped off units to protect its flanks and would have ended up facing inescapable defeat. Such an attempt would have played into the hands of the enemy.

  The more the entire situation was studied the more it became clear that the plan arrived at through weeks and months of development was still applicable, even though the immediate conditions under which it would be executed did not conform to the detailed possibilities we had projected into the operation. Consequently I decided that we would thrust forward on our right to a point of junction with General Devers’ forces, which we believed would be in the region of Dijon, while on the left Montgomery would be ordered to push forward as rapidly as possible, to make certain of securing a line that would adequately cover Antwerp. Bradley directed Hodges’ First Army to advance abreast of the British formations, roughly in the general direction of Aachen, so as to make certain of success on our left.3

  We hoped that this northeastward thrust would go so rapidly and that the collapse of the German would be so great that we might even gain, before the inevitable halt came about, a bridgehead over the Rhine which would immediately threaten the Ruhr.

  It was under this general plan that the battling of the succeeding weeks took place.

  While affairs on the front of the Twelfth and Twenty-first Army Groups were proceeding in such satisfactory fashion, Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch’s Seventh Army was achieving remarkable results in the south of France.4

  At the conference of Allied war leaders at Teheran, in late 1943, the Western Allies had informed Generalissimo Stalin that a secondary movement into the south of France would be an integral part of our invasion across the Channel to establish the second front in Europe. However, in early 1944 the Allies were waging one campaign in Italy and were planning for the great adventure of Overlord. During all the first half of 1944, therefore, it was impossible for General Wilson, commanding in the Mediterranean, to secure estimates of what might be available for the Dragoon attack.

  My decision in January that the Overlord attack must be carried out on a front of five divisions had made it impossible to launch the Dragoon attack simultaneously with the Overlord landing, as had been originally planned. A vast amount of study and telegraphic correspondence subsequently developed between the Combined Chiefs of Staff, General Wilson, and my headquarters concerning the wisdom of persisting in the plan. From the beginning I had been an ardent advocate of this secondary attack and never in all the long period of discussion would I agree to its elimination from our plans. In this position I was supported by General Marshall.5

  All these arguments and discussions were now definitely things of the past and we were assured that very shortly there would be a force, to be constituted as General Devers’ Sixth Army Group, of at least ten American and French divisions in southern France driving northward to join us and that these would be followed quickly by reinforcing divisions from the United States. There was no development of that period which added more decisively to our advantages or aided us more in accomplishing the final and complete defeat of the German forces than did this secondary attack coming up the Rhone Valley.

  Because of the distance of General Patch’s troops from my headquarters and the lack of communications, it had been arranged that General Wilson was to retain operational control of that force until it was possible for me to establish the machinery for command. This date we estimated as September 15. However, from the beginning of the southern invasion all battle fronts in France really became one, and all plans, both tactical and logistical, were devised upon the assumption that soon the whole would constitute one continuous order of battle. This we wanted to bring about quickly, and with the conclusion of the fighting on the Seine at the end of August, Bradley ordered Patton’s Third Army to push eastward with a primary mission of linking up quickly with the Seventh Army to form a continuous front.6

  The remainder of the Allied forces continued their generally northeastern direction of advance to liberate Belgium, seize Antwerp, and threaten the Ruhr. This advance was conducted on a wide front and involved many incidents of marches and battles that will be told only in detailed history. For example, the American VII and XIX Corps advanced so rapidly that in the vicinity of Mons, location of one of the great battles of the first World War, they trapped between them an entire German corps. After a fierce engagement 25,000 prisoners were taken. In ordinary times this would have been acclaimed as a great victory. But the times were far from ordinary and the incident passed almost unnoticed in the press.7

  A special problem that became acute toward the end of August was that of determining what to do about Paris. During all preliminary operations we had been at great pains to avoid direct bombing of the French capital. Even in the process of destroying French communications we had, in the Paris region, done this by attacking railway bottlenecks outside rather than terminals inside the city. Pursuing the same general purpose, we wanted to avoid making Paris a battleground and consequently planned operations to cut off and surround the vicinity, thus forcing the surrender of the defending garrison. We could not know, of course, the exact condition and situation of the city’s population. At the moment we were anxious to save every ounce of fuel and ammunition for combat operations, in order to carry our lines forward the maximum distance, and I was hopeful of deferring actual capture of the city, unless I received evidence of starvation or distress among its citizens.

  In this matter my hand was forced by the action of the Free French forces inside Paris. Throughout France the Free French had been of inestimable value in the campaign. They were particularly active in Brittany, but on every portion of the front we secured help from them in a multitude of ways. Without their great assistance the liberation of France and the defeat of the enemy in western Europe would have consumed a much longer time and meant greater losses to ourselves. So when the Free French forces inside the city staged their uprising it was necessary to move rapidly to their support. Information indicated that no great battle would take place and it was believed that the entry of one or two Allied divisions would accomplish the liberation of the city.

  For the honor of first entry, General Bradley selected General Le-Clerc’s French 2d Division. The veterans of this organization had started at Lake Chad three years before, made an almost impossible march across the Sahara Desert, joined the Eighth Army to participate in the latter part of the African campaign, and now, on August
25, 1944, its commander received the surrender from the German general commanding the Paris garrison. It was a satisfying climax to an odyssey which, in its entire length, carried all the way from central Africa to Berchtesgaden in Germany.

  However, before the Germans were completely subdued in Paris and the city restored to order, the American 4th Division had to be brought in. Fortunately the fighting involved no great material damage to the city. From our viewpoint the most significant of all these fortunate circumstances was that the bridges over the Seine were left intact.

  Immediately after the capture of Paris, I notified General de Gaulle that I hoped he would quickly enter the capital; I desired that he, as the symbol of French resistance, should make an entrance before I had to go in or through it.

  On the Saturday following the capture of the city I visited General Bradley’s headquarters and there learned that General de Gaulle had already established his headquarters in one of the government buildings of Paris. I at once determined to push on into the city to make a formal call upon him. To present an Allied front, I advised Montgomery of my intention and asked him to accompany me. This he was unable to do because of the rapidly changing situation on his front, and so I contented myself, in this respect, with taking along my British military assistant, Colonel Gault.