Systems and Debates

by Alain de Benoist

  Such is the case of Japan, a land to which Haushofer dedicated an entire series of well-informed books: Dai Nihon, 1913; Das japanische Reich, 1923; Japan und die Japaner, 1923; Japans Reichserneuerung, 1930; Mutsuhito, Kaiser von Japan, 1933; Alt-Japan, 1937; and Japan baut sein Reich, 1941.

  In Japan und die Japaner,164 which was published by Payot in 1936 and both translated and prefaced by anthropologist George Montandon, what Haushofer analyses is precisely the Japanese struggle for its own vital space, as he makes the following observation: ‘In Japan, the geopolitics of expansion has chosen a fatal direction, so to speak’. He also specifies that oceanic resistance efforts seem more intense to him than continental ones.

  And although the author highlights the capital importance of the Japanese presence in Manchuria, he does use the book to cast doubt upon this colonisation’s future, as a result of ‘Japan’s inferiority on a continental territory whose climate is foreign to the Japanese’. ‘The continental superiority enjoyed by the Chinese coloniser in comparison with its Japanese and Russian counterparts is an ethnic and political axiom which no expert on the East-Asian issue could ever deny’, he states, adding that ‘in the distant future, this could result in a return to the Asian bosom of the Russian North-East, although the benefits of this operation would not be reaped by the Japanese, but by emigrating Chinese masses’.

  The Anglo-Saxons

  Expressed during the inter-war period, at a time when Germany’s demographic and geographic situation seemed to demand an expansion towards both the East and the South-East, such considerations could only be met quite favourably by the public opinion.

  In 1926, writer Hans Grimm165 published his famous work entitled Volk ohne Raum (‘A People without Space’), in which he developed the notion of a Germany that had been deprived of its natural expansion possibilities. Almost a million copies would be sold.

  In Japan, geopolitics garnered the greatest respect among military staff and occupied a central position in Japanese universities. Haushofer, whose works have virtually all been translated into Japanese (in Tokyo), went on to state that Japan’s history served as the ultimate proof of his views’ veracity.

  In contemporary Italy, Fascism managed to affirm its sovereignty over the Mediterranean (mare nostro). Geopoliticians, however, remained doubtful as to whether the peninsula could, once again, become a great power.

  In Anglo-Saxon countries, wariness prevailed. The manner in which geopoliticians dealt with territorial expansion issues, as if they constituted a mere ‘working hypothesis’ among many others, was often willingly and systematically perceived as the acknowledgement of a Pan-Germanism that was still very much alive. In England, the publication of Ewald Banse’s166 Raum und Volk im Weltkriege (meaning ‘Space and People in the World War’) two years after the original German edition (1932) almost triggered a diplomatic incident.

  Banse, who worked as a military science professor at Brunswick, stated that since 1918, the German empire had been suffering from ‘bad borders’, explaining that ‘save for the short eastern and southern borders of Eastern Prussia, Germany’s defence lines are entirely surrounded by populations whose languages and cultures are German, which generates a highly unfavourable position from a national point of view, since it implies that the external parts of the German national territory will automatically serve as battleground for any and all future military conflicts’.

  During World War II, several (mostly American) authors felt compelled to demonstrate that it was geopolitics that served as inspiration for the Third Reich’s entire foreign policy. So as to defend this view, six books and a brochure, all of which were admittedly more than inaccurate, would be published in the USA in the course of 1942 alone.

  As the years went by, Karl Haushofer’s attitude towards the National Socialist regime would indeed evolve. With regard to Germany’s foreign policy, he began by expressing his concern, before embracing utter disagreement. Slowly but surely, he joined the ranks of the opposition, an evolution which, incidentally, is quite interesting, since it retrospectively sheds light upon certain events that occurred during the 1937–1941 period.

  A Febrile Activity

  In February 1938, Hitler appoints Joachim von Ribbentrop as Germany’s Minister for Foreign Affairs. On the 12th of March, the Wehrmacht enters Austria: such is the Anschluss. The Haushofers thus become convinced that a world war is on the point of breaking out, a war that is to be fatal from Germany’s perspective. Albrecht even begins to consider moving abroad, an intention that he ends up renouncing for being too cowardly in his eyes. In a letter to his mother, he makes the following acknowledgement: ‘I must make an effort to bear this life’. From his father’s perspective, it is the deterioration in British-German relations that embodies the greatest cause for concern. What he fears most is the outbreak of open hostilities on two different fronts. His reasoning is a simple one: if Germany is to wage war against the USSR, an alliance with Great Britain becomes necessary. If it is the latter than Germany is to fight against, then it must make peace with Russia. Otherwise, a war against Great Britain would, sooner or later, trigger a US intervention, and Germany would find itself alone against the entire world.

  Being of the same opinion, Rudolf Hess declares: ‘I cannot imagine cold and calculating England throwing itself head first into the Soviet snares rather than salvaging itself by reaching an agreement with us’.

  Incidentally, it seems that Karl Haushofer was among those who advised Hitler to sign the Munich accords with Chamberlain.167 He was, however, under no illusions. In June 1939, he wrote the following words in the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik: ‘London, Paris, Washington and Moscow are henceforward convinced that, in order to maintain peace, it is out of the question to take a single additional step upon the road that leads to Munich’.

  On his part, Hitler hesitated for a long time. This is what he declared in Mein Kampf: ‘If we end up lacking soil in Europe, this can only be remedied at Russia’s expense. And in order for us to implement such a policy, we have but one ally in Europe: England. (…) No sacrifice would be too great to earn its friendship’. In June 1940, six months after the outbreak of hostilities, he expresses his disagreement with those of his advisers who view England as an anti-Hitlerian ‘Trojan horse’ that lies alongside Western Europe. On the 19th of July, in the Reichstag, he makes England a peace offering. On the 22nd, however, the latter is rejected by Lord Halifax during a radio broadcast.

  The Haushofers, both father and son, engage in a febrile activity in the hope of bringing London and Berlin closer. Their efforts are supported by Rudolf Hess. On 8th September, 1940, Haushofer is summoned to Bad Godesberg by Hess. He tells him: ‘In the eyes of the British, Hitler is the embodiment of all that they have abhorred for the past centuries’. During the conversation, he mentions the names of several figures with whom contact could be made: Samuel Hoare, Lord Lothian, and especially the young Marquis of Clydesdale, who had recently been made Duke of Hamilton and whom the Haushofers had met for the first time in Munich, on 23rd January, 1937. He suggests that contact is made on neutral soil; in Portugal, for instance. Hess gives his permission to have a message delivered to the Duke of Hamilton. Sent to the British embassy in Madrid through one of Albrecht Haushofer’s former students, H. W. Stahmer, this message would remain unanswered, having, in fact, only been delivered to the addressee in 1946.

  Following this meeting, Albrecht Haushofer writes a memorandum entitled ‘Is a German-British Peace Still Possible?’, in which he expresses his pessimism. ‘Should the worst come to pass, the British would rather surrender their entire empire to the Americans one piece at a time than sign a peace accord that would grant National Socialist Germany dominion over Europe’.

  A copy of this memorandum is addressed to various milieus belonging to the (secret) Rightist opposition, particularly to the ‘Wednesday Circle’ and the Circle of Kreisau, in addition to a resistance group headed by Ulrich von Hassel (admiral von Tirpitz’s son-in-
law) and Johannes Popitz, with whom Albrecht Haushofer had discretely initiated contact.

  During the next months, Karl and Albrecht Haushofer, still acting in conjunction with Hess, persevere in their efforts. Further messages are sent to England through Switzerland, Portugal and Spain. Most are lost along the way. Towards the end of April 1941, Albrecht Haushofer travels to Geneva, where he meets with Doctor Burckhardt, a Swiss diplomat.

  In Touch with the Resistance

  A few days later, on the 1oth of May, Rudolf Hess boards a Messerschmitt-110 and takes off. Flying at low altitude, he manages to cross enemy lines. At around 5.45 in the afternoon, he lands in Scotland, where he is immediately arrested. He is found to be carrying two calling cards, one bearing Karl Haushofer’s name, the other that of his son. A letter addressed to the Duke of Hamilton is also recovered. Prior to setting off, Hess had left Haushofer a message, in which he imparted his hope of signing a separate peace treaty. The message declares: ‘I shall attempt to sever the Gordian knot’.

  The result is one of complete failure. When, on the 11th of May, the Duke of Hamilton manages to contact Winston Churchill,168 he receives the following response: ‘Are you trying to tell me that Hitler’s deputy has fallen into our hands? Well, Hess or no Hess, I am going to see the Marx Brothers!’

  In Germany, the news leaves everyone in disbelief. Hitler proceeds to remove Hess from office and spreads the rumour that his deputy had fallen prey to ‘hallucinatory illusions’. He may, however, have been warned about it. In England-Nürnberg-Spandau — Ein Schicksal in Briefen (Druffel, Leoni, 1952–1961), Hess’ wife, Ilse, makes the following declaration: ‘In the aftermath of the French defeat, my husband attempted, with Hitler’s consent, to engage with British milieus through Albrecht Haushofer’.

  On 4th February, 1942, while in his main headquarters, Hitler confides in Bormann:169 ‘When treating the British with utmost care, my purpose was to avoid causing irreparable damage to the West. Later, by attacking the East and bursting open the communist abscess, I hoped to arouse a reaction in which Westerners would display some common sense. I had, however, underestimated the power of the Jewish dominion over Churchill and his Britons. Indeed, they would rather drown in decay than accept National Socialism!’

  No sooner had Rudolf Hess undertaken his escapade than Haushofer was summoned to Berchtesgaden, where he is instructed to write a report on his personal relations in England and how one could make use of them. He was then incarcerated in the Gestapo prison in Berlin. Released after eight weeks and allowed to resume his courses (while remaining under surveillance), he proceeded to write a further memorandum in November, entitling it Reflections on a Possible Peace Plan. In it, he advocates the notion that German primacy must be restricted to Central Europe (a position that is espoused by the conservative resistance), recommending that all measures are taken to negotiate global peace and expressing the greatest doubts regarding the actual achievability of a Russian conquest.

  In 1942–1943, Karl and Albrecht Haushofer are in almost constant touch with the resistance, especially with Carl Langbehn, Jens Peter Jessen, Erwin Plack, Johannes Popitz, Beck, Schulenburg, and many others. Following the assassination attempt that took place on 20th July, 1944, the inquiry conducted by Kaltenbrunner led to the disappearance of all contacts between them. Karl Haushofer and his youngest son, Heinz, are then placed under arrest. Albrecht, who had already fled on the 25th, manages to remain in hiding for some time in the Bavarian Alps. Having been located and arrested in December, he is incarcerated at the Moabit prison in Berlin (where he writes his own poems — the famous Moabit Sonnets). He is executed on the morning of 23rd April, 1945.

  Karl Haushofer is transferred to the Dachau concentration camp. A ban on the publication of an anthology of his works (an anthology created by Gustav Fochler-Hauke and meant to be released on his 75th birthday under the title Raum und Rasse — Eine Auswahl aus den Schriften von Karl Haushofer) is introduced. It would, however, see the light of day once the Reich had fallen, thanks to Kurt Vowinckel. Haushofer is tried by the Americans — who file no grievances against him — and then released; but his life is over.

  On 11th March, 1946, Karl Haushofer and his wife (born Martha Mayer-Doss to a Jewish merchant from Mannheim) commit suicide by ingesting poison, in the trough of a creek located in the vicinity of the Bavarian village of Hartschimmelhof, not far from Pähl.

  His former disciple, Rudolf Hess, is nowadays the only person still detained at the Spandau fortress in Berlin. He is eighty-three years old. The USSR does not want him to be released. He is thus the world’s oldest prisoner.

  Nuclear Deterrence

  It is nowadays difficult to give proper weight to the contributions made by geopolitics. During the past thirty years, the latter has nonetheless had a greater impact than is typically believed.

  Most specialised magazines (sometimes even those that target the general public) have adopted the cartographical methods that geopoliticians once developed. The information gathered by the Institute of Geopolitics in Munich on the world’s natural resources is still being exploited. On a practical level, geopolitics has allowed us to gain a better understanding of the role played by purely political strategies compared to conventional military strategies. It has demonstrated the usefulness of economic and climatic information for the purposes of national Defence. Last but not least, it has enabled fighters to adapt to natural environments more efficiently, environments that are considered to be the theatre in which potential operations could be carried out.

  Nevertheless, the strongest piece of evidence pointing to the soundness of numerous intuitions expressed by Karl Haushofer may lie in the manner in which our world’s international situation has evolved.

  Just like Germany and Japan in the past, China and the USSR now face their own ‘vital space’ issue. Without making any official claims, the Chinese keep their eyes set upon the territories that Tsarist Russia obtained through the ‘unequal treaties’ signed at the end of the 19th century. As for the Russians, they fear for the future of East Siberia, the centrepiece of their development plan.

  Likewise, the relations between the Kremlin and Japan are strained due to the Kuril island issue.

  Trapped between the American and Soviet blocs, Europe occupies a similar geopolitical position to that of Germany thirty years ago, as the latter found itself surrounded by Eastern Europe on one side and Western Europe on the other. And it is Europe that has now become a ‘middle land’.

  The states that strive to implement an acrobatic policy of ‘equidistance’ between superpowers are likely to collapse in the future. Such is the case of North Korea and Japan.

  The ‘geopolitical masses’ that colonial empires once embodied have now turned into coalitions and leagues which focus on large scale political-economic interests. There are also further groupings that have been established on the basis of civilisational or sentimental affinities. These masses are limited by the relative interdependence of various states or state groups, which results in more or less major repercussions on local policies.

  Just as Great Britain once epitomised maritime power, so does the USA today; and just as Germany once exemplified continental power, it is Russia that now occupies this position.

  Through their concept of ‘nuclear deterrence’, modern national defences are compelled to take all notions of geopolitics and geostrategy into account.

  The current US-Soviet ‘solidarity’ is based on the fact that no power modification could ever bestow advantages upon either of the two sides without simultaneously generating inconveniences that would be approximately equal to any resulting benefits. In other words, the US-Russian rivalry for supremacy over Europe is immobilised by dissuasion, transforming this antagonism into a condominium. At the same time, however, what this condominium triggers in return is a series of clashes. Indeed, despite the invigorating declarations hurled here and there (especially in Helsinki), what such a situation actually leads t
o is a ‘rebellion’ among those who refuse to acknowledge the alienation of their own independence and believe that a political existence within the matrix of a ‘pacifistic coexistence’ which only benefits the superpowers that have imposed it is not worth experiencing.

  The global deterrence strategy thus enjoys a ‘disciplinary’ aspect (the struggle against nuclear proliferation, the dividing of our planet into ‘influence zones’, etc.) which, logically, can only generate a counter-strategy of national affirmation (and liberation) conducted by peoples who refuse to have their land reduced to a protectorate. Whether in Europe, Asia, Latin America, Africa or the Middle-East, neo-nationalisms are sprouting out of the sudden awakening that results from the condominium established in Yalta.