by Jon E. Lewis
Specification (M16A2)
Cartridge: 5.56-mm NATO; Weight: 4kg; Length: 1000mm; Cyclic rate of fire: 600 rounds per minute; Magazine: 20- or 30-round box; Effective range: 500m.
Assessment
Reliability ****; Accuracy ***; Age ****; Worldwide users ****.
“I assured Diem we’d be back. With Sergeant Tranh, I kept going uphill through heavy brush. The Muzzle flashes from VC weapons were closer now.
“Suddenly the radio crackled. ‘This is Straight Flush. How are you doing down there?’ Captain Watkins’ words carried to the VC above us. Suddenly, they were shooting at us. Tranh and I hit the deck as grenades began exploding in the heavy foliage nearby. But we’d seen enough: a row of men hunched over their guns behind a straight barrier of sandbags on the ridge crest. There were at least 100 of them, far more than we’d thought.
“A grenade ripped off branches above my head. Shrapnel tore through my fatigues, slashing my arms, back buttocks. Tranh was cut up even worse. I clutched the radio desperately and cried out:
“Straight Flush, this is Amber Rose. Make a low firing pass from the south west over the village. Hit the slope three-quarters of the way up and give your bombs a 100 yard spread”
Watkins couldn’t believe it.
“Won’t we be hitting you?”
“You’ll be close. But if you don’t do it quick we’ll be cut to pieces.”
“I heard the whine of their engines as the T-28s dived and levelled off over the hamlet. Then the aircraft were roaring over our heads and silvery napalm bombs tumbled from their wings. The T-28s pulled away, leaving a fire storm sweeping over the ridge crest.
“Almost as an afterthought, one of the tiny fighter-bombers began spewing smoke. VC small arms fire had riddled its fuselage. The plane wobbled, fell and exploded against a hillside. Minutes later, it was all over. I came out, only mildly hurt, with Tranh and Diem. Trevor’s men found 65 burnt corpses on the ridge crest – all Viet Cong. We had scored what the South Vietnamese would later call ‘a great victory’, but to me it was all a little sickening.
SON TAY
During the decade of direct US involvement in Vietnam, around 800 American military personnel were captured by the enemy, most of them USAAF aircrew shot down in raids over the North. The preferred tactic of the US Government was to negotiate the release of the captives (with occasional success), but in 1970 it decided to sanction more direct methods. This was the daring raid by Special Forces on Son Tay, the only attempt ever made to free prisoners held in the North, described here by Leroy Thompson.
It was only natural that such a task should fall to Special Forces. Formed in 1952 – although with a lineage dating back to the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS) – the Special Forces had been charged from the beginning with recovery operations, especially of downed pilots, in addition to their role as Unconventional Warfare (UW) experts. Initially, Special Forces – the “Sneaky Petes” had been viewed with suspicion by the military establishment, but had grown in both size and stature after the inauguration of President J F Kennedy in 1961. In Vietnam, Special Forces were committed heavily – and often inappropriately – in the war, and the less than satisfactory outcome of that conflict for the US led the army subsequently to downgrade its commitment to unconventional warfare. After ill-starred roles in Iran, Grenada, El Salvador and at Paitilla airfield during the Panama invasion, Special Forces demonstrated their elite status in the Gulf, where their long range reconnaissance proved invaluable at identifying Scud missile sites.
When on 9 May 1970, an NCO of the USAF’s 1127th Field Activities Group (1127th FAG), a special intelligence unit that correlated information about American POWs in North Vietnam, spotted what appeared to be a prison full of American POWs at Son Tay, some 37 km west of Hanoi from reconnaissance photographs, he started a chain of events that would eventually lead to one of the most daring Special Forces operations of the entire war. Once the Joint Chiefs of Staff had evaluated the information from the 1127th FAG and decided that a rescue was desirable, both for the well-being of the prisoners and for the morale of American fighting men and civilians, the go-ahead was given for SACSA (the Special Assistant for Counter-insurgency and Special Activities), Brigadier-General Donald Blackburn, to begin planning a rescue mission to free the POWs held at Son Tay.
Various photo-intelligence sources, including the Big Bird reconnaissance satellite, the SR-71 Blackbird and Buffalo Hunter reconnaissance drones, were also made available to gather the information necessary for the raid. By 5 June, a full briefing had been given to the Joint Chiefs, and Blackburn had received permission to continue planning the raid. A little over a month later, on 10 July, the Joint Chiefs gave Blackburn the OK to begin implementing the plan. Blackburn, a real fire-eater who had commanded Philippine guerrillas during World War II and the Special Operations Group in Vietnam, wanted to lead the raid himself, but because of his knowledge of sensitive intelligence matters he was precluded. Instead the assignment went to Colonel “Bull” Simons, a highly experienced Special Forces officer who had served under Blackburn and had a reputation for getting things done. The raiding force was known as the Joint Contingency Task Group (JCTG), and the mission itself was code named Ivory Coast. An area of Eglin Air Force Base in Florida was set aside for training the JCTG. Although Major-General Leroy Manor, the commander of USAF special operations at Eglin, was put in overall command, Simons was his deputy and in charge of leading the raiding force.
Since the optimum time for the raid appeared to be between 20–25 October, when the weather and moon would be most favourable, both men began selecting their teams: Manor, the air and planning elements, and Simons, the actual assault force. At Fort Bragg, hundreds of Special Forces troopers volunteered for the JCTG only knowing that it was hazardous and that the “Bull” would be commanding. Some 15 officers and 82 NCOs, predominantly from the 6th and 7th Special Forces Groups, were chosen. As training progressed, the assault force, their backups and the support personnel would be selected from these 97 Green Berets.
To carry out realistic training, a mock up of the Son Tay compound was built at Eglin. So that Soviet spy satellites could not detect its presence, the mock up was designed to be dismantled during the day and quickly set up at night for training. Since the raid itself would be at night, training at night on the mock up was essential. As an additional training aid, a table top model of the camp, costing some $60,000, was also built.
Detailed training of the raiding force began on 9 September. Two problems involving the elimination of guards at the prison arose during this period. Simons was dismayed to find that even his best marksmen were having trouble getting more than 25 per cent of their shots on target at night. This difficulty was solved, however, by going outside the normal Army supply channels to acquire “Singlepoint Nite Sites” for the sharp-shooters’ M16s. The other problem involved the need to saturate the guard towers around the Son Tay compound with fire. To solve this problem an HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant equipped with 7.62mm miniguns was given the mission of chopping the towers down with a hail of fire.
The Model 870 is one of the most widely manufactured shotguns of all time, being produced in sporting and hunting versions as well as in dedicated police and security variants. When the US Marine Corps conducted trials to find a combat shotgun in the mid-1960s, it was decided that the reliability of the 870’s pump action gave it the edge over the semi-automatic weapons then available. The Model 870 has a seven-round tubular magazine and can fire a wide variety of ammunition ranging from light shot and riot rounds to heavy buckshot and flechettes. Its primary function in Marine hands is for use in boarding parties and as a security weapon aboard ship.
Specification
Cartridge: 12 gauge 2½-in; Weight: 3.6kg; Length: 1060mm; Cyclic rate of fire: pump action only; Magazine: 7 rounds in tubular magazine.
Assessment
Reliability*****: Accuracy**; Age****; Worldwide users****.
The assaul
t force was formed into three groups: the compound assault force of 14 men, who would actually be deposited inside the prison compound by crash landing an HH-3 helicopter; the command and security group of 20 men; and the support group of 22 men commanded by Simons himself. Five HH-53s, which could be refuelled in-flight and the HH-3 would carry the assault force.
Beginning on 28 September, the assault force practised the actual assault with the air force crews who would fly the helicopters and other aircraft, which included three C-130s (two of which were Combat Talons equipped for command and control) and A-l strike aircraft. The landing and assault were rehearsed again and again, with many simulations being “live-fire” run-throughs. Alternative plans were also produced.
As the rehearsals progressed, Simons, a firearms enthusiast and expert ordered his supply people to come up with additional weapons and special equipment. Eventually, the teams were equipped with 12-gauge shotguns, 30-round Ml6 magazines, .45 automatic pistols, CAR-15s for the compound assault force, M-79 grenade launchers, LAWs, bolt cutters, cutting torches, chainsaws and special goggles. Some men carried cameras to record the prisoners’ living conditions. Many items used in the raid had to be acquired outside of normal Army supply channels. To ensure communications during those critical minutes on the ground, the 56 men of Simons’ assault force were given 92 radios: two AN-PRC-41s to maintain contact with the Pentagon via a radio link at Monkey Mountain in South Vietnam, 10 AN-PRC-77s for calling in air strikes, 24 AN-PRC-88s for communications between the various groups on the ground and finally, 56 AN-PRC-90 survival radios for escape and evasion.
Although the mission had not been approved by the target date of 20–25th October, Blackburn got the go ahead to begin moving personnel to Southeast Asia in preparation for the mission on 27 October. On 1 November, Blackburn and Simons, among others, left for Southeast Asia to lay the ground-work for the raid. By the 12th, both Blackburn and Simons were back in the States as the raiding force prepared to head for Thailand. Six days later, a few hours after the raiders had left for Takhli RTAFB (Royal Thai Air Force Base) in anticipation of receiving orders to carry out the raid, President Nixon gave the “go” order. The weather and moon had to be right for the raid to take place and conditions were deemed acceptable on the night of 20/21 November.
On the evening of 20 November, the raiders were shuttled to Udorn RTAFB from where the raid was launched at 2318 hours local time. Carrier aircraft from the Oriskany, Ranger and Hancock were also launched a couple of hours later, during the early morning of the 21st to create a diversion by staging a fake raid over Hanoi. At about 02.18 on the morning of 21 November, the raid itself began. As a C-130 flare ship illuminated the area with flares, the HH-53, code named Apple Three opened up on the guard towers of Son Tay Prison with its miniguns, bringing them crashing down.
Shortly thereafter, the HH-3 carrying the assault party commanded by Major “Dick” Meadows, landed inside the prison compound: the whole group pressed against mattresses to cushion them against the crash. The HH-3, known as Banana One came to rest amid branches, leaves and other debris brought down by its whirling rotors during the crash descent. On landing, “Dick” Meadows rushed out with his bullhorn shouting: “We’re Americans. Keep your heads down. We’re Americans. This is a rescue. We’re here to get you out. Keep your heads down. Get on the floor. We’ll be in your cells in a minute.” The remainder of the assault party rushed into action, some men laying down suppressive fire, others streaking for the cellblocks to rescue the prisoners.
A few minutes later the command and security group landed just outside the prison’s walls. The Support group led by Simons himself, however, had landed 400m off course at what was identified on the raiders’ maps as a secondary school. Instead of a secondary school they found themselves outside a barracks housing Chinese or Soviet advisors to the NVA (North Vietnamese Army). School or not, though, Simons and his men proceeded to teach its denizens a lesson. Within minutes of touching down, many of the residents of the barracks had been killed, preventing them from reinforcing the prison compound and taking the other raiders by surprise. Within 10 minutes Simons had cleared the area and his men had been lifted back to the Son Tay compound, where they assisted the assault and security elements in eliminating several guards.
Despite the smoothness of the assault, however, the raiders discovered that there were no POWs in the prison. They had been moved elsewhere some weeks before the raid. This development had not been picked up by the US intelligence because no one had wanted to risk putting in any agents on the ground, and too much reliance had been placed on photographic intelligence.
Less than 30 minutes after the raid had started, the raiders were back on board their choppers and heading for Thailand. Casualties were light; only one raider had been wounded. The raid itself had gone almost perfectly. Even Simon’s landing at the wrong complex was fortuitous as it allowed a surprise attack on an undetected enemy unit.
The raiders themselves had mixed reactions on the flight back to Thailand. They were disappointed that all of their training and effort had not resulted in the rescue of a single prisoner. However, they were also glad that they were all heading home, and justifiably proud of the precision with which the raid had been carried out.
The Son Tay raid was not a complete failure, despite the fact that no prisoners were rescued. It proved in very striking fashion that the North Vietnamese were vulnerable to attacks on installations close to home. As a result, the North Vietnamese had to tie down additional troops to guard sensitive areas, and they also lost some credibility with the Chinese and Russians, who feared that the US would continue to mount raids into North Vietnam. Indirectly the raid also led to some improvement in the treatment of American POWs.
It should not be forgotten, either, that Simon’s party had killed dozens of the enemy, many of them foreign advisors, without taking any losses themselves. The Special Forces troopers, and the air force and navy pilots had carried out their jobs with great skill. It was a classic raid – get in quick, hit hard, get out fast, inflict maximum casualties – but the intelligence had been wrong, a failure which clearly illustrated the fact that intelligence is critical to special operations, especially raids into enemy territory. It is still not known why the North Vietnamese moved their prisoners from Son Tay, but it may be speculated that a rescue attempt was foreseen as the US were steadily building up pressure for their release.
The final point proven by the Son Tay raid was one that Donald Blackburn had been making ever since being appointed SACSA. He argued that North Vietnam was vulnerable to hit-and-run raids by highly-trained special operations forces. Other such raids might have secured the release of many of the American POWs held by the Hanoi government.
DELTA FORCE
Surprisingly, the Unites States of America was slow to establish a specialist anti-terrorist and hostage rescue unit, although all too often it is Americans who are the victims of attacks. Perhaps the fact that terrorism is a phenomenon which is rarely encountered in the continental United States explains why the Department of Defense was three or four years behind European governments in setting up elite counter-revolutionary warfare units. It was not until November 1977 that Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta – Delta Force – came into being.
The driving spirit behind Delta Force was Colonel Charles Beckwith, a Special Forces officer who had been extremely impressed by Britain’s SAS during an exchange tour in the early 1960s. For several years he badgered the Pentagon into setting up a similar unit in the US Army.
Selection for the new unit was very much SAS style, with hard physical, mental and psychological challenges weeding out nine out of 10 applicants. Once selected, the successful candidate is sent on a five month “Operators” course, where he is introduced to the many and varied skills that an anti-terrorist commando is expected to master. These include assault tactics, hostage management, communications, observation using the latest high-tech gear, climbing, small boat work
and parachuting. Since the majority of Delta Force candidates are from Special Forces or Ranger units they already possess many of these skills, but even so they learn a lot before moving to their operational troop.
Delta Force is organised into operational squadrons, each squadron is broken down further into troops. Marksmanship is a prime requirement in Delta Force and Force members train up to four hours a day, five days a week. Such intensive training leads to very high shooting standards: Delta snipers are expected to make nine first-round hits out of 10 at 1,000 yards, and score every time at 600 yards.
Like other elite counter-terrorist units, Delta Force has built its own “House of Horrors” which simulates various kinds of combat situations, from hostage taking to aircraft hijacks. Hijacks are a favourite terrorist ploy, so Delta Force has practised assaults on airliners, and regularly runs training exercises at New York’s Kennedy Airport and at other large international gateways.
Delta receives terrorist intelligence via US Government organisations such as the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and from contacts with other anti-terrorist units around the world. Its members also make exchanges with the British SAS, Germany’s GSG-9, the French GIGN and other similar units.
Delta was set up in less than a year, becoming operational in the middle of 1978. Just over a year later, the Force was alerted to a possible rescue mission as the US Embassy in Teheran was seized and the embassy staff held hostage. This was far from the mission they had trained for: penetrate hundreds of miles into hostile territory, making an assault in the middle of a major city and then getting clear with 100 or more freed hostages.
Months of intensive training went into “Operation Eagle Claw”, as the rescue mission was called. It was to involve Delta Force, Special Forces units from Germany, US Marine Corps helicopter pilots, US Navy helicopters and ships and US Air Force air support. It was all planned for the 25th April.
