The Naval Battles for Guadalcanal 1942
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Heavy cruiser San Francisco at Pearl Harbor on December 4, 1942, on her way to the United States for repairs after being damaged in the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. The ship was hit by an estimated 45 shells, causing extensive topside damage. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-21099)
Now the Japanese failure to knock out the airfield paid immediate dividends for the Americans. First, search aircraft found the retreating Japanese cruiser force, sank Kinugasa and damaged Maya so badly she was forced to return to Japan. Meanwhile, the convoy had departed the anchorage at Shortland Island on the afternoon of November 13 under escort of Tanaka’s 12 destroyers. Astoundingly, Yamamoto let the convoy advance toward the island before confirming that the airfield had been neutralized. Throughout the day on November 14, aviators from Henderson Field and carrier Enterprise made a supreme effort to destroy the incoming convoy. Six transports were sunk and another heavily damaged and forced to turn back. These attacks forced Tanaka behind schedule, and he considered temporarily suspending the operation, but was ordered by Yamamoto to continue south without regard to losses.
Once again, Yamamoto had failed to grasp the decisive moment. He still retained large forces under Kondo’s command lingering north of Guadalcanal, including a second pair of fast battleships and several heavy cruisers. These were not committed in support of Abe’s first attempt to neutralize the airfield, or on the following night. Now, after the convoy had already been largely destroyed, Kondo assembled another force to conduct a major effort. He gathered up the Kirishima, a couple of heavy cruisers and two destroyer squadrons and headed toward Guadalcanal with the intent of hitting the airfield during the early hours of November 15. This was far from a maximum effort since the fast battleships Kongo and Haruna were still not committed. Yamamoto did not intervene as Kondo put his plan together.
Halsey had much less to work with than Yamamoto, but was certainly more decisive. Halsey did not flinch from throwing all available surface forces into the fray. With Callaghan’s task force shattered, Halsey had a single major asset remaining – his two fast battleships operating southeast of Guadalcanal with carrier Enterprise. After some debate on the wisdom of committing these heavy ships to the waters of Iron Bottom Sound, Halsey decided to send them north. They were too far away to intervene against Mikawa’s cruiser bombardment on the night of November 13–14, but they arrived in the area ready to contest any Japanese operation the following night.
Halsey was taking a grave risk committing his last remaining surface assets. The task force he assembled, named Task Force 64, was a makeshift formation. Only four destroyers were available, and these had never worked together. The two battleships, Washington and South Dakota, had also never worked together and were not well trained for night combat. Halsey was exposing these ships, designed for long-range daytime gunnery duels with their Japanese counterparts, into confined waters at night where the torpedo threat was maximized. On the other hand, these were the most powerful ships in the United States Navy, and possibly in the world. Both possessed powerful and accurate 16in. naval rifles and the most modern radar-guided fire-control gunnery available.
SECOND NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL ORDER OF BATTLE
UNITED STATES NAVY
Task Force 64 Rear Admiral Willis Lee on Washington
Battleships South Dakota, Washington
Destroyers Benham, Gwin, Preston, Walke
IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY
Bombardment GroupVice Admiral Kondo Nobutake on Atago
Sentai 11
Battleship Kirishima
Sentai 4
Heavy cruisers Atago, Takao
Screening Unit (Destroyer Squadron 10) Rear Admiral Kimura Satsuma on Nagara
Light cruiser Nagara
Destroyer Division 9 Asagumo
Destroyer Division 11 Hatsuyuki, Shirayuki
Destroyer Division 61 Teruzuki
Unassigned Samidare, Inazuma
Sweeping Unit (Destroyer Squadron 3) Rear Admiral Hashimoto Shintaro on Sendai
Light cruiser Sendai
Destroyer Division 19 Ayanami, Shikinami, Uranami
Reinforcement Unit (Destroyer Squadron 2) Rear Admiral Tanaka Razio on Hayashio
Destroyer Division 15 Oyashio, Kuroshio, Kagero
Destroyer Division 24 Suzukaze, Kawakaze, Umikaze
Destroyer Division 31 Makinami, Naganami, Takanami
Transports Kinugasa Maru, Hirokawa Maru, Sangetsu Maru, Yamura Maru
(The Reinforcement Unit was located to the east of the battle area; Tanaka dispatched Oyashio and Kagero on his own initiative to join the fight.)
THE SECOND NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL
Rear Admiral Willis Lee brought Task Force 64 into Iron Bottom Sound and moved west of Savo Island to intercept the Japanese force he knew was coming, based on a spotting report from an American submarine on the afternoon of November 14. Lee’s battle plan reflected the improvised nature of his command. He pinned his hope on the big guns of his two battleships. He arranged his task force in a column with the destroyers close to the battleships.
Kirishima pictured in 1937 after her second major reconstruction. After conversion to fast battleships, the Kongo-class ships retained only battle cruiser level protection with an 8in. main armor belt. Kirishima was overwhelmed by American 16in. gunfire at the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. (Yamato Museum, 071227)
Kondo had an inaccurate idea of what was waiting for him. Japanese reconnaissance aircraft had continually misidentified Task Force 64 as two cruisers and a number of destroyers. Kondo expected to have to fight his way into Iron Bottom Sound, but did not expect to face two battleships. Accordingly, his plan was for his two destroyer squadrons to neutralize the American force before bringing in his battleship and two heavy cruisers to crush the airfield.
From a position northwest of Cape Esperance, Lee brought his task force around Savo Island to the north and east, before entering Iron Bottom Sound. The nearest Japanese formation was the Sweeping Unit composed of Destroyer Squadron 3 with light cruiser Sendai and three destroyers. This force was entering Iron Bottom Sound by moving to the east of Savo Island. At 2313hrs on November 14, one of the Japanese destroyers spotted Lee’s task force, providing yet another example of Japanese optics outperforming American electronics. One destroyer, Ayanami, was dispatched to scout the channel west of Savo Island and the rest of the force continued to scout the channel east of Savo Island.
The Japanese continued to track Lee’s force as it began to head west after reaching a point southeast of Savo Island. They continued to identify the force as two cruisers and four destroyers. In response to this information, Kondo ordered the Screening Unit, with a light cruiser and four destroyers, to enter the channel south of Savo at 0015hrs and engage the Americans. He turned his heavy ships away to give the Screening Unit time to do its job.
Lee finally got a radar contact on the Sweeping Unit to his north at 18,000 yards at about 0001hrs. This was converted into a visual contact at 0012hrs, and two minutes later Lee ordered his battleships to engage the Japanese thinking that this was the Bombardment Group. At 0017hrs at a range of 18,500 yards, Washington opened the battle with a salvo of 16in. rounds, joined seconds later by South Dakota. The Japanese immediately turned away and made smoke. Despite several salvoes of 16in. and 5in. rounds from the battleships, no hits were scored against the Japanese. However, the admiral in charge of the Sweeping Unit continued to move to the east, effectively taking his three ships out of this phase of the battle.
November 14
1. 2313hrs – Japanese lookouts aboard Shikinami spot TF-64. Ayanami dispatched to scout the channel west of Savo Island and the rest of the Sweeping Unit is ordered to clear the channel east of Savo.
November 15
2. 0001hrs – TF-64 gains radar contact on Sweeping Unit at 18,000 yards.
3. 0012hrs – Americans gain visual contact on Sweeping Unit; Lee orders battleships to engage, thinking this was the Japanese bombardmen
t force.
4. 0015hrs – Kondo orders Screening Unit led by Nagara to engage Americans; Japanese heavy units turn to the northeast to give his light forces time to clear the way.
5. 0017hrs – Washington opens the battle with 16in. gunfire on the Sweeping Unit at a range of 18,500 yards. No ships of the Sweeping Unit are damaged.
6. 0022hrs – Ayanami detected by radar south of Savo; Americans engage her with gunfire.
7. 0027hrs – The Screening Unit is detected west of Savo. American destroyers engage with no effect; Japanese return fire and cripple Preston. Her captain orders the destroyer abandoned at 0032hrs.
8. 0033hrs – South Dakota loses electrical power.
9. 0037hrs – Benham and Walke hit by torpedoes; Walke sinks almost immediately. Gwin damaged by gunfire. Lee’s destroyer screen is out of the fight.
10. 0054hrs – Kondo, thinking the American force has been destroyed, orders his heavy ships to approach Guadalcanal to commence the bombardment. He immediately receives reports of American battleships which he dismisses.
11. 0100–0104hrs – Japanese engage South Dakota and score heavily with gunfire destroying the battleship’s radar and fire control systems forcing her from the fight at 0110hrs. However, no Japanese torpedoes find their target and South Dakota is in no danger of sinking.
12. 0100hrs – Undetected Washington given permission to engage Kirishima. At a range of only 8,400 yards, the Japanese battleship is crippled by a torrent of well-aimed 16in. and 5in. shells.
13. 0113hrs – Atago and Takao each engage Washington with eight torpedoes from only 4,000 yards; again, no hits are scored.
14. 0132hrs – Kondo cancels bombardment; three groups of Japanese ships concentrate on Washington.
15. 0240hrs – After several additional unsuccessful torpedo attacks, the Japanese lose contact on Washington.
16. 0425hrs – Kirishima sinks.
Ayanami was a unit in the second group of Special Type destroyer. She made numerous reinforcement runs to Guadalcanal before being assigned to the Japanese forces tasked to conduct a bombardment of Henderson Field on November 15. In this battle, she was handled aggressively by her skipper, but paid the price and was damaged by American gunfire before being scuttled. (Yamato Museum, 071982)
The fourth ship of the Sweeping Unit was much more aggressive. After sweeping around to the west of Savo Island, Ayanami was south of Savo when she was detected by radar aboard destroyer Walke. Two American destroyers took the contact under fire commencing at 0022hrs and were joined by the 5in. secondary batteries aboard Washington.
Behind Ayanami by some 10,000 yards was the Screening Unit led by Nagara. This formation was spotted by destroyer Preston at 0027hrs, west of Savo. Preston and two other destroyers took this new threat under fire. The American gunfire was ineffective, but Nagara’s response was not. Several shells hit Preston and turned her into a flaming wreck. Her own torpedoes exploded at 0032hrs and her captain ordered the remaining crew to abandon ship.
Worse was yet to come. First Ayanami, and then the Screening Unit had launched torpedoes at the American destroyers. Ayanami’s eight torpedoes missed, but at 0037hrs, a torpedo hit Benham and blew her bow off. Another hit Walke forward and blew off her bow as well. Gwin had been hit earlier by at least two shells, which reduced her speed and made her incapable of further action. Lee’s entire destroyer screen was now out of action. None of the American destroyers had even fired a single torpedo at the Japanese.
Destroyer Preston, shown in this prewar view, was a Mahan-class unit. She fought at the battle of Santa Cruz and was then assigned to TF-64 for the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. She was sunk with the loss of 117 of her crew. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 97937)
Walke, a Sims-class destroyer, was sunk at the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal by a Japanese torpedo. Eighty men from her crew were lost. She was selected to participate in the battle simply because she had the most fuel on board at the time Halsey dispatched TF-64 to Guadalcanal. This view, taken on August 24,1942, shows the destroyer in her Measure 12 (modified) camouflage scheme at Mare Island Navy Yard before heading to the South Pacific. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 97911)
It was up to the battleships to repel the Japanese. Unfortunately for Lee, South Dakota began to experience a series of electrical failures, which essentially took her out of the battle. The shock of her gunfire tripped a circuit breaker, which led to the loss of electrical power on the entire ship. Without radar or power to service her guns, South Dakota was helpless for three key minutes. By the time power was restored, South Dakota had lost contact with Washington, and was still focusing on engaging the Sendai located to her east.
Destroyer Benham was the lead ship often 1,500-ton destroyers ordered in 1936. They were armed with four 5in. guns and a heavy battery of 16 21in. torpedo tubes. This is Benham in February, 1942, off the Mare Island Navy Yard. Censors have deleted her radars. The ship was sunk in the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal but remarkably, none of her crew was lost. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 90936)
Battleship South Dakota was the lead ship of four 35,000-ton ships that entered service beginning in 1942. South Dakota reached the South Pacific in time to participate in the battle of Santa Cruz during which she claimed 26 Japanese aircraft shot down. She was paired with Washington to repel the Japanese in the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, but was bedeviled by electrical problems, which left her blind for important parts of the battle. She was moderately damaged by Japanese shellfire in the battle. This view was taken in June 1943 after she had been repaired. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 97265)
WASHINGTON ENGAGES KIRISHIMA (pp. 78–79)
On the night of November 14-15,1942, both the Americans and Japanese committed battleships to the waters around Guadalcanal in what would be the first engagement of battleships during the Pacific War. In this confused action, the single Japanese battleship present, Kirishima, was among several Japanese ships to target the American battleship South Dakota. As Kirishima and several other Japanese ships focused on South Dakota, the second American battleship, Washington, targeted Kirishima from only 8,400 yards. At this pointblank range for 16in. guns, Washington engaged the relatively poorly protected Japanese battleship. This scene shows Washington (1) taking the surprised Kirishima (2) under fire with her 16in. main battery. The well-drilled gunnery team aboard Washington fired a total of 75 16in. shells at Kirishima and scored at least nine hits. Another 107 5in. shells were fired at the Japanese battleship with some 40 hits likely. With her main belt being limited to a maximum of 8in., Kirishima could not stand this kind of battering. Her forward turrets were knocked out in the first minutes of the action. By the time Washington ceased fire, Kirishima was on fire amidships and in her stern area. Her steering compartment was partially flooded and her rudders jammed. Underwater hits by the massive 16in. rounds had penetrated Kirishima’s armor and created a starboard list which the Japanese were unable to check. Though the fires were subsequently put out, Kirishima was beyond salvation with the increasing list and loss of propulsive power. In return, Washington was untouched by Kirishima’s sporadic and ineffective return fire. In the first battleship duel of the Pacific War, the Americans were the clear victors. Washington’s superb performance also brought to a close the last major Japanese effort to turn the tide of battle of the naval campaign for Guadalcanal.
Heavy cruiser Atago was a member of the four-ship Takao class. Despite her formidable armament and high degree of training for night combat, she played little part in the campaign, seeing action only in the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. (Yamato Museum, 070342)
This is some of the hull damage on the forward section of South Dakota after the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. The high number of 8in. and 5in. hits on the battleship caused much topside damage, but they lacked the ability to penetrate the ship’s heavy armor and damage her vitals. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 19-N-42745)
On
board Washington, her well-trained crew was already tracking a large target to the northwest. This was Kirishima. By 0040hrs, Washington’s gun crews were ready to engage this target, but since the location of South Dakota was uncertain, Lee did not permit Washington to open fire. Lee ordered Benham and Gwin to withdraw.
After a lull in the action, and after reports from Ayanami that the American force had been dealt with, at 0054hrs Kondo ordered his heavy ships to head to the southeast and approach Guadalcanal to conduct its bombardment mission. The Screening Unit then issued a report that it had sighted an American battleship in the path of the bombardment force. Kondo dismissed this report, but lookouts aboard Atago confirmed this startling information minutes later when they gained contact with South Dakota. Immediately, Atago put eight torpedoes in the water against this new threat and then used her searchlights to illuminate the battleship. The five ships of the bombardment force, battleship Kirishima, cruiser Atago and Takao and the two lead destroyers, Asagumo and Teruzuki, all engaged South Dakota. From 0100–0104hrs, the Japanese scored heavily against South Dakota with 18 8in., six 6in., and two smaller hits. Kirishima scored only a single 14in. hit and this succeeded only in blowing a hole in the main deck before being defeated by the armored barbette of the battleship’s aft turret. The Japanese were confident that the damage inflicted was enough to sink the heavily armored battleship, but in reality she was in no danger of sinking since her watertight integrity was not threatened. South Dakota did take extensive topside damage, which destroyed her radar and fire control systems and left her out of the fight. Fortunately for the Americans, none of the eight torpedoes from Atago or four more from Asagumo found their mark.