The Bloody Triangle
Page 6
Colonel Yermolayev, who in late June replaced wounded Major General Karpezo, shed light on the condition of the XV Mechanized Corps immediately before the war. The following two charts were made from his report.8
Table 5.
Strength of XV Mechanized Corps, Expressed in Percentage of Assigned Personnel
Table 6.
Armored Fighting Vehicles
An additional seventeen T-40s were in the 131st Tank Regiment of the 212th Motorized Rifle Division. Also, there were additional tanks assigned to command elements of the divisions that were not reflected among the above totals. Five more armored cars were in the motorcycle regiment.
According to Yermolayev:
The 212th Motorized Rifle Division was not fully organized, staffed, or trained . . . and did not have transportation means. This division, while being almost fully manned by lower enlisted personnel, did not have any vehicles to transport them and could not even provide itself with enough trucks to deliver ammunition, food, and POL (petroleum-oil-lubricants). . . . The artillery regiment had eight 76mm cannon, 16 122mm howitzers (12 of them without sights) and four 152mm [cannon], but only five tractors. The lower enlisted personnel of the motorcycle regiment, while at full strength, were not trained and have not conducted even one rifle practice. . . . Communications and combat engineer battalions were staffed by brand new recruits, still conducting Phase I of their basic training, and were experiencing severe shortage of command personnel, with companies being commanded by junior officers. [Both battalions] just started receiving equipment, were not fully organized, and could not carry out combat missions.10
Yermolayev is seconded by Lieutenant Colonel Sukhoruchkin, who in similar manner to Yermolayev ascended to command the 10th Tank Division: “At the start of the war, division was short 583 junior leaders, 37 medical personnel, 813 privates, and 25 technical personnel. Out of 1,092 men which division was supposed to receive at mobilization, only 333 privates arrived.”11
Sukhoruchkin, however, was more optimistic about the overall condition of his division’s materiel, reporting that out of assigned fighting vehicles the following numbers actually left the garrisons and deployed forward: sixty-three KV-1s, forty-four T-28s, 147 BT-7s, eight OT-26s, nineteen T-26, fifty-three BA-10, nineteen BA-20, and eight hundred wheeled vehicles. He summarized their overall status:
BT-7 tanks were a mixture of machines with various engine usages of 40 to 100 hours, and only 30 of them had brand new engines. However, there were practically no spare parts. T-26s were in overall good shape, averaging 75 hours of usage. Armored cars were in good shape overall, with ten BA-20s being brand new machines. Therefore, KV, T-34, and T-26 were in good overall shape and were mission-capable. T-28s and BT-7s needed engine replacements and could not be used in prolonged operations.12
The following table illustrates the actual numbers of armored combat vehicles of the XV Mechanized Corps that were able to leave their garrisons and lumber towards the border:
Table 7.
Combat-Capable Vehicles, XV Mechanized Corps
Additionally, 152 out of 160 armored cars were combat capable.
The 37th Tank Division under Colonel Anikushkin wasn’t in as good shape as the 10th:
In accordance with [Timoshenko’s] directive #ORG/1/521114, the 37th Tank Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps was supposed to be completely formed by July 1st, 1941. As of June 22nd, 1941, division had 41.2 percent of senior command personnel, 48.3 percent of junior command personnel, and 111 percent of lower enlisted.
As far as tanks were concerned, there was 1 KV-1 (1.6 percent of TO&E [table of organization and equipment]), 34 T-34 (11.4 percent), 258 BT-7s (on hand, but not on TO&E), 22 T-26 and one flame-throwing OT-26. Artillery: 37mm air-defense artillery guns 33 percent, 122mm howitzers—56 percent, 152mm howitzers—33.3 percent. While, counting extra-allotted 258 BT-7, the division was at almost 90 percent strength, having 315 tanks, it was lacking in sticking power. . . . Sixty percent of privates were recruits called up in May 1941, who have not yet completed their basic training. Six hundred of them in the motorcycle regiment did not even have personal weapons issued to them.13
He continued:
The motorized rifle regiment, far from being completely equipped with wheeled vehicles, and initially located ninety-five miles away from the [rest of] division, at first could not operate in concert with the division.
The artillery regiment was also not completely equipped with materiel and left its deployment area (Kremenets) having only one 122mm and one 152mm howitzer [battery]. Separate air defense battalion out of [allocated] twelve guns (three batteries) only numbered four guns (one battery).14
As part of the conclusion section of his report, Anikushkin wrote:
1. Division left its [peacetime] deployment area of Kremenets with approximately 70 percent of its assigned personnel. The rest [of personnel] were left in Kremenets, where it later conducted, along with units of 14th Cavalry Division, defensive battles in Kremenets vicinity.
2. There were 315 tanks (approximately 90 percent of assigned numbers), and out of them, 258 BT-7 tanks were not part of TO&E, which negatively reflected on division’s striking power and firepower.
3. The maneuverability of the motorized rifle regiment, which set off on foot due to lack of wheeled vehicles, was extremely low, which did not allow [this] motorized rifle regiment to operate as part of the division until June 25th, 1941. This situation forced the tank regiments to allocate large number of tanks for support missions instead of utilizing them as striking power.
4. Lack of fully equipped artillery regiment . . . negatively reflected on division’s combat operations.
Ironically, contradicting himself and obviously putting on a brave face to present it to higher echelon commanders, Anikushkin stated: “Despite everything mentioned above, the 37th Tank Division represented a solid combat formation and . . . successfully carried out all assigned missions.”15
VIII MECHANIZED CORPS
The VIII Mechanized Corps, belonging to the Twenty-Sixth Army and headed by Lt. Gen. Dmitriy I. Ryabyshev, was one of the strongest Soviet mechanized formations. Various sources place the number of tanks in this corps between 850 and 932 machines of at least six different models, plus 172 armored cars. The main punch was provided by one hundred T-34 tanks and approximately eighty KV-1 heavies. However, this corps included a staggering variety of older models as well, including obsolete BT-2 tanks. Corps’ 34th Tank Division also included a battalion of flame-thrower OT-26 tanks and forty-eight giant T-35 tanks.
The VIII Mechanized Corps began its conversion in July of 1940 from the IV Cavalry Corps. Its 12th and 34th Tank Divisions were formed around cores of two light tank brigades, plus smaller tank units withdrawn from other formations.
The 7th Motorized Rifle Division was a distinguished unit, tracing its history from the Russian Civil War. This well-trained unit with high esprit de corps was handicapped by a lack of wheeled transport.
Sources on the breakdown of armored vehicles in this corps are too varied to present a cohesive table. However, the majority of new T-34s and KV-1s were concentrated in the 12th Tank Division, while the 34th Tank had all forty-eight of slow T-35s.
The chart below illustrates the difference between the number of tanks on rosters of VIII Mechanized Corps and the number of tanks that were actually able to leave their garrisons and move towards the border.16
Table 8.
Tanks Available, VIII Mechanized Corps
There was an additional small number of tanks that was not reflected in the above totals that were assigned to command elements of the VIII Mechanized Corps.
IX MECHANIZED CORPS
Even though the IX Mechanized Corps was formed in the first wave in November 1940, at the start of German invasion it was one of the weakest mechanized corps in the Red Army. Its commander was pugnacious Maj. Gen. Konstantin K. Rokossovskiy, recently released from NKVD jail. Major combat formations of IX Mechanized Corps
were the 20th Tank, 35th Tank, and 131st Motorized Rifle divisions. Part of the reserves of the South-Western Front, this corps was located ninety miles from the border, having its regular garrisons in and around Novograd-Volynskiy and Shepetovka, along the pre-1939 border.
At the start of war, the corps had 298 tanks, all of them light and older models, most of which were gathered from training facilities, consisting of 269 BT and T-26 tanks and 29 very light reconnaissance T-37, T-38, and T-40 tanks. There were 11 light and 62 medium armored cars, 1,069 wheeled vehicles of all types, 133 tractors, and 181 motorcycles. The dearth of armored combat vehicles caused Rokossovskiy to bitterly call his tank divisions the “so-called tank divisions” in his memoirs.
Rokossovskiy was bitter for good reason. Among the tanks in his corps, there was not a single modern one. His 20th Tank Division numbered only 36 light tanks. The 35th Tank Division numbered 142 light tanks, 40 of which were armed only with a machine gun. Ironically, the 131st Motorized Rifle Division was stronger in tanks than the 20th Tank Division, having 122 tanks, including 18 T-37 swimming reconnaissance tanks and 21 outdated BT-2s.
Table 9.
Tank Distribution, IX Mechanized Corps 17
In the 35th Tank Division, seventy-nine T-26s were armed with 45mm cannons, and an additional forty mounted only machine guns. Four T-26s had 37mm cannon, and ten T-26s did not have any armament at all, being used only for towing.
Table 10.
Status of Artillery on June 22, 1941
Table 11.
Status of Transportation
In his memoirs, Marshal Rokossovskiy wrote:
By the beginning of war our corps had an almost complete complement of personnel, but was not fully equipped by primary materiel: tanks and wheeled transportation. We had no more than 30 percent of quantities allocated under the TO&E. Combat vehicles were worn out and not ready for prolonged operations. Basically, the [9th Mechanized] Corps was not combat ready under these circumstances. Neither the headquarters of Kiev Special Military District nor General Staff could have been ignorant of this situation.
XIX MECHANIZED CORPS
The XIX Mechanized Corps under Maj. Gen. Nikolay V. Feklenko was a virtual twin to Rokossovskiy’s IX Mechanized. Feklenko’s corps was also part of reserves of South-Western Front and was also located along the old border, centered on towns of Zhitomir and Berdichev. Major combat units of this corps were the 40th Tank, 43rd Tank, and 213th Motorized Rifle divisions. The chart on the next page illustrates the approximate strength of XIX Mechanized Corps at the start of the war.
Table 12.
Tank Strength, XIX Mechanized Corps18
Colonel Tsibin, commander of 43rd Tank Division, described the condition of his unit on the eve of war in the following manner:
Division had 711 out of 1,253 senior commanders; 1,054 out of 2,172 junior commanders; 6,669 out of 6,451 lower enlisted; for a total of 8,434 out of 9,876 allotted, i.e. 50–60% of commanders, over 100% in privates. Core of division was formed from the veteran 35th Tank Brigade and was well trained. Command personnel were also well trained, many being veterans of the Finnish War. Motorized rifle regiment was approximately 70% short of command personnel. Lower enlisted personnel of 1st battalions of both tank regiments were mainly new inductees who just finished their basic training.
Combat vehicles were fully ready for combat operations, with complete crews, but were technically seriously worn. Out of wheeled vehicles on hand, almost 150 were in Berdichev, inoperable; partially under repair at the depots and partially without drivers. . . . There were approximately 40%–50% of required spare parts at division’s supply depot.19
Tsibin describes the vehicles available to 43rd Tank Division (see Table 13).
Table 13.
Vehicles, 43rd Tank Division
Table 14.
Situation of 43rd Tank Division’s Artillery
The 37mm ADA cannon did not have any ammunition.
Table 15.
Status of Artillery in the XIX Mechanized Corps
Table 16.
Status of Mechanized Transport, XIX Mechanized Corps
The overall condition of the XIX Mechanized Corps resembled that of the IX. The motorized rifle divisions of both corps were similarly short of wheeled transport and prime movers for artillery:
[W]heeled vehicles on hand did not by any means provide division with means to begin campaign and upload all the supplies. Because of this, majority of personnel from the motorized rifle regiment . . . did not have transportation. In the similar manner, the soldiers of first battalions of tank regiments could not depart, not having equipment.20
Diluting the offensive power of the XIX Mechanized Corps were the numerous very light T-37 amphibious reconnaissance tanks, comprising roughly 60 percent of corps’ total tank strength. These tanks, being hardly more than tankettes, were armed with machine guns only and had very light armor.
1ST ANTITANK ARTILLERY BRIGADE
The 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade under Maj. Gen. K. S. Moskalenko was a brand new unit. After evaluating successes of German panzer formations in Poland and France, leadership of the Red Army created a number of antitank artillery brigades, designed to counteract German panzer threat. Moskalenko’s brigade, bearing numeral one, was also the most combat-capable of the five such brigades of the South-Western Front.
In his memoirs, Moskalenko described his unit:
The 1st Antitank Artillery brigade was comprised of two artillery regiments, combat engineer battalion, transportation battalion, and smaller service support units. Each regiment had two battalions of 76mm cannons (24 pieces), three battalions of 85mm cannons (36 pieces) and one air defense artillery battalion (eight 37mm cannon and 36 DShK machine-guns). Therefore, brigade possessed 48 76mm cannons, 72 85mm ones, 16 37mm cannon and 72 DShK machine-guns. We were completely equipped with ammunition, including armor-piercing.21
Likewise, Moskalenko’s brigade was fully equipped with wheeled and tracked vehicles.
Similar to other military districts, the majority of units under Kirponos’ command experienced manpower shortages. Colonel Alexei V. Vladimir-skiy, chief of Operations Section of Fifth Army’s headquarters, described the manpower situation in his army on the eve of war:
Rifle divisions . . . had on the average 10,000 men, or 70%, of assigned personnel. These divisions were staffed at 68–70% with officers, 70–72% with noncommissioned officers, and 66% of lower enlisted. . . . Shortages of officers were planned to be remedied by calling up reserve officers from the eastern regions of Ukraine; shortage of noncommissioned officers—by promoting privates and, in part, by [calling up] noncommissioned officers of former Polish army born in the western regions of Ukraine, after re-training them at division-level training course; shortages of lower enlisted personnel was to be fully covered by residents of western Ukraine, with the exception of truck and tractor drivers, who were to be assigned from eastern Ukrainian regions.
Significant portion of senior commanders of the [Fifth] Army, as well as commanders of larger units who survived Stalin’s purges, participated in World War I and Civil War, and some of them—in fighting with Japanese aggressors or with Finns in 1939–1940—had combat experience, but those who were elevated to their command positions relatively recently did not yet fully know their missions in accordance with the operational plan. Headquarters of armies and rifle [corps] were headed by experienced commanders and were cohesive; however, headquarters of [lower-echelon] units were composed of officers with little experience, needing additional training. Readiness of cadre noncommissioned officer and lower enlisted personnel could be acknowledged as quite satisfactory, but the lower enlisted men called up in the fall of 1940 only finished their training on squad level.22
Shortfall in personnel in the Kiev Special Military District was mirrored by chronic and systemic shortages of equipment, vehicles, and armaments. Lieutenant General Mikhail A. Parsegov, chief of artillery of the South-Western Front/Kiev Special Military
District, on July 14, 1941, presented an extensive report to the chief of artillery of the Red Army. The tables below were created from his report.23
Table 17.
Infantry Weapons
In addition, Separate Railroad Corps (arriving from another district in May–June of 1941) was short fifteen thousand rifles and other infantry weapons; at least fifteen construction battalions (formed locally and arriving from different districts) each needed one thousand rifles.
Table 18.
Field Artillery Weapon System
Note: The Kiev Special Military District also had 213 old 107mm cannons that were not on any table of organization. Including these field pieces, Kiev Special Military District was 88.56 percent equipped with artillery. According to the same report, 487 artillery pieces, or almost 14 percent of on-hand totals, were in need of depot-level overhaul.
Table 19.
Air Defense Artillery
A problem plaguing air defense artillery in particular was a shortage of ammunition, especially the armor-piercing type.
The above-mentioned report noted that quantity and quality of equipment varied based on when the unit was created:
Older units . . . were well-provided with all weapon systems, with the exception of 37mm air defense cannons. . . . The corps-level artillery regiments and those belonging to first tier of Reserve of High Command were fully equipped, the shortages in the [Kiev] District were experienced by units formed in the second wave. The new formations, created during April–May, had the following shortages: