The Bloody Triangle

by Victor Kamenir

  Kirponos told Purkayev to find out what could be done to help the XV Mechanized Corps. Purkayev instructed Bagramyan to find out if any trucks could be taken from local civilian infrastructure. While seeing to this task, Bagramyan found General Morgunov, chief of Auto-Armor Directorate of Kiev Special Military District, and asked him for at least one transportation battalion. Morgunov had nothing at hand. Almost all transportation units under direct command of Kiev Special Military District were already employed moving forward the several rifle corps from deeper within the district. There was a small reserve vehicle park left around Shepetovka, almost two hundred miles away, but it would take some time to move them to Tarnopol.35 Thus, Karpezo received reply: “Carry on with your orders.”

  Similar requests came from Major General Feklenko’s IX Mechanized Corps and Major General Rokossovskiy’s 19th, both located deeper within the district’s territory. Since Rokossovskiy’s and Feklenko’s corps were urgently needed at the border, they were given priority with all trucks coming in from the civilian sector. Also, Kirponos ordered Morgunov to immediately move forty trucks from Shepetovka to Feklenko.

  Bagramyan later wrote in his memoirs: “By the evening of 22nd of June nobody at the front’s headquarters could think about the possibility of immediate counterattack. We could barely hold! Everybody was convinced that further directives from Moscow would be aimed at defensive actions.”36

  However, when the next directive arrived around 2300 hours, it was a rude shock to the command element of the Kiev Special Military District, renamed into wartime South-Western Front. This Directive #3 from the People’s Committee of Defense bore General Zhukov’s signature. Years later in his memoirs, Zhukov claimed that he was not the author of this directive, but was ordered to sign it by Stalin.37

  While correctly determining that the main thrust was at the juncture of Fifth and Sixth armies, this directive was downplaying enemy gains, stating that in most places German attacks have been halted or achieved only minor penetrations. Bagramyan could not help thinking that this optimism in Moscow was partially caused by his staff’s overly cautious report. He tried to justify their inadequate reporting by stating that around 1500 hours, when they sent in their first report, they had no information yet about the breakthroughs of two strong enemy panzer forces at Sokal and Vladimir-Volynskiy—they received this concrete news only in late afternoon.

  After the war, while writing memoirs and poring over the first intelligence reports, Bagramyan saw how easily the situation was misinterpreted. From the reports issued by Kirponos’ staff, it appeared that only five or six enemy divisions were attacking in the area of Fifth Army. This would not have been seen as very alarming by Moscow due to the fact that the Fifth Army had four divisions of its own near the border. The first intelligence summary sent to Moscow by the South-Western Front made the following conclusion estimating the attacking German forces:

  The Lutsk [Fifth Army] direction: four–five infantry and one panzer division; the Rava-Russkaya-Lvov [Sixth Army] direction: three–four infantry divisions with [some] tanks; the Peremyshl-Lvov [Twenty-Sixth Army] direction: two–three infantry divisions; the Chernovtsy [Twelfth Army] direction: four Rumanian infantry divisions.38

  “It is possible that similar mistakes in evaluating correlation of forces which invaded us took place at the other fronts as well,” Bagramyan wrote.39

  Regardless of the reasoning upon which its decision was made, the Soviet High Command issued its infamous Directive #3:

  While maintaining strong defense of the state border with Hungary, the 5th and 6th armies are to carry out concentric strikes in the direction of Lyublin, utilizing at least five mechanized corps and aviation of the [South-Western] Front, in order to encircle and destroy the enemy group of forces advancing along the front Vladimir-Volynski–Krystonopol, and by the end of June 24th to capture the vicinity of Lyublin.40

  To Bagramyan and Purkayev these orders were plainly unrealistic: at the present time they would be lucky just to hold on. Lyublin, located roughly eighty miles on the other side of the border, was as unreachable as the moon. Purkayev took Bagramyan with him to see Kirponos.

  Upon receiving these news, Kirponos immediately called for Vashugin. Predictably, Commissar Vashugin was enthusiastic about attacking. Purkayev plunged into an argument with Vashugin, trying to convince the party hack about the necessity of defense, not attack. Purkayev tried to reason with him, pointing out that against the ten already-identified infantry and panzer German divisions between Sokal and Lyuboml, they could only place four weak rifle divisions. At best, on June 23 two more divisions could come up, the 135th Rifle and, maybe, the 41st Tank Division, of which there were still no news. They did not know yet that without contact with his superiors, the commander of the 41st Tank Division broke open his red envelope and moved his unit from Vladimir-Volynski to Kovel, away from the fighting, where the XXII Mechanized Corps was to concentrate in accordance with pre-war plans.

  Therefore, Purkayev continued, by tomorrow they could have six divisions against ten German ones, not even taking into account additional divisions which the Germans were sure to send in to exploit the breakthroughs. Of the approaching reserve corps, the XXXI and XXXVI Rifle Corps would need five or six days to arrive, the IX and XIX Mechanized Corps were still three to four days away. The IV, VIII, XV, and XXII Mechanized Corps could be ready in a day or two. He especially stressed the fact that neither the armies nor the South-Western Front itself had rear echelon support structures, because they had not been mobilized yet.

  General Purkayev went as far as making an outrageous suggestion that Kirponos tell Moscow the real situation and insistently request to change the mission. Purkayev wanted permission to organize strong defenses along the pre-1939 border using the second echelon units. Only after halting the Germans along the old border, he argued, any thoughts of offensive could be entertained.

  As was fast becoming his habit, Kirponos deferred to Vashugin, who spoke up first. In the dual-command structure of the Red Army, Commissar Vashugin was the dominating personality in this particular symbiotic relationship with Kirponos. While demonstrably a capable division commander, Kirponos was promoted beyond his ability to command the Kiev Special Military District, the most powerful one in the Soviet military establishment. Unfortunately for him, and tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers, this rise in rank was not accompanied by a rise in experience. Additionally, his mild-mannered persona was completely overshadowed by the bombastic Commissar Vashugin.

  True to himself, Vashugin pointed out that while Purkayev was correct from the military standpoint, this was the narrow view of a specialist, not taking into account the morale factor: “Did you know what kind of morale damage this would be, when we, after nurturing the Red Army in high offensive spirit, would order a passive defense in the very first days of war?!”

  Seeing Purkayev unconvinced and ready to contest the point further, Vashugin calmly played his trump card: “You know . . . if I would not have known you as a tested Bolshevik, I would have thought you panicked!”41 While Purkayev was ready to explode, Kirponos intervened.

  Playing the peacemaker, Kirponos stated that they both were right. According to Kirponos, while correct overall, Purkayev overlooked that fact that the fortified districts along the old border were not ready for defense. He brushed off Purkayev’s retort that they could be rapidly brought up to partial readiness by utilizing combat and construction engineer units.

  Kirponos continued. While it was obvious that they could not take Lyublin by the end of the 24th, they were still obligated to counterattack. Thus, they now needed to concentrate on rapidly bringing the five mechanized corps towards the developing area of main battle and conduct a coordinated attack. Commander of the Fifth Army, General Potapov, was to do everything possible to hold what he got. The IV, VIII, and XV Mechanized corps would attack from the south, while the IX, XIX, and XXII Mechanized corps would strike from the east and northeast. The XXXVII Rifle Corps was to
cover Tarnopol from the northwest with two of its rifle divisions. Its third division would be held in reserve of the South-Western Front near Tarnopol.

  This was it, then. While Vashugin expressed his loud and enthusiastic agreement, Purkayev and Bagramyan quietly left and began preparing for an offensive which they believed suicidal. They understood that Kirponos would not change his mind for fear of being labeled as defeatist and panic-monger, even if he knew them to be correct. All Soviet officers knew that the punishment for an even perceived display of inability to carry out orders and accomplish the mission was an arrest by NKVD and swift execution.

  The two senior staff officers had to make plans with meager assets available to them. The VIII and XV Mechanized Corps were still out of position. The IV Mechanized Corps became involved in local fighting along the front of the Sixth Army and could not disengage in time to participate in the general counterattack. Therefore, the Fifth Army under General Potapov would have to carry out the counterattack alone.

  Year later in his memoirs, Reminiscences and Thoughts, Marshal Zhukov acknowledged that instructions about carrying the war into enemy territory were premature [emphasis added]. He, however, defended these orders by stating that nobody in the senior Soviet command echelons knew the main direction of enemy’s push nor the German strength. Zhukov attempted to distance himself from the fiasco, stating that this directive was composed and disseminated according to a decision by Stalin and People’s Commissar for Defense S. K. Timoshenko, without Zhukov’s input.

  Major General Potapov’s Fifth Army, which was to be the leading force in the counterattack, was in woefully inadequate shape for the task. It is the clear indication of terror under which Stalin held his military commanders that Kirponos was willing to knowingly commit inadequate forces rather than even to attempt to change or postpone the mission. The four forward rifle divisions of the Fifth Army were pinned down by the enemy, plus the 41st Tank Division was out of contact at Kovel and feared lost. Consequently, the three divisions of the Fifth Army which had not been engaged yet would have to form the strike force of the counteroffensive. These units were the 135th Rifle Division of the XXVII Rifle Corps and two divisions of the XXII Mechanized Corps, the 19th Tank, and the 215th Motorized Rifle. However, even the participation of the 135th Rifle Division was still questionable. In its Situation Report #1, forwarded to Moscow at 2000 hours on June 22, Major General Purkayev stated that as of 1800 hours location of the above division was still unknown.42 This rifle division was advancing to the border incommunicado, and it was Kirponos’ wishful thinking that it would be informed of its mission in time to participate in the offensive the next day.

  The jump-off time for the counterattack was set for 2200 hours on June 23. However, while advancing towards the border, these three divisions were discovered by German reconnaissance aircraft and subjected to severe air attacks. Besides inflicting casualties and destroying invaluable vehicles and equipment, the air attacks caused significant time delay. Thus, the counterattack was later postponed until 0400 hours on June 24.

  After receiving his marching orders, Major General Potapov, in turn, had no doubts that the proposed counterattack was doomed to failure. His chief of staff, Major General Pisarevskiy, suggested that they at least keep the motorcycle regiment of the XXII Mechanized Corps as their last reserve since committal of the three above-mentioned divisions on June 23 would leave them without any unengaged major units. Potapov approved his suggestion, wondering if the Moscow leadership had lost their collective mind.

  During the night of June 21–22, a majority of officers at the General Staff and People’s Committee for Defense in Moscow were ordered to remain at their posts. Timoshenko and Zhukov were constantly on the phone with border district commanders, receiving information updates. Everybody was tense from incoming multiple reports about increasing German activity along the border.

  At 0307 hours, Timoshenko received a call from the Black Sea Fleet commander, Adm. F. S. Oktyabrskiy, informing him that naval forward listening posts were reporting an approach of a large number of unidentified aircraft from the sea. The fleet was standing by, and Oktyabrskiy was requesting instructions. Zhukov, who was in Timoshenko’s office, asked him what he wanted to do. The admiral replied: open fire on the unidentified aircraft. After a quick consultation with Timoshenko, Zhukov gave Oktyabrskiy permission to open fire.

  Things started happening fast after that. From 0315 hours calls began coming in from commanders of Baltic, Western, and Kiev military districts with reports of air attacks by German aircraft.

  At 0430 hours Timoshenko and Zhukov met with Stalin and selected members of Politburo (Politburo, short for Political Bureau, was the Soviet supreme governing body) in Kremlin. After a short discussion, a call was placed to the German embassy with request for explanations. As the reply, the German ambassador Count von Shulenburg requested an urgent meeting with the Soviet foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, which was immediately granted.

  The Soviet leadership awaited Molotov’s return amid further disjointed news from the western frontier. Every passing minute added to the list of more and more Soviet cities subjected to German bombing and Red Army and Air Force units coming under attack. At last Molotov arrived. His opening statement dispelled any doubts as to German intentions: “The German government declared war on us.”43 Back at their headquarters, Zhukov and Timoshenko were struggling with lack of communications:

  Without having communications, army commanders and some district commanders went directly to forward units to find out the situation for themselves. But because the events unfolded so rapidly, this method of command further complicated situation. District headquarters were receiving the most conflicting information from various sources, often inflammatory and panicked in character. . . .

  Until 9 a.m. we were not able to find out anything of significance, because the [Districts’] headquarters and [their] commanders could not receive concrete information about the enemy from headquarters of armies and corps. They simply did not know where and in what strength the German units were advancing, where the enemy was striking main blows and where the secondary ones, where his armored and mechanized units were operating.44

  At noon all the staff officers gathered around the radio. Amid slight crackling, Molotov’s voice, minutely shaking, but strong, came through:

  Citizens of the Soviet Union! The Soviet Government and its head, Comrade Stalin, authorized me to make the following statement:

  Today at 4 a.m., without making any demands upon the Soviet Union, without declaration of war, the German forces invaded our country, attacked our borders in many locations, and their aircraft bombed our cities: Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas, and some others, killing and wounding over two hundred people. Air attacks and artillery bombardment were also conducted from Rumanian and Finnish territories.

  This unheard-of attack upon our county is an unprecedented travesty in the history of civilized countries. The attack on our country was perpetuated despite the fact that a treaty of nonaggression had been signed between the USSR and Germany and that the Soviet Government most faithfully abided by all provisions of this treaty. The attack upon our country was perpetrated despite the fact that during the entire period of operation of this treaty, the German Government could not find grounds for a single complaint against the USSR as regards observance of this treaty. Complete responsibility for this treacherous attack upon the Soviet Union completely and totally falls upon the German Fascist rulers.

  After the attack took place, at 5:30 a.m. Von Schulenburg, the German ambassador in Moscow, made the statement to me, as the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in the name of his government, that the German Government decided to enter into war against the Soviet Union in connection with the concentration of Red Army units near the eastern German border.

  In reply to this, in the name of the Soviet Government, I stated that until the last moments the German Government did not make any demands upon the Sov
iet Government, that Germany attacked the Soviet Union despite the peaceful stance of the Soviet Union, and in this the Fascist Germany is the aggressor.

  On instruction of the government of the Soviet Union I also stated that at no point had our troops or our air force committed a violation of the frontier and that the statement made this morning by the Rumanian radio to the effect that Soviet aircraft allegedly had fired on Rumanian airfields is a sheer lie and provocation.

  Likewise, the whole declaration made today by Hitler is a lie and provocation by Hitler, who is trying belatedly to concoct accusations charging the Soviet Union with failure to observe the Soviet-German pact.

  Now, when the attack against the Soviet Union is an accomplished fact, the Soviet Government orders our troops to repulse the treacherous attack and drive the German forces from our territory.

  This war has been forced upon us, not by the German people, not by German workers, peasants, and intellectuals, whose sufferings we well understand, but by the clique of bloodthirsty Fascist rulers of Germany who have enslaved Frenchmen, Czechs, Poles, Serbians, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Greece, and other nations.

  This is not the first time that our people have had to deal with an attack of an arrogant foe. At the time of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia our people’s reply was war for the fatherland, and Napoleon suffered defeat and met his doom.

  It will be the same with Hitler, who in his arrogance has proclaimed a new crusade against our country. The Red Army and our whole people will again wage victorious war for the fatherland, for our country, for honor, for liberty.