The Bloody Triangle

by Victor Kamenir

  Mobilization efforts were producing poor results in the chaotic environment. For example, the 2nd Antitank Artillery Brigade did not receive its allotment of tractors from the civilian sector and could only send one artillery battalion to the border.

  Only by the evening of June 23, the command group of the South-Western Front developed relatively clear picture of the situation at the border. It became obvious that the main German effort fell on the Soviet Fifth Army, and the fate of the border battle would be decided on its front, in the area from Vladimir-Volynskiy to Sokal.2

  After the 87th and 124th Rifle Divisions became cut off and surrounded, the Soviet defenses in the Vladimir-Volynskiy area collapsed. The town itself was taken, and a strong German panzer group advanced along the highway to Lutsk.

  Another German panzer force became engaged around Radekhov with the forward elements of XV Mechanized Corps under General Karpezo. The Soviet commander had to leave his motorized rifle division, the 212th, in Brody due to lack of transport. His 37th Tank Division and one tank regiment from the 10th Tank Division became delayed by marshy terrain. Only two regiments from the 10th Tank Division, under Maj. Gen. S. Y. Ogurtzov, one rifle and one tank, met the Germans at Radekhov. Moving around Ogurtsov’s unprotected flanks, the Germans advanced toward Berestechko, completely unprotected by Soviet troops.3

  Meanwhile, the Sixth and Twenty-Sixth armies, while heavily engaged, were hanging onto their positions for time being. The Twelfth Army, guarding the border with Hungary along Carpathian Mountains, reported practically no enemy activity.

  In the evening of June 23, the Military Council of the South-Western Front gathered to work on the counteroffensive plans. After a short situation report by General Purkayev, they began figuring out what assets could participate in the counteroffensive on June 24: the XV Mechanized Corps and one division from XXII Mechanized Corps, supported by 135th Rifle Division and 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade. The VIII Mechanized Corps was still on the march from Lvov, under constant air attacks. The IV Mechanized had been diverted to fight in its parent army’s area of operations. The IX and XIX Mechanized Corps were still at least two days away. The XXXI, XXXVI, and XXXVII Rifle Corps were at least four to five days away.4

  As usual, Commissar Vashugin began spouting the offensive-minded philosophy demanding stronger attacks against the Germans. Purkayev soberly opposed him, pointing out that if they attacked right now, they would be committing their forces piecemeal. He insisted that it was absolutely crucial to maintain defensive posture for at least two more days, allowing three more mechanized corps and parts of two more rifle corps to concentrate for a large-scale offensive. Still, Kirponos supported Vashugin, and the argument was over.

  Thus, the plan for the next day’s counterattack was worked out. The two-pronged attack would be aimed at Vladimir-Volynskiy in the north and Berestechko in the south. Three divisions were to advance on Vladimir-Volynskiy: 135th Rifle from the XXVII Rifle Corps and 215th Motorized Rifle and 19th Tank from the XXII Mechanized Corps. They were to be supported by the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade. The initial time for the first large-scale counterattack by the Fifth Army was set for 2200 hours on the 23rd of June. However, the German aviation so severely hampered the advance of the 135th Rifle Division and the XXII Mechanized Corps that the offensive was postponed until 0400 hours on the 24th.

  The southern pincer would be comprised of the 10th and 37th Tank divisions of the XV Mechanized Corps. Both forces were not in communication with each other and would be attacking on their own timetables.

  After finalizing the plan, Colonel Bagramyan brought it to Kirponos’ office for final approval. He found a grim atmosphere there. In addition to Kirponos, Purkayev, and Vashugin, two more people were there. Chief of General Staff Colonel General Zhukov and Member of Military Council Nikita Khrushchev had just returned from their inspection of the situation closer to the border.

  Bagramyan’s entry interrupted Zhukov lambasting Kirponos for what he considered the latter’s lackluster efforts to bring sufficient forces to bear on the German panzer and mechanized group of forces. Zhukov was particularly upset that Kirponos allowed the commander of the Sixth Army, I. N. Muzychenko, to use the powerful IV Mechanized Corps in local fighting, instead of shifting it north to support the XV Mechanized Corps.5

  By the end of June 23, 1941, despite stubborn resistance by the Soviet forces, the Germans achieved significant inroads, up to forty miles, into the Soviet territory. The nightfall found the 14th Panzer Division halted in the woods three miles northwest of Voinitsa, with orders to reach the Styr River in the area of Lutsk on June 24. The 298th Infantry Division was firmly in control of Vladimir-Volynskiy. The 44th Infantry Division, after leaving few units pinning down the remains of the 87th Rifle Division, moved off to within six miles southwest of Voinitsa. The 299th Infantry Division was moving through a small town of Lokachi in the direction of Lutsk. The freshly committed 13th Panzer Division, leapfrogged them, also moving to Lutsk. Another follow-on unit, the 16th Panzer Division, was advancing on Radekhov in the wake of hard-charging 11th Panzer.

  Kovel Direction

  Throughout the night of June 22–23, commander of the XV Rifle Corps, Col. Ivan I. Fedyuninskiy, continued receiving disturbing reports about increasing German activity along Brest-Kovel road. Especially disturbing was news that a significant number of German tanks were descending upon his right flank. However, none of these reports were true. Paralyzing “tankophobia” afflicting the Soviet troops in the early days of the war made the ever-present German motorcycle scouts and armored reconnaissance cars to be major panzer formations. Lacking his own effective reconnaissance assets, Fedyuninskiy had not way of verifying the false reports. Therefore, he kept the bulk of his reserve 41st Tank Division and 104th Rifle Regiment aimed at defending the Kovel area from the threat that wasn’t there.

  Fedyuninskiy was in an unenviable position. Knowledge that he was responsible for holding the right flank of the entire South-Western Front weighed heavily on him and robbed the colonel of the ability to interpret the events unfolding to his front. The real threat was in the center of his position, along the railroad tracks leading from Chelm to Lyuboml. Realizing that Germans had punched gaps between and in their units, both commanders of Fedyuninskiy’s rifle divisions spent the night preparing for their counterattacks in order to eliminate German penetration of their lines.

  During the night, virtually no resupply reached Timoshenko’s 62nd or Sherstyuk’s 45th Rifle divisions. However, the 253rd Rifle Regiment from the 45th Division finally arrived during the night and took up positions for the attack in the morning. Colonel Timoshenko, commanding the 62nd Rifle Division, having his units widely scattered, was forced to put his reconnaissance, combat engineers, and signal battalions in line to fight as infantry. Intent on maintaining even a semblance of linkup with the 87th Rifle Division from the XXVII Corps to his south, Timoshenko kept a strong group of his forces at Mosyr. This group, as mentioned previously, composed of his 123rd Rifle Regiment and two artillery regiments, remained idle in its positions throughout June 23.

  The 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment from the 41st Tank Division was deployed between the two divisions, partially linking them together. This regiment, which fought as part of Fedyuninskiy’s corps throughout June 22, was composed mostly of almost-untrained recruits and suffered disproportionately heavy casualties. With the commitment of the 253rd Rifle Regiment, the only immediately available reserve was a makeshift battalion of border guards. These men, survivors of destroyed outposts, gathered around the core of the 98th NKVD Border Guards Detachment and formed themselves as the reserve behind the 45th Rifle Division. However, numbering only several hundred men, the heaviest weapons in their possession were a dozen light machine guns salvaged from their destroyed blockhouses.

  At 0900 hours on June 23, both rifle divisions began their counterattack after a short preparatory artillery fire. The short duration of supporting fire was not intentional. Within
ten minutes, German aircraft located Soviet artillery positions and subjected them to severe bombardment. A majority of XV Rifle Corps’ artillery was put out of action. Those that survived ceased fire so as not to invite deadly German reply.

  The infantrymen of the XV Rifle Corps were supported by two companies of tanks from the 41st Tank Division attacking in the area of operations of 45th Rifle Division. When the Soviet tanks were within two hundred meters of the enemy’s positions, Germans met them with practically point-blank artillery fire. The soft-skinned T-26s were brutalized. Lieutenant Bochakoshvili, commanding one of the tank companies, ordered his unit to pull back after losing seven tanks in quick succession. By the time his company returned to its starting position, Bochakoshvili had only three tanks left. The other company suffered similar fate. After their attack halted, both gutted tank companies numbered five tanks out of thirty-two they started with. Later in the day, dismounted tank crewmen were organized into a makeshift rifle company, armed mainly with pistols and light machine guns removed from disabled tanks and lacking bipods. Because of their black tanker uniforms, they were nicknamed the “black infantry.”6

  The two weak Soviet rifle divisions did not fare any better. The attack of the 45th Rifle Division faltered almost immediately, except on its left flank, where its 61st Rifle Regiment made minor initial progress, pushing Germans back about a mile before running out of steam in face of mounting casualties. Advancing on its left flank, the 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment also made a good showing before being similarly halted.

  South of the Chelm-Lyuboml railroad, the 62nd Rifle Division made only a token attempt to counterattack. Immediately met with withering artillery and machine-gun fire, Colonel Timoshenko’s division halted and treaded water in place throughout the day, absorbing heavy casualties in the process.

  In their turn, the Germans counterattacked their counterattackers. The 62nd Infantry Division slammed into both Soviet divisions with a vengeance. Very soon the Germans recovered the ground lost in the morning and began pushing the Soviets east. By the end of the day, the XV Rifle Corps held the line roughly ten miles east and paralleling the border. Its south wing around Mosyr, the relatively quiet sector of Soviet lines, remained slightly forwards. Germans expanded the gap between the 45th and 62nd Rifle divisions to almost four miles wide and ten miles deep.

  The Soviet counterattack did have some small measure of success, however. During the day’s fighting, the pressure on the surrounded 1st Battalion, 306th Rifle Regiment, and the 201st Machine-Gun Battalion lessened, and the survivors of both units managed to fight their way out of the encirclement. A two-train detachment of Soviet armored trains significantly contributed to the day’s fighting, alternatively supporting the Red Army riflemen in attack and retreat.

  Vladimir-Volynskiy Direction

  As difficult as Fedyuninskiy’s situation was, the one facing his counterpart, commander of the XXVII Rifle Corps, Maj. Gen. Pavel D. Artemenko, was simply nightmarish. Bearing the brunt of attack by Army Group South, the two frontline rifle divisions, 87th and 124th, found themselves practically surrounded by the end of June 22. However, receiving the word that their sister division, the 135th, would be deployed between them on June 23rd, both divisions remained in place. Believing themselves to be reinforced and going onto offensive, the Soviet soldiers prepared only the most rudimentary defensive positions during the night.

  Throughout most of the day, Major General Alyabyshev’s 87th Rifle Division attempted retaking Ustilug, only to be drawn further into the trap. Two of its rifle regiments made no headway against the town, while the third regiment, reinforced with a tank regiment from the 41st Tank Division, fought its way to the southeastern outskirts of Ustilug by 1400 hours. The price paid by the tank regiment, equipped with T-26 tanks, was disproportionally high when compared against gains achieved.

  The steep price paid by Soviet riflemen and tankers was for naught. German response came around 1600 hours when units from Wehrmacht’s 298th Infantry and 14th Panzer divisions counterattacked the winded Soviet formations from the west and northwest. At the same time, the German 44th Infantry Division attacked the left flank of the 283rd Rifle Regiment and forced it to retreat with heavy casualties. The pullback exposed the left flank of the 96th Rifle Regiment, which in turn was forced to abandon the fight for Ustilug and retreat.

  The Red Army units were thrown back from Ustilug in disorder, and victorious Landsers broke into Vladimir-Volynskiy on the heels of retreating Soviets. So swift was the German attack that the Soviet soldiers did not have a chance to prepare the small town for defense. After a series of running street fights lasting several hours, disorganized units from the 87th Rifle Division were pushed out of town. One small group of die-hard Red Army men made a suicidal stand on a hillock east of town, amid the remains of earthen ramparts of a ruined fourteenth century castle.

  Attacking just south of them, the 299th Infantry Division of the German XXIX Corps found the going much easier. Other than two border guard blockhouses and two bunkers from the fortified district, there were no Soviet troops readily available to oppose them. After surrounding and bypassing the Soviet strong points, the 299th Infantry Division continued its dash eastward.

  Throughout day this division continued a two-pronged effort. As the bulk of 299th pressed forward, its rear echelons continued to systematically isolate and destroy the Soviet bunkers which continued to resist in its rear. By evening, the main body of 299th Infantry Division concentrated in the vicinity of Yanevichi railroad station, ten miles south of Vladimir-Volynski. Its forward elements reached Lokachi but were furiously attacked and severely mauled by the approaching 396th Rifle Regiment from the Soviet 135th Rifle Division.

  By the nightfall of June 23, situation of the 87th Rifle Division looked bleak. As the result of the 14th Panzer Division’s breakthrough, its defensive front was broken in two. The main body of the 87th Rifle Division, flanked on both sides, became cut off and surrounded and suffered punishing casualties. Ammunition was running low, and there was no communications with headquarters of the XXVII Rifle Corps or the Fifth Army or with the neighboring divisions. In these circumstances, commander of the 87th Rifle Division, Maj. Gen. F. F. Alyabyshev, decided to begin a pullback east during the night. His intent was to rejoin the Fifth Army, which he believed was to begin a counterattack in the direction Vladimir-Volynski at any time.

  When the 87th Rifle Division attempted to break out during the night, its 283rd Rifle Regiment was cut off and annihilated. During the retreat, Alyabyshev’s command became fragmented from brushes with German troops. In one of these countless skirmishes in the early morning of June 25, General Alyabyshev himself was killed. Division’s Chief of Staff Colonel Blank replaced the fallen general and led the unit in the northeast direction through the wooded and swampy area between rivers Turya and Stokhod.

  Sokal Direction

  Throughout the day, the Major General Suschiy’s 124th Rifle Division continued its stubborn fight as well. Containing its spirited, but ineffective, counterattacks from the front, the Germans shifted their attention to the flanks of the 124th Rifle Division. Slowly, the Soviet division was being completely surrounded. On their way to their goal of Radekhov, the 15th Panzer Regiment of the 11th Panzer Division passed through and around the left flank of the beleaguered division, pinning it in place. Following closely in the wake of panzers, German 57th Infantry Division surrounded Suschiy’s division and began tightening the noose. Not having prepared adequate defensive positions during the night, the 124th Rifle Division suffered heavy casualties before being able to halt the Germans.

  Being out of communications with higher echelons, Major General Suschiy still expected to be relieved by the counterattacks of the Soviet reserves. Without orders to withdraw, Suschiy decided to continue holding his positions and established all-around defense. By this time, the 124th Rifle Division has been pushed almost forty kilometers east of the border. He ordered evacuation of as many supplies as possib
le from the divisional depots in Gorokhov and the destruction of what could not be evacuated.

  Soviet Reserves Moving to the Border

  While the forward Soviet units fought for their lives, reserves of the Fifth Army and the South-Western Front were ponderously moving forward. The 135th Rifle Division, detached from its parent XXVII Rifle Corps to be Fifth Army’s reserve, bivouacked in a forest west of Torchin, ten miles west of Lutsk. Its forward-most unit, the 396th Rifle Regiment, as mentioned previously already had a brush with advance German elements. After expelling a reconnaissance unit from the German 299th Infantry Division from Lokachi, it set up defensive positions there for the night.

  The 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade, after a night march from Kivertsi, in the morning of the 23rd deployed west of Zaturtsi, approximately eighteen miles west of Lutsk, straddling the Vladimir-Volynskiy–Lutsk road.

  The main body of the XXII Mechanized Corps, after completing a thirty-mile night march from Rovno, was concentrating approximately twelve miles northeast of Lutsk. It was preparing to leave in the evening for Kovel area to link up with its 41st Tank Division, which was covering the city from northwest.

  The XIX Mechanized Corps, setting off in the late evening of the 22nd from Zhitomir-Berdichev area, since the morning of June 23 was resting in the woods east of the river Slutch, still 125 miles southeast of Lutsk. The corps was preparing to leave in the late evening of the 23rd to the area of Klevan, northwest of Rovno.