The Bloody Triangle

by Victor Kamenir

  Since the area west of Lutsk, assigned to the IX and XIX Mechanized Corps as starting positions, was already captured by the Germans, they were instructed to stage in the area roughly southeast of Lutsk. The two mechanized corps, along with units of the arriving XXXVI Rifle Corps, were to destroy the enemy in the area of Mlynuv and Dubno and capture those towns. Rokossovskiy’s two tank divisions began shifting there from their positions along the Lutsk-Rovno highway. The XIX Mechanized Corps under Feklenko was closer than Rokossovskiy to their new areas of concentration. However, as it moved into positions north of Mlynov, it became engaged with the forward German units and could not adequately prepare for the offensive on June 26.

  Since the morning of June 24, the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade had had a difficult fight on its hands in the direct vicinity of the western suburbs of Lutsk. During the previous night, Moskalenko deployed his brigade in three defensive lines. They made the enemy pay dearly, and as the Germans overcame each successive line, the surviving Soviet gunners fell back to the next one.

  During the night of June 24–25, Moskalenko’s depleted brigade was ordered to abandon its positions on the southwest outskirts of Lutsk and fall back north to the town of Rozhysche. This small town on the Styr River was becoming a focal point of Soviet defenses on the northern flank of Potapov’s Fifth Army. Pushing the XV and XXVII Rifle Corps ahead of them, the Germans were attempting to pierce a gap between the two beleaguered corps at Rozhysche and capture beachheads across the Styr River. The shattered XXII Mechanized Corps and the 135th Rifle Division were falling back on this town as well, and Moskalenko’s units were to form the keystone of the antitank defenses around town.

  As the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade arrived at the bridge near Rozhysche, which it intended to use to cross to the eastern side of the Styr River, it found the bridge destroyed under orders of General Artemenko, commander of the XXVII Rifle Corps. In the general chaos of the retreat, the Soviet demolition detachment charged with destroying the bridge was not informed to wait for Moskalenko’s crossing before blowing up the bridge. Now the brigade was trapped on the western side of the river.7

  Fortunately, Moskalenko’s scouts soon located another bridge nearby. This one was a railroad bridge. While it was possible to move the artillery across the cross ties and rails of this bridge, it would take time. The Soviet gunners began digging in near the bridge’s western end, forming a crescent with the flanks resting on the river. At approximately the same time, some rear-echelon support units from the 27th Rifle and XXII Mechanized Corps arrived at the railroad bridge as well.

  As the Soviets began frantically digging shallow trenches and foxholes, sporadic German artillery and mortar fire began falling among them. They were quickly followed by determined German infantry and armor attacks around 0600 hours. The Germans pressed very hard, hoping to rush the bridge and trap as many Soviets as possible on the west bank. During one attack, the German panzers broke through the first Soviet line of shallow trenches. In the ensuing close-quarters fighting, one Soviet battery was destroyed, but Germans were forced to fall back.

  Utilizing the lull in fighting, Moskalenko began hurriedly transferring his units to the eastern side of the railroad bridge. He barely had enough time to send one battalion over when an unexpected delay took place.

  The rear echelon units of the XXVII Rifle and XXII Mechanized Corps rushed the bridge in panic. Several hundred men and horses, pushing and shoving, tried to force their way to the eastern side. In the ensuing panic, men and animals trampled over each other in the narrow confines of the bridge. Wagons, people, and horses lost their footing or were shoved over the sides and plunged into the water. The draft horses began breaking their legs between railroad ties, creating ungodly tangles of overturned artillery pieces, crushed men, flying hooves, splintered wagons, and stalled vehicles. Adding to the panic, German artillery shells began falling among the crowds at the bridge.8 The whole scene resembled Napoleon’s disastrous retreat over Berezina River in 1812.

  An indescribable panic ensued. Drivers began unhitching horses; some men jumped in the river and tried to swim across. The debris on the railroad bridge completely blocked the passage and created such an obstacle that it would have taken several hours to clear it. In order to quickly remove the obstacle, Moskalenko sent two heavy KV-1 tanks from 19th Tank Division to bodily push the obstruction off the bridge. The huge tanks flattened, crushed, and pushed the debris off the bridge, and those units that maintained their cohesion began crossing at once. After the rear-guard motorcycle regiment from the XXII Mechanized Corps crossed the bridge, it was blown up.9

  North of Moskalenko’s location, Maj. Gen. I. I. Fedyuninskiy’s XV Rifle Corps was retreating as well. Falling back with Fedyuninkiy’s corps, the 41st Tank Division fought several sharp rear-guard actions, keeping the hard-pressing German reconnaissance units at arm’s length. The rear echelons of the 41st Tank Divisions suffered heavily from German air attacks during the daytime retreat. Meager antiair defenses of this tank division amounted to only four antiaircraft cannons and could not prevent the German planes from getting in close to the strung-out Soviet columns.10

  Following on the heels of retreating Soviet units, German III Corps deployed a fresh panzer division, the 13th, which looped around Lutsk and entered the town in late afternoon on the 25th.

  DUBNO, 11TH PANZER DIVISION

  After crushing the left flank of Soviet XXVII Rifle Corps and brushing aside the elements of XV Mechanized, the 11th Panzer Division continued advancing towards Dubno.

  Even though several shattered and disorganized Red Army units put up feeble resistance, the Soviet Air Force was present in strength. The Soviet bombers, almost always unprotected by their fighter brethren, launched numerous attacks against the German division. Gustav Schrodek informs us of fifty such attacks recorded during the day; this number seems a little inflated. German fighter aircraft falling upon virtually defenseless Soviet bombers took a terrible toll on these valuable aircraft, often shooting down whole squadrons as they helplessly and unwaveringly droned on to their targets.

  Pushing aside weak Soviet defenses and shrugging off air attacks, 11th Panzer Division continued forward:

  While the [15th Panzer Regiment was] continually entangled and stopped by new fights with enemy detachments, the 11th Panzer Division continued its advance on Dubno under cover of a small forest in two columns.

  The Recon Battalion 231 (motorized) [attacked] towards Mlynov from the north. The 110th Infantry Regiment, which spent the whole night destroying the weaker enemy units while advancing, [reached] Dubno with its advance elements south of the city and [continued] to penetrate the area at 0730 hours. By 1100 hours, Dubno could be attacked from both south and the north. After defeating a flank attack during which the Russians also used tanks, the 11th Panzer Division announced in the early afternoon on June 25th that Dubno was firmly in their hands at 1400 hours.

  In the evening, a rumor of Soviet armor units advancing from Ostrow caused big confusion with the supply units in the rear, and they [returned] to Lopatin. Some columns [turned] back, [causing] major jams on the route of advance. However, the retreat was stopped and intended hasty burn of the timber bridge of Styr at Merva [was] prevented.11

  IX MECHANIZED CORPS, MAJ. GEN. K. K. ROKOSSOVSKIY COMMANDING

  Throughout June 25, the IX Mechanized Corps continued fighting south of Lutsk-Rovno highway against German 13th and 14th Panzer divisions. The Germans were pushing hard to cut the highway and encircle Lutsk from the east. Instead of preparing for the offensive the next day, Rokossovskiy’s corps was forced to fight a defensive battle.

  At the end of the day as Lutsk was abandoned, Colonel Kalinin’s 131st Motorized Rifle Division waited until the last organized Soviet unit retreated across the river, then blew up the bridge. Casualties were heavy. Even though Kalinin’s division absorbed small groups of retreating soldiers from other units, they were nowhere enough to make good his losses.12

 
Strugglers and survivors of the XXII Mechanized Corps began arriving in the positions of the IX Mechanized in increasing numbers. One of them was Maj. Gen. Kuzma A. Semenchenko, whose 19th Tank Division was shuttered in the fighting the previous day. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, this attack cost the 19th Tank Division all the regimental commanders hors de combat. Semenchenko himself, narrowly escaping a brush with death, was quite depressed, telling Rokossovskiy the story of the defeat of the XII Mechanized Corps. He was closely echoed by an unidentified regimental commissar from the same corps. Never one to mince words, Rokossovskiy pointedly told the two officers to stop whining, find their units, and rejoin them. In his memoirs, Rokossovskiy did not actually name Semenchenko, stating that this was “commander of a tank division from XXII Mechanized Corps.” It is easy to establish Semenchenko’s identity, however. There were two tank division commanders in the XXII Mechanized Corps, colonels Semenchenko and Pavlov. Since Pavlov’s 41st Tank Division was still at Kovel on June 25, this disheartened division commander had to be Semenchenko.13

  Still, Rokossovskiy realized that the XXII Mechanized Corps suffered heavily, and morale was low among its survivors. He was very explicit in describing one episode of his interaction with the survivors:

  In the area of Klevan we gathered many [such] sad-sack warriors, among whom were many officers. Majority of these people did not have weapons. To our shame, they all, including the officers, removed their rank insignia.

  In one such group my attention was caught by an elderly man sitting under an elm, whose appearance and bearing did not resemble that of a common soldier. A young female medical orderly was sitting next to him. Addressing the sitting men, roughly one hundred in number, I ordered the officers to come to me. Nobody moved. I approached the elderly [man] and ordered him to stand up. Then, addressing him as an officer, I asked for his rank. His forced reply of “colonel” was said so indifferently and his demeanor so arrogantly challenging that I almost exploded at the sight of him and his tone of voice. Pulling out a pistol, I was ready to shoot him where he stood. Apathy and grandstanding immediately left the colonel. Realizing the likely outcome of this, he fell to his knees and began begging forgiveness, swearing to wash off his shame with blood. The scene was not the most pleasant one, but that’s how it happened.

  I ordered the colonel to gather all the [stragglers] by morning, organize them into a detachment, and personally report to me in the morning of June 26th. My orders were carried out. The newly formed unit numbered over 500 men. They were all used as replacements in the motorized rifle units of the corps.14

  XIX MECHANIZED CORPS, MAJ. GEN. N. V. FEKLENKO COMMANDING

  While its two advance companies were operating east of the Ikva River, the main body of XIX Mechanized Corps was approaching its assigned areas of operations around Rovno in two echelons, mounted and dismounted. All the working tanks, combined into one regiment per tank division, as well as other elements of the corps that could be transported in trucks, constituted the first echelon. Everybody else, marching on foot or with the horse-drawn vehicles, made up the second echelon.

  The units available to Major General Feklenko for the attack on the 26th hardly resembled a mechanized corps. His 213th Motorized Rifle Division and the motorized rifle regiments of the tank divisions, being essentially the regular foot-slogging infantry, hopelessly fell behind, needing at least two more days to catch up. Feklenko’s meager artillery, whatever could be towed by truck, tractor, or horse, straggled as well.

  The two tank divisions, the 40th and 43rd, suffered such horrendous attrition during the march that each division had to be combined into a provisional regiment. Thus, Major General Feklenko would be attacking on the morrow with the equivalent of roughly two tank regiments, unsupported by infantry or artillery. However, orders given to him from above continued to refer to his formation as a full-strength mechanized corps.

  VIII MECHANIZED CORPS, LT. GEN. D. I. RYABYSHEV COMMANDING

  In the morning briefing on June 25, acting chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Tsinchenko (a week before the war, Chief of Staff Colonel Katkov went on leave), outlined their mission for the next day. The VIII and XV Mechanized Corps were to form a mobile group and attack the southern flank of the advancing German armor force.15

  The XV Mechanized Corps under Major General Karpezo was to attack from Toporov area (approximately twenty-five miles west of Brody) towards Radekhov and Berestechko. A division of fighter aircraft, which failed to materialize, was allocated to support Karpezo’s attack. While the right flank of the 15th Mechanized and the left flank of the 8th’s were supposed to be in contact with each other, so far the command group of the 8th Mechanized was not aware of XV Mechanized Corps’ exact location. There was no neighbor on the right and wasn’t going to be one. The area over which the two corps were to advance was wooded and swampy, very unfavorable for tank maneuvers. There were four small rivers running across the axis of advance: Slonovka, Syten’ka, Styr, and Plyashevka. Although narrow, they had wide, muddy banks.

  During the meeting, Tsinchenko reported about dozens of vehicles, broken down, damaged by enemy, out of gas, that were abandoned along the roads leading to Brody. Along with the vehicles, they had to leave people behind to repair and salvage whatever possible. Hinting at desertion, Popel writes: “Some commanders could not always account why people were missing.”16

  Especially hard hit by mechanical breakdowns were the older vehicles, like the five-turreted T-35 tanks. According to Ryabyshev:

  Large numbers of older tanks broke down and could not reach the staging area. T-35 tanks, for example, were all left behind on the roads. The flame-thrower tank battalion (T-26s) of the 24th Tank Regiment/12th Tank Division arrived far from full strength. Other older tanks were left behind as well. By this time we found out about major defects in KV tanks. Their brake belts, due to frequent turns during protracted continuous movement, would overheat and break down.17

  Ryabyshev and his senior staff officers faced a daunting task of planning a major offensive with limited information available. He wrote:

  There was no enemy in Brody, but neither were our troops. We did not receive any information about the enemy from [South-Western] Front HQ. There was no information either about the neighbors on the left and right. We did not know with whom we [would] be cooperating and which air units [would] be supporting corps combat operations. However, we received reports from our reconnaissance, sent out when we were still on the march. When we consolidated information by midnight on June 25th, we reached conclusion that in the area of proposed corps’ offensive, the enemy, covering its main tank force operating in the Lutsk-Rovno-Kiev directions, took up defenses along the Ikva River facing east and along the Sytenka River facing southeast. By this time additional reconnaissance reports informed us that to the right and left of the Brody-Berestechko road, along the east bank of Sytenka River, 212th Motorized Rifle Division from Maj. Gen. I. I. Karpezo’s 15th Mechanized Corps took up positions and made contact with the enemy.18

  In the afternoon, corps’ commissar Nikolai Popel drove to the vicinity of Toporov, attempting to find the headquarters of the XV Mechanized Corps, and located it after spending several hours bouncing around deep-rutted roads. Upon arrival there, Popel was struck by how different the command posts of the two corps looked.

  The VIII, not yet subjected to severe bombardment and precise German artillery strikes, still established its command post as it did before the war by setting up their white canvas tents. Karpezo’s headquarters, on the other hand, had already undergone two severe air attacks and adapted the dugouts and slit trenches. Popel recalled a female typist who worked in a slit trench, placing her “Underwood” typewriter on the trench’s top lip. Upon hearing the whistling of the incoming German artillery shells, she would pick up her typewriter and duck down into the trench.19

  Lieutenant General Karpezo, his commissar Ivan Vasilevich Lutai, and Popel conferred about the upcoming attack. Popel was shock
ed to find out that on the 26th, only one division from the XV Mechanized Corps could participate in the attack. Karpezo’s other two divisions suffered such heavy casualties during the previous three days that they could barely hold their defensive positions. In conversation with Popel, Karpezo expressed his concern that the headquarters of the South-Western Front was not aware of his situation and was giving him a mission as if for a full-strength corps. He was right.

  During the night of June 25–26, Maj. Gen. T. A. Mishanin conducted a local counterattack using the motorized rifle regiment from his 12th Tank Division. He managed to eliminate a small German beachhead on the southern, Soviet-occupied, side of Slonovka River and set up several observation posts on the northern, German, side of the river. Despite expending large amounts of energy, Mishanin recon patrols could not find out locations of German main defensive positions or their strength.20

  Also late at night, Ryabyshev’s staff was able to establish direct contact with the 212th Motorized Rifle Division under Major General Baranov from Karpezo’s corps.

  Headquarters of this unit informed us that the division was located on the right flank of the 15th Mechanized Corps, whose troops were in combat contact since the beginning of the war with the enemy paratroopers in the area of Radekhov. After eliminating several airborne groups, the corps became involved in combat with enemy’s tank group, which penetrated our border. . . . Forces of the 15th Mechanized Corps were forced to go on the defensive along the line of over forty miles.21