The Bloody Triangle

by Victor Kamenir

  In his own turn, after covering approximately one hundred miles, fighting almost every step of the way and suffering severe privations, Popel’s command rejoined the Red Army on July 23, near a small village of Belokorovichi, southwest of Novograd-Volynskiy.15 The border battle was over.

  Conclusion

  SETTING OUT TO FINISH THE LAST SECTION, I scanned through reams of information and books that I have gathered for my research. I felt that an analysis was needed to summarize why the large numbers of Soviet mechanized formations were defeated with such an almost contemptuous ease by their German opponents. My glance fell across a report written on August 5, 1941, by Major General Morgunov, chief of armored forces of the South-Western Front. By the time of writing of his report, not only was the border battle lost, but the line of old fortified regions was pierced as well. In his report, General Morgunov succinctly outlined a majority of main causes leading to the defeat of Soviet mechanized formations in the initial period of the war. What happened to Red Army tank units in Ukraine was mirrored along the whole front.

  Below, shortened and edited, are excerpts from Morgunov’s report:

  1. From the very first day of war, the mechanized corps were employed incorrectly, because, while the mechanized corps (I’m not talking about all of them) were really a Front-level asset, all of them were assigned to [field] armies. Naturally, cases of reassignment of an individual mechanized corps directly to an army should have been possible, but [only] in instances when situation really demanded it, and this should have been done by grouping them into strike forces.

  2. All operations of mechanized corps were conducted without thorough reconnaissance; some units were completely unaware what was happening in their immediate vicinity. There was absolutely no aerial reconnaissance assigned specifically for mechanized corps. Control of the mechanized corps by commanders of all-arms [armies] was poorly organized; units were widely separated . . . and by the time of the offensive were not in contact with each other. Headquarters of armies were completely not ready to control such large mechanized formations as the mechanized corps. Infantry, as a rule, acted independently, and the overall situation did not permit organization of combined operations.

  3. Headquarters of armies completely forgot that equipment has a limited lifespan, that it needs maintenance, minor repairs, refueling and re-arming. . . . Mechanized corps completely lacked air cover during the road marches, as well as after combat. . . .

  4. Information top-to-bottom, as well as with neighboring units, was established very poorly. The war, from the very beginning, assumed fluid character; the enemy turned out to be more mobile. The main feature of his actions is the wide use of encirclements and flank attacks. [Germans] avoid head-on attacks and immediately would employ mobile antitank assets . . . while encircling around one or (in most cases) both flanks. Our command personnel were poorly trained during peacetime for these very operations; trying, therefore, to defend in close contact with neighbor, while there were no adequate forces to establish such a defense. . . .

  There were many shortcomings committed directly by commanders of mechanized formations, such as:

  1. Headquarters of mechanized corps, tank divisions, and regiments did not yet possess operational-tactical know-how; they could not reach right conclusions and completely failed to understand plans of army and front commanders.

  2. Command personnel is lacking sufficient initiative.

  3. Not all the mobile assets, which the corps possessed, were utilized.

  4. There was no maneuverability—there was listlessness, sloth in carrying out orders.

  5. Operations, as a rule, were demonstrated by head-on attacks, which led to unnecessary loss of equipment and personnel. This happened because commanders at all levels neglected reconnaissance.

  6. Inability to organize combat operations along the routes which would interfere with enemy movements, who advanced mainly along roads.

  7. Obstacles were not utilized; cooperation with combat engineer troops was nonexistent.

  8. The was no attempt to deny the enemy the opportunity to bring up fuel and ammunition. Ambushes along the main enemy routes of advance were not employed.

  9. Enemy pressure on [our] flanks led to fear of being encircled, while the tank units should not fear encirclements.

  10. Large population centers were not utilized to destroy the enemy and inability to operate in them was discovered.

  11. Control, starting from platoon commander to senior commanders, was poor; radio was seldom utilized; too much time was wasted on encoding and decoding [of messages].

  12. Crews were extremely poorly trained in preventive maintenance: there were cases when crews abandoned their vehicles with ammunition still in them; there were individual cases when crews left their vehicles and retreated.

  13. All units lacked [sufficient] means of evacuation; the ones that did have them, could support mechanized corps and tank divisions only during offensive operations.

  14. Personnel was not familiar with new equipment, especially KV and T-34; and was completely untrained in conducting repairs in field conditions. Repair facilities of tank divisions turned out to be incapable to conduct repairs during retrograde operations.

  15. Large percentage of command personnel did not know missions, did not have maps, which led to instances when not just individual tanks, but whole units would wander around aimlessly.

  16. Existing organization of rear echelons is too cumbersome: commander’s technical deputy, instead of working with combat materiel, as a rule, would remain behind in the rear echelon. The rear support echelons need to be reduced, leaving only those vehicles employed in delivering fuel, ammunition, and food.

  17. There was no, as a rule, army-level staging areas for emergency vehicles, and nobody oversaw their operations. Lack of organic evacuation assets on army and front levels, led to inability to evacuate combat equipment.

  18. Headquarters turned out to be poorly trained, staffed, as a rule, with officers not having experience of working in tank units.

  19. [Too] many people oversaw mechanized formations: front would assign missions, army would assign missions, commanders of rifle corps would assign missions. Employment of the 41st Tank Division of 22nd Mechanized Corps is the vivid demonstration of this issue.

  20. Some commanders of mechanized corps turned out to be not up to the task and completely lacked understanding about mechanized corps operations.

  Given the reasons above, the Soviet defeat in the battle for northwest Ukraine was unavoidable. Battles are not fought by abstract concepts of corps and division, moved with chess-like precision on a map top. Battles are chaotic conglomerations of very tangible human and mechanical factors with very distinct limits, all wrapped up in a blanket of confusion and lack of information.

  The Red Army of 1941 could be described being akin to mythological golem, large, scary, and formidable, but with no soul and very little brain. The brutal purges of late 1930s ripped the very soul out of the Soviet officer corps. Besides sheer loss of life and destroyed careers, the spirit of innovation and initiative was lost along with a significant portion of the upper crust of Red Army’s commanders. Golem’s puppet strings ended up in the inept hands of Stalin’s cronies from the heady days of the Russian Civil War.

  An underlying factor of Soviet efforts during the battle in Lutsk-Dubno-Brody triangle was an utter lack of coordination and gaping information void. Over one hundred thousand Soviet soldiers and well over three thousand tanks and armored cars moved to the sound of the guns without any tangible efforts to coordinate their operations. They were fed into the grinder piecemeal.

  Enjoying strategic initiative, German commanders achieved numerical and qualitative superiority at the time and place of their choosing. While all the German divisions crossing into the Soviet Union on June 22 were viable and combat-capable formations, the majority of their Red Army counterparts were pale facsimiles of same. This point merits a closer look.

 
The basic maneuver block tasked with combat operations was a division. Eighteen German divisions from the Sixth Army and Panzer Group 1 were directly involved in the battle of the Bloody Triangle. I am considering this battle as lasting from June 22 to July 2, in the area from Vlodava in the north to Krystonopol in the south and east to Ostrog. These eighteen divisions are broken down into ten infantry divisions, one security division, two motorized divisions, and five panzer divisions. The five panzer divisions numbered roughly 650 tanks between them, with an additional approximately 100 tank destroyers and assault guns in four separate battalions.

  Opposing this German group of forces was the Soviet Fifth Army, with additional reserve infantry and mechanized corps, consisting of twenty-eight divisions total. These forces were broken down into eleven rifle divisions, eleven tank divisions, and six motorized rifle divisions.

  There were several more corps on the Soviet side and several more divisions on German sides, which were in close proximity to Dubno battle, but did not take immediate action in these particular events. I do not include them in this total.

  Table 20.

  Soviet Divisions in Dubno Battle

  If we look at just the number of divisions intimately involved in the struggle of the Bloody Triangle, the Germans are clearly outnumbered. However, qualitatively, Germans held a clear advantage. Each German division was larger in terms of assigned personnel. A German infantry division numbered susteen thousand men and a panzer division, fourteen thousand. Being already on war footing, these divisions were almost at their fully assigned strengths.

  Of the Soviet divisions, a overwhelming majority was still on prewar footing, with the average of rifle divisions in the first echelon being around ten thousand men. The rifle divisions from the reserved corps, like the XXXI and XXXVI, numbered closer to eight thousand men.

  Qualitatively, the Germans were on top as well. As I have already mentioned, each German division was fully a combat-worthy formation. Their Soviet counterparts, on the other hand, would have to be closely examined to determine which numbers could be called combat-capable.

  Based on their time of formation, histories, and tables of organization and equipment, I would rate only six of these divisions as combat capable. I would characterize further nine more divisions as marginally capable of combat operations. I include all five of the rifle divisions from the Fifth Army in this category due to them being close to required personnel and equipment numbers, but lacking in command personnel and training. Divisions like the 37th Tank, belonging to the XV Mechanized Corps, for example, had roughly 90 percent of assigned tank strength, but fully over 80 percent of them (258 out of 316 tanks on hand) were super-numerary BT-7s, which this division was not supposed to have. The rest were chaff, a true cannon fodder, beefing up the Soviet numbers without adding further combat capabilities to the mix.

  Table 21.

  Combat Capable Soviet Divisions

  Much lip service has been given to the vaunted invulnerability of Soviet new machines, the medium T-34 and heavy KV tanks. However, this was just that—a myth. In an ancient battle between armor and projectile, the projectile usually won. While the thicker armor of T-34s and KVs could undoubtedly shake off projectile of German panzers and regimental antitank guns, they could do so only at medium to longer ranges. Germans’ flexible tactics and initiative quickly developed an effective antidote to the new Soviet machines.

  Faced with an attack by Soviet tank formations, the lighter German tanks would fall back, drawing the Soviet units behind them in pursuit onto the waiting ambush of heavier 105mm and 150mm artillery from corps and army assets. The famous 88, a versatile air-defense gun, showed itself remarkably efficient in dispatching the dreaded Soviet tanks. At the same time, the more-maneuverable German panzers would double back and take the winded Soviet tank units from their vulnerable sides and rear.

  Even as the Germans initially had difficulties with the new Soviet machines, they had no problems with disposing of the lighter Soviet tanks, the T-26 and BT series, which comprised the majority of Soviet tank formations. The much-maligned German regimental 37mm antitank guns, contemptuously called by their crews as “door-knockers,” proved to be quite efficient against the lighter Red Army tanks. The cannons on German panzers proved to be quite adequate to this task as well.

  The use of artillery during the battles around Dubno has usually been glossed over. Yet, in a deadly cocktail that contributed to the defeat of Soviet counteroffensive, the German artillery played a major and decisive role. It is with the proper respect that the Russians call artillery “The God of War.”

  Communications proved to be the weak link that plagued the Soviet tank formations for quite some time. At the beginning of the war, almost the only tanks equipped with radio were the commanders’ machines, usually not below company level. The rest had to rely on flag signals and messages relayed by motorcycle riders.

  During battles, the Soviet tankers had a tendency to bunch up closer to their commanders in order to be able to better see their signals. The Germans quickly learned to spot and knock out command tanks, usually leaving the remainder of Soviet vehicles as a headless herd. Personally brave, Soviet officers, often up to senior levels, tended to actively participate in the attack or lead it from the front, suffering disproportionate numbers of casualties.

  As already pointed out by General Morgunov above, high-level coordination of large-scale operations left much to be desired. Purkayev and Kirponos’ plans to utilize six mechanized corps in an early effort to defeat von Kleist’s Panzer Group 1 show sound operational thinking. However, it was the execution of these plans that came to naught.

  Soviet reliance on civilian communications networks before the war and German timely neutralization of the same left Kirponos’ staff without an effective means to coordinate the efforts of forces converging on the border. German Luftwaffe further frustrated Soviet attempt to reestablish communications by systematically hunting down and destroying Soviet command posts with their irreplaceable radio equipment.

  On par with the lack of communications, the Soviet ability to gather information came up short. German air superiority denied the Red Air Force its ability to conduct aerial reconnaissance, while lack of appropriate equipment, personnel, and training left Soviet ground formations moving blind.

  Still, despite all the shortcomings, the Soviet forces in Ukraine gave Germans the first bloody nose, not only slowing down the overconfident Wehrmacht, but even halting them for three days at Ostrog. Forced to attack into numerous Soviet formations echeloned in depth and limited by poor road system, von Kleist’s panzers could not achieve the finesse needed to break into operational maneuver room. West of Lutsk, faced with determined defense by gunners of General Moskalenko’s 1st Antitank Brigade, the Germans had to give up their attempts of rapid and easy advance up the Panzerstrasse to Kiev. Time lost in bypassing and battering aside Soviet forces near Lutsk, and then Rovno, significantly contributed to delaying the blitzkrieg in Ukraine.

  The formidable Soviet mechanized corps virtually melted in the cauldrons of war. Of the powerful armored fleet of Kiev Special Military District that greeting the morning of June 22, less than three hundred operational tanks remained by mid-July. Still, the lessons learned and paid for with a premium were instrumental in rebuilding the Soviet armored corps anew. The Battle of Dubno was lost, but Kursk loomed large on the horizon.

  APPENDIX A

  Abridged Order of Battle: Army Group South

  This abridged version depicts only the major combat formations of the two armies (Panzer Group 1 was an army in all but name) that participated in the Bloody Triangle battle:

  Commander: Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt

  SIXTH ARMY

  Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Reichenau

  Army Reserves

  LV (55th) Corps: General of Infantry Vierow

  75th Infantry Division: Lieutenant-General Hammer

  168th Infantry Division: Lieutenant
-General Mundt

  298th Infantry Division: Major-General Graessner

  (under direct control of HQ 6th Army)

  278th Air Defense Artillery Battalion (88mm)

  279th Air Defense Artillery Battalion (88mm)

  XVII (17th) Corps: General of Infantry Kienitz

  56th Infantry Division: Major-General von Oven

  62nd Infantry Division: Lieutenant-General Keiner

  XXIX (29th) Corps: General of Infantry von Obstfelder

  44th Infantry Division: Lieutenant-General Siebert

  111th Infantry Division: Lieutenant-General Stapt

  299th Infantry Division: Major-General Moser

  XLIV (44th) Corps: General of Infantry Koch

  9th Infantry Division: Major-General von Schleinitz

  297th Infantry Division: Lieutenant-General Pfeffer

  PANZER GROUP 1

  GeneralOberst Ewald von Kleist

  Group Reserves

  16th Motorized Division: Major-General Henrici

  25th Motorized Division: Lieutenant-General Cloesner

  Motorized Division SS “Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler”:

  Obergruppenfuehrer Sepp Dietrich

  III Motorized Corps: General of Cavalry Mackensen

  13th Panzer Division: Lieutenant-General von Rothkirch