The Shankill Butchers

by Martin Dillon

  McAllister was a classic example of a petty criminal from an early age and, like Murphy, was remembered for having extorted money from other boys at school. He was born in Argyll Street in 1955 and by the age of eleven was the subject of probation orders for shopbreaking, theft and malicious damage. Two years later he faced similar charges, including one of breaking into his own school and stealing office equipment. His criminal record from childhood until he met Murphy in 1971 is a disturbing litany of petty crime and he was well known on the Shankill Road as a tough individual. He towered over other boys, being over six feet in height and heavily built. He used his size to full advantage when it came to intimidating others. ‘Basher’ Bates and ‘Big Sam’ both attended Ballygomartin Secondary School in West Belfast and were two of the most violent and unruly pupils at the school. McAllister ran a protection racket and those who refused to pay were summarily punished by a beating in the school toilets. When a pupil persistently refused to pay up it was not unknown for McAllister to bash his head against a wash basin.

  Murphy encouraged Bates and McAllister to join the UVF, though this took little persuasion. The UVF at that time was not in a position to vet recruits and, like the IRA, it was only too glad to have as many members as would join its ranks. It was also competing with the vigilante groups, which were beginning to assert their independence and form themselves into a properly structured paramilitary organization. From his prison cell Gusty Spence was trying to mastermind a reorganization of the UVF and it was his belief that the organization should, as soon as possible, try to incorporate members of the vigilante organizations. His plan did not come to fruition because those running the vigilante groups were unwilling to relinquish the power they exercised in many Protestant districts. In 1971–2 the UVF and UDA operated alongside each other to protect Protestant areas and jointly carry out acts of violence. Lenny Murphy exploited this dimension to the situation because it afforded him an opportunity to engage in violence whenever the opportunity arose. In essence this dual membership enabled Murphy to undertake operations with whichever grouping was engaging in violence at a particular time which coincided with Murphy’s availability. Murphy was therefore able to exploit his own potential for violence by taking full advantage of whatever opportunities were provided by both organizations.

  March 1972 saw the major change that the Nationalists and Republicans had been demanding: the abolition of the Stormont Parliament. Unionists watched their edifice crumbling without resistance and saw Provisional IRA leaders being flown to London for talks with the British Prime Minister, Edward Heath. In the Protestant community there was not just despondency but a feeling of political impotence and an increasing suspicion that, with Stormont gone, they were about to be driven into a United Ireland. The fall of Stormont created a trauma in the Protestant community which has never been properly evaluated in relation to the subsequent development of Loyalist paramilitary thinking. The Provisionals achieved something which the Loyalists had believed could never happen: the destruction of so-called Protestant supremacy. The Protestants were immersed in feelings of frustration and despair. They could not attack the British Army or the police because they saw them as their security forces; instead they reverted to terror against the other community. They had no ideological struggle to wage so they used the strategy which Gusty Spence had initiated in 1966: ‘If you can’t get an IRA man, get a Taig.’ One political scientist has suggested that the Loyalist paramilitaries recognized the impact of the Provisionals’ terrorist campaign and felt they could never emulate its success or tactics. The British Government appeared to be conceding to a guerrilla movement which was capable of acquiring new weaponry, making sophisticated bombs and waging an urban guerrilla campaign against a formidable army, namely the British Army. The Protestant population received a bad press after August 1969 and subsequently compounded the problem by behaving aggressively towards journalists who were interested in reflecting the story in both communities. As a result, Loyalists generally recognized they had no friends internationally and likewise Loyalist paramilitaries knew that, unlike the Provisionals, they could not seek to raise money internationally to buy weapons or to ask for weapons from left-wing regimes who in any event viewed Ulster Protestants as oppressors. As a result, the UVF and UDA recognized that they could not acquire the weapons or perhaps the expertise to fight ‘the enemy’. So they decided it was better to engage in a ‘dirty war’ of indiscriminate terror which would prove that the IRA was incapable of defending its own people. Such a view is simplistic, though there is little doubt that by the summer of 1972 a decision had been made by the UDA/UVF to conduct a sectarian assassination campaign. Spence, who would not have agreed with this tactic, was interned in prison at the time, together with the entire UVF leadership. With the introduction of internment without trial in 1971 the conditions had been created for new, younger recruits on both sides to devise different tactics for the paramilitaries. Initially, all internees were Republicans, and the Loyalists could not accept that such legislation could ever be used against them, but it was. By the summer of 1972 the UVF, with its leaders interned, was being led by younger men who saw themselves as terrorists and not as soldiers. The old guard of the organization, men like Spence, preferred to describe themselves as soldiers but their incarceration precluded their orders from being obeyed.

  The absence of the older men paved the way for Lenny Murphy, ‘Basher’ Bates, ‘Big Sam’ McAllister and many others like them to develop their own type of warfare in alliance with the omnipresent UDA, which was prepared to flex its muscles to establish credibility as a paramilitary force.

  2

  A Killer is Blooded

  In the opening weeks of 1972 two killings were carried out by the IRA which clearly illustrated to Loyalists the sheer ruthlessness of their adversaries. The first was the shooting of a twenty-eight-year-old Catholic publican who, when his killers burst in and shot him, was at home counting a night’s takings from his pub. The IRA escaped with the money but it was widely believed that the act was not simply robbery but was meant to serve as a warning to other publicans to pay protection money when demanded. Several weeks later another IRA squad arrived on the doorstep of a forty-six-year-old Protestant bus driver, Sidney Agnew, and shot him dead in front of his family. His ‘crime’, as the IRA saw it, was that he had given an affidavit identifying three young IRA men who had hijacked his bus. It was callous treatment and a warning to others not to cooperate with the police, although the IRA knew that his evidence could be posthumously presented at trial, which it was and the three hijackers were convicted. The killing of Sidney Agnew horrified and incensed the Protestant population, who were convinced that the IRA could assassinate civilians, and particularly Loyalists, with impunity. Both murders came at a time when Protestants were beginning to believe that history was betraying them, that the British Government cared little for their plight, and that they were about to be sold into a United Ireland. An indication of the intensity of feeling in working-class areas of the Protestant community can be seen in a letter to a Loyalist paramilitary news sheet of the period:

  I want to remind Protestants that these animals are crawling into Ulster, hitting vital points like RUC stations etc. The ugly thing is that the bastards are getting away with it. Then the question arises, what the hell are the UVF doing about it? You’ve got to fight fire with fire. I don’t think they’ve enough fire to make the animals sweat. I am not against the UVF but I would like to see a new UVF fighting for the cause and willing to give their lives for what others gave their lives for.

  The rhetoric in this letter was not new and had been expressed during earlier troubles, but its nature was a factor in dehumanizing the enemy before the battle. Another phrase which frequently found its way into Loyalist news sheets and bulletins was ‘the Provos and their passive sympathizers’. A lack of any proper definition of the enemy encouraged many Loyalists to believe that all Catholics were IRA sympathizers, if not actual supporters.r />
  On 30 January 1972 members of the 1st Parachute Regiment shot dead thirteen innocent civilians in Londonderry on what was to become known to the world as ‘Bloody Sunday’. The reaction to this event within the Catholic community and within the Irish Republic placed increasing pressure on the Unionist Government at Stormont. The Prime Minister, Brian Faulkner, told his Cabinet that it was a grave moment in the history of Northern Ireland. The former Cabinet minister, William Craig, who had been sacked by Captain Terence O’Neill in 1969, also recognized that events were running away from the Unionists and announced that he had an answer which would arrest that trend. He told a rally held outside Belfast that the time had come for Protestants to preserve their British traditions and way of life. His speech carried a more sinister message in the words: ‘God help those who get in our way’. If there was any semblance of doubt about the import of the threat, the meaning was certainly understood by the Loyalist paramilitaries with whom Craig maintained continuing dialogue. Craig’s words carried authority because he had held the post of Minister of Home Affairs during the crucial days of 1968. He was remembered by nationalists as the man who ordered police onto the streets of Londonderry on 5 October 1968 to deal with a civil rights march. The result was that many of the marchers were batoned by police and film of the event was beamed by television into homes throughout the world. 5 October produced an event which the SDLP leader, John Hume, later described as ‘the spark that lit the bonfire’. Loyalists saw Craig as a man who was staunchly anti-Republican and who was sacked by Terence O’Neill because he was prepared to deal firmly and decisively with truculent Nationalists.

  Rumours were rife in early 1972 that Stormont was about to be abolished, and a public assertion to this effect came from the lips of the Reverend Ian Paisley, who was regarded by many Protestants as being not only astute but also possessed of prophetic powers. Edward Heath was indeed planning to get rid of Stormont and, as often with British political manoeuvring, a decision was taken to use a shred of leaked information to test reaction and to prepare people for the inevitable. The British perception of Paisley was that he would be listened to by hardline Unionists and it was this section of the population that Edward Heath and his advisers were interested in studying. Paisley was to be used in a similar way in the late seventies when the British Government wished it to be known retrospectively that the IRA had made calls to 10 Downing Street to bargain for the release of the Price sisters in return for the freedom of the kidnapped German industrialist, Herr Neidermeyer.

  In 1972 there were those who were convinced that Ian Paisley was speaking the truth but the Ulster Prime Minister, Brian Faulkner, was obliged publicly to deny the claim. Faulkner did, however, privately suspect that Paisley was being used as a loudspeaker and, as a result, went to see Heath who reassured him that no such thing was happening. Within one month of Faulkner’s visit to 10 Downing Street the Stormont Parliament was abolished. The shock to the Protestant psyche was damaging and it took some time before it was accepted and before reaction was manifested. William Craig repeated his earlier ominous warning that the time for talking was over and Loyalists must commit themselves to action. There were talks between the UDA and UVF and joint operations were discussed as well as the policing of Protestant communities by bands of vigilantes. It was agreed that vigilantes should ensure that there were no IRA incursions, that the identity of strangers should be thoroughly checked, and that suspicious persons should be held for interrogation. William Craig made it clear in an interview for the Irish Republic’s broadcasting service, RTE, that Loyalists might have to resort to killing. He kept more threatening words for a massive rally in Belfast in which he warned that if politicians failed to protect the Protestant heritage it would be for Ulster Loyalists to ‘liquidate the enemy’.

  At that rally, which came within days of direct rule being imposed on Ulster, Craig talked of dossiers being compiled on ‘known IRA sympathizers’. It was dangerous talk but it was exactly the kind which many people wished to hear. Within three months of direct rule the British Government negotiated a truce with the IRA and a prelude to this truce was the release from internment of Gerry Adams, who was at one time the Army’s ‘most wanted’ Provisional in Belfast and would later become the President of Sinn Fein. He was placed in the custody of the SDLP Chief Whip, Paddy Devlin, who was given a Military Intelligence Order guaranteeing immunity for Adams should he be stopped at Army roadblocks. An IRA negotiating team was flown to London but not before the IRA leader in Londonderry, Martin McGuinness, had received a guarantee from the British Government and Army authorities that he would return safely. Two Army Intelligence men were handed over to the IRA in Londonderry and were held under guard until McGuinness returned home from the London talks.

  In the months between direct rule and the IRA truce the UDA increased in size, as did the UVF, but both organizations were unable to vet those who joined the swelling ranks. There were many in both organizations who were from criminal backgrounds and were intent on using both the UDA and UVF for criminal purposes. The fact that joint membership was not ruled out by either body also led to a lack of control over the activities of certain individuals. The joint membership, however, was used particularly by members of the UVF who saw advantage in using the UDA’s weight of numbers in street confrontations. Between March and June there were signs that Craig’s threat was being realized. The killing of Catholics had begun and in Protestant neighbourhoods large numbers of men in combat jackets were seen patrolling the streets. At the beginning of May the first ritualistic killing occurred and the victim, Victor Andrew, was the first IRA man to be killed by Loyalist paramilitaries. He was a member of the Official IRA and the nature of his death indicated the lengths to which Loyalist assassins would go when they encountered an enemy. Andrew was stabbed to death and his body dumped in an alleyway. This killing signalled the beginning of a sustained campaign of sectarian assassination which began in earnest after the meeting between the IRA and members of the British Government.

  In the first six months of 1972 Lenny Murphy was preparing for his terrorist career in a most unusual fashion by attending many of the murder trials being held in Belfast’s Crumlin Road courthouse. He not only appeared in the public gallery at the trials of those UVF members whom he knew but also at trials involving members of the IRA. Murphy was learning about the law, the nature of witness and forensic evidence, and when such evidence was ruled admissible or inadmissible. He sat and listened intently to the most complex legal arguments. A detective who remembers seeing him regularly in the courthouse says that Murphy would attend every sitting of a trial and was not perturbed by the fact that his presence was obvious to the security forces. The detective believes that Murphy had a second reason for attending IRA trials: to identify IRA supporters in the public gallery who could later be targeted for assassination. Murphy’s dress sense was such that he was always clearly identifiable from a distance. He wore an expensive leather jacket and a scarf which he casually draped over his left shoulder. One other feature of his dress provides a bizarre insight into the man. He carried in his jacket a pair of leather driving-gloves which he wore on special occasions. A policeman who met him several times at the courthouse remembers him this way: ‘Lenny loved his notoriety and the fact that we knew who he was. He enjoyed watching the reaction of his friends when he talked to me or my colleagues. It was as if he was saying to his friends, “Look, I can talk to these jerks and they don’t know what the hell I’m up to and even if they suspect me there is nothing they can do about it.” One thing which always stuck in my memory about those brief encounters with Lenny was that when he walked over to me he always put on his driving-gloves before he shook my hand. It was as though he was saying to himself, “I will shake hands with this cop, but not in an intimate way.” It was his way of suggesting that I was diseased. The one thing about him I never could forget was his eyes . . . those blue eyes that pierced you. I could almost detect a look which suggested that if he ha
d half a chance he would have blown me away. He was like the smiling assassin. When I saw him in the scarf and the leather jacket he reminded me of those First World War pilots who were going off in glory to battle and were loved by the women. He was like that. He always had young girls around him even in the courthouse. There was a Jack-the-Lad quality about him as well. I’m not a homosexual, you understand, but I have to say he was good-looking. I think in retrospect that he saw himself as a film star.’

  Lenny Murphy was a womanizer and enjoyed being seen around the Loyalist clubs of the Shankill, chatting to whichever woman looked available. He was also a loner and was careful not to be seen publicly with known members of the UVF or UDA, unlike many of his associates who stood on street corners exchanging gossip. On those occasions when he was seen on the street it was invariably when he was travelling from his home to a meeting. This was a curious side to his nature when one considers that he was willing to be seen attending murder trials. It was indicative of the fact that when Murphy was active with the UVF he was careful about his security.

  His first direct involvement in killing was on Friday 21 July 1972. That day a thirty-four-year-old Catholic, Francis Arthurs, from Fallswater Street off the Falls Road, was travelling in a taxi from the predominantly Nationalist Ardoyne area in North Belfast. The taxi was stopped on the Crumlin Road, which runs parallel to the Shankill Road. The mistake made by Arthurs was a classic one, in that the enclave from which the taxi emerged signalled to those watching the area that the occupant of the vehicle was a Catholic. Arthurs was drunk and was unaware that the previous night a young Catholic couple, also travelling in a taxi, had been apprehended and murdered. When Arthur’s taxi was stopped he was bundled out of the vehicle unceremoniously and was hit over the head with a metal object. He was then taken to the Lawnbrook Social Club, a Loyalist club off the Shankill Road. In the club that night were Lenny Murphy and other members of Loyalist paramilitary organizations, drinking and making merry. Arthurs was now in a place which later would be given the name ‘a romper room’.1