The Shankill Butchers

by Martin Dillon

  12

  The Bombing Mission

  A dimension to terrorism which was never contemplated by the Butchers under Lenny Murphy’s leadership was the use of bombs. The Provisionals initiated the tactic of using car bombs, particularly in the early seventies, against civilian targets. Explosives had been used in the UVF campaign of the mid-sixties but in a manner which did not endanger life. However, the gradual emergence of the Provisional IRA saw the use of explosives against both ‘economic targets’ and the civilian population. The Provisionals have consistently argued that their bombing campaign from 1972 onwards has been directed against ‘economic’ targets. These are defined as buildings or centres of ‘oppression’. The falsity of such a claim is exposed by the history of violence in Northern Ireland. A leading member of the Workers’ Party of Ireland, who was an internee in the Maze Prison (then known as Long Kesh) in 1971, explains the strategy of using explosives: ‘I remember being in the Kesh with Gerry Adams. He was young but was regarded as the contemporary symbol of a freedom fighter. He became the Provo theoretician and was so well respected that it was Adams who was released by the Brits when Harold Wilson wanted to deal. While I was there Adams advocated the use of explosives as a means of stepping up the IRA campaign. He talked of using explosives in built-up areas. I interpreted that to mean the car bombs which later wrecked Belfast and caused untold casualties in 1972 and 1973.’

  This statement was made by a member of a party with a Republican past but which has now chosen to exchange its history and rhetoric in favour of a socialist ideal which includes condemnation of the Provos. The truth contained in his testimony is that the IRA did seek to develop a strategy which involved the use of explosives and subsequently, whether they care to recognize it or not, brought about mass murder. They refined their tactics to the point where British security forces admitted they were unable at times to deal with their sophisticated methods in the new manufacture of bombs. They were, with their international contacts and history of violence, adept at developing a strategy using modern technology and creating bombs without the basic ingredients such as gelignite or plastic explosives. They initiated methods of mixing fertilizers in the absence of a supply of other basic raw materials. Bombs were placed in areas populated by civilians and, after deaths had been counted, the Provisionals claimed they had issued warnings which had been ignored by police. They developed the means of destroying the economic heart of Northern Ireland, convinced that though civilian casualties would occur they were unimportant in terms of the overall object of demoralizing a population and its government.

  The UVF and UDA sought to imitate the Provo strategy but they were latecomers to this contemporary form of terrorist warfare and they did not possess the expertise which the more professional IRA terrorists had cultivated. They had neither knowledge of, nor access to, explosives. There was no desire on their part to bomb the ‘heart’ out of Ulster and for this reason they never set out to acquire the same sophisticated knowledge. Nevertheless, they were interested in the murder of Catholics on a large scale. Their chosen method, amateur in comparison, was the manufacture of bombs using small quantities of explosives, or the conversion of gas cylinders into bombs which they placed outside Catholic pubs or clubs. In the mid-seventies the UVF had but one bomb maker, whose skills did not measure up to those within the IRA. This man was James ‘Tonto’ Watt, a fitter by trade from Benview Park in North Belfast. He was in great demand in 1976 – and was, therefore, not always available to units such as the Brown Bear team. The procedure at this time was that the UVF would sanction the use of an explosive device and Watt would be called in to put it together. He joined the UVF in 1973 because, in his words, ‘the IRA was blowing up my city’. ‘It was the right thing to do at the time,’ he later told detectives.

  Lenny Murphy never chose to use the services of ‘Tonto’ Watt because this would have required sanction from the West Belfast leadership of the UVF, thus depriving him of his independence. However, at the beginning of April 1977 Mr A. devised a plan to use explosives which he thought would appeal to the UVF leadership. He discussed the matter with Moore and it was agreed that Mr A., on the grounds of seniority within the UVF hierarchy, should approach the UVF Brigade Staff with the project. The idea was that the Brown Bear team would undertake the planning and execution of the bombing but that they would require the services of Watt.

  Mr A. and Moore were certain the plan would meet with the Brigade Staff’s approval since it involved the bombing of Republicans in the heart of the Falls area of West Belfast. Although the activities of the Brown Bear team did not always have the blessing of the UVF, the prospect of bringing about the deaths of large numbers of Republicans and serving members of the IRA was bound to be attractive to UVF leaders.

  Easter Sunday, 10 April, was the day for the annual celebration by Republicans throughout Ireland of the Easter 1916 Rising in Dublin. Traditionally Easter Sunday is when Republicans stage a large demonstration which includes a march to Milltown Cemetery in West Belfast to the Republican Plot, where speeches are read in Irish. Some marchers dress in what has become the IRA uniform of dark clothes, berets and sunglasses. People of all ages participate in the march along a three-mile stretch of the Falls Road, which is always lined with spectators. Until 1969 there was one traditional march through West Belfast on Easter Sunday. With the advent of the split in the Republican Movement, the residents of the Falls Road found themselves offered two marches: by those who saw themselves as the traditional IRA (the grouping which has since become the Workers’ Party), and by those who believed themselves to have inherited the Pearse tradition of blood sacrifice, the Provisional IRA.

  By 1977 the routine of the separate marches was well established. The Workers’ Party traditionally marched to the cemetery in advance of the Provisionals. This was not simply a convenient arrangement but one which reflected the tensions between them which had resulted in bitter feuding and the deaths of members of each organization.

  Mr A. recognized that the Easter Sunday celebrations in West Belfast afforded the ultimate opportunity to accommodate Lenny Murphy’s ambition to kill a large number of Catholics. The fact that the planned killing would occur during a parade in celebration of Republicanism would be certain justification for murder. This rationale was, however, flawed. To believe that everyone present at a Republican commemoration parade was in fact a Republican failed to take into account that the parades are watched every year by spectators; by people who happen to live in the Falls area, as well as those who actively support the IRA or Sinn Fein. Mr A. held a blinkered view of his society; he shared the endemic prejudice which labels people because of where they live, where they go to church or whether they watch a parade. It would be true to say that many of these who watch such parades would vote for Provisional Sinn Fein but others would be present with their children out of a sense of tradition, or simply to watch the spectacle. A corollary would be to believe that every person watching an Orange procession was either a member of a Loyalist organization or a passive supporter of Loyalist violence.

  The Provisionals themselves have, in recent times, exhibited an acceptance of this equation; for example, their belief that all those present on Remembrance Day at the cenotaph in the town of Enniskillen were, in their terms, part of the ‘British war machine’ and could therefore be arbitrarily and summarily dispensed with. The absurdity of such views has led to much of the terrible violence in Northern Ireland. It was Voltaire who suggested that any man who gives himself to absurdity is capable of mass murder.

  The Loyalist perception of Easter Commemoration Parades is analagous with IRA thinking in many aspects. Loyalists believe anyone at such a parade is part of the IRA war machine and it is inconceivable to them that there might be present those who are not members of the IRA or Sinn Fein.

  Against this backdrop, Mr A. told Moore that he could convince the UVF leadership that Easter Sunday was the time to strike at the IRA. His plan was that members of the Brow
n Bear unit would conduct reconnaissance missions the week before the parades and decide on the most strategic point at which to place a bomb. The bomb which would be small so as to avoid detection would be positioned the night before the parades and set with a timer to explode when the parades were under way. Mr A. was convinced his plan could be achieved but he would need the services of the UVF’s bomb maker, James ‘Tonto’ Watt.

  On 4 April Mr A. made his approach to the UVF Brigade Staff, put his plan before them and asked for the assistance of Watt. He was given the go-ahead after assurances had been sought that he would bring about the mass murder of members of the IRA only. Mr A. called a meeting of the Brown Bear unit and selected a team to carry out his plan. He chose Benny ‘Pretty Boy’ Edwards, Waugh, and two other people who cannot be named because they have never been charged before the Courts. They have not been the subject of any incident previously dealt with in this book and will be referred to as Mr K. and Mr L.

  Between 4 and 6 April Mr A. discussed his plans with Mr B. and ‘Tonto’ Watt. This was the first example of Mr A. taking over the complete planning of an operation. He chose to involve Mr B. and to exclude William Moore. Moore was the secret cutting edge of the private war being conducted from Lenny Murphy’s prison cell and for this reason Mr A. believed he should be excluded from an operation which had been sanctioned by the leadership.

  Mr A. and Mr B. between them had an extensive knowledge of Belfast already but they carried out research through newspaper files and by talking to older people in the UVF, and learned about the organization of Easter Sunday parades. They arrived at the conclusion that Beechmount Avenue was one of the main routes from which Republicans marched onto the Falls Road and therefore it was there that a bomb should be planted.

  Edwards and Waugh were sent on reconnaissance missions into the Falls area to identify an exact spot where the bomb could be placed without attracting attention, since it would be planted and primed on the night prior to the parade. The reconnoitre failed and they returned unable to provide satisfactory information for Watt, who insisted on having precise details. They made a second journey and again returned unsure how the bomb should be planted or which type of device was required. Within twenty-four hours they made another trip but this time they took ‘Tonto’ Watt with them. At Beechmount he asked that the car be halted while he studied a security barrier which had been erected by local people to prevent sectarian incursions into their area. It consisted, as do many such barriers in Belfast, of a number of metal beer kegs through which had been driven a metal pole and the beer kegs filled with cement. The security forces often used these devices to limit IRA access to certain streets in the event of a car chase.

  ‘Tonto’ Watt had discovered the ideal disguise for his bomb. He instantly told Mr A. that he could construct a bomb and place it in a beer keg which, when laid alongside those in the security barrier, would not arouse suspicion. The three UVF men returned to the Shankill; Mr A. and Mr B. to put the final touches to their plan, and Watt to make the bomb, which Mr A. told him he needed on Saturday night. A further meeting was held on Friday 8 April at which Mr A. and Mr B. told Leckey, one of the original members of the Murphy gang, Waugh and the others that they believed the best time to leave the bomb in Beechmount was in the early hours of Easter Sunday morning. Those who would be ‘up and about’ later that morning would be preoccupied with going to church services and, afterwards, crowds gathering for the parade would be caught up in the excitement and therefore not likely to notice an extra beer keg sitting alongside a security barrier.

  Waugh and the other accomplices were instructed to be at Mr A.’s home by midnight when the final details would be conveyed to them. Mr A. instructed that the bombing team would travel to Beechmount in two vehicles, the first to lead the way and to alert the second if a security roadblock lay ahead, the second to transport the bomb. Mr A. boasted to the team that this would be the greatest blow ever struck against the Provisionals. For the first time the imminent operation bore the hallmarks of something which was being well planned with the presence of a second vehicle which would be used in a scouting role. In previous operations where a victim was picked up only one vehicle was required. In this instance the gang saw themselves as attempting a more daring plan which involved thorough preparation; a plan which would take them outside of their own territory and would involve greater risk.

  By Saturday lunchtime Mr A. and Mr B. informed Watt that they had ‘earmarked’ a van for hijacking for the purposes of carrying the bomb and it would be driven to his house to collect the device in the early hours of Easter Sunday. The first vehicle was to be a car which, in the event of being stopped by the Army or police, would show up on a computer as ‘clean’. Mr A. had in mind a car belonging to a UVF contact who lived near him. The man was approached and agreed to collude with the gang; in the event of his car being stopped by police he was to allege that it had been stolen.

  At midnight on Saturday Mr A. told Mr B. to drive the hijacked van to collect the bomb. Shortly after midnight Waugh, Leckey, Mr K. and Mr L. arrived at Mr A.’s house. They were given drinks, and discussion about the bombing was deferred until 2.00 A.M. when Mr B. arrived with the bomb, which was primed to explode at 2.00 P.M. the following day. Mr B. consulted Mr A. concerning the instructions from the bomb maker and told him that since the bomb in the beer keg was primed, one of the team would have to sit in the rear of the car and hold it steady on the journey to Beechmount. Mr A. outlined to the team that Mr B. would travel in the lead car with Leckey at the wheel and, should a hitch arise, the lead vehicle would make a detour which would be repeated by the van. Mr B. was the man who knew the route and exact spot where the bomb was to be placed and he reassured the others that there was nothing to worry about since the route they were taking had been carefully mapped out. Mr A., the director of operations, once again was not to be party to the action. This was a classic example of the manner in which he manipulated members of the Murphy gang while acting as go-between and remaining at a distance from the actuality of operations.

  Edwards, without prompting, offered to drive the van and this was agreed but with the stipulation by Mr A. that Waugh should sit alongside him. Mr K. and Mr L. were given the task of remaining in the rear of the van to ensure that the bomb remained steady. Watt’s instructions were that the bomb was composed of sticks of gelignite in an unstable condition and care was imperative when the van was traversing road ramps.

  Mr A. watched from his house as the van drove towards the Shankill and turned in the direction of Glencairn. Leckey was instructed to keep his vehicle at a sixty-yard distance from the van. He was directed by Mr B. towards Ainsworth Avenue on the Shankill, which led directly to the Springfield Road, a distance of half a mile from Beechmount Avenue. At this point Leckey began to panic but was reassured by Mr B. who pointed out that the bomb was in the van and not the car in which they were travelling. Mr B. guided the car into the Beechmount district and on to Beechmount Avenue where he produced a pistol and again told Leckey that they had nothing to worry them. He told Leckey to stop the car, at which stage the van came to a halt. Waugh and the others carefully unloaded the bomb and positioned it alongside the other beer kegs which formed the security barrier. Then Mr B. instructed Leckey to lead the way in his car and they drove back to the Springfield and into the Shankill. Leckey drove the car to the home of the man who had loaned it for the operation and he dropped the keys through the letterbox. Together with Mr B. he returned to Mr A.’s house where the others arrived a short time later. They all celebrated the success of their mission by drinking for several hours. During the drinking session Leckey was the butt of the rest of the gang’s derision on account of his nervousness.

  After lunch that day the bomb exploded not, as planned, while the Provisionals were marching but during the march organized by the Official Republican Movement (now the Workers’ Party). Watt had set the timer on the bomb on the instructions of Mr A. who had mistaken the starting time
of the Provisionals demonstration. A ten-year-old boy, Kevin McMenamin, was killed and many people injured.

  No group claimed responsibility for the atrocity, with the result that the Official Republican sources pointed the finger at the Provisionals. The Provisionals denied involvement and attributed the bombing to Loyalist paramilitaries but without specific reference to the UVF. A journalist, Jim Cusack, who dealt with the story the following day suggested that the RUC knew the UVF or UDA were the perpetrators but were unwilling to make this information public because it suited their purposes to have the Provisionals and the Official IRA in conflict. Relations between the two Republican groups came close to breaking point until talks between them clearly established that the bombing had, in fact, been carried out by Loyalists. The RUC reacted to Cusack’s claim by replying that they did not publicize their suspicions for fear of heightening sectarian tension, especially during the Easter period which was widely recognized as a time of community strife and suspicion.

  Two months after the bombing ‘Tonto’ Watt was caught and admitted to making the bomb: ‘On the Monday, I heard about an explosion in the Beechmount area and I knew this was the bomb I made. I didn’t know that it was going to kill any kids but I always had it in my head that it was going to kill somebody. When I heard about the kid I felt sick and I am sorry it happened. I didn’t know the man who collected it to plant it.’

  Watt knew well the devastation his bomb would create and the risk to civilians of all ages, as do the Provisionals when they plant bombs in city centres or in built-up housing areas.

  Ten days after the Easter Sunday killing Watt provided another bomb for a UVF unit. It exploded at a funeral in the Ardoyne area, killing two civilians. On 2 May another bomb manufactured by him killed Corporal John Geddis of the Ulster Defence Regiment. He was passing a filling station on the Crumlin Road which had been instructed to close by the UVF and the UDA. The filling station owner had disobeyed the edict, and the punishment for his courage was a bomb, which exploded as Corporal Geddis drove past the premises.