State Department Counterintelligence: Leaks, Spies, and Lies

by Robert David Booth

  Mark and I finally decided to avoid any “Mutt and Jeff” or good guy–bad guy routine and employ the old Joe Friday scenario, asking many questions requiring simple “yes” or “no” answers. Confident of our approach, I called Mr. Penn on April 23, identified myself, and advised him that I was conducting an official investigation involving official State Department matters. I asked if he could be available for an interview, and he answered that he could be available in about one hour. He did not ask for a lawyer to be present.

  I alerted Mark to prepare for the interview. The Special Investigations interview room was a tiny, interior office space, painted “puke” green and crammed with an oak conference table along with eight solid oak chairs. The only other item gracing this room was a solitary bookcase, stocked with pathetic looking pamphlets and worn out telephone books. Upon entering the space, Mr. Penn would be seated with his back to the door facing the two of us. There were no visual distractions and nothing on the table except two legal notepads. Not exactly Gestapo central but dreary enough for our purposes.

  Mr. Penn arrived around 2:15 and told the secretary that he was looking for agent Booth or McMahan. Once alerted, I sent Mark into the interview room and went out to introduce myself. Standing about 5´6˝, in conservative clothes, clean shaven, hair neatly combed back, Mr. Penn would go unnoticed in a crowd of two. I introduced myself and quickly guided him over to the interview room.

  Inside Mark shook Mr. Penn’s hand and directed him to his prearranged seat. Before we started the interview, I provided him with a standard “Warning and Assurance to Employee Required to Provide Information” form, which he read and signed. The form explains to employees they are being interviewed concerning job-related issues and are required to respond to questions unless their answers would tend to incriminate them.

  He started the interview by explaining that he had been employed in S/P as a speechwriter since February 15, 1985.

  “What are your general responsibilities in the office?” I asked.

  “My primary duties are to draft speeches for department officials and ‘remarks’ for other public functions.”

  “So it is a good job?”

  “Yes,” he said. “I enjoy my position at the department, and I have good professional relationships with my colleagues, even spending social evening hours with many.”

  I paused for a few seconds after his answer, opened a file on the table, and perused the contents for about thirty seconds. Looking up, I closed the file folder and glanced over my right shoulder to Mark before looking directly at Mr. Penn.

  “Any recent problems or commotion in the office?”

  “None that I am aware of,” he replied quickly. To this point, Mr. Penn was genial and forthcoming.

  “Any recent leaks in the press that caused problems in S/P?”

  “None that I can think of.” It was lie number one.

  I produced the April 10 edition of the Washington Post and pointed out the article entitled, “Ambassador Assails O’Neill Delegation.” I asked him if he remembered reading that article. He said “Yes” and added that he read the Post daily and thought he had read that article the day it was published. I asked whether he recalled that segments of a State Department cable were quoted in the article, and he said “Yes.”

  Mark next asked our suspect if he had been able to read S/P’s copy of the cable. Mr. Penn answered that he probably had read BA 2888. To the question whether he had discussed the cable with anybody, he replied that he “did not disclose it to anyone.” Chalk up lie number two.

  At this point in the interview, I noticed that our suspect started shifting uncomfortably in his chair and that his hands, which had rested comfortably on the table since the beginning of the interview, were now clasping his cheeks. It was time for the first trap question.

  “Mr. Penn, do you know William Kritzberg of the Washington Times?”

  “Yes.”

  “Give me some background, please.”

  He acknowledged that someone working in S/P first introduced him to William Kritzberg, but he could not recall who made the first introduction or where it occurred.

  “Mr. Penn, are you currently in contact with Mr. Kritzberg?”

  “Yes.”

  “Mr. Penn, how do you maintain the relationship?”

  He remarked that he normally talked to Kritzberg by phone, that he had conversations with Kritzberg several times prior to April 10, 1986, and that the purpose of the phone calls was to schedule and then cancel appointments to have lunch together.

  I casually passed a knowing glance at Mark. We had a department employee sitting in front of us who acknowledged reading BA 2888 the first week in April and who knew William Kritzberg, the first individual to ask senior department employees to confirm the contents of BA 2888. The trap question had been to get him either to admit that he knew Kritzberg (good for us) or lie and say he didn’t (also good for us).

  Mark asked, “You would not have disclosed portions of BA 2888 to Kritzberg or other unauthorized persons, would you?”

  “No.” It was lie number three.

  Our suspect commented, to direct questioning, that Kritzberg never made any reference to him about BA 2888 and that he did not have any contact with him during the first two weeks of April. Well, that was lie number four.

  Now it was time to see just how truthful Mr. Penn was going to be with me. I knew that Kritzberg had called the S/P office before April 5 and left a message with one of the S/P officers for our suspect to contact Kritzberg “urgently.” A standard practice for leaving colleagues a message then was to use a small, yellow “memorandum of call” form that indicated who called and at what time. Previously an S/P employee had allowed me to see the form from “Kritzberg” to Mr. Penn, dated April 4, which had the word “urgent” underlined and capitalized in the message block.

  “Mr. Penn,” I asked, “do you remember getting any telephonic messages in the office from Kritzberg around the time of the leak?”

  “No.” That was lie number five—maybe.

  Four and a half lies later and our suspect was beginning to fidget visibly. I knew by reviewing department telephone records that his office telephone had been used to call Kritzberg’s office phone on the morning of April 7 and that, according to time and attendance records, our suspect had reported for work that day. While it was possible that another employee used his telephone to call Kritzberg, the probability was about as likely as Chicago Mayor Rahm “Rahmbo” Emanuel going through a day without using the word “mother.”

  “Have you ever discussed BA 2888 with anyone?”

  He answered slowly this time. “To the best of my recollection, I have not talked about that cable with anyone inside the building.”

  I thought, What is this “anyone inside the building” disclaimer about?

  “Have you talked to anyone outside the building about BA 2888?”

  “I am certain that I did not.”

  It was lie number six. Time to ratchet up the interrogation.

  “Would you be willing to undergo a polygraph examination in which the only issue would be whether you had disclosed the contents of BA 2888 to any unauthorized person?”

  After thirty seconds of quiet deliberation, Mr. Penn said, “I’d have to think about it.” He was now squirming so much in his seat that I thought he would fall off. His hands moved all around his head, and he had a tough time looking either one of us straight in the eyes.

  There was nothing left to do but ask our suspect if he would immediately prepare and sign a sworn statement denying that he disclosed the contents of BA 2888 to anybody not authorized to see it. He agreed, wrote a one-paragraph denial, and signed the document, by which he acknowledged that any false statement on the document is a violation of federal law—the exact same proviso that had Don Keyser incarcerated as a felon in 2007. Mr. Penn’s physical agitation during the final questions was so extreme that I planned to have his chair equipped with a seat belt at our next meeting.<
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  I told him that we would probably call him back to set up another short, clarifying interview in the near future. We all stood up and shook hands, and Mark escorted our suspect out to the main corridor.

  The next morning I reported to Director Dittmer that I was confident that Mr. Penn was responsible for disclosing BA 2888 to the media and that he had just executed a false sworn statement of denial. I told Director Dittmer that we would be calling our suspect in for a second interview shortly in order to clarify some of his answers. Director Dittmer was visibly surprised. I think this was the first time that a department leak investigation was relatively successful, so we were sailing uncharted waters. He gave me approval to continue the investigation.

  I called Mr. Penn that afternoon and arranged the next interview for the following day as I was scheduled to leave on April 25 for a four-day vacation in Bermuda with my future wife. He said he would check his schedule and get back to me. He called back when I was out of the office and left a message. My secretary wrote down that he “said he could wait until you get back from vacation.” Boy, I bet he could have waited until Hell (or Bermuda) froze over to see me again.

  When I returned from vacation on April 30, I reported to Director Dittmer’s office, where I was informed that during my absence Mr. Penn hired a lawyer who had contacted the department to advise DS that in any future interview Mr. Penn would have his lawyer present.

  What was the takeaway message? Mr. Penn had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the unauthorized disclosure but was willing to confess only with the assistance of legal counsel.

  In fact, one Gordon Diddlemeyer called my office at 4:00 that very afternoon and left a message that he wished to arrange a second interview with Mr. Penn. Before I could return the call, I was summoned to Director Dittmer’s office and told that the department’s legal advisor’s office, known simply as “L,” directed that I was not to contact the Department of Justice to discuss the potential prosecution of a suspected leaker nor was I to talk to Mr. Penn’s legal representative without L’s approval. L had never conducted or prosecuted criminal investigations and had not contacted me or seen my report of the investigation. L was simply the legal mouthpiece for the department. What the hell was going on here?

  Maybe the surprised look on Director Dittmer’s face back on April 10 was in some sense prophetic. I had done my job, closed the SIB’s unauthorized disclosure case involving the Washington Post and BA 2888, and moved to other investigations. And there matters rested until mid-May.

  On May 16, 1986, at 12:35 p.m., the Department of State held a televised press briefing as it does every day in the Press Briefing Room, room 2209 of the HST, before the assembled accredited State Department Press Corps. The department’s spokesman, Charles E. Redman, read the following from a prepared brief:

  “The Department is dismissing a mid-level employee because he made an unauthorized disclosure of classified information to the news media. We regret that because of this transgression the Department is losing an otherwise productive and trustworthy employee. But we believe that leaking classified information is a serious breach of discipline required of all public servants. It is essential that the public be informed concerning the activities of government. However, we must recognize that the national interest often requires that information concerning national and foreign relations be protected against unauthorized disclosure.

  “Officials who leak do not serve the larger national interest by disclosing information but instead may well be undermining the process of making foreign policy and protecting national defense. Leaks can betray confidences and embarrass other governments, making them less willing to confide in us. Leaks can undermine the confidentiality needed in a decision-making process to ensure a full and candid airing of all points of view. Leaks can also threaten the security of our nation or friendly nations, or the safety of individuals, of our sources of vital information.

  “Because of the potentially serious consequences of unauthorized disclosures of classified information, the Department will continue to deal strictly with any of its employees who have made unauthorized disclosures of classified information.”

  The assembled journalists went berserk.

  Q: “Copy?” (This was a journalist asking if he could get a photocopy of the just-released statement.)

  CR: “Yes.”

  Q: “Who was the man? First of all—second of all, was he given a polygraph test?”

  CR: “What was your first of all?”

  Q: “That we can get a copy of that.”

  CR: “Yes.”

  Q: “Second of all—”

  Q: “Just a copy or just the text?”

  CR: “Yes, you may have a copy.”

  Q: “Was he discovered by a polygraph?”

  CR: “No, the employee did not take a polygraph test.”

  Q: “And who is he?”

  CR: “I’m not going to discuss the name of the individual involved. The important point is that the Department has dealt strictly with an individual who has made an unauthorized disclosure of classified information. The specific name of the individual involved is not material to that point. I can tell you that he was a GS-15 non-career employee.”

  Q: “What was the story about?”

  CR: “I can’t give you that.”

  Q: “Is he in violation of any law, and can he be prosecuted for what he did?”

  CR: “The Department is dismissing the employee who leaked the classified information. In the particular circumstances of this case, the Justice Department has declined to prosecute the employee for this unauthorized disclosure, but criminal prosecution will be undertaken in future cases if appropriate. Concerning the nature of the information, let me say, as I did, that I wouldn’t comment on the substance of it, that it would be inappropriate to confirm or deny that a specific story involved classified information. I can tell you that the unauthorized disclosure involved matters to our diplomatic relations. It did not involve defense secrets.”

  Q: “Chuck, when someone leaks a name this afternoon—”

  CR: “No. The reason I won’t give you his name is because it’s not my intent, nor the Department’s intent, to publicly embarrass the individual in that sense. He has been dismissed from the department. He has paid that price for his transgression. The point to be made is that he made an unauthorized disclosure of classified information, and the Department intends to deal strictly with those kinds of unauthorized disclosures.”

  Q: “Did he make it to a publication?”

  Q: “Did he admit to the charges on which he was accused?”

  CR: “The individual has apologized to the Secretary for his actions.”

  Q: “So he’s not contesting his dismissal, or is he?”

  CR: “I said he has apologized to the Secretary.”

  Q: “All right, a separate question, then. Is the individual contesting—are there any bureaucratic procedures underway now in which there is a contest of this action?”

  CR: “He has been dismissed. It has been done, Ralph.”

  Q: “Is there a way he can—”

  CR: “It’s over. That’s right, it’s over.”

  Q: “Can you identify the law that he would be in violation of or that in future cases people would be prosecuted for doing what he did? What is the nature of that law? And does it also apply to the news agencies that publish leaked material when they know that it’s classified information?”

  CR: “I’m not in a position to give you that legal reading.”

  Q: “Can you tell us when all this occurred? When he was dismissed, when the leaks occurred?”

  CR: “He was dismissed today.”

  Q: “He was dismissed today?”

  CR: “That’s right.”

  Q: “How long had the investigation gone on before—or was there any investigation?”

  CR: “There certainly was an investigation, but it’s [sic] duration I can’t give you any details of.”

 
Q: “Did he have a meeting with the Secretary of State?”

  CR: “I can’t go into the details of how he did it, suffice it to say he has apologized.”

  Q: “Did the Secretary dismiss him himself?”

  CR: “The Secretary dismisses his employees; that’s right.”

  Q: “Himself? He did it himself?”

  CR: “If you’re implying does he have to be in person to do it, I don’t want to lead you to believe that. But he has been dismissed by the Department. The Secretary is the head of this department.”

  Q: “In what form was the disclosure made—to a newspaper or to—”

  CR: “I have nothing beyond what I gave you earlier that—which is that it was not a defense secret but rather related to diplomatic relations.”

  Q: “How was he located? Did he—did some investigative body discover him or did he—”

  Q: “Did he come forward?”

  CR: “It was uncovered through an investigation.”

  Q: “Is this the first time this has been done? The Secretary has been talking about this quite a lot lately.”

  CR: “This is not the first employee to have left the Department because of unauthorized disclosures.”

  Q: “Can you give us any—”

  CR: “But I cannot give you any further details.”

  Q: “Dates or precedents?”

  CR: “Nothing else.”

  Q: “‘A non-career employee,’ does that mean a political employee?”

  CR: “I think that’s a fair assumption.”

  Q: “Chuck, when you say he was not the first to have left the Department for unauthorized disclosures, is he the first employee to have been fired for doing that as opposed to resigning?”

  CR: “As I say, I don’t have all the details as to what the circumstances of others may have been.”

  Q: “[Inaudible] . . . publicizing this, and you are unwilling to tell us if there have been a dozen in the last four or five years, or one hundred, or one thousand? Why are you coming out now?