Paul Collier - Wars, Guns, and Votes

by Democracy in Dangerous Places (pdf)

  national community welcomes the coup subject to conditions,

  they must decide whether to accept these conditions and pro-

  ceed to free and fair elections, or to cling to their new power:

  whether to be Colonel Vall of Mauritania, or General Gueï of

  Cote d’Ivoire.

  Now we solve the game by working through it backward. Start

  with step 7: will the coup leaders abide by the conditions set by the

  international community? If they do they are heroes and can be

  treated accordingly, if not, as you will see, they are living danger-

  ously. The coup leaders will have come to power precisely in the

  context of a stolen election, and this is surely the rationale that they

  will have used to motivate their own soldiers into action. Coup lead-

  ers are not inevitably self-serving like General Gueï. Mauritanian

  coup leader Colonel Vall promptly arranged free and fair elections

  and stood down. But suppose that, having said all these things dur-

  ing the coup, the new leaders then became so partial to power that

  they refused to hold verified elections. What might happen then?

  The answer is that they themselves would face a high risk of a fur-

  ther coup. Remember the risk is high because one coup leads to

  another. The leaders of a second coup would have a ready-made

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  justification, and the leaders of the first coup would face dire con-

  sequences: they would have no protectors. Gueï himself suffered a

  countercoup once it was clear that he had reneged. So here is the

  punch line: the threat of a further coup enforces the commitment to

  the intervention being temporary. Of course, people sometimes make

  mistakes or they take big gambles that pay off. But in step 7 the most

  probable outcome is for the coup leaders to abide by the conditions

  of the international community.

  Now we can roll the game up, turning to step 6. Having sorted

  out step 7, step 6 is pretty obvious. Why would the donors ignore

  the coup or condemn it, when by responding with conditional ac-

  ceptance they can pave the way for verified elections?

  Now we are ready for step 5. The decision at this step is taken

  by the military: should it launch a coup? The circumstances, re-

  member, are that the international community has certified that the

  government has stolen the election and publicly withdrawn its com-

  mitment to intervene to put down a coup. The answer is that we

  really cannot tell whether the military will launch a coup in these

  circumstances. Perhaps the president has established such an intru-

  sive form of repression that even discussion would be too dangerous.

  Perhaps the military is entirely dominated by the president’s close

  family and they all love him to bits. But quite possibly the bored

  general staff decides that this is their moment. Above all, they will

  worry that if they don’t take this decision, other more junior officers

  will launch a coup instead. In that eventuality the current leader-

  ship will be plunged into an ignominious premature retirement. So:

  the threat of a rival coup makes a coup more likely. A close parallel to this stage was the coup threat that enforced regime change following the Senegalese elections of 2000. Remember that the threat

  was emboldened by the coup in Cote d’Ivoire, which had revealed

  that the French security guarantee had been withdrawn across La

  Francophonie.

  Now for step 4, which is in fact the crucial step: will the inter-

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  national community have the backbone to stick by its commitment

  despite its deserved reputation for being pure jelly? Steps 5 through

  7 have provided us with the answer. The international community

  gets what it most wants by the strategy of declaring the elections

  illegitimate and withdrawing the commitment to suppress a coup.

  Indeed, it is actually much stronger than that. Suppose that the in-

  ternational community does not withdraw the commitment. Now

  what would happen if the military launches a coup on the argument

  that the government is illegitimate? The international community

  finds itself in the dangerous, damaging, and embarrassing situation

  of either breaking its commitment to put down the coup, or inter-

  vening militarily to defend a government against domestic forces

  for decent governance. No doubt about this one: the international

  community withdraws the commitment to put down a coup.

  At last we are at the step that cuts the mustard: step 3. The

  government realizes it may lose a fair election: should it steal it? We

  know what the answer to that is if the government has not signed

  up to an international standard: look at Nigeria, look at Kenya. Are

  things different if it has committed itself? We now have the answer.

  The government thinks through how events would unfold: if you

  doubt this, remember that the representatives of the international

  community will be explaining in graphic terms how they would

  react. More crucially, the presidents of the countries of the bot-

  tom billion have all been selected through a Darwinian struggle in

  shrewdness: they may not always be the sort of people your mother

  would invite for tea, but they would beat you at poker. They think

  it through: stealing the election no longer looks such a good idea.

  This is, indeed, precisely the calculation that confronted President

  Abdou Diouf of Senegal: step down with honor and dignity, or face

  a high risk of be ousted by a coup. He stepped down with honor.

  And so to the potential killer: step 2. Anticipating all that fol-

  lows, would any government sign up? We have seen the downside:

  the government loses the scope to steal an election and this is costly.

  Better Dead Than Fed?

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  So governments will only sign up if there are gains that more than

  offset these losses. We know the promised gain: protection against

  coups, but is it credible?

  To find out, we have to investigate the related game of whether

  the international community would make and then honor its com-

  mitment. Fortunately, this game is not so complicated: technically it

  is termed a “sub-game.”

  S t e p 1 :

  The international community decides whether to commit

  to put down a coup in return for a commitment to abide by

  democratic rules.

  S t e p 2 :

  There is a coup in a country that has committed, so does

  the international community intervene and keep its promise?

  Remember: work backward, so step 2 is first. Why should the

  international community keep its commitment? After all, this com-

  munity can hardly say, “My word is my bond,” at least not with a

  straight face. The answer depends as usual upon the costs and the

  benefits. There is no doubt that keeping the commitment has seri-

  ous costs. This is the situation in which “our boys,” and indeed one

  day my own boy, may get sent to somewhere most voters have barely

  heard of, to put down a coup. As Daniel’s father, I do not relish such

  a prospect. But there are
also benefits, and the benefits are poten-

  tially enormous. We have found a way of making democracy work

  in environments where otherwise it deepens many of the problems.

  Suppose that by the time there is a coup that needs to be put down,

  a dozen governments of the bottom billion have already signed up

  to democratic standards.

  And now put yourself in the shoes of the politician who has

  to decide whether to keep the commitment or renege. Am I really

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  going to be a politician who reneges, wrecking not just this par-

  ticular country but tearing up the commitment technology that a

  dozen countries are already using? If I do that, not only will I be

  vilified, I will have to look at myself each morning knowing what

  I did. But, despite my posturing before the voters, I am 99 percent

  jelly. I decide to ask my military: can we put down this coup? So

  what will the military say? Realize that they will have been training

  and equipping and extracting extra budget for just this eventuality.

  They have already checked up on the historical record of how the

  French and the British military put down coups in little countries

  swiftly and with virtually no losses: this is not another Iraq. The

  chief of the general staff stares down at the politician: “Piece of cake,

  sir!” he replies. The ball is back with the politician: at some point

  even jelly solidifies. In fact, the game is more satisfactory than I have

  presented. Knowing that the coup is very likely to be put down, only

  the drunken potential coup leaders make the attempt in the first

  place, and so coups become rare and incompetent.

  So much for step 2, how about step 1? If it is worthwhile put-

  ting a coup down when it occurs, it is worthwhile making the com-

  mitment to put it down. The international community gets many

  of the benefits immediately, and any costs are in the future. So we

  arrive at the solution that the coup commitment is credible and so

  the benefits for signing up to the democracy compact are consider-

  able. There is one further reason that the international community

  should regard a guarantee against coups as appropriate: think back

  to what drives the risk of a coup. Aid significantly increases coup

  risk, and so donor governments are inadvertently exposing recipi-

  ent governments to a menace. It is a menace they could and should

  see off.

  It is time to return to the question of whether in these cir-

  cumstances any political leaders in the societies of the bottom bil-

  lion would sign up to international democratic standards. Not only

  would protection from the domestic military be attractive but the

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  government may also value other benefits. It gains legitimacy in the

  eyes of donors, which may translate into cash. It may gain legiti-

  macy in the eyes of its own citizens, which may translate into greater

  power to achieve its objectives. And finally, there is likely to be a

  push factor. The political opposition will almost certainly try to gain

  electoral advantage by publicly and vociferously undertaking to sign

  up to international standards if elected. The opposition will make

  this commitment as part of its critique of government unfairness,

  and because donor support may reduce the extent of government

  cheating.

  Indeed, I think it likely that President Kibaki of Kenya would

  have committed himself to international standards, had there been

  any, on first coming to power in 2002. His prior campaign had been

  based around a series of promises to change Kenyan politics: an in-

  ternational standard would have suited him well. Similarly, I think

  it very likely that Raila Odinga, the Kenyan opposition leader, would

  have committed himself to them during the campaign of 2007. Af-

  ter all, following the declaration of the doubtful results, he called for

  precisely the international intervention that a commitment would

  have triggered. If the opposition is gaining political traction by mak-

  ing such promises, the government may decide that is it best to neu-

  tralize it by making the commitment itself.

  Were there to be an international standard, the leaders of the

  bottom billion would begin to sort into sheep and goats. And that it-

  self would gradually increase the pressure on the goats. But given all

  these benefits, would any nation or group of nations with the military

  capability be willing to provide a security guarantee against coups?

  Only a few nations have the required military logistics for rapid

  deployment of sufficient force: America, France, and Britain. Are

  they willing? Well, they already have the forces in place. America is

  in the process of creating a dedicated military rapid-reaction force

  stationed in Africa, rationalizing its existing capabilities around the

  region. Appropriately, while the commander of the force will be a

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  general, the number two will be a development professional. France

  still has a chain of military bases in West and Central Africa, and

  Britain is already providing a security guarantee to Sierra Leone.

  As I write, America is searching for African governments willing to

  host the base: South Africa and Nigeria, two obvious locations, have

  both declined.

  After Iraq, many governments are naturally apprehensive about

  the American preemptive use of force and so are wary. South Africa

  and Nigeria are probably also concerned that an American capability

  in the region might dilute their own regional superpower status. But

  the brute fact remains that neither South Africa nor Nigeria is able or

  willing to provide the necessary military capability itself. Nor, if either

  developed such a capacity, would it be welcomed by neighbors who

  are probably more apprehensive of the big brother next door than of

  the global superpower. Whereas with America it is its recent military

  behavior that raises concerns, with France and Britain it is the colo-

  nial record. The world is not ideal: there is no military power that is

  untainted in African eyes. But precisely because of these concerns, it

  is surely better to have these forces bound by clear rules of use. While

  the governments of South Africa and Nigeria might well not wish to

  host foreign forces with an unclear mandate, they should welcome

  them for the specified purpose of protection from coups against gov-

  ernments that have committed themselves to proper standards of

  democratic elections. “Keep out of Africa” is irresponsible if it con-

  demns the continent to unaccountable government.

  Finally, I turn to my most demanding readers: those presidents

  who, having read the section that sets out strategies for reducing the

  risk of a coup, still could not sleep soundly. Gentlemen, I promised

  you that if you read on you would find a fully reliable protection

  from your own army. You now have it: you no longer have to trust

  your brother-in-law. All you need to do is to lobby at that otherwise

  us
eless international jamboree to which you have just been invited,

  for a compact on democracy. You make a note of it and fall asleep.

  Better Dead Than Fed?

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  Proposal 2: Enforcing Probity in Public Spending

  Proposal 1 provides some rules for how a government acquires

  power. Proposal 2 shows how the international community

  could also feasibly provide some rules for the use of power. At

  the heart of the abuse of power is money.

  Public revenue, whether from aid or from taxation, is not

  a trough for political patronage: it is there to finance the public

  goods needed for a society to be decent and prosperous. But, as

  scandal upon scandal demonstrates, public money is only put

  to these proper uses if politicians and senior civil servants are

  shielded from temptation by systems of scrutiny and punish-

  ment. In the developed societies in which corruption is now a

  rarity we tend to forget that the habit of honesty is built on

  the bedrock of fear of detection. In most of the societies of the

  bottom billion, systems of public scrutiny were dismantled

  from the top. The resulting grand corruption not only wasted

  public resources, it empowered the political crooks. Patron-

  age financed by embezzlement has been the standard means

  of retaining power. How can international action help to put

  restraints back in place, given that people who are politically

  powerful would stand to lose?

  For most countries of the bottom billion the answer is quite

  straightforward: much of the money comes from aid. Donors

  have both the power and the obligation to ensure that this money

  is well spent. For many years donors hid behind the illusion

  that their money was financing specific projects to which it was

  ostensibly tied. As aid-receiving governments have increasingly

  been encouraged to determine the content of aid programs, this

  has become even more of a fiction. Quite evidently, if donors fi-

  nance the projects that governments want, the chances are that

  many of these projects would otherwise have been financed out

  of taxation. There is nothing intrinsically wrong about such a

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  process, but what the aid is actually financing is whatever the

  government would otherwise not have done. Knowing that the

  Swedish government is willing to finance schools, the govern-