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Thirteen Days

Page 15

by Robert F. Kennedy


  First Armored Division

  Foreign Office (Soviet), October 27 letter from

  Forrestal, James

  Fulbright, J. William

  action advocated by

  Gagarin (ship)

  Gaulle, Gen. Charles de, support by

  Gilpatric, Roswell

  Governance, dilemma of

  Great Britain, skepticism of U.S. position in

  “Great Society,”

  Gromyko, Andrei, misleading statements of

  Guantanamo Bay

  strengthening forces in

  Guinea

  “Hawks,” coining of

  Hoover, J. Edgar

  Indonesia

  Intelligence Community, see also Central Intelligence Agency

  Italy, missile deployment in

  Jefferson, Thomas

  John Pierce (destroyer)

  Johnson, U. Alexis

  decision on blockade and

  as member of Ex Comm

  Johnson, Lyndon B.

  as member of Ex Comm

  Vietnam War and

  Joint Chiefs of Staff

  invasion recommended by (Oct. 27)

  military attack recommended by (Oct. 17)

  opinion on air strike

  preventive attack on Soviet Union and

  use of nuclear weapons and

  Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. (destroyer)

  Jupiter missiles

  Kaiser, Philip M.

  Katzenbach, Nicholas

  Kennedy, Jacqueline

  Kennedy, John F.

  acceptance of Khrushchev proposal by (Oct. 27)

  advice sought by, conflicting opinions

  Ex Comm and decisions of

  from officialdom

  basis for action of

  alternatives

  Khrushchev

  most difficult decision

  opinion on miscalculations

  prevention of war

  purposefulness

  Bay of Pigs and

  blockade and

  decision on blockade (Oct. 20)

  line of interception

  on start of blockade

  speech announcing blockade (Oct. 22)

  support by allies

  boarding of ships and

  boarding of Bucharest

  boarding of Marucla

  congressional criticism of

  deployment of Air Force and

  initial reaction to missiles in Cuba by

  invasion and

  implications of invasion

  increase in overflights ordered (Oct. 26)

  military attack and

  on readiness for invasion

  retaliation for attack on U-2s and

  U-2 crash and (Oct. 27)

  Khrushchev and

  comparison of Khrushchev to himself

  decision to give Khrushchev time

  J. F. Kennedy’s basis for action

  Khrushchev’s deception of

  Khrushchev’s liking for

  as partners in preventing mutual disaster

  question of Khrushchev’s respect for

  relations between

  Macmillan and

  McNamara and

  meeting with Gromyko (Oct. 17)

  military and

  failures of military

  strengths of military

  missiles in Turkey and

  “rules of the precarious status quo” of

  secrecy kept by

  shying away from Congress by, reasons for

  Soviet deception and

  Stevenson and

  warning by, on use of SAMs

  Khrushchev, Nikita S.

  acceptance of proposal by (Oct. 27)

  allowing time for reactions of

  assurances on SAMs by

  confusion in Soviet Union and

  J. F. Kennedy and, see Kennedy, John F., Khrushchev and

  memoirs attributed to

  October 22 letter to

  October 23 letter from

  October 23 letter to

  October 25 letter to

  October 26 letter from

  October 27 letter from

  October 27 letter to

  peaceful intentions of

  proposed communications to

  B. Russell and

  summit meeting with

  support by Latin America as surprise to

  Komiles (ship)

  Korean War

  Laos

  Latin America

  support by

  LeMay, Gen. Curtis, military attack recommended by

  Liberty (ship)

  Lincoln, Abraham

  Lovett, Robert

  McCloy, John

  McCone, John

  as advocate of military action

  on invasion

  as member of Ex Comm

  report on Soviet deployments by

  on turning of Russian ships

  Macmillan, Harold

  support by

  McNamara, Robert S.

  as advocate of blockade

  interception of ships and submarines and

  J. F. Kennedy and

  lack of control over Navy by

  as member of Ex Comm

  military deployment for attack and

  Navy’s line of interception and

  nuclear war and

  report on casualties expected in invasion

  report on increased activity in Cuba (Oct. 27)

  requirements for military action reported by

  retaliation for attack on U-2s and

  Martin, Edward

  decision on blockade and

  as member of Ex Comm

  Marucla (Liberty ship)

  “Munich,”

  National Security Act of

  National security complex

  National Security Council

  Berlin threat and (1961)

  creation of

  formal meeting of (Oct. 20), and decision on blockade

  See also Executive Committee of the National Security Council

  NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization

  Navy

  blockade rules for

  deployment of

  forces in Caribbean (Oct. 25)

  line of interception for

  McNamara’s lack of control of

  report on submarine movements by

  tracking of submarines by

  turning of Soviet ships and

  See also specific ships

  Neustadt, Richard E. “Afterword” by

  New York Times

  Nigeria

  Nitze, Paul

  as advocate of military action

  as member of Ex Comm

  Nixon, Richard M.

  North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

  implications of invasion for

  support by

  Nuclear war

  morality of

  possibility and implications of

  OAS, see Organization of American States

  O’Donnell, Kenneth

  as member of Ex Comm

  Officialdom

  Ex Comm

  Executive bureaucracy and

  mutual dependence and conflict of Presidency and

  101st Airborne Division

  Operations Coordinating Board (under Eisenhower)

  Organization of American States (OAS)

  blockade and

  decision to blockade and

  unanimous support by (Oct. 23)

  Ormsby-Gore, David

  Pathet Lao

  Peace Corps

  Pearl Harbor

  Planning Board (under Eisenhower)

  Poland

  Polaris submarines

  Polk, James

  Presidency

  as Final Arbiter

  mutual dependency and conflict of officialdom and

  problems of

  role of

  war making as prime example of incompatibility be
tween Congress and

  See also specific presidents

  “Quemoy-Matsu” formula

  Rayburn, Sam

  Republicans, security threats and

  Reston, James

  Roosevelt, Franklin D.

  Rusk, Dean

  advises Dobrynin of blockade (Oct. 22)

  Jupiter missiles and

  as member of Ex Comm

  Russell, Bertrand

  Russell, Richard B.

  Salinger, Pierre

  Scali, John

  Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr.

  Foreword by

  Senegal

  Senghor, Leopold

  Shoup, Gen. David M.

  Sorensen, Theodore

  as member of Ex Comm

  as opponent of air strike

  Soviet Union

  alert of forces of

  Berlin blockade as reciprocal act of

  confrontation in U.N. and

  consequences of deception by

  demands of

  J. F. Kennedy’s basis for action with

  letter from Foreign Office of (Oct. 27)

  naval base for

  preventive attacks on

  reciprocal withdrawal of missiles and

  refusal of, to recognize blockade

  turning of ships of

  use of SAMs by

  Spanish-American War

  Stalin, Joseph

  State Department

  charges in function of

  draft reply to Khrushchev by (Oct. 27)

  Khrushchev’s October 26 letter and

  missiles in Turkey and

  post-invasion government for Cuba and

  “Status quo, rules of the precarious,”

  Stevenson, Adlai

  as advocate of reciprocal withdrawal

  confrontation with Zorin of

  as member of Ex Comm

  Strategic Air Command, deployment of

  Sweeney, Gen. Walter C., Jr.

  Synopsis of events

  Tass

  Taylor, Gen. Maxwell

  as member of Ex Comm

  preparations for invasion and

  Thompson, Llewellyn

  Tojo, Hideki

  Tonkin Gulf Resolution

  Touré, Sekou

  Truman, Harry S

  Tuchman, Barbara

  Turkey

  attack on

  implications of invasion for

  removal of missiles from

  U Thant

  United Nations

  confrontation at

  moratorium suggested by

  United States Information Agency (USIA)

  Victory, meaning of

  Vienna (Austria), summit meeting in

  Vietnam War

  War

  incidence of undeclared

  See also Congress, war making as prime example of incompatibility between presidency and; Nuclear war; specific wars

  War of 1812

  Warsaw Pact

  Wilson, Donald

  Wilson, Woodrow

  World War, First

  World War, Second

  World War Three

  Zorin, V. A., confrontation with

  * According to Theodore Sorensen, “The odds that the Soviets would go all the way to war, he [John Kennedy] later said, seemed to him then ‘somewhere between one out of three and even’” (Kennedy [New York: Harper & Row, 1965], p. 705).

  * Other accounts supplement his discussion. For these accounts, see p. 175. In the paragraphs that follow, we have drawn on some of them.

  * According to memoirs attributed to Khrushchev, “Our goal was…to keep the Americans from invading Cuba, and, to that end, we wanted to make them think twice by confronting them with our missiles” (Khrushchev Remembers [Boston: Little, Brown, 1970], p. 496). This account avoids any discussion of the deception involved.

  * Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Ploughshares (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1972).

  * Dean Acheson, “Homage to Plain Dumb Luck,” Esquire, February, 1969.

  * The preceding paragraphs are adapted from Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

  * U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Cong., 1st sess., Hearings, Part I, Testimony of Richard E. Neustadt, March 11, 1963, p. 97.

  * The preceding paragraphs are adapted from Neustadt, op. cit.

  * If one includes all instances in which American armed forces were used by Executive discretion—military as well as presidential—against the forces and persons of other countries without a declaration of war, the list numbers over one hundred. For a partial listing, see U.S., Department of State, Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Force, memorandum of the Solicitor for the Department of State, 3rd rev. ed., 1934. Among the more important were Polk’s occupation of the Mexican border territory, Wilson’s interventions in Mexico and Siberia, and interventions in the Dominican Republic by no fewer than four Presidents.

  * See Warren F. Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease 1939–1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), pp. 67–71; also Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper, 1948), pp. 174–76.

  * On Friday, Oct. 26, Khrushchev sent two letters to President Kennedy. The first, not made public, apparently took the “soft” line that Russia would remove its missiles from Cuba in return for ending of the U.S. quarantine and assurances that the U.S. would not invade Cuba. The second took a harder line seeking the removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey in return for taking Russian missiles out of Cuba. [A notation from Congressional Quarterly]

 

 

 


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