The Silent Deep

by James Jinks

  Orders for the operation, codenamed Operation ‘Nightjar’, were produced by FOSM on 19 November and two submarines, HMS Tabard, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Peter Samborne, and HMS Artful, under the command of Lieutenant J. T. Mitchelmore, departed Rothesay on 21 and 23 November, and took up positions off the Norwegian coast by the North Cape, where, in some of the worst weather imaginable, they remained until late November.227 Both submarines were under strict orders to remain undetected. They were not to commit hostile acts towards Soviet Forces unless authorized to do so and if they were detected they were to do their utmost to break contact. If they failed and were attacked with persistence by Soviet forces they were to surface and inform the Admiralty that they were being attacked. The submarines were also required to maintain complete radio silence throughout the operation. They were only permitted to break it to report:

  (a) A large scale movement of ships, submarines and depot ships e.g. in the region of 50% order of battle.

  (b) Five or more Submarines transiting to the West in a period of 24 hours.

  (c) A total of 10 or more Submarines transiting to the West in a period of 72 hours.

  (d) Three or more cruisers proceeding West of 31 degrees East independently.

  (e) A cruiser task force (e.g. 2 Cruisers and 8 destroyers proceeding west of 31 degrees East).

  (f) If attacked …

  (g) If assistance is needed in the event of a serious breakdown.

  (h) If forced to leave patrol prematurely.228

  Although HMS Tabard detected sixty-nine contacts, only three were considered to be of Soviet origin, the remainder attributed to neutral, or possibly Soviet, merchant ships, trawlers or fishing boats.229 HMS Artful encountered twenty-four merchant ships and fishing vessels and one Royal Navy warship, HMS Hound, which was on passage near Bear Island. Mitchelmore suspected that Artful had detected two possible diesel submarines moving to the southwest, but he was unable to identify them.230 Although uneventful, both COs found the patrols valuable from the point of view of training. Samborne treated the operation as a war patrol, which he said ‘was of great benefit to myself and the ship’s company; morale remained high throughout – the feeling that the job is worth while being an excellent stimulus’. But he was frustrated by the restrictions imposed on Tabard’s movement. ‘Whilst it is gratifying that the “raison d’être” of this operation was not fulfilled, it was a great disappointment that the opportunity could not be taken to spend a period in an area only twelve snorting hours further east.’231

  Two additional submarines, HMS Totem and HMS Andrew, were to sail from the UK on 5 December to relieve Artful and Tabard. However, on 30 November the Admiralty decided to hold them at seventy-two hours’ notice due to improvements in the international situation.232 On 19 December the requirement was reviewed once again and Inglis concluded that it was no longer required. ‘I consider that there is no indication of global war and that tension has diminished considerably since Operation Nightjar was instituted.’ Operation ‘Nightjar’ was suspended and Totem and Andrew were stood down. Artful arrived back in the UK on 16 December and Tabard on 19 December. With the last of the British and French troops due to withdraw from Egypt on 22 December, the judgement was that the international circumstances no longer warranted a continuous submarine patrol in northern waters. But Inglis suggested that the ‘Nightjar orders should be retained for use at short notice in times of tension. The operation could then be remounted with a minimum of delay.’233

  Inglis attempted to use the operation to prompt Eden to reconsider his position on intelligence-gathering operations. Reports from HMS Tabard and Artful were sent to the First Lord, Lord Hailsham, who found them ‘most interesting’ and insisted the COs of both submarines come to London to brief him personally. But Hailsham felt there was little point in approaching Eden, who was in poor health and politically weakened:

  It is not much good trying to get the P.M. to alter his post-Crabb policy unless a powerful case can be deployed based on either (i) change of circumstances (ii) substantial advantages to Anglo American cooperation or (iii) prospects of really impressive yield. However I favour vigorous patrolling as the best possible training and a valuable source of information and will help all I can.234

  It was the second of these cases, the consequences for Anglo-American relations, that led to the resumption of intelligence-gathering operations.

  Inglis had hoped to deepen relations with the US Navy by inviting American observers to participate in Operation ‘Nightjar’, but he was unable to deliver a formal invitation to the USN before the operation was cancelled.235 Another opportunity arose a month later, in December 1956, when COMSUBLANT privately informed the Flag Officer Submarines, Rear Admiral Woods, that the US Navy intended to send the USS Tirante into northern waters in February 1957.236 A worried Elkins informed the First Sea Lord, Lord Mountbatten that:

  It is apparent the U.S.N. see this as the first of a series of patrols to provide thorough coverage of the Northern Fleet by submarine reconnaissance. It is also plain that the decision to institute these patrols was influenced by two factors: firstly, the U.S.N. feel that, since the cancellation of PONTIAC, we are no longer providing sufficient cover in an area where we have hitherto been a reliable and productive source; secondly, having recently been given access to the reports of our own submarine operations off the Murmansk coast, the U.S.N. have been able to persuade the State Department of the feasibility and value of such operations, and that the risks of detection are negligible … It appears that our prestige will suffer in the operational and intelligence fields (where it stands high at present), unless we resume these activities ourselves, though, of course, I appreciate it was a political decision to discontinue them.237

  Elkins urged not only restoration but also a ‘bigger and better operation’.238 He told Mountbatten that ‘we have here an opportunity to co-ordinate our efforts with the U.S.N. to our mutual benefit’.239 However, any such operation would require Prime Ministerial authorization and the Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, was consumed with the aftermath of the Suez Crisis. However, on 9 January 1957, Eden resigned and was succeeded by Harold Macmillan. At some point between Macmillan assuming office on 10 January and 4 February 1957, the new Prime Minister approved the Royal Navy’s ‘submarine operation in Northern Waters this spring’, codenamed Operation ‘Offspring’.240

  With the Americans now operating in northern waters, Inglis informed Mountbatten that it was ‘necessary to co-ordinate our operations with those of the U.S.N.’ There were two ways of achieving this. The first was to ask the US Navy to cease its operations in northern waters. The second was to allocate areas in which US Navy and Royal Navy submarines could operate. Woods strongly favoured the second option and felt that because ‘his relations with ComSublant are so good’ he could easily arrange it.241 Mountbatten agreed and on 4 February he wrote to his opposite number in the US Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and recommended coordinating US Navy and Royal Navy submarine operations in northern waters and repeated the offer to host US observers on Royal Navy submarines.242 Burke replied on 3 March:

  I was pleased to read that we agree as to the necessity for closely coordinating submarine surveillance operations in areas of mutual interest. Various means of implementing an effective liaison procedure have been reviewed and I believe the following system would be advantageous for both of us. It is proposed that we utilize national command structures rather than the NATO organization. Thus, through the offices of Admiral Boone, we could ensure more intimate coordination with over-all U.S. planning and operational data. This more direct access to the facilities and resources of CINCNELM [Commander-in-Chief US Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean] would facilitate the essential exchange of information concerning these sensitive operations.

  If you concur, I will direct the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet to establish direct liaison between the Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Atlan
tic Fleet and Flag Officer Submarines utilizing the offices of Admiral Boone. There are several excellent officers on Admiral Boone’s staff who are well qualified to serve as a strong link between the Commander Submarine Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet and your Flag Officer Submarines.

  It is our sincere hope that we will be ready to take advantage of your kind invitation to send an observer to one of your submarines this spring. Implementation of such close coordination and teamwork in peacetime will materially increase the over-all readiness of our submarine forces.243

  Operation ‘Offspring’ was the first intelligence-gathering operation coordinated with the United States Navy and was conducted by HMS Tabard under the command of Peter Samborne.244 ‘We were patrolling and nothing much was happening,’ recalls Richard Heaslip, then a junior navigator on board Tabard. ‘Then the entire Russian fleet came out. The natural thought is “They’ve got us”, but that proved not to be the case. They were all coming out for an exercise. But they were all around us, the whole lot: planes, helicopters, destroyers. We were at action stations for about four hours in the Control Room. Samborne loved that. The tighter it got, the more he enjoyed it.’245

  This is where the accessible records end. However, there were clearly other secret submarine operations. The catalogue at The National Archives in Kew lists a series of files whose titles include submarine patrol reports such as Operation ‘Sanjak’ (HMS/M Turpin Submarine Patrol, 1954–1955); Operation ‘Tartan’ (HMS/M Turpin Submarine Patrol, 1954–1955); Operation ‘Offspring’ (HMS/M Tabard Submarine Patrol, 1957); Operation ‘Tripper’ (1957–9); Operation ‘Orion’ (1958); and Operation ADAMIS (1958–1959).246 All are withheld under section 3.4 of the Public Records Act 1958 and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

  PIN-PRICKING A COLOSSUS

  What was it like on board one of the Royal Navy’s ‘T’ class submarines during a Cold War intelligence-gathering operation? A 22-year-old Leading Electrical Mechanic (LEM) named Michael Hurley kept a diary during two patrols conducted by HMS Taciturn, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Roache O’Connor, in September 1957 and April 1958. According to Hurley, O’Connor, ‘a patient, polite and understanding’ CO, was one of the few individuals on board Taciturn who knew exactly where the submarine was going and what it was going to do.247 However, the arrival of extra personnel on board alerted Taciturn’s crew to the nature of the operation. One addition was a Lieutenant Commander named Lucas, described by Hurley as one of the ‘special team’ and as ‘fat, foreign looking with a slight accent but seems good natured’. Rumours quickly spread that he was ‘an ex-Russian who can speak 14 languages’:

  Everyone has already got their own ideas about this trip but we will know a great deal more when the Captain tells us later what its purpose is … A report in yesterday’s paper seems significant as it reports that the Red Fleet is exercising in the Arctic from Sept 10 to Oct 15 and warns all ships to stay out of the area. In this morning’s paper the warning is repeated plus statements saying live ammo and charges will be used. We will see if this affects us. Morale at present is high.

  When Taciturn sailed from the Clyde, O’Connor briefed his crew:

  We are going to snoop on the Russian Fleet exercises and the Captain made no bones about what would happen if we were caught: ‘It will be very unpleasant and most dangerous’. The charts will be screened and we are not to look at them. We shall retain a complete Radio silence apart from emergency. He also warned us of the complete necessity for keeping our mouths shut when we return. For some time we will be watched and so will our families. We must not say a word even to wives and mothers. Aboard a different routine will be worked, lights out as much as possible to conserve the batteries. All the time we will be in Defence State 2 (ready for deep diving). Finally the Captain repeated his earlier warning by saying ‘This will be a wartime patrol, we must get good results’. Most people had a fair idea before but now we know for certain it is different although everyone is so far being humorous.

  Before sailing north, Taciturn dived and exercised against a number of British warships. While conducting ‘listening watches’ on the British ships the submarine suddenly ‘jumped a couple of times and rocked a little’:

  My first thought was of ‘depth charges’ (shows how dramatic we’ve become!). The Control Room asked for damage reports if any and told us we had ‘grazed’ the bottom. No internal damage was discovered and we were told we had hit a rock pinnacle and would remain at periscope depth until time to surface. At 2030 we surfaced and went into Passage Routine.

  After completing the exercises Taciturn set course for HMS Adamant, the submarine depot ship stationed off Greenock. O’Connor informed his crew that when they arrived no one was allowed to leave the submarine as the depot ship had been quarantined due to an outbreak of Asian Flu. ‘No one at first believed this and thought it just an excuse to prevent us breaching security.’ Once Taciturn had been loaded with stores, the submarine slipped away from Adamant and ‘opened up for diving’. The next day the crew were struggling to keep the submarine stable while snorting due to bad weather – ‘it was a job to hold our depth properly’ – and conditions deteriorated to such an extent that even at 50 or 60 feet below the surface life was uncomfortable for the crew. The weather was also taking its toll on Taciturn:

  During this spell our anchor became loose and was continually thudding against the bows. The weather of course was too rough for anyone to go on the casing so we continued below at 150 ft, snorting when necessary. The weather was the same if not worse on Saturday with snags coming up on Husk due to oil and salt water sloping over it. On Sunday the weather calmed down enough for ‘Scratch’ and Silver to secure the anchor. We then carried on as before snorting until the forenoon when we surfaced to complete operations on the anchor as now the weather was quite calm. We had to dive in a hurry due to an aircraft and remained below all day until 2145 when we stopped snorting and went deep.

  Two weeks into the operation the ‘buzz’ on board was that the submarine was somewhere in the Arctic Circle. It was very cold and, when Taciturn snorted, ice would form around the Engine Room bulkhead door. The submarine was also making a lot of noise while submerged: ‘we might as well tow a bell for the amount of noise we are making. It’s a serious problem as it is imperative all possible noise is eradicated to avoid detection,’ wrote Hurley. O’Connor repeatedly surfaced Taciturn at night and sent teams outside to try and find the source of the noise. After two days Hurley wrote that:

  Unfortunately this mysterious noise has continued and caused us a great deal of trouble. Last night we surfaced and dived no less than three times. It is a fact that the Skipper seriously considered turning back. This may sound silly but unless this noise was located it was pointless to go on as if located we would either be a grave embarrassment to HM Government or dead! However at 1730 this evening we surfaced once more and a real attack on the casing was made and I think the trouble has finally been removed although we will not be sure for a few hours.

  Taciturn’s crew was now working under a very arduous regime. O’Connor repeatedly emphasized the need for silence. An ‘ultra-silent’ state was introduced whereby all machinery was stopped and all unnecessary movement was discouraged:

  He told us that although in many ways we had cut down on noise we would in future have to be really quiet all the time. No crashing of stores, shouting, hammering, or dropping of hatch covers. He then told us what was happening. Although he was unable to say where we are he said that we were in the area and that starting from yesterday afternoon we would be passing through a heavily patrolled U-boat area for about 48 hours then after a further two days we would enter or I should say cross another line which would have both Submarines and surface vessels patrolling. On the other side of the line would be an area which would be ‘most interesting’ and busy. It appears we have not got one particular stretch to cover but a roving commission in the area.

  ‘T’ class submarines operating in nort
hern waters would stay well outside the twelve-mile limit off the Soviet coast recognized internationally as territorial waters. The submarines would remain dived during the day, hoovering up communications and electronic signals from special aerials stuck on top of the periscope, augmented with visual sightings on the rare occasions anything was observed. When operating outside the twelve-mile limit in the harsh Russian winter the coastline in bad weather was barely visible and thick snow tended to cover everything. The only time the submarines would surface was at night to establish a star fix. Access to the Control Room was strictly limited and only the officers were allowed to look through the periscope or consult the charts which were used to keep track of the submarine’s location. The majority of the crew had little idea of where exactly they were operating. As a Leading Electrical Mechanic, Hurley was assigned to the Motor Room in the aft sections, where he and the rest of the crew would speculate about Taciturn’s exact location. ‘There seems to be no doubt,’ he wrote, ‘that at the moment we are going round the “top” as we have gradually been changing course from n/e and are now going due East.’

  As the weeks passed, living conditions on board Taciturn deteriorated. Although no two ‘T’ class submarines ever had the same complement, from an accommodation point of view the post-war modernized ‘T’ boats were no different from their wartime counterparts. During the war the ‘T’ class had carried an average of 53 men. Following conversion and modernization, the addition of various specialists and intelligence operators known as riders increased the number to 68. To accommodate these extra personnel there were two sittings for Wardroom meals and the torpedo stowage compartment became a mess deck complete with bunks. The growing size and complexity of electronic equipment also had a material bearing on habitability, further reducing the space available for accommodation of the personnel whose duty it was to use and maintain it. Officers and ship’s company lived in conditions that were best likened to caravanning with much reduced headroom, and complete exclusion of daylight. Wooden boxes containing tinned food would be stowed as a false deck in the gangway throughout the submarine, forcing the crew to move about in a more crouched position than ever.248 Instruments and controls of all sorts obtruded into what were primarily living spaces. To open a locker or cupboard usually entailed disturbing messmates who were using it as a seat or bunk. Coote wrote that conditions in Totem were ‘pretty squalid, there was no doubt about it. I would hardly pretend it was comfortable for anybody.’249