The Silent Deep
Page 36
The Navy Department considered it ‘essential that the POLARIS control officer at Northwood should be able to see the Prime Minister as he gives the order to release and that, similarly, the Prime Minister should see the Control Officer’.433 A two-way closed-circuit television system was installed between No. 10 and CINCWF at Northwood and the secondary Polaris headquarters in the Old Admiralty building. A camera was fixed to the wall in the office of Harold Wilson’s Principal Private Secretary, Michael Halls, and permanently focused on a table in Halls’s office on which there was a blue telephone connected to Northwood. The act of lifting the phone and pressing three buttons activated the link to the Polaris Duty Officer in Northwood, who would appear on a small monitor alongside the table. The system, the existence of which was highly secret and known only to a limited number of people, was tested daily by the Duty Clerks in Downing Street, as and when the pressure of work in the Prime Minister’s Private Office allowed, usually first thing in the morning, at lunchtime or during a quiet time in the evening. Strict procedures were developed to ensure that the individuals testing the system ‘could in no way imitate the Prime Minister’ and ‘that if the tester went haywire or indeed had a mental aberration someone else was present to deal with the situation’.434
From March 1968 onwards, Duty Clerks in No. 10 followed a strict set of procedures to ensure that the system was working correctly. It went like this:
(a) remove the lens cap from the camera;
(b) sit at the table with the blue telephone instrument and –
(i) press the brown button and slide the top to the left
(ii) lift the handset,
(iii) press the button marked ‘PRIM’Y’ (‘SEC’Y’ in the case of tests with Whitehall Wireless)
(iv) press the button marked ‘CALL’;
(c) when the Duty Officer at POLARIS HQ can be seen on the monitor screen, say –
‘This is the Duty Clerk testing the television link. Report how you see and hear me.’
In reply the Duty Officer will say –
‘This is the Duty Officer. Your test message received. Vision is clear and sound is good.’
To this, the reply from No.10 will be –
‘Test completed.’
(d) Replace the telephone instrument and slide the top of the brown button to the right.
(e)Replace the lens cap on the camera.435
In the event of technical problem with the CCTV system there was a ‘fall back of a direct telephone connection using a simple authentication system’.436 Two pairs of pads containing authentication tables were housed in two separate combination lock boxes located in the inner or outer Private Office in No. 10. Only two individuals knew the combination settings to each box (four individuals in total) and neither pair were permitted to know the other combination.437
What if the UK was attacked in a so-called ‘bolt from the blue’ scenario? The recently declassified Appendix Z from the 1969 Government War Book indicates that in the event of such an attack CINCWF was to seek instructions from the Prime Minister or the Nuclear Deputies, ministers selected by the Prime Minister with the authority to authorize the release of nuclear weapons in the event that, at the critical moment, the Prime Minister was not available.438 If CINCWF was unable to contact the Prime Minister or the First Nuclear Deputy, he was to seek authority from the Second Nuclear Deputy, who, the instructions assumed, would have moved to Northwood.439 There were no instructions about what to do in the event that the Second Nuclear Deputy failed to reach Northwood or in the event that CINCWF and the Second Nuclear Deputy were wiped out before being able to issue a firing directive.440 According to the files, arrangements existed ‘to enable authority for the firing of POLARIS weapons to be transmitted direct by the surviving Prime Minister to the submarines’.441 While it is not clear what these were, it presumably involved the ‘secondary firing HQ for Polaris’ in London.442
What if the Prime Minister, the Deputies and CINCWF were wiped out before being able to issue a firing directive? When the Royal Navy assumed responsibility for the strategic nuclear deterrent there was no ‘in place’ system for authorizing the launch of Polaris missiles in the event of a complete breakdown of communication with the submarines. Authority to fire was not delegated to CINCWF, as was the case with the Royal Air Force, nor to individual Commanding Officers on board the submarines.443 There was no sealed order, locked in the inner safe in the control room on board the submarine, with the Prime Minister’s ‘response from the grave’, as exists today.444 In the event of the communication system failing, Polaris Commanding Officers were given certain actions to carry out, including trying to receive BBC radio. In extremis, they were to try and place themselves under US command.
It was only in 1972 that concern grew about the degree of uncertainty in the actions to be taken in the event of a surprise bolt-from-the-blue attack resulting in destruction of large swathes of the United Kingdom and the Command and Communication arrangements for the release of the weapons. The solution, which had first been devised in the late 1960s, was the issue of the so-called ‘letter of last resort’, containing written orders from the Prime Minister which relieved the CO of any personal responsibility for initiating a nuclear response. From 1972 onwards Polaris submarine commanders were issued with instructions that if they encountered indications of a nuclear attack on the United Kingdom or if all Polaris and other naval broadcasts transmitted from the United Kingdom went silent for four hours they were to open a sealed envelope held on board each submarine. Each envelope contained further instructions from the Commander-in-Chief Fleet, which laid down the conditions under which another sealed envelope containing specific instructions from the Prime Minister should be opened.445
The CO of a Polaris submarine was incapable of physically launching the missiles – part of the failsafe lay in the fact that he merely gave permission to launch. A combination of careful drills and tight discipline ensured that a submarine was unable to launch without proper authority or be misled by spurious instructions.446 On receipt of a properly formated firing message the Polaris Systems Officer and the First Lieutenant would have been summoned to the Control Room to open a two-man safe in the Navigation Centre which contained material to properly authenticate the message. That signal was in two parts. The CO or the First Lieutenant had access to decode one part of the signal, while the Polaris Systems Officer had access to decode the other. Once decoded and authenticated the first CO would give permission to fire by moving the submarine to 1SQ, ready to launch missiles, and inserting a key into the Attack Centre Indicator Panel, located in the Control Room, which activated the firing circuits. The Polaris Systems Officer was responsible for pressing the trigger and launching the missiles. If any of the procedures were followed incorrectly, personnel in the Navigation Centre, who were aware of the correct procedures, would have physically restrained the CO from using his key. This was just one of a number of physical breaks in the firing chain that prevented any one person on board the submarine, including the CO, from launching the missiles without authorization.447
What about the possibility of a mad or even rogue crew launching the missiles? For Rear Admiral Whetstone, the first CO of HMS Repulse, a scenario in which he and the Polaris Systems Officer were ‘in cahoots’ was unlikely. ‘We both had to have a brainstorm if we wanted to amuse ourselves before lunch by starting World War Three. The chance was, had the other people around the bazaars seen us behaving in this bizarre manner without a signal having arrived or gone through the procedure somebody would have wrapped us up, locked us in our cabins and sent for the Doctor!’448 Ken Frewer, CO of HMS Resolution, agreed: ‘If you can envisage 143 people, all going mad at once, I suppose it is just conceivable,’ he said, before adding: ‘In my opinion it is not conceivable because the attitude we take to this job is a professional attitude. We are not either morally or philosophically involved. We are in the Royal Navy, this is our job and we do as we’re told. We also have as an added ad
juncture a doctor on board to keep an eye on us all.’449 Indeed, all personnel, whether serving on board the submarines or working at Faslane, Coulport and the Operating Headquarters had their medical records checked in order to safeguard the weapon system against sabotage, inadvertent arming, launching or firing. COs were also given strict instructions to keep ‘constant watch on all personnel under their command’ for any officers or ratings who ‘showed signs of mental or emotional instability’.450
When the Polaris force first went to sea in 1968 the missiles on board were targeted at the Soviet Union. We also know that the primary target plan was allocated under the NATO nuclear-response plan.451 Targets were allocated by SACEUR to CTF 345, who in turn issued target plans to individual SSBNs and a forecast of the operational availability.452 In order to fire the missiles each submarine carried target tapes which fed target information into the missile system. The provision of such tapes was ‘extremely complicated’ and involved the ‘selection of targets in broad terms, choice of aiming points, establishment of aiming points to the required standards of accuracy, translation of geodetic data into a form suitable for incorporation into a tape, and the manufacture of the tapes, independent check of their correctness and, finally, their timely distribution’.453 The Chiefs directed that the tapes had to be completed by March 1968, when Resolution was able to deploy in an emergency capacity and fire its missiles. Preliminary discussions with NATO’s targeting authority started in May/June 1966, target planning in October 1966, the firm and detailed target list was issued in February 1967 and production of tapes began in April 1967.454
The submarines also carried alternate national target plans, details of which were ‘known only to a small circle in the UK and they have never been communicated to either the US or NATO authorities’.455 A December 1963 Chiefs of Staff paper stated that ‘The 32 missile load of two POLARIS submarines constitutes a 20 city deterrent; and of one submarine, a 7 or 8 city deterrent. These figures allow for the probabilities of inaccuracies and for the two biggest targets to be hit more than once.’456 The figures also took into account the reliability of the weapons system (calculated at 99 per cent), the probability that each weapon would hit its target (calculated at 70 per cent), failures in the fire control system, misfires due to the influence of weather conditions and, finally, in-flight failures. Overall, it was estimated that if a Polaris submarine did launch its missiles, and assuming none were intercepted while in flight, eleven out of the sixteen missiles on board would hit their targets. Eleven missiles on target represented a seven-city deterrent, as Moscow required four hits and Leningrad two.457 CINCWF was also required to keep submarines alongside at Faslane at maximum notice of twenty-four hours to fire thirteen missiles in order to increase the number of missiles available. But as the submarines were alongside, they were at risk of a ‘bolt from the blue’ attack or sabotage so the credibility of the threat could be questioned. There was also a school of thought in the MOD that with adequate ‘political warning … it could well be that the whole Polaris force could be on patrol’. However, given the complex maintenance and refit arrangements of the Polaris force this would have been very difficult to achieve and sustain.
The capability to set targets manually also existed on board the submarines. This was done using an item of equipment called the Target Indication Panel and Target Acquisition Panel (known as the Tip Tap Panel) which was used to feed information into the missile system. Whetstone recalled how ‘One or two bright sparks, said: “How about Paris for a start?” ’458
ON BOARD A ‘RESOLUTION’ CLASS SUBMARINE
On 14 June 1968, HMS Resolution slipped out of Faslane and departed on her first eight-week patrol. For most of the patrol Resolution’s carbon dioxide absorption plants – ‘scrubbers’ – did not work and Henry was forced to bring Resolution up to periscope depth each night to ‘ventilate’, renewing the atmosphere in the submarine through the snort inlet and exhaust masts. ‘It was glassy calm for most of the patrol with clear skies, and I sat in the Control Room for the hour or so that it took each night with both periscopes manned, glumly contemplating our chances of detection,’ remembered Henry.459 Resolution’s primary method of navigation, the Loran C Chain (a radio navigation system that allowed a submarine to determine its position by listening to low-frequency radio signals) also failed to function throughout the entire patrol, meaning the submarine had to rely on ‘bottom contouring’ – reading the map of the ocean bed for navigational updates. At the end of the patrol news of the suppression of the Prague Spring by Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia came through and Henry prepared for an extended patrol. ‘We had emergency provisions on board, and could certainly have extended from 56 to 90 days [far short of later record patrols], but happily it was not to be so,’ explained Henry.460
With the commissioning of HMS Repulse on 28 September 1968 and HMS Renown on 15 November 1968, the Navy was ready to assume its new role. On 14 June 1969, Commander Henry Ellis, a Royal Navy Commander in the Navy’s Plans Division, conveyed by hand to his opposite number in RAF Plans a signal stating that the Navy was ready to assume responsibility for the UK strategic deterrent. ‘I knew, and he certainly suspected,’ said Ellis, ‘that it had been a close run thing.’461 Despite the problems and the setbacks the Royal Navy had achieved its overall aim. From that moment, the RAF’s V-bomber force ceased to maintain the extremely high state of readiness at which it had been kept, although it retained its nuclear capability and weapons.
The first Polaris patrol for which the Royal Navy was responsible for the strategic nuclear deterrent was conducted by HMS Repulse, under the command of Tony Whetstone.462 He quickly discovered that commanding an SSBN was entirely different to commanding any other submarine. Traditionally, a submarine’s role was to detect and identify a target, and then close and attack it. In an SSBN, this concept was completely reversed: if a target was detected, no matter how tempting, the SSBN’s duty was to evade. Only when the missiles had been successfully launched would it take up the hunter-killer role for which it was fitted with long-range sonar equipment and six torpedo tubes. This took a while to get used to, as Whetstone explains:
‘Whereas one’s previous submarine experience had all been directed towards going on patrol and looking for people and trying to get close to them, we now had the problem of trying to make sure that we never got close to anybody for six weeks. There were various different opinions as to whether it was safest to stay on a single course very slowly, or whether in order to make sure you had detected any potential people you had to alter course, and would altering course too frequently upset your navigation system? We found out that it didn’t as a matter of fact and after a while we found that the freedom of operation you’re allowed was much greater than perhaps we’d feared when we first set out … we were still careful, but we were careful within sensible limits.’463
Living and working conditions were vastly different to other submarines and it took some time for the crews to adjust to the unique manning and operational arrangements. Publicly, the Navy wanted to give the impression that the Polaris crews were not fazed by their new responsibilities. When asked what it felt like to be in Britain’s first Polaris submarine the standard response from officers and ratings was ‘I am a submariner. This is a submarine. It is a job like any other.’464 But with each crew conducting two patrols per year, on roughly a three-month cycle, service in Polaris was unlike any other job in the Navy. Begg later pointed out to Healey that ‘service in SSBNs in time of peace poses special morale problems which have no counterpart elsewhere or in the other Services’.465 This was apparent to Mackenzie when a rating complained that because of the length and regularity of the patrol cycle the crews would never be at home for the birth of their children. Mackenzie could only say: ‘Sorry about that, but I promise that I will have you there for the conception!’466
Adapting to these new operating methods was not easy and there was some disharmony between the first Port and Starboard crews
of HMS Resolution. Much of this was due to Henry, who had ‘thrown himself wholeheartedly into his important mission, but possibly with a higher degree of egotism than some of his superiors felt to be appropriate’.467 His insistence and contrivance that the Port crew did everything first engendered an aura of superiority.468 Lessons were learned and the COs of Repulse, Renown and Revenge worked carefully on inter-crew relationships and ensured that the Port crew were first to sea and conducted Contractors’ Sea Trials, while the Starboard crew conducted the workup and deployed on deterrent patrol.
For submariners who had served in the Navy during and after the war, living and working conditions on a Polaris submarine were unrecognizable. In 1972, the former submariner, turned author and Daily Telegraph naval obituarist, John Winton, wrote about his visit to HMS Renown, an experience that made him feel ‘not just old but positively antediluvian’:
Antediluvian is right. In the decade or so since I left … there has been a flood of changes in the submarine world. It is as though every aspect of the submarine life and technology I used to know has now been raised to a much higher power.