The Silent Deep
Page 48
In order to counter Soviet short-range tactical-missile-firing submarines, as well as their long-range counterparts, both of which would attack from well inside the maximum effective missile range, the United States Navy developed a form of unlinked operations in which US SSNs were placed in what the Americans termed ‘the deep-field’, some fifty or sixty miles from a friendly surface force, operating on passive sonar. The Americans also spent vast sums of money making their submarines quieter and they developed highly capable passive sonars to go into them. They also developed and continuously improved anti-submarine torpedoes, such as the Mark 48. In 1974, after observing these American developments, the Royal Navy concluded that ‘Studies have shown that the use of a nuclear submarine in this [linked] role is not an effective employment.’82
The Submarine Service now recognized, as Commander Richard Sharpe, a submariner on FOSM’s staff, explained in a 1973 presentation to an annual anti-submarine warfare conference that:
The ASW battle has moved away from the area of water surrounding a surface force. The mobility, endurance and weapon systems of modern Soviet submarines can primarily be countered by mounting a major surveillance effort across likely deployment routes and subsequently by vectoring the Fleet submarine to a shadowing position. In the NATO area a state of confrontation exists today and surveillance and shadowing are part of an acceptable deterrent posture.83
The Submarine Service still played an important role in the observation of Soviet maritime deployments, a key requirement that in the run-up to war was considered essential to political and military decision-making. But it now sought to play a more active role in the Cold War at sea. As Sharpe pointed out, ‘Confrontation is the name of this game.’84
Yet this confrontation bore little resemblance to past undersea confrontations. As Gary Weir has noted:
With the constant threat of mutually assured destruction placing erroneous but strict limits both on the use of weaponry and the traditional expectations of battle, Cold War submariners formulated strategy and tactics, and calculated victory and defeat in a very different way. Since using even conventional offensive weapons could easily precipitate horrible and nearly uncontrollable geopolitical consequences, undersea warriors measured victory in terms of surveillance, detection and constant monitoring. If you knew the enemy, his vehicle or ship, his location and capability and you could follow or ‘shadow’ him without betraying yourself, you claimed victory by Cold War standards.85
Thus the undersea conflict during the Cold War that the Royal Navy fought alongside the US Navy was redefined away from physically destroying targets in encounters that would almost certainly escalate with unthinkable consequences, towards surveillance, detection, submerged capability and destructive potential. As Weir has again noted, ‘With this victory achieved, a national leader might anticipate any threat with sufficient time to destroy an adversary’s ability to act. Control over the opponent became the operational objective and precise knowledge of him the means to that end.’86 By demonstrating that the West was in control over what was happening at sea, Royal Navy submarine Captains hoped their actions would serve to deter the Russians. As Sharpe explained:
To contain these unambiguous threatening capabilities, we had to confront (both on land and at sea) this massive military power in order to deter the Soviet hierarchy from dangerous initiatives, which could trigger a real war. In other words, in the maritime world we had to demonstrate by covert strategic nuclear deterrent patrols and surveillance operations that we were better than they were, and together with the United States and other navies could confront any expansionist ambitions by countering them with conventional or, as a last resort nuclear weapons … The obvious question: ‘How could covert surveillance operations deter?’ The answer is that they were only covert in time, place and detail but in the sure knowledge that the Soviets at a higher level would be aware of our superior capabilities.87
From the early 1970s onwards, Royal Navy submariners put to sea with the aim of developing in the Russians an inferiority complex, the thought that whenever they went to sea, they would know that there was going to be a Royal Navy or US Navy submarine around that could probably hear what they were doing and thus attack at any moment.88 The Royal Navy set out to ensure that every submarine operation contained, as Sharpe put it, ‘an underlying element of threat, such as to make the use of force an unattractive option’.89 As Peter Herbert, another submariner on FOSM’s staff in the early 1970s, explained to the conference on ASW in 1973:
We are going to have relatively few SSNs. We have got to use our SSNs in the most cost effective way – and that is to put them on the tails of the most threatening of the enemy submarines. If we can achieve this it is probably the best way of protecting our forces. If all of them can be attacked approaching our forces, we should achieve our objective.90
This doctrine of controlled confrontation, or flexible response, depended on Royal Navy submarines being in the right place at the right time with sufficient force either to de-escalate tension or be able to initiate action or counter-action effectively with the minimum force necessary. The SSN, with its ability to shadow a target using an intermittent contact policy or, depending on sonar conditions, the ability to establish a firm trail on a contact and mark it with a weapon system, ready to fire on command or on pre-ordered rules of engagement, was the ideal platform to fulfil this doctrine. Royal Navy policy was to always remain covert, and conduct operations in a passive manner. As one submariner, Captain Tom Le Marchand, has explained, ‘The one thing that you make sure above all else is that you are not detected by the enemy. If you are, you break that detection as aggressively as you can. A number of our crews have been detected. It is a pretty tense experience. If you think you are being tracked, you turn round and get out as quickly as you can.’91
While identifying, trailing and marking Soviet submarines sounds easy, both the US Navy and the Royal Navy had to overcome a number of different problems in order to meet this aim. First, how to find a contact? US Navy and Royal Navy SSBN patrols had already shown the virtual impossibility of finding a modern nuclear submarine in vast oceans. Second, in order for shadowing and trailing to be effective, it needed to be covert, which demanded a significant sonar advantage so that, in effect, Royal Navy submarines could hear the target, but the target could not hear them. Third, a secure two-way communications system was required in order to keep Maritime Headquarters in the picture, and to receive, quickly, the directive to fire and take out the target. Finally, a quick and responsive weapon system was required. The Royal Navy recognized that it was no good having a weapon system that took twenty minutes to reach its target; by that time the enemy, such as a Soviet SSBN, would already have fired its missiles.
The Royal Navy had some of the answers to these problems and a large part of the submarine development programme in the early 1970s was concentrated on improving performance in these areas. The best place to gain initial contact with Soviet submarines was during the deployment and transit to a patrol area. By concentrating all long-range detection sensors (airborne, seabed, SOSUS, ship, submarine or other intelligence) on the transiter the Navy hoped to provide sufficient data to vector in its SSNs towards a target using a new concept of anti-submarine warfare operations, known as ‘Aided Intercept’. In order to obtain initial contact with Soviet submarines during their deployment and transit to patrol areas, SOSUS, satellite intelligence and various other forms of intelligence were combined, analysed and relayed to Maritime Patrol Aircraft, surface ships and submarines. This new concept of ASW also demanded centralized command and control, backed up by reliable all-source intelligence as well as good, fast communications. It also demanded significant advances in navigation, as intercept information was largely based on geographical data rather than a target’s position relative to a unit in contact with it.
The new concept also required significant advances in submarine tactical development. In 1966, a Submarine Tactical Development Grou
p (STDG) was formed at the Clyde submarine base, Faslane, to develop submarine tactics. In 1974 the Submarine Tactics and Weapons Group (STWG) was formed from STDG and a weapons trial group, to take over submarine tactical development and in-service tactical-weapon-firing evaluations. The group changed the tactical picture and was responsible for developing many of the submarine tactics that enabled the Submarine Service to maintain superiority over the Soviet Navy. The STWG also developed a very close relationship with the US Navy’s tactical-development squadron, Submarine Development Squadron Twelve (SubDevRonTwelve), whereby a Royal Navy Exchange Officer was involved in the development of the US Navy’s newest submarine concepts and tactics.92
The US Navy and the Royal Navy also continued to send submarines to observe Russian naval movements and to gather as much information as possible on new Soviet ships, submarines and weapon systems. Two operations could be initiated at short notice: Operation ‘Larder’ – shadowing and intelligence gathering by surface ship, submarine on the surface or aircraft; and Operation ‘Lacquer’ – covert intelligence collection by submarine.93 The US Navy and the Royal Navy also continued to cooperate on intelligence-gathering operations in northern waters and by 1973 the Submarine Service was running two operations a year under American auspices as part of a programme known as the Special Naval Collection Programme, or SNCP.94 The Royal Navy could not afford to install the special intelligence-gathering equipment and modifications into all of its SSNs and throughout the Cold War Royal Navy policy was to keep two operational SSNs equipped for SNCP work.95 These submarines were more commonly known as ‘special fit’ submarines and were employed on intelligence-gathering operations for the majority of their operational time at sea.96
One of the first submarines to receive ‘special fit’ equipment in the early 1970s was HMS Courageous. The coxswain’s, engineer’s and ship’s offices were stripped out and transformed into what was known as the ‘L Shaped Room’, in which the very latest radio ‘listening’ and recording gear was fitted. Up-to-date electronic-warfare equipment was also added to the Radar and Electronic Warfare Office and new equipment was installed in the Control Room. The old radar mast was also removed and replaced with a completely new one, known as the telegon mast, which provided the ‘L Shaped Room’ with loose radio chatter and telemetry. A video system with a playback facility was also incorporated into the periscopes, known as the ‘periviz’. A digital time system was incorporated in all operational areas and microphones were fitted to various compartments to record what was said during sensitive operations onto a large eighteen-track tape recorder for later analysis. Courageous’s sonar equipment was also upgraded, including prototype active sonar intercept equipment which provided the source and range of active sonar transmissions. It was nicknamed ‘Donald’ after its inventor, a scientist from the Navy’s Underwater Detection Establishment.97
‘Special fit’ submarines employed on these operations would carry specialists in ACINT, SIGINT and COMINT, known as ‘riders’. The submarines would remain under British control, but the US would provide training, support and guidance, as well as a liaison officer who would often serve on board during operations – another example of the intimate and close relationship that existed between the Royal Navy and the United States Navy beneath the waves. Royal Navy officers also served on board US Navy submarines on similar operations. One such US Navy Exchange Officer who served on board Courageous during a special intelligence-gathering operation was Lieutenant Commander Bruce Schick, the Assistant Intelligence Officer on the staff of COMSUBLANT. In the early 1970s, Schick spent two months on board Courageous, where, because of his intelligence experience, he was appointed as the CO’s personal advisor, on twenty-four-hour call. He was also responsible for drafting the patrol report and this created some security problems, as Schick explains:
At the end of the patrol, when requisite copies of the final product were produced, the skipper took a razor blade to the one which was destined for the U.S. He literally cut out sections which the British ‘Intel weenies’ had declared NOFORN (no Foreign Dissemination). This little ploy has always rankled submariners on both sides of the pond. The skipper was obviously embarrassed. After all, I had written the thing. Then he produced another undefiled copy. Inside the front cover was a little envelope with razor blades inside. This is yours, he said. Put in the US diplomatic pouch and cut it up when you get home. What a gentleman.98
There could be few better illustrations of the trust which the underwater Anglo-American relationship carried. But, as the Flag Officer Submarines, John Roxburgh, pointed out, the close relationship with US Navy submariners needed to be ‘fostered by continuing attention and effort’ and would ‘only persist as long as we remain effectively up to date with our nuclear propelled submarines and have ourselves something to offer’.99
Aside from these special operations, the Submarine Service was also increasingly intercepting and trailing Soviet submarines. One of the most important intelligence priorities in the 1970s was to detect the sea-lanes, the routes that the Soviets used to transit to and from their patrol areas. Once these had been identified, Royal Navy submarines would lie in the centre of the lanes and wait for contacts to appear. One of them, the Soviet Northern Fleet homebound lane, was identified in the Mediterranean and in March 1975 HMS Courageous, under the command of Captain Richard Sharpe, then operating as part of the UK contribution to US deterrent forces in the Mediterranean, was ordered to intercept a transiting Soviet ‘Echo II’ class submarine. Courageous travelled over 300 miles in seventeen and a half hours, and moved into the centre of the Northern Fleet homebound lane. Initial detection of the ‘Echo II’ was achieved using Aided Intercept procedures based on SOSUS track assessments. Long-Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft narrowed down the location of the enemy submarine and transmitted the information to Courageous. Initial contact was made at a range of eight miles and Courageous trailed the Echo II, covertly for 320 miles, remaining on the Soviet submarine’s quarter at an average range of between ten and fifteen miles and at speeds of up to 15 knots.100 By the 1970s, the Echo II was an old noisy submarine and Sharpe recorded just some of the sounds the submarine made in Courageous’s log: ‘Target clearing stern arcs to port. Compressed cavitation. Changing propulsion mode. Rattles and bangs. Ringing tones. Buzz saw noise. All typical of Type I nuclear.’101 As a result of another successful operation, Courageous won the coveted US Navy ‘HOOK EM’ award for excellence in anti-submarine warfare.
Detecting and remaining in contact with Soviet submarines was extremely difficult and was nowhere near as simple as is often portrayed in Cold War fiction or Hollywood films. Establishing viable estimates of a target’s course, speed and range when only provided with passive sonar bearings was, as Sharpe later explained, the ‘most important and obscure of the submariner’s black arts’:
It is difficult enough when the noise source is constant, as in a cavitating surface ship propeller, but achieves a whole new plane of obfuscation when the contact is irregular. A simple analogy is that it is like being in a field with a herd of cows in pitch darkness. You can hear munching, the swish of tails, footfalls and the occasional seismic contribution to global warming, but only a fool would claim that he knows the exact PIM (position and intended movement) of any individual animal. Part genius or pure ‘con job?’ The answer is, a bit of both, and to an extent the dynamics of each encounter are variable and uncertain. You really do need first-hand experience of submarine versus submarine operations to understand what happens and … what doesn’t happen. This takes years for Commanding Officers to learn. The trouble is that if you are looking in the wrong direction, or the noise is shielded by acoustic interference, or even by the target’s aspect, any fire control solution is not guaranteed. Even if it is, you still have the bearings only/range rate analysis computation, which can go wrong and go wrong and go wrong. Active sonar can help in exceptional circumstances but instantly gives away your own position. Hence the collisions and near m
isses in this era of NATO–Soviet confrontation, for example, Warspite in 1968 and, in later years, Sceptre were involved in actual scrapes with nearly disastrous consequences.102
The 1970s saw the introduction of new technology which enhanced the Royal Navy’s ability to track Soviet submarines. One of the most important came from HMS Warspite’s former CO, Sandy Woodward. Before assuming command of HMS Warspite, Woodward had been appointed as Teacher to the Perisher course. During his week of preparation, he spent time with the then incumbent Teacher, Commander Sam Fry. One lunchtime, as the frigates hunting the submarine opened up for the next run against the Perishers, Fry said, quietly, without even looking up: ‘They’ve turned.’ Woodward asked Fry how he knew, but Fry couldn’t answer. ‘I questioned him carefully but to no avail,’ said Woodward. ‘He had no idea how he knew. He just did.’103 After months of pointed curiosity Woodward eventually discovered how it was Sam Fry knew the frigates had turned. The vital clue was a change in the note of the frigates’ sonar transmissions as heard over the loudspeaker in the submarine’s Control Room.104 Woodward realized that the attacking frigates’ active sonar transmissions jumped in frequency as the frigates turned at the end of a run. This was due to the Doppler effect – the common acoustic phenomenon, heard every day in the changing pitch of an ambulance’s siren as it goes by.
Woodward realized that the change in frequency could be exploited passively for tracking purposes and could help avoid the occurrence of unintentional close-quarters encounters, such as Warspite’s collision in 1968. If the frequency was higher than the base frequency, then the range was closing. If the frequency was lower, then it was opening. If submariners were armed with such information then they should be able to prevent a collision as it would be evident immediately that a range was closing regardless of the bearings. Woodward approached the Submarine Tactical Development Group for technical assistance, where a mathematician, Lieutenant Guy Warner, got to work on developing tactical guidance. Mathematics was then used to determine the base frequency and in the early 1970s various calculators were introduced into submarines to assist submariners to extract tactical information from frequency data.105