The Silent Deep

by James Jinks

  On 1 June, Onyx berthed alongside HMS Fearless and collected a team of SBS Marines and their associated equipment. The submarine sailed from San Carlos Water at 0700 to prepare for Operation ‘Kettledrum’, with a lot of what Johnson called ‘unanswered questions’. It was still unclear whether the operation was to be ‘in-and-out’ or one way. Regardless of the answer, merely conducting a landing at Puerto Deseado would have been fraught with difficulties, due to the seabed profile and the fact that the Gemini inflatables would have ‘to be launched from as far as 20 miles offshore, where the water begins to shoal sharply from 230 feet to 100 feet’.237 Accommodating the additional SBS personnel within the cramped confines of the small submarine was not easy. As Johnson recorded:

  When we stored prior to our departure, we had laid a complete ‘false deck’ of canned food and stores throughout the submarine, reducing headroom from six to four feet in some places. Even the showers were full of stores. I can remember the three occasions in the entire 116 day patrol on which I was able to have a proper wash, rather than just a dip in a bucket! Living with eighty-four people in a space designed for sixty-eight, as well as all the extra equipment, was the epitome of ‘cheek by jowl’. Remarkably, however, there was no friction, and our ‘visitors’ soon became fully integrated into the crew, taking a full part in the day-to-day operation of the boat.238

  Onyx continued to prepare for Operation ‘Kettledrum’ throughout 2 and 3 June, conducting a series of ‘wet drills’ with the SBS: surfacing the submarine, inflating two Geminis on the casing and diving beneath the craft, before surfacing again to quickly recover them. But at 1800 on 3 June, Northwood cancelled the operation. ‘Puerto Deseado was such an insignificant air base that it did not warrant a major military and diplomatic failure – and a failure it would have been.’239

  Onyx was re-tasked to conduct a far more pressing operation. The British suspected that the Argentinians had landed on Weddell Island, the third-largest of the Falkland Islands, and that an Argentinian reconnaissance team was involved in directing Argentinian aircraft towards the archipelago. If this was the case, the reconnaissance team had to be taken out. On 5 June, Onyx attempted to insert an SBS team at Chatham Harbour on Weddell Island, but at 1314, while transiting to the area, the submarine struck an uncharted rock pinnacle south of Cape Meredith, damaging the bow shutters on two torpedo tubes and trapping a Mark 24 torpedo in one of the tubes. ‘The SBS Operations Officer was sitting in the seat nearest the wardroom door when this happened – we were having lunch,’ recalled Johnson. ‘He was trampled by the rest of the wardroom who literally ran over him to get into the control room. He arrived some minutes later wearing a lifejacket and enquiring politely if everything was all right!’ Concerned, Johnson asked the SBS officer if he would don his diving gear and exit the submarine and carry out an inspection. The SBS officer politely declined.240 Onyx resumed the operation but was unable to land the SBS team at Chatham Harbour due to poor weather. A second attempt, at a different southern location, Pillar Cove, was carried out the next day. Onyx went to action stations at 2000 and approached to within 3 cables, 0.3 nautical miles, of the coast, where the SBS team was successfully inserted. They found no evidence of Argentinian activity.

  PICKET DUTY

  With British land forces involved in fierce fighting as they advanced across the Falklands towards the capital, Port Stanley, and the reluctance of the Argentinian Navy to leave Argentinian territorial waters, the SSNs sought to contribute to the conflict in a way that demonstrated the flexibility of submarines if the crews were well trained and capable of unrestricted operations in shallow water.241 While HMS Valiant was waiting west of the Falklands for two Argentinian destroyers, the sister ships Hipólito Bouchard and Piedra Buena to run the gauntlet from the mainland, Valiant’s crew realized that their submarine was between forty and sixty miles off Rio Grande Naval Air Base, the home of the Super Etendards, Naval Skyhawks and other Argentinian aircraft and sitting directly under the flight path the Argentinian air force was using to reach the Falklands. Valiant’s crew started to send flash enemy locating reports to the Task Group of all the Argentinian aircraft approaching the Falklands, by simply looking through the periscope and counting the number of aircraft that flew over the submarine. This seemed a relatively safe and easy way to contribute to the lack of early warning available to the Task Force.

  At 1815 on 23 May, Valiant’s crew suddenly became aware of a number of explosions, each getting progressively louder, until the fifth and last was loud enough to shake the submarine. Valiant had taken up position on the flight path of Argentinian aircraft adopting the shortest route back to the mainland dropping their bombs while being chased by the Task Force’s Sea Harriers. ‘The moral was get off track from their return route,’ noted Le Marchand, ‘We were lucky, but a few feet closer and it might have been something of a bad luck story.’242 Later analysis revealed that some of the bombs used by the Argentinians had a short delay in their fusing, which coupled with the channelling effect of the shallow water explained the heaviness of some of the detonations. ‘FOSM seems to be impressed with our ability to act like this,’ wrote Le Marchand.243Thanks to SSIXs communications equipment, Valiant was able to detect, classify, report and receive acknowledgement from the Task Force within about five minutes and in some cases as little as two minutes. ‘This is the first time anything like this has been done as it would have been impossible with H. F. Communications,’ wrote Valiant’s Navigator, David White.244 As Le Marchand noted, while sitting in Valiant, counting Argentinian aircraft, ‘a new dimension to the Concept of SSN Operations was born’.245

  Just how valuable this information was to the Task Force was demonstrated on 8 June 1982, when a Chilean long-range radar that had been providing vital intelligence to the Task Force about Argentinian aircraft taking off and landing from airbases in Argentina failed.246 With the radar out of action, Argentinian aircraft took off late on the morning of 8 June. Flying with their radar permanently switched on, the aircraft were easily detected by Valiant’s electronic-warfare mast. Valiant immediately signalled Northwood via satellite to circulate an air-raid warning to the Task Force. As this could be completed in around two minutes and the distance to East Falkland was 440 miles there should have been plenty of time to notify the ships in San Carlos Water and the ground troops to prepare for the attack and take all necessary precautions. However, due to communication problems Valiant’s messages did not get through to the Task Force in time.247

  At San Carlos Water, the first indication of any attack was when the Harriers on Combat Air Patrol were drawn to four Mirages from the Argentinian 8th Fighter Group, which had conducted a low-level flight to the north of the Falklands. However, these were decoys while the main flight went for the landing ships. The Harriers then diverted to the Type 12 frigate HMS Plymouth in Falkland Sound, which was attacked by Daggers and hit by four bombs which fortunately, due to insufficient altitude, failed to detonate. The Harriers were then forced to return to the carriers to refuel, leaving the landings at Bluff Cove unprotected. Five Skyhawks flew on to their targets in Bluff Cove. The first run over Fitzroy was unsuccessful, but during the second run the Skyhawks sighted Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram. Sir Galahad was attacked from the east, taking three direct hits with conventional 250-kilogram bombs. A cluster of bombs then hit Sir Galahad again before all five Argentinian aircraft turned south and returned back to base. Fifty-six British servicemen were killed and over 150 were wounded. In his book on naval intelligence, Nigel West concludes that ‘The central tragedy of Bluff Cove is that the warning transmitted by Valiant on the morning of the raid never reached the Welsh Guards at Bluff Cove, who were completely unaware of the urgent need to disembark quickly.’248

  Despite the Bluff Cove tragedy, early-warning duty was now one of the most important tasks for the Royal Navy submarines stationed around the Falklands. HMS Onyx and the SSNs were ordered to join the air picket patrol. Onyx was stationed off the west of the Falkla
nds, where she spent fifteen days monitoring Argentinian aircraft movements, while Conqueror moved to early-warning picket duties off Puerto Deseado from 11 to 14 June, while Spartan was in the north, observing mainly transport aircraft. The early-warning information the SSNs were providing was so valuable to the Task Force that Valiant was ordered to turn back while sprinting to intercept an Argentinian destroyer, the Piedra Buena, as the ‘job of ELINT picket off RIO GRANDE considered to be more important’.249 This was possible despite the fact that Valiant’s interception equipment had a number of shortcomings: an inability to identify detections rapidly, an inability to determine radio frequency, and poor bearing discrimination. The ‘Valiant’ class was fitted with what Powis on Conqueror described as ‘a truly ante-diluvian’ ESM outfit:

  Barely capable of reliable operations for a periodic return to periscope depth it was a thing of cathode ray tubes and valves. It warmed up like a 1950s television set but was not half so easy to use. More than 4 or 5 radars in a band and it was swamped. In coastal waters it was at its limit: off an airbase with 2 dozen angry aircraft testing their radar before launch it was all but useless. We knew something was coming our way but until we saw its classification, it was guesswork.250

  Equipment shortcomings meant, as Le Marchand noted, that ‘any meaningful attempt at Target Motion Analysis in the time scale was a forlorn hope’. However:

  as operator experience increased, considerable skill was developed and much confidence held in the early identification of emitters, even with the very few sweeps that could be intercepted before an aircraft had passed. At the same time a highly efficient periscope watch was maintained, and on several occasions raids were observed as contrails heading East, whilst low-flying aircraft could be identified shortly after take off or landing.251

  Valiant’s record speaks for itself. From 17 May to 10 July, Valiant detected, classified and reported a total of 263 contacts to the Task Group, a feat greatly appreciated by Woodward and the ships that made up the Task Force. Before Valiant departed the South Atlantic on 11 July, Woodward sent the following signal to Le Marchand:

  OVER 300 ENEMY REPORTS TESTIFY TO THE EFFICIENT CONDUCT OF YOUR LONELY VIGIL OFF RIO GRANDE. YOU CAN BE PROUD OF YOUR PART IN CORPORATE AND I AM GRATEFUL FOR ALL YOU HAVE DONE

  BRAVO ZULU AND BON VOYAGE.

  Chris Craig, the CO of HMS Alacrity, later wrote of the surveillance provided by the submarines:

  Such notice would enable us to shorten our readiness at appropriate times and significantly reduce the potential for surprise attack, even though we had just lost one of our three air-defence destroyers. The early warning that the submarines provided by watching the enemy’s doorstep saved the lives of many men. That the achievement of Valiant, Splendid and others were not recognized more emphatically after the war, I found a travesty.252

  DEPARTURE

  On 14 June 1982, British forces advanced to the outskirts of the Falklands’ capital, Port Stanley, where General Mario Menéndez, in command of 9800 troops, surrendered to Major General Jeremy Moore, Commander of British Land Forces. The conflict was over. As we have seen, HMS Splendid was the first to depart. She arrived back in Devonport to awaiting families on the jetty and a low-key reception. Her crew had been expecting to return to the South Atlantic, but the Argentinian surrender put a stop to that.253 For Lane-Nott, Operation ‘Corporate’ was a ‘demanding, stimulating though often frustrating experience’ but he was impressed with how the Royal Navy’s latest nuclear submarine had performed. ‘It will be four months to the day since the submarine left Devonport,’ he wrote. ‘During this time SPLENDID has steamed over 30000 miles without either an AMP [Assisted Maintenance Period] or SMP [Short Maintenance Period]. The Swiftsure Class continues to prove itself … For me personally, Operation Corporate has provided the culmination of a unique experience. I have taken SPLENDID from being hoops on the slip to war – something few are fortunate or privileged to achieve.’254

  James Taylor’s HMS Spartan started its homeward passage on 9 June and entered Devonport on 24 June, after steaming a total of 24,320 miles. The submarine was greeted with an emotional reception as she came alongside. The third submarine to depart the South Atlantic was HMS Conqueror. Before departing, Conqueror signalled Courageous and Valiant: ‘Goodbye and Good Luck. We will spin a few dits in the Back-Bar for you. For COURAGEOUS – I look forward to being as well rigged as you on my return!’ – a reference to RN Sub Harpoon. HMS Courageous responded with:

  VMT for your signal

  When they hear you’ve gone away

  We trust the Argies come out and play

  For we can’t accept there are no

  Targets like the Gen BELGRANO

  As to Rig, we plan to say

  Performance matches bold display!

  Meanwhile, I know VAL will agree

  Fair shares for all ’mongst SM3

  Go Conquering Heroes bathed in glory

  Regale the Bombers with your Story

  Well done. Good Luck. Happy Homecoming.

  HMS Conqueror arrived in Faslane on 4 July 1982, flying the first Jolly Roger with an atomic symbol as well as a symbol denoting a sunken warship and a dagger for the special operations transfer off South Georgia. It was the first Jolly Roger flown from a nuclear submarine.255 Herbert met each of his submarines as they returned from the war and the ‘low-key sort of feeling about things’ on board Conqueror surprised him. ‘I didn’t understand it at the time,’ he says, ‘when I went down, I thought everyone would be you know: “Super, we’ve done it.” But it wasn’t like that and it took me by surprise.’256

  Operation ‘Corporate’ did not end with the surrender of Argentinian forces on 14 June 1982. HMS Valiant and HMS Courageous remained on patrol in the South Atlantic and continued to keep a close watch on the Argentinian Navy. On 29 June, Valiant sighted H. Bouchard and P. Buena off the coast near Rio Grande. But once again the Rules of Engagement prevented Le Marchand carrying out an attack. ‘I have no doubt,’ he wrote, ‘that had the Rules permitted it I would have been able successfully to have attacked the two destroyers.’257 By early July, supplies on board both submarines were running low. On Courageous, a lack of cigarettes forced many of the crew to start rolling and smoking pipe tobacco. Valiant departed for home on 11 July and arrived back in Faslane in early August after spending eighty-seven days at sea and travelling 26,400 nautical miles. ‘There was one single frozen chicken in the ship’s fridges,’ recalled Le Marchand.258 ‘There is no doubt that the ultimate test is War,’ he wrote, in the official summary of Valiant’s patrol, ‘and whilst there is disappointment in not having a scalp to hang at our belts, I consider a real contribution to the collective CORPORATE effort has been made, and my Ship’s Company deserve the highest praise for the manner in which they have done so.’259 HMS Courageous left the Falklands on 29 July after a total of sixty-two days in the area. In total Courageous’s Operation ‘Corporate’ patrol lasted ninety-three days.

  The last submarine to arrive home was HMS Onyx. Prior to departure Onyx had been awarded the unpleasant task of sinking the landing ship, RFA Sir Galahad, which had been damaged by bombing at Bluff Cove on 8 June. Onyx lined up in ideal conditions and Johnson took his boat to action stations at 1215, firing the first Mark 24 at 1235. It failed to explode. At 1254, Onyx fired another Mark 24, but it also failed. The crew were unable to determine what caused the failure, but they suspected there was a problem with the torpedo batteries. At this stage Johnson gave up on the Mark 24s and resorted to the Mark 8s. At 1330, a Mark 8, the same torpedo Wreford-Brown had used against the General Belgrano, was fired from a range of 1500 yards. It struck RFA Sir Galahad, which later sank. Had Wreford-Brown used the Mark 24, could he have expected similar results?

  Onyx’s transit homeward started on 17 July and continued on the surface from 22 July without incident until 11 August, when the starboard main generator developed a fault which could not be repaired. Passage continued at reduced speed until the subm
arine finally arrived in Gosport on 18 August 1982. The patrol covered 20,000 miles in four months with minimum support. The submarine was immediately put into a floating dry dock in Portsmouth, where damage to the hull and the Mark 24 torpedo trapped in the tube could be examined. Johnson explained how:

  Both bow tubes were damaged while the torpedo in one tube was cracked like an egg, with the safety range clock ‘wound off’ as the battery had partially energised … the experts in the armament depot had no idea how to dismantle the torpedo while it was still in the tube – and we couldn’t move it forward or back. In the end, the dockyard staff cut away the area of the torpedo tube around the warhead, then an engineer from the dockyard, with myself and one of the ‘fore-ends men’ hacked the sonar head off the torpedo with drills and crowbars in the middle of the night. The area around the floating dock had to be evacuated and the cross-channel ferry terminal closed while we did so. So I guess from that we can conclude that the torpedo was in quite a dangerous state. One expert assured us that it could certainly explode at any time – not that we knew that until we entered Portsmouth. Ignorance is bliss!260

  That the torpedo had failed to explode during Onyx’s 8000-mile journey back to the United Kingdom was a minor miracle.

  AFTERMATH

  There was a near constant SSN presence around the Falkland Islands for years after the conflict. This was almost entirely the duty of the older SSNs, HMS Valiant, HMS Warspite and HMS Courageous. These submarines were known as the South Atlantic Runners. Before departing on patrol the boats would enter the floating dock and be fitted with a special Falklands propeller. HMS Warspite was the first submarine to conduct a post-conflict patrol. Fresh out of refit from Chatham after completing an emergency workup in April and May, Warspite, under the command of Commander Jonathan Cooke, sailed on 25 June for a 75-day patrol, 43 days of which were spent on station in the Falklands. Warspite was armed with a full weapon load of 20 Harpoons, 5 Mark 8 torpedoes and 6 Mark 24s. In the aftermath of the fighting the period on station was extremely uneventful, which was something of an anti-climax for her crew, who had spent a considerable amount of time rushing the submarine through the refit. Warspite was assigned to an area to the north of the Falklands, on the edge of the Protection Zone. She reported twenty Polish trawlers and one merchant vessel before returning to Faslane on 21 September.