The Silent Deep

by James Jinks

  Courageous continued to track the Victor, and the next day closed yet again to conduct another simulated Mark 24 Tigerfish attack. Northwood then instructed the submarine to break off the trail and conduct surveillance of the Soviet research ship Boris Davidov, which was suspected of conducting special operations 180 miles to the north of Courageous’s position. When Courageous arrived the next day it closed the research ship and carried out visual surveillance. There was no unusual activity. The ship appeared to be conducting oceanographic research.187 Courageous moved away and attempted to locate a Yankee which had been detected by IUSS in the north Norwegian/Greenland Seas, but after searching for seven days in the vicinity of the Jan Mayen Polar and Eastern Front, abandoned the search in favour of a ‘Sierra’ class SSN which was also operating in the area. Although Courageous detected the Sierra, the Soviet submarine quickly moved away and into the Barents Sea. Courageous then attempted to intercept a possible Victor III transiting out of the Barents, but a noisy mechanical fault forced the British submarine to withdraw and return to Faslane to conduct repairs.

  This most secret Cold War of the deep, almost a private war involving three navies, peaked in terms of technology, continuous operations and intensity in the 1980s, the last decade of the great forty-year East–West confrontation. By the end of the 1980s, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the US Navy and the Royal Navy to detect and track Soviet submarines. In October 1989, a Yankee I, two Delta Is, a Delta II, a Delta III and a Delta IV were all unlocated, and a Victor III that had been held on SOSUS operating north of Bear Island simply disappeared. All three submarine services raised each other’s games. Of course, the Walker–Whitworth betrayal gave the Russians huge technological and operational assistance. But this should not detract from the skills of the Soviet commanders in making use of the technical bonanza espionage handed them.

  For Royal Navy submariners the 1980s will almost certainly remain the underwater equivalent of a permanent world cup competition, a continuous preparation for a dreaded penalty shootout should real war have come. The Russians were worthy and increasingly stretching opponents for the British and American submariners who went up against them year after year, in a confrontation that required ingenuity and nerve in copious quantities, of which the public knew almost nothing. Royal Navy submarines, in their intelligence and surveillance roles, are still the country’s first line of defence. But for those who serve in the silent deep no front line has yet quite matched the NATO–Soviet one and the demanding, inhospitable conditions through which it ran.

  10

  After the Cold War: 1990–Today

  The Russian Navy has not gone away. As I speak a Russian intelligence gatherer is not more than twelve miles away off the coast of Northern Ireland … So the nuclear attack submarine’s traditional role of anti-submarine warfare remains, but with it has come a newer role, into littoral water, brown water, areas closer into the coastline.

  Captain John Harris, CO, 1st Submarine Squadron, 1996.1

  The SSN is not a legacy of the Cold War. Its attributes and abilities reflect exactly modern maritime doctrine. The SSN has broad utility and offers a wide range of options to politicians and campaign planners, at low risk. It can deploy early and quickly, exercise full freedom of the sea, changing role and area of operation at will. This posture can be maintained almost indefinitely. It can be an instrument of diplomacy, coercion, or war fighting employed directly or obliquely. The multi-faceted capabilities of the SSN, in contributing to the overall effort in both political and military ‘battle spaces’, are dependent on remaining abreast of current technological advances. Failure to invest in the future has the potential to sideline a capability that offers the widest ranges of strategic, operational and tactical choices.

  Commander Nick Harrap, Staff Warfare Officer, Flag Officer Submarines, 2001.2

  UNCERTAINTY AND DECLINE

  The Cold War ended at just the right time for the Submarine Service. In December 1989, a month after the Berlin Wall came down, a series of material defects were discovered in HMS Warspite’s PWR1 reactor systems during routine tests while she was in refit in Devonport. Significant cracks were detected in the transition welds that joined the primary circuit pipework to the steam generator heads, known as ‘trouser legs’. The one-inch-thick welds joined two large pipes about 14 inches in diameter and a crack extended across about half the weld. If the weld had failed, an uncontrolled loss of primary coolant would have occurred with the likelihood of a major reactor incident.3 As the PWR1 was operational in all the Royal Navy’s SSNs and SSBNs (excluding the new ‘Vanguard’ class SSBNs, which were powered by the PWR2 and were not yet in service), the Navy immediately recalled all its nuclear submarines to port and limited operations to those tasks it considered absolutely necessary such as protecting SSBNs from Soviet submarines. As Warspite was one of the oldest SSNs in the fleet, the ‘trouser leg’ problem was assumed to be age-related and a limited number of SSN operations, involving the newer ‘Trafalgar’ class submarines, continued, while the remaining ‘Valiant’ and ‘Swiftsure’ classes were inspected for similar problems. Although the SSBNs were of similar age to Warspite, the Government maintained Polaris patrols, sailing the ‘Resolution’ class SSBNs under so-called ‘operational imperatives’ to sustain the continuity of the UK’s independent nuclear deterrent. There appears to have been some concern over this decision, which was taken at the highest levels of government. Alan Clark, at the time a junior defence minister, reportedly told Tom King, the Secretary of State for Defence, that ‘If – if there is an accident, it’s not just you who resigns; the Government falls.’4

  The Navy eventually determined that the defect was caused by steel corrosion. A demanding testing regime for the submarines of the ‘Resolution’, ‘Swiftsure’ and ‘Trafalgar’ classes was immediately put in place but inspecting and rectifying the defect proved difficult and time consuming. The defective weld was located inside the lower part of the steam generator, an area in an operational submarine that is radioactively hot, at about an arm’s length from a 4-inch access hole. Rolls-Royce developed a robot that was small enough to pass through the hole to X-ray the weld, a complex operation that was compared by one of those involved to keyhole surgery or wallpapering a hallway through the letterbox of a front door. Specialist teams worked four-hour shifts in reactor compartments to limit their exposure to radiation. One of the techniques used to treat the affected areas was to bombard the defective transition welds with small ‘lead shot-like’ particles to relieve stresses in the areas surrounding the welds and so minimize the likelihood of further cracking.5

  Some loosening of operational restrictions on the Navy’s oldest SSNs took place in the summer of 1990 and HMS Courageous, which had been alongside for six months, was able to sail. But after only a week at sea, the submarine was recalled due to fears that the ‘Valiant’ class SSNs were still at risk. They were once again confined to port until they had been inspected and certified as safe.6 Having so many SSNs confined to port placed considerable demands on those still able to operate, particularly the latest ‘Trafalgar’ class SSNs, which were less prone to the problem because of their relatively young age. HMS Tireless spent eighteen months doing back-to-back patrols. ‘It was very hard work, very very hard work,’ recalled Matt Kemp, Tireless’s Weapons Engineering Mechanic (Ordnance). ‘I think in those two years I managed about 5 weeks at home.’7

  Despite the instability in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Soviet/Russian Navy continued to send its submarines to sea. Although the Submarine Service continued to enjoy an edge over even the most advanced Soviet SSNs and SSBNs, the risk of counter-detection when operating against them was much higher than in the past, particularly when the Russians conducted ‘Crazy Ivan’ stern arc clearance manoeuvres. In mid-1990, HMS Trafalgar undertook Operation ‘Mayhem’ in the Norwegian and south Greenland Seas with orders to intercept an ‘Akula’ class submarine that had been picked up on SOSUS an
d designated L-032. Although up against one of the most advanced submarines in the Soviet Navy, Trafalgar detected the Akula, closed it and passed 4000 yards down the Soviet SSN’s port side before turning onto its quarter and conducting a simulated Tigerfish attack. Trafalgar continued to follow the Akula until it conducted a complex stern arc clearance, which was at first interpreted on board Trafalgar as a reversal of course, but it soon became clear that the Akula had, in fact, altered course to the northwest and was rapidly closing on Trafalgar. Once Trafalgar’s crew realized what was about to happen they immediately altered course to starboard and the submarines came to within 1000 yards of each other. The Akula then came round in a tight turn to port and moved in behind Trafalgar. Aware of the possibility of counter-detection, Trafalgar’s CO immediately reversed course and slowly moved away to the southeast. Trafalgar continued to track the Akula for the next hour, during which the Soviet submarine transmitted twice on its ‘Shark Gill’ active sonar, clearly suspicious of the presence of another submarine. It was unclear whether or not the Akula achieved active contact on Trafalgar. It certainly took no aggressive action. But shortly after transmitting for a second time on active sonar, it accelerated to 28 knots and sprinted away to the south with an impressive display of compressed cavitation.8

  Aside from operations, the Submarine Service also continued to use its ‘Trafalgar’ class SSNs on training exercises. On 22 November 1990, HMS Trenchant was operating in the Clyde Exercise Areas, acting as the training vessel for the final phase of the Perisher course. At 0217, as one of the Perisher students handed over control of Trenchant to another, the submarine’s passive sonar detected a close contact to starboard. As Trenchant turned to port to avoid the contact, a series of banging noises were heard throughout the submarine. Assuming that Trenchant had snagged a fishing trawl the submarine immediately returned to periscope depth where two fishing vessels were easily identified. Trenchant then surfaced and a trawl wire was found on the submarine’s casing. After attempts to contact the two nearby fishing vessels by radio failed, Trenchant reported the incident to Faslane, noting that although it had snagged a trawl, the two fishing boats believed to be involved were safe. Trenchant then dived again and continued with exercises. Back in Faslane, attempts to identify the trawler involved in the incident continued well into the morning, until it was realized that a fishing vessel, known as the Antares, was missing. A full-scale search and rescue operation later located the wreck on the morning of 23 November in the area that Trenchant had been operating in. All four members of the crew died.

  Both an internal MOD report and a report by the Marine Accident Investigation Board (MAIB) found that Trenchant had collided with Antares’ trawl gear at 0219 on the morning of 22 November, causing the trawler to capsize and sink. The MAIB report was highly critical of Trenchant’s command team, which it concluded ‘had no clear appreciation of the surface contacts held on sonar during the period between the completion of the exercise and the collision’. They were criticized for focusing too much on the position of HMS Charybdis, a nearby frigate also taking part in the exercise and the focus of the then duty Captain, whose concentration was ‘impaired due to his conversation with the next duty captain in the minutes before the collision’. The report described the command team as having ‘a false sense of security’, making ‘incorrect assumptions’ and ‘failing to properly assess what might have happened on the surface subsequent to the collision’. Attempts to establish contact with the two fishing boats following the incident were described as ‘not adequate’ and the decision to resume the exercise was criticized on the grounds that it was taken with ‘a lack of appreciation of the reality of the situation’.9 The Perisher student in charge of Trenchant at the time was later reprimanded in a formal naval court martial. As a result major changes were made to submarine operating policy and procedures in order to improve the safety of fishing vessels. The Royal Navy, in consultation with local fishing organizations, also implemented an information service to advise fisherman of dived submarine operations in the Permanent Exercise Areas around the Scottish coast.

  Against the background of the ‘trouser leg’ crisis, the collapse of the Soviet Union and a changing strategic environment, the Government embarked on a mini-defence review, ‘Options for Change’, that resulted in a significant reduction in the size and shape of the submarine fleet. The changes in the international political climate led the MOD to review the central point of UK planning throughout much of the Cold War: that the Royal Navy’s role in any crisis would be to provide first line defence until the full force of the Allies, and particularly the US, could be brought to bear. The MOD concluded that the increasing instability in the Soviet Union had resulted in a dramatic shift, from a matter of days to eighteen months or more, of the likely warning period in the run up to the ‘sort of conflict which might require our submarines to be engaged in major operations against the Soviet Union’. The increased warning time naturally affected how long the Royal Navy would have to wait before the United States Navy significantly reinforced it.10 With increased warning time fewer operationally ready submarines were required to meet the threat. With warning of up to eighteen months submarines undergoing maintenance or refit could be brought back into a state of operational readiness over a short period, while other submarines could be held at various states of readiness rather than being put into refit. The MOD estimated that given the eighteen months or so that it judged it would take the Soviet Union to recover itself so that it could mount a major attack on NATO, at least 10 Royal Navy SSNs out of a maximum fleet of 12 could be ready, compared to a peacetime figure of very short notice availability of 7 or 8 SSNs. In other words, with the increased warning time, an additional 2 or 3 SSNs could be readied over a period of some months if there was perceived to be the possibility of a serious conflict, leaving only those SSNs that were in deep refit unavailable for operations.11

  The Navy’s fleet of conventional submarines also underwent radical changes. By 1995 all the remaining ‘Oberon’ class submarines were due to be retired and replaced by the new ‘Upholder’ class SSK.12 The MOD had intended to procure between ten and twelve replacement Upholders. However the ‘Options for Change’ review announced a scaled-back requirement of just four submarines.13 The ‘Upholder’ class had been beset by delays. One of the most troublesome concerned the largely automatic system for controlling the sequencing of the valves in the weapon discharge system. Although the automated system was successful in achieving near-silent discharge and a marked reduction in manpower, in certain circumstances the hydraulic interlocks could cause the torpedo tube slide valve to open while the tube door was open, allowing unrestricted flooding into the torpedo compartment. The programme was also delayed due to problems with the submarine’s powerful main engines (which were originally designed for use in railway locomotives) as the stress of stopping the rotating parts from full power at the end of snorting led to many failures. Consequently, the first of class, HMS Upholder, was accepted into service two years late in 1990.14

  Despite these problems, the few Royal Navy officers who commanded the Upholders insisted that the class was highly capable. ‘Having operated UNSEEN in all weathers and in demanding circumstances, I can vouch for the effectiveness and sturdiness of these fine submarines,’ wrote one of her former COs. ‘The boats were handy both surfaced and submerged, they were a joy to command.’15 After periods of docking to put right the problems with the weapon handling and discharge system, which was redesigned and re-engineered, all four submarines entered service. At the time the decision to reduce the requirement was taken, a number of improvements were also intended for later submarines of the class, including increased bunk space, rotating conversion machinery with static inverters and increasing fuel capacity by using spaces external to the pressure hull. There were also long-term plans to reduce snorting time by introducing experimental fuel cells.

  However, on 25 July 1990, the Secretary of State for Defence, Tom King, tol
d the House of Commons that ‘We need to take account of the decline in the size of the Soviet navy, but also of its continuing modernization, especially with the new class of submarine … In addition to Trident, we envisage a future submarine force of about 16 boats of which three quarters would be nuclear powered.’16 An accompanying fact sheet referred to the then submarine force of 27 nuclear and diesel submarines, reduced to ‘perhaps around 16 nuclear and diesel submarines’.17 The proposed reductions (twelve SSNs, four SSKs and four SSBNs) represented around a 40 per cent reduction (16–12 SSNs) on Cold War levels and a 30 per cent cut in planned twenty-first-century force levels.

  The Submarine Service was deeply concerned. The twenty-seven or twenty-eight SSNs and SSKs in the submarine flotilla in the 1980s had been hard pressed to meet commitments. However, the Government insisted that a reduced force could carry out the same range of wartime and peacetime tasks and that no individual role had been abandoned. Ministers apparently reached the decision as a result of their appreciation of ‘the changing strategic environment’ rather than as a result of budgetary pressures. As one MOD official put it to the House of Commons Defence Committee: