The Silent Deep

Home > Other > The Silent Deep > Page 98
The Silent Deep Page 98

by James Jinks


  The ‘Valiant’ Class

  249. Daniel, End of an Era, p. 352. 250. TNA/ADM/1/26779, Memo from Chairman, Ships’ Names Committee, 13 January 1961. 251. Paul Wrobel, ‘U.K. Nuclear Submarines: The Development of the Overall Design,’ Journal of Naval Engineering, vol. 28, no. 1 (1983), pp. 106–19. 252. Bud and Gummett, Cold War, Hot Science, pp. 168–9. 253. Brown and Moore, Rebuilding the Royal Navy, p. 125. 254. Horlick, ‘Nuclear Submarine Propulsion in the RN’. 255. Patrick Middleton, Admiral Clanky Entertains (Matador, 2010), pp. 147–8. 256. Hill, ‘Admiral Hyman G. Rickover’. 257. Ibid. 258. Baker and Rydill, ‘The Building of the Two Dreadnoughts’. 259. Horlick, ‘Nuclear Submarine Propulsion in the RN’. 260. Duncan, Rickover, p. 156. 261. Horlick, ‘Nuclear Submarine Propulsion in the RN’. 262. Professor Jack Edwards, ‘Initial Problems of the Submarine Pressurised Water Reactor Design and the Related Experimental Programme’, paper to the Institute of Marine Engineers, January 1962, n.32. 263. Hammersley, ‘The Propulsion System’, p. 155. 264. William Crowe, The Policy Roots of the Royal Navy 1946–63 (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University, 1965), p. 293. 265. Hearing before the Sub-committee on Agreements for Cooperation, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 – Exchange of Military Information and Material with Allies, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 27 February 1958, p. 499. 266. Solly Zuckerman Archive (SZ)/CSA/122, Zuckerman to Sir Peter Ramsbotham, 30 April 1977. 267. Peter Hammersley, ‘The US/UK Agreement on Nuclear Co-operation’, in Friends of the Royal Navy Submarine Museum, All Round Look: Year Book 2009/2010 (Royal Navy Submarine Museum, 2010), p. 35. 268. Hearing before the Sub-committee on Agreements for Cooperation, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 – Exchange of Military Information and Material with Allies, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 27 February 1958, p. 171. 269. Rockwell, Rickover Effect, pp. 274–5. 270. TNA/DEFE/24/46, Nuclear Submarines Presentation, Opening Remarks by First Lord, 1962. 271. See Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy, p. 338; also Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics (Columbia University Press, 1970).

  4 ‘MOVE DETERRENTS OUT TO SEA’: THE BOMB GOES UNDERWATER

  1. Lord Hailsham, A Sparrow’s Flight: Memoirs (Collins, 1990), p. 283. 2. TNA/ADM/1/27389, Burke to Mountbatten, 6 February 1959. 3. Quoted in Ian McGeoch, ‘The British Polaris Project: A Study of the British Naval Ballistic Missile System (BNBMS), Its Origins, Procurement and Effect’, (M.Phil. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1975), p. 89. 4. Michael Henry, ‘A CO’s Story’, in John E. Moore, The Impact of Polaris: The Origins of Britain’s Seaborne Nuclear Deterrent (Richard Netherwood, 1999), p. 250.

  First Contact

  5. Roy Dommett, ‘The Blue Streak Weapon’, Prospero: Proceedings from the British Rocket Oral History Programme, 2 (2005), pp. 24–7. 6. Ministry of Defence, Outline of Future Policy, Cmnd. 124 (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957). 7. James M. Roherty, Decisions of Robert S. McNamara: A Study of the Role of the Secretary of Defense (University of Miami Press, 1970), p. 122. 8. Rear Admiral I. J. Galantin, ‘The Future of Nuclear-Powered Submarines’, US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 84 (June 1958), pp. 23–35. 9. Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War II (Bodley Head, 1987), p. 256. 10. Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography (HarperCollins, 1985), p. 593; Sir William Jackson and Lord Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (Macmillan, 1992), p. 331. 11. TNA/ADM/205/112, First Sea Lord Conference on Submarine Policy, 2 February 1956. 12. TNA/ADM/167/149, B.5163, 15 October 1957. 13. Rear Admiral Peter La Niece, Not a Nine to Five Job (Charltons, 1992), p. 131. 14. TNA/ADM/167/149, B.5163, 15 October 1957. 15. Peter La Niece, ‘First Contact with Polaris by the Royal Navy’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 28. 16. TNA/ADM/1/27375, Selkirk to Hailsham, 1 January 1958. 17. John Boyes, Project Emily: Thor IRBM and the RAF (Tempus, 2008); Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent and America, 1957–1962 (Oxford University Press, 1994). 18. TNA/ADM/1/27375, Selkirk to Hailsham, 1 January 1958. 19. Ken Young, ‘The Royal Navy Polaris Lobby, 1955–1962’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 25/3 (2002), p. 64. 20. TNA/ADM/205/179, Goodwin to Brockman, 15 April 1957. 21. TNA/ADM/205/179, Burke to Mountbatten, 14 April 1958. 22. Richard Moore, The Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons (Frank Cass, 2001), p. 166. 23. TNA/ADM/205/179, Mountbatten to Burke, 8 May 1958. 24. LHCMA/McGeoch/GB0099/File7/CDS Data, Garson to McGeoch, 18 March 1994. 25. Wid Graham, ‘Watching Brief 1961–1963’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 38. 26. TNA/ADM/205/179, Burke to Mountbatten, 16 May 1958. 27. TNA/ADM/205/179, Mountbatten to Burke, 16 September 1958; TNA/ADM/1/27389, Mountbatten minute, 13 February 1959. 28. TNA/ADM/205/163, Burke to Mountbatten, 28 February 1959. 29. Ibid. 30. TNA/DEFE/7/2162, Mountbatten to Sandys, 10 November 1958. As First Sea Lord and later CDS, Mountbatten tended to think he was in charge of everything, down to the smallest detail. He even informed the Ships’ Names Committee that ‘IF and WHEN’ Polaris submarines were acquired by the Royal Navy, they should ‘continue the battleship through with an “R” class, starting with SSBN 01 – REVENGE, followed by RENOWN and REPULSE’. All these were the names of traditional capital ships on which Mountbatten had served while a young officer; John Penton, Solly Zuckerman: A Scientist Out of the Ordinary (John Murray, 2001), p. 139; TNA/DEFE/19/209, Names for Polaris Submarines, 15 November 1963. 31. TNA/ADM/1/27389, Lambe to Selkirk, April 1959. 32. Ziegler, Mountbatten, pp. 560–61. 33. TNA/ADM/1/27389, First Lord to VCNS, DCNS, USS, 25 May 1959. 34. TNA/CAB/131/23, D(60)1, 24 February 1960; US designed and built standoff air launched ballistic missile with a range of 700 to 1000 nm. 35. Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 27 April 1960, Vol. 622, Col. 244. 36. TNA/ADM/1/27389, Polaris, Secretary to VCNS, DCNS, USS, 25 May 1959. 37. Jackson and Bramall, Chiefs, p. 331. 38. TNA/DEFE/4/124, COS (60) Meetings, 26 and 27 January 1960; TNA/DEFE/7/1328, BND(SG)(59)19(Final), 31 December 1959. 39. TNA/DEFE/7/1328, BND(SG)(59)19(Final), 31 December 1959; BA/J40, Burke to Mountbatten, 11 April 1960. 40. Ziegler, Mountbatten, p. 594. 41. Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy, pp. 269, 271, 277, 290–96; TNA/PREM/11/2941, Watkinson to Macmillan, 23 September 1960. 42. TNA/ADM/1/27609, Head of M Branch II, Memo, M.II/679/13/99, Basing Polaris Submarines in the Northern UK, 1959. 43. TNA/ADM/1/27389, Admiral BJSM to Admiralty, 9 June 1960. 44. TNA/PREM/11/2941, Washington to Foreign Office, 26 August 1960. 45. TNA/CAB/128/34, CC(60)50th Conclusions, 15 September 1960. 46. TNA/DEFE/7/2162, Record of a meeting between Watkinson and Carrington, 29 September 1960. 47. TNA/DEFE7/2162, Harold Watkinson, Polaris Submarines, 19 May 1960. 48. TNA/ADM/205/163, Admiralty Organisation for a ‘Polaris’ Submarine Programme, Annex A, 12 July 1960; TNA/ADM/205/163, Admiralty Organisation for a ‘Polaris’ Submarine Programme, Annex B, undated (July 1960); TNA/ADM/205/163, Admiralty Organisation for a ‘Polaris’ Submarine Programme, Annex C, 8 July 1960; TNA/ADM/205/163, Memorandum by the Secretary, Admiralty Organisation for a ‘Polaris’ Submarine Programme, Addendum, u/d (July 1960). 49. TNA/ADM/205/163, Extract Board Minutes 5431, 28 July 1960. 50. Ibid. 51. Richard Baker, Dry Ginger: The Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Michael Le Fanu (W. H. Allen, 1977), p. 170. 52. Ibid. 53. Sidney John Palmer, ‘Technical Evaluation 1961’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 42. 54. TNA/ADM/205/163, Items discussed with CNO by First Sea Lord in Washington, 6 November 1960. 55. TNA/FO/371/159649, Foreign Office to Caccia, 13 January 1961. 56. TNA/ADM/1/29349, Polaris Mission to the United States, Part I – General Outline of the Visit, p. 4. 57. TNA/ADM/281/180, Polaris Mission to the United States, Appendices, Appendix VIII, The Weapon System, March 1961. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61. TNA/ADM/1/31048, The Submarine Base of the Future, 31 July, 1961. 62. Ibid. 63. TNA/ADM/1/31048, M.I/652/8/61, Minute Sheet No. 4, 2 August 1962. 64. TNA/ADM/205/202, John to Le Fanu, 1 November 1960. 65. The records of the British Nuclear Deterrent Study Group can be found in TNA/DEFE/13/617 and TNA/DEFE/13/618. 66. Young, ‘Royal Navy Polaris Lobby’, pp. 75–6. 67. Stewart Menaul, Countdown: Britain’s Strategic Nuclear Forces (Hale, 1980), p. 117. 68. William Cro
we, ‘The Policy Roots of the Royal Navy 1946–63’ (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University, 1965), p. 284; TNA/DEFE/13/295, Future of the British Nuclear Deterrent, 8 October 1962; TNA/ADM 167/158, Board Minutes 5503–5509, 9 November 1961; TNA/ADM/167/158, Board Minutes 5512, 11 December 1961. 69. TNA/ADM167/158, Board Minutes 5512, 11 December 1961. 70. TNA/DEFE/7/2162, Carrington to Watkinson, 18 December 1961; Carrington gave Watkinson a number of options: (1) eight sixteen-missile single-purpose Polaris submarines, if the ‘50% destruction of 40 cities’ criterion was adhered to; (2) four sixteen-missile boats if the criterion were halved; (3) seven eight-missile hybrid submarines at less cost than (2) as the hybrids would be substituted for hunter-killers in the building programme; TNA/DEFE/7/2162, Polaris Submarines, Lawrence-Wilson Minute, 28 December 1961; DEFE/7/2144, Holligan to Price, 26 July 1962; TNA/DEFE/7/2144, BNDSG, Hybrid Submarines, Note by the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, 11 October 1962. 71. Fred M. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 253–6. 72. TNA/ADM/1/28839, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff to First Sea Lord, 14 November 1962. 73. TNA/ADM/1/28839, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, 4 December 1962. 74. TNA/DEFE/7/2162, Brief by the Admiralty, 14 December 1962. 75. Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy, pp. 355–61. 76. TNA/ADM/1/28839, Begg on behalf of John to Crawford, 18 December 1962. 77. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Vol. XIII, Memorandum of Conversation, 16 December 1962, pp. 1088–91. 78. Peter Hennessy, Muddling Through: Power, Politics and the Quality of Government in Postwar Britain (Victor Gollancz, 1996), p. 112. 79. TNA/PREM/11/4147, Record of a Meeting Held at Bali-Hai, The Bahamas, 09.50 am, 19 December 1962. 80. Hennessy, Muddling Through, p. 112. 81. Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 1961–1963 (Macmillan, 1973), p. 358. 82. TNA/T/325/88, ‘The Skybolt Story’ 1 January 1959 to 31 December 1963. 83. TNA/PREM/11/4229, Record of a Meeting Held at Bali-Hai, The Bahamas, 9.50 a.m. 19 December 1962. 84. TNA/PREM/11/4229, Record of a Meeting Held at Bali-Hai, The Bahamas, noon and 12:30pm, 20 December 1962. 85. TNA/PREM/11/4148, Macmillan to Ormsby-Gore, 26 January 1963 86. Cmnd. 1915, Bahamas Meetings, December 1962: Texts of Joint Communiqués, (HMSO, 1962). 87. Harold Macmillan Diary, 23 December 1962. 88. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, ‘Partial Transcript of a Background Press Interview with John F Kennedy at Palm Beach’, 31 December 1962. 89. TNA/PREM/11/4147, Paris to the FO, ‘Nassau Agreement’, 2 January 1963. 90. Solly Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles: An Autobiography, 1946–1988 (Collins, 1988), p. 399. 91. TNA/DEFE/13/619, Zuckerman and Scott to Thorneycroft, 21 December 1962; Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, p. 261. 92. TNA/AVIA/65/1840, note of 2 January 1962; TNA/AVIA/65/1840, The Bahamas Conference: Report on Attendance as Part of the Ministry of Defence Party by D/RAE, u/d (December 1962). 93. Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, pp. 262–5. 94. George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (Norton, 1982), pp. 264–5. 95. Donnette Murray, Kennedy, Macmillan and Nuclear Weapons (Macmillan, 2000), p. 151; John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939–1984: The Special Relationship (Macmillan, 1984), p. 105. 96. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 268. 97. Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, p. 265. 98. TNA/FO/371/16405, Ormsby-Gore, Annual Review of Anglo-American Relations, 1 January 1963. 99. Alan Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers (Routledge, 1995), p. 130. 100. See Oliver Bange, The EEC Crisis of 1963: Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in Conflict (Macmillan, 2000); John Young, The EEC Crisis of 1963: Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in Conflict (Macmillan, 2000). 101. TNA/ADM/1/28839, Le Fanu, Notes on Bahamas Meeting, u/d (December 1962). 102. Ibid. 103. Nigel Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence (Palgrave Macmillan), p. 152. 104. TNA/ADM/1/28839, Controller of the Navy, Notes on Bahamas Meeting, u/d (December 62); Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War, p. 187. 105. TNA/ADM/1/28839, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff to First Lord, Polaris, 13 December 1962. 106. TNA/ADM/1/28839, Brief for the Prime Minister, Talks with President Kennedy, December 1962. 107. Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 30 January 1963, Vol. 670, Cols. 955–1074. 108. TNA/ADM/1/28839, Unaccounted for note by Le Fanu, 22 December 1962. 109. TNA/ADM/1/28839, Begg on behalf of John to Crawford, 18 December 1962. 110. Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government (Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 159. 111. TNA/ADM/1/27740, Polaris Nuclear Submarine: Admiralty Organisation, May 1960. 112. Quoted in Moore, Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons, p. 162. 113. Ibid. 114. TNA/ADM/1/28839, Letter from John, 31 December 1962. 115. Rebecca John, Caspar John (HarperCollins, 1987), p. 197. 116. Ibid. 117. TNA/ADM1/28839, Notes on Bahamas Meeting, u/d (December 1962).

  Planning for Polaris

  118. Herbert Fitzer, ‘The Electrical System and the RN Polaris School’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 159. 119. McGeoch, ‘British Polaris Project’, p. 60. 120. TNA/ADM/205/211, Organisation for Polaris, Sitrep by Le Fanu, 16 January 1963. 121. TNA/ADM/1/28377, Taylor to Osmond, 1 January 1963. 122. Vice Admiral Sir Hugh Mackenzie, Sword of Damocles (Periscope Publishing, 2007), p. 243. 123. Vice Admiral Sir Hugh Mackenzie, ‘Setting Up the Project’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 47. 124. Ibid. 125. Mackenzie, Sword of Damocles, p. 230. 126. Ken Dunlop, ‘Support Planning’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 167. 127. Peter Nailor, The Nassau Connection: The Organisation and Management of the British Polaris Project (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1988), p. 28. 128. Nailor, Nassau Connection, p. 28; Mackenzie, ‘Launching the Project’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 55. 129. TNA/ADM/331/15, The Future Management of the British Naval Ballistic Missile System, Report by Vice Admiral Sir Raymond Hawkins, October 1967. 130. Sir Rae McKaig, ‘Initial Tasks’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 78. 131. IWM/12071, Interview with Vice Admiral Sir Hugh Mackenzie, 3 June 1991. 132. TNA/ADM/1/28377, Taylor to Hunt, 24 January 1963. 133. TNA/ADM/1/28362, Synott to Mackenzie, 23 January 1963. 134. Ibid. 135. TNA/ADM/1/28362, DGW, Proposed Statement on Polaris Requirements, 8 February 1963. 136. TNA/ADM/1/28362, What’s So Special about the Polaris Programme?, March 1963. 137. TNA/CAB/131/28, D(63)6, Polaris Submarines: Size and Number, Memorandum by the Minister of Defence, 16 January 1963. At a meeting between Admiralty and Treasury officials, the Treasury referred to the criterion as an ‘assumption’ and reserved its position; TNA/T/225/2161, Note of a Meeting, 18 January 1963. 138. Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945–64 (Harwood, 2000), p. 132; TNA/DEFE/13/619, Scott to Thorneycroft, 1 January 1963; the Navy could only build a maximum of seven submarines because of the difficulty of providing crews. 139. TNA/ADM/1/28839, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff to First Lord, 13 December 1962; TNA/DEFE/7/1752, Carrington to Thorneycroft, 31 December 1963. 140. TNA/DEFE/7/1752, Meeting between Thorneycroft, Carrington and Amery, 3 January 1963. 141. TNA/ADM/1/28842, Size of the U.K. Polaris Force, (u/d) December 1964. Due to their size as targets, Moscow and Leningrad required 4 and 2 missile hits respectively. 11 missiles on target represented a 7-city deterrent, including Moscow and Leningrad, TNA/DEFE/13/297, Polaris Submarines – Size of UK Force – Appendix to COS/3200, 12 December 1963. 142. TNA/DEFE/7/1752, D(63)6 – Polaris Submarines, u/d (January 1963). 143. TNA/DEFE/7/1752, Defence Committee Paper by Thorneycroft, Polaris Submarines, Size and Number, u/d (January 1963). 144. TNA/ADM/1/28839, Unknown to Carrington, 14 December 1962. 145. Nailor, Nassau Connection, p. 29. 146. Dunlop, ‘Support Planning’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 67. 147. TNA/AVIA/65/1840, Carrington to Thorneycroft, 31 December 1962. 148. Jack Daniel, End of an Era: The Memoirs of a Naval Constructor (Periscope Publishing, 2003), p. 191. 149. TNA/CAB/131/28, Minutes of a Meeting, 23 January 1963. 150. Ibid. 151. TNA/AVIA/65/1840, Follow-up to Nassau, 3 January 1963. 152. Decision-making was also complicated by different possibilities for re-entry bodies and warheads. The US had developed two re-entry systems for Polaris. The MK I was used on the Polaris A1 and Polaris A2: it c
arried a large warhead and had no real penetration aid capability. The MK II was to be used on the A3. It used a different warhead and re-entry vehicle and had ‘some measure of penetration capability’. The British Skybolt warhead could fit ‘without serious modification’ into the MK I re-entry body, but this could only be used on the A2, not the A3. If the UK decided to purchase the A3 missile, the Skybolt warhead could be used in different ways. However, all involved ‘considerable redesign and flight testing’ and there were doubts whether this could ‘technically be done by the US within a timescale compatible with UK submarine production’. Alternatively, the UK could use the MK II re-entry system but this would mean developing a completely new warhead. TNA/ADM/1/28839, Appendix III to Report of Polaris Fact Finding Mission to Washington, January 1963. 153. TNA/ADM/1/28965, U.K. Polaris Mission to U.S., Report by DAS, January 1963. 154. TNA/ADM/1/28987, POLARIS: Report of Mission to the USA, 16 January 1963. 155. TNA/DEFE/7/1752, Peck to McMahon, 4 February 1963. 156. TNA/ADM/1/28839, Carrington to Thorneycroft, 4 March 1963. 157. Ibid. 158. TNA/DEFE/13/734, Ormsby-Gore to Macmillan, 28 January 1963. 159. Sunday Telegraph, ‘Anglo-US Dispute over Polaris, Britain Asked to Pay for Development Costs, Oversight at Nassau’, 27 January 1963. 160. TNA/ADM/1/28987, Report of Polaris Fact Finding Mission to Washington – January 1963. 161. Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, p. 267. 162. TNA/PREM/11/4148, Macmillan to Ormsby-Gore, 15 January 1963. 163. Ibid. 164. Ibid. 165. Ibid.; Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 363. 166. TNA/PREM/11/4148, Macmillan to Ormsby-Gore, 26 January 1963. 167. Ibid. 168. Ibid. 169. TNA/AVIA/65/1866, Washington to FO, 26 January 1963. 170. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 363. 171. TNA/ADM/1/28978, United States/United Kingdom Polaris Sales Agreement Programme Costs, 1963/4 to 1971/2 Summary of Expenditures by United Kingdom Financial Year. 172. TNA/PREM/11/4148, Macmillan to Maudling, 26 January 1963. 173. TNA/DEFE/13/734, Ormsby-Gore to Macmillan, 28 January 1963. 174. Ibid. 175. TNA/PREM/13/1317, Zuckerman to Wilson, 23 March 1967. 176. TNA/ADM/1/29356 Draft E.P.C. Paper ‘Polaris’ Submarine Building Programme – Choice of Building Yards, u/d (February 1963). 177. TNA/T/225/2161, Darracott to Dodd, Polaris, 20 February 1963. 178. TNA/DEFE/19/209, Johnson to Director of Naval Contracts, 8 April 1963. 179. Ibid. 180. TNA/ADM/1/28965, Carrington to Mackenzie, 31 January 1963. 181. TNA/ADM/1/28965, Nuclear Submarines – Polaris – Operating Base and Support Facilities – Safety Considerations – Note by Head of M.II, 1 February 1963. 182. TNA/ADM/1/28965, Turner to Mackenzie, 15 February 1963. 183. TNA/ADM/1/28965, Special Military Branch Aquaint, No. 5268, 25 February 1963. 184. For a more detailed discussion of the alternative sites see Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker, Uncharted Waters: The UK, Nuclear Weapons and the Scottish Question (Tuckwell Press, 2001), pp. 17–22; TNA/ADM/1/28965, Naval Ballistic Missile Force – UK Operating Base, Report of Working Party, 25 February 1963. 185. TNA/ADM/1/28965, Nuclear Submarines – Polaris Operating Base and Support Facilities – Safety Considerations. Note by Head of M.II, u/d (February 1963). 186. TNA/ADM/1/28965, Polaris – Shore Support, Safety Considerations, 19 February 1963. 187. TNA/ADM/1/28965, Naval Ballistic Missile Force – UK Operating Base, Report of Working Party, 25 February 1963. 188. Although the working party did not let the prospect influence its deliberations, a proposal was under consideration elsewhere in the Admiralty to establish a shore base at Faslane for the Navy’s hunter-killer submarines and not, as previously planned, at the submarine depot ship HMS Maidstone; TNA/ADM/1/28965, Naval Ballistic Missile System – U.K. Operating Base, 25 April 1963. 189. Ian Mcgeoch, ‘Allocated to …’, Naval Review, Vol. 74, No. 3, July 1986, p. 261. 190. TNA/ADM/1/28965, Requirement for a Naval Ballistic Missile Submarine Operating Base, Appendix A, u/d (April 1963). 191. TNA/DEFE/19/209, RNAD Coulport, Establishment of Depot to Support Ballistic and Other Submarines Operating from the Clyde, 20 June 1963. 192. Sir Simon Cassells, ‘The “Bull Pen” ’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 86. 193. TNA/ADM/157/162, Board Minutes, 5576–5578, 28 March 1963. 194. TNA/DEFE/7/2163, Mackay to Admiralty, 26 February 1963. 195. TNA/CAB/131/28, Nassau Agreement, Record of a Meeting, 25 February 1963; TNA/DEFE/7/2163, Wood to Mackay, 25 January 1963. 196. TNA/DEFE/13/1050, Eighth Joint Annual Report, 1 July 1970. 197. TNA/AVIA/65/1866, Downey to Haviland, 27 February 1963. 198. Alan Pritchard, ‘Negotiating the Sales Agreement’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 72. 199. TNA/ADM/1/28978, Joint Annual Report (1963) of the Project Officers for the United States and United Kingdom Polaris Program to the Secretary of Defense and to the Minister of Defence. 200. TNA/FO/371/173518, Burden to Rose, 22 March 1963. 201. Daniel, End of an Era, p. 160. 202. Francis Duncan, Rickover: The Struggle for Excellence (Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp. 151–3. 203. IWM/12071, Interview with Vice Admiral Sir Hugh Mackenzie, 3 June 1991. 204. Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way 1959–1961 (Macmillan, 1971), p. 323. 205. La Niece, Not a Nine to Five Job, p. 163. 206. Peter Nailor, ‘Making the Organisation Work’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 92.

 

‹ Prev