by James Jinks
Constructing Polaris
207. For more information about how the shipbuilders addressed the problem of building the submarines see P. H. Rance, ‘Programme and Build Philosophy’, paper given to the Nuclear Submarine SSN07 Symposium for equipment, machinery, and systems suppliers, Vickers Limited Shipbuilding Group, Barrow-in-Furness, 28 February 1968 208. TNA/DEFE/19/209, P. Sherwell, 28 June 1963. 209. TNA/DEFE/13/350, Nairne to Healey, 12 May 1965. 210. John Schank, Jessie Riposo, John Birkler, James Chiesa, The United Kingdom’s Nuclear Submarine Industrial Base, Vol. 1: Sustaining Design and Production Resources (Rand Corporation, 2005), p. 8. 211. TNA/ADM/1/29270, Staff Requirements of SSBN.01 and Class, 24 February 1963. 212. For insight into what it takes to design a submarine from scratch see R. J. Daniel, ‘Submarine Design’, Naval Forces, No. 111, 1987. 213. Jack Daniel, quoted in David K. Brown, Century of Naval Construction: The History of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors (Conway Maritime Press, 1983), p. 239. 214. TNA/ADM/1/28839, A. J. Sims, Polaris Submarine Programme, 24 January 1963. 215. TNA/DEFE/19/209, P. T. Williams, Polaris – Second Builder, 24 April 1963; TNA/DEFE/13/953, Nuclear Submarine Programme, Talk for Minister (E), 10 May 1967. 216. Mackenzie, ‘Launching the Project’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 66; Daniel, End of an Era, p. 157; TNA/ADM/1/167/163, Board Minutes, 5633–5638, 6 February 1964. 217. Paul Wrobel, ‘U.K. Nuclear Submarines: The Development of the Overall Design’, Journal of Naval Engineering, vol. 28, no. 1 (1983), pp. 106–19. 218. TNA/ADM/1/29213, Report on the Operation of the Electric Boat Co. Group System, Part ‘B’ Possible Application of E. B. Group System to Nuclear Naval Production, u/d (September 1963). 219. Peter La Niece, ‘Procuring the Weapon System’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 145. 220. Wirral Archives Service/Cammell Laird Collection/Polaris 1316–1317, Birkenhead Presentation, 8 December 1966. 221. Mackenzie, ‘Launching the Project’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 67. 222. IWM/12071, Interview with Vice Admiral Sir Hugh Mackenzie, 3 June 1991. 223. Ibid. 224. Nailor, Nassau Connection, p. 73. 225. ‘The Polaris Submarine Programme’, Nuclear Energy, Nov/Dec 1967, p. 169. 226. “Resolution”: First Polaris Missile Submarine for the Royal Navy’, Shipbuilding and Shipping Record, 19 October 1967; Nailor, Nassau Connection, pp. 77–82. 227. The Economist, 20 April 1968. 228. Mackenzie, ‘Launching the Project’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 67. 229. TNA/DEFE/13/953, BNBMS Building Programme, 23 December 1965. 230. Solly Zuckerman, Six Men Out of the Ordinary (Peter Owen, 1992); Inconel is a super-alloy made of nickel and chromium, designed to perform in extreme environments. TNA/ADM/1/28982, Le Fanu to Jellicoe, 22 November 1963. 231. Mackenzie, ‘Launching the Project’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 65. 232. TNA/ADM/1/28982, Le Fanu to Jellicoe, 22 November 1963; TNA/ADM/1/28982, Pepper to Hedger, 10 December 1963. 233. TNA/ADM/1/28842, Mackenzie to Le Fanu, 22 January 1964. 234. TNA/ADM1/28982, Le Fanu to Zuckerman, u/d (November 1963). 235. TNA/ADM/1/28842, Le Fanu to Jellicoe, 20 January 1964. 236. TNA/ADM/1/28842, Mackenzie to Le Fanu, 22 January 1964. 237. Ibid. 238. The article criticized nuclear policy and sought to distinguish between nuclear weapons as a deterrent and the futility of using battlefield nuclear weapons. 239. Zuckerman, Six Men Out of the Ordinary, pp. 169–70; Duncan, Rickover, pp. 155–6. 240. TNA/DEFE/7/2165, Zuckerman to Thorneycroft, 12 December 1963; Daniel, End of an Era, p. 160; Duncan, Rickover, p. 190. 241. TNA/DEFE/7/2165, Zuckerman to Thorneycroft, 12 December 1963. 242. TNA/PREM/11/4741, Background Note, u/d (December 1963). 243. TNA/DEFE/7/2165, Zuckerman to Thorneycroft, 27 November 1963. 244. TNA/ADM/1/28842, Le Fanu to Jellicoe, 20 January 1964. 245. TNA/PREM/11/4741, Ormsby-Gore to FO, 24 December 1963. 246. John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain and the Military Atom (Macmillan, 1983), p. 182. 247. TNA/ADM/1/28842, Le Fanu to Jellicoe, 20 January 1964. 248. TNA/ADM/1/28842, Mackenzie to Le Fanu, 22 January 1964. 249. Ibid. 250. TNA/ADM/1/28842, Le Fanu to Jellicoe, 20 January 1964. 251. TNA/ADM/1/28842, Le Fanu, record of conversation with Thorneycroft, 24 January 1964. 252. TNA/PREM/11/4741, FO to Home, 22 January 1964. 253. TNA/CAB/130/196, GEN.836/1st mtg., ‘Holy Loch’, 24 January 1964. 254. Louis Le Bailly, The Man around the Engine: Life below the Waterline (Mason, 1990), pp. 164–5. 255. TNA/ADM/1/28842, Admiralty to CBNS, 24 January 1964. 256. TNA/DEFE/13/295, Newell to Thorneycroft, 12 May 1964; Daniel, End of an Era, p. 352. 257. TNA/DEFE/13/295, Newell to Thorneycroft, 12 May 1964. 258. Ibid.
The Fifth Submarine
259. TNA/ADM/1/28842, Polaris Submarines: Size of Force, u/d (26 September 1963). 260. TNA/ADM/1/28842, COS 69th Meeting/63, 10 December 1963. 261. Ibid. 262. TNA/ADM/1/28842, Director of Plans to First Sea Lord, 13 January 1964; TNA/ADM/1/28842, Jellicoe to Thorneycroft, 2 December 1963. On average the majority of early US Polaris refits overran by about three months, or 27 per cent, for such reasons as strikes and problems connected with the nuclear-propulsion plant; TNA/DEFE/13/953, Memorandum by VCNS, 22 April 1970. 263. ‘The 32 missile load of two submarines constitutes a 20 city deterrent; one submarine, a 7 or 8 city deterrent. These figures allowed for the probabilities of inaccuracies and for the two biggest targets to be hit more than once.’ 264. Mackenzie, ‘Launching the Project’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 69. 265. Ibid. 266. Ibid. 267. TNA/ADM/167/161, Board Memo, B1470, 25 November 1963; TNA/DEFE/13/296, Hockaday to Mountbatten, 13 December 1963. 268. TNA/ADM/167/161, Board Memo, B1470, Appendix A, 25 November 1963. 269. TNA/ADM/167/162, Board Minutes, 5615–5618, 28 November 1963. 270. TNA/ADM/1/28842, Jellicoe to Thorneycroft, 2 December 1963. 271. TNA/DEFE/4/160, COS 68th Meeting/63, 3 December 1963. 272. TNA/ADM/1/28842, Hull to Thorneycroft, u/d (December 1963). 273. TNA/DEFE/4/160, COS 69th Meeting/63, 10 December 1963. 274. TNA/ADM/1/28842, Thorneycroft to Douglas-Home, 20 December 1963. 275. TNA/T/225/2521, Maudling to Douglas-Home, 1 January 1964; throughout 1963, Treasury officials repeatedly asked for assurances from the Admiralty that ‘production proposals made no provision for a possible fifth boat’ as there was no money in the forward Defence costings. 276. Lord Home, The Way the Wind Blows (Collins, 1976), p. 213. 277. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Memorandum of Conversation, 13 February 1964, pp. 17–20. 278. TNA/225/2521, Fraser to Dodd, 24 February 1964; Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 27 February 1964, Vol. 690, Col. 756. 279. TNA/CAB/148/1, DO(64) 8th Meeting, 19 February 1964. 280. TNA/CAB/128/38, CM(14) 14th Conclusions, 25 February 1964. 281. TNA/CAB/148/1, DO(64) 7th Meeting, 25 February 1964; Michael Quinlan, Oral Evidence taken before the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, 14 March 2006. 282. TNA/CAB/148/1, DO(64) 9th Meeting, 25 February 1964. 283. Michael Quinlan, Oral Evidence taken before the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, 14 March 2006. 284. TNA/CAB/128, CM(14) 14th Conclusions, 25 February 1964. 285. La Niece, ‘Procuring the Weapon System’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 145; Sir Hugh Mackenzie, ‘The Continuing until It be Thoroughly Finished’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 98.
The 1964 General Election
286. Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964–1970: A Personal Record (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), p. 40. 287. Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 12 November 1963, Vol. 684, Cols. 49–51. 288. The Conservative Party, The Manifesto of the Conservative and Unionist Party (1964), p. 6. 289. The Labour Party, Let’s Go with Labour for the New Britain: The Labour Party’s Manifesto for the 1964 General Election (1964) p. 23. 290. TNA/DEFE/13/296, Jellicoe to Thorneycroft, 18 December 1963. 291. Ibid. 292. TNA/ADM/1/28383, Jellicoe to Le Fanu, 21 November 1963. 293. TNA/ADM/1/28383, Le Fanu to Jellicoe, 2 December 1963. 294. Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, p. 373. 295. Nailor, ‘Making the Organisation Work’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 94. 296. Nailor, Nassau Connection, p. 37. 297. IWM, 12071, Interview with Vice Admiral Sir Hugh Mackenzie, 3 June 1991. 298. Mackenzie, ‘Continuing until It be Thoroughly Finished’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 99. 299. Private correspondence with Jack Daniel, 13 December 2009. 300. TNA/DEFE/24/291, Penny to Seaborg, 21 July, 1964. 301. Hennessy, Muddling Through, p. 113; Nailor, Nassau Connection, p. 53. 302. Macken
zie, ‘Continuing until It be Thoroughly Finished’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 99. 303. Ibid., p. 98. 304. TNA/T/225/2586, Williams to Clifton, 17 July 1964. 305. British Areospace Archive BAE/VA/Box10, Polaris Meeting, 3 April 1964. 306. North West Evening Mail, 15 August 1964. 307. Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 23 November 1964, Vol. 702, Col. 995; these are also quoted in Leslie Shore, Vickers’ Master Shipbuilder (Black Dwarf Publications, 2011), p. 149. 308. Ibid. 309. Ibid. 310. David Gill, ‘The Ambiguities of Opposition: Economic Decline, International Cooperation, and Political Rivalry in the Nuclear Policies of the Labour Party, 1963–1964’, Contemporary British History, 25/2 (2011), p. 263. 311. Ziegler, Mountbatten, p. 626. 312. TNA/DEFE/32/9, COS 58th Mtg/64(2) (Confidential Annex) (SSF), 29 September 1964. 313. Ibid. 314. Ibid. 315. Ibid. In the run-up to, and during, the election campaign, both Wilson and the man who was expected to become Defence Secretary, Denis Healey, had suggested converting the Polaris submarines into hunter-killers, ‘a programme of certain and immediate value to the British Navy and to national defence which has been set back five years by the Polaris programme’. They also suggested that they would expand the naval shipbuilding programme by using ‘savings made by stopping wasteful expenditure on the politically inspired nuclear programme’; Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 26 February 1964, Vol. 690, Col. 480. 316. TNA/DEFE/32/9, COS 58th Mtg/64(2) (Confidential Annex) (SSF), 29 September 1964. 317. Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, p. 373. 318. TNA/ADM/167/162, Board Minutes 5593–5595, 17 July 1963. 319. TNA/T/225/2586, Visit To Bath, 22 March 1964. 320. Zuckerman also confirms that the Navy had plans for ‘the Wilson class of nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines’; Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, p. 374. 321. Daniel, End of an Era, p. 7. 322. TNA/DEFE/24/78, Confidential Annex to COS 59th Meeting/64, 6 October 1964. 323. Ibid. 324. Ibid. 325. TNA/DEFE/24/78, Wright to P.U.S., 16 October 1964.
‘Go’ or ‘No Go’: Deciding to Continue
326. Mackenzie, ‘Continuing until It be Thoroughly Finished’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 101. 327. Edmund Dell, The Chancellors: A History of the Chancellors of the Exchequer, 1945–90 (HarperCollins, 1997), p. 310. 328. TNA/DEFE/13/350, CPE to PUS(RN), Appendix ‘A’, Modification of the Polaris Programme, 19 October 1964. 329. Ibid. 330. Denis Healey, Time of My Life (Michael Joseph, 1989), p. 302. 331. Andrew J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force 1939–1970 (Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 284–5; Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons (Macmillan, 1980), p. 32; Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Preparing for the Worst 1945–2010 (Penguin Books, 2010), p. 72; David Gill, ‘Strength in Numbers: The Labour Government and the Size of the Polaris Force’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 33/6 (2010), p. 833. 332. TNA/DEFE/32/9, COS(I) 5/11/64 (SSF), 5 November 1964. 333. MB/J61, Mountbatten to Wilson, 19 October 1964; quoted in Ziegler, Mountbatten, p. 627. 334. LHCMA/McGeoch/GB0099/Box6/Mountbatten Research, Interview with Lord Mountbatten, 2 March 1973. 335. Zuckerman, Six Men Out of the Ordinary, p. 147. 336. Healey, Time of My Life, p. 307. 337. Hennessy, Muddling Through, p. 115. 338. TNA/DEFE/10/510, Defence Council, Minutes, 29 October 1964. 339. Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 3 March 1966, Vol. 725, Col. 1483; Wilson maintained this in his memoirs, Wilson, Labour Government 1964–1970, p. 40. 340. Hennessy, Muddling Through, p. 115. 341. Ibid. 342. Ibid., p. 116. 343. TNA/DEFE/10/510, Defence Council, Minutes of the 9th Meeting, 29 October 1964. 344. Quoted in Philip Ziegler, Wilson: The Authorised Life (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993), p. 208. 345. TNA/CAB/129/39, CC(64)11th Conclusions, 26 November 1964. 346. Ibid. 347. Anthony Shrimsley, The First Hundred Days of Harold Wilson (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), pp. 112–14. 348. Healey, Time of My Life, p. 302. 349. Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1: Minister of Housing, 1964–1966 (Book Club Associates, 1975), p. 73. 350. Ibid. 351. TNA/CAB/130/212, MISC 16, Atlantic Nuclear Force, 11 November 1964. 352. TNA/DEFE/13/350, Luce to Healey, 6 November 1964. 353. TNA/DEFE/69/449, Pollock to VCNS, 18 November 1964. 354. Ibid. 355. Ibid. 356. Ibid. 357. TNA/DEFE/19/129, The Purpose of the U.K.’s Deterrent, 12 October 1971. 358. TNA/CAB/130/213, MISC, 17/4, Defence Policy, 22 November 1964. 359. Ibid. 360. Hennessy, Muddling Through, p. 115. 361. TNA/CAB/130/213, Minutes of a Meeting held at Chequers on Sunday, 22 November 1964. 362. TNA/DEFE/10/510, Defence Council, Minutes of the 9th Meeting, 29 October 1964; TNA/DEFE/32/9, Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff (Informal) Meeting, 5 November 1964. Healey later acknowledged that there was always ‘the hypothetical possibility that the alliance might break up or at least be changed in a radical way; and that, in the event, the (so to speak) bargaining position of this country would be very weak without the strategic nuclear deterrent force’; TNA/DEFE/11/437, Healey to Hull, 20 June 1967. 363. TNA/CAB/130/213, Minutes of a Meeting held at Chequers on Sunday, 22 November 1964. 364. TNA/DEFE/13/350, Mayhew to Healey, 17 December 1964. 365. TNA/DEFE/13/350, Healey to Wilson, 21 December 1964. 366. TNA/CAB/148/18, OPDC(65), 5th Meeting, 29 January 1965. 367. Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, p. 34. 368. Mackenzie, ‘Continuing until It be Thoroughly Finished’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 104. 369. Richard Hill, Lewin of Greenwich: The Authorised Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin (Cassell, 2000), pp. 326–7. Most literature on Polaris states that the Navy intended to call the submarine HMS Ramillies. This is incorrect. When the Ships’ Names Committee reconvened in June 1964, to decide on a suitable name, Redoubtable, not Ramillies, was considered to be the most appropriate ‘from the point of view of harmonising with the four previous selections’. However, the Committee eventually recommended breaking from convention and using a two-word name, Royal Sovereign, which was approved by the Admiralty Board on 26 June, and then by the Queen on 30 June 1964.
Completing the Programme
370. La Niece, ‘Procuring the Weapon System’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 152. 371. TNA/DEFE/13/350, Third Joint Annual Report (1965); TNA/DEFE/13/700, Fourth Joint Annual Report (1966); TNA/DEFE/13/953, Mackenzie to Mason, 16 May 1967. 372. Nailor, Nassau Connection, pp. 83–4; TNA/DEFE/13/953, BNBMS, Building Programme, 23 December 1965. 373. Comments of Captain A. P. Northey in H. J. Tabb and S. A. T. Warren, ‘Quality Control Applied to Nuclear Submarine Construction’, Royal Institute of Naval Architects Quarterly Transactions, 108 (1966). 374. ‘ “Resolution”, First Polaris Missile Submarine for the Royal Navy’, Shipbuilding and Shipping Record, 19 October 1967. 375. TNA/DEFE/13/953, Mackenzie to Mason, 16 May 1967; Henry, ‘A CO’s Story’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 242. 376. Henry, ‘A CO’s Story’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 238. 377. ‘Mr Starboard and Mr Port Take Over First Polaris Sub’, Daily Mirror, 6 October 1965. 378. John Wingate, The Fighting Tenth: The Tenth Submarine Flotilla and the Siege of Malta (Pen & Sword, 1991), p. 1. 379. Henry, ‘A CO’s Story’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 243. 380. Ibid., p. 248. 381. Ibid. 382. Ibid. 383. Mackenzie, Sword of Damocles, p. 236. 384. Ibid. 385. TNA/DEFE/13/548, Macdonald to Healey, 5 February 1968. 386. Healey, handwritten note, TNA/DEFE/13/547, Begg to Healey, RESOLUTION – Publicity on Commissioning, 15 September, 1967. 387. Daily Express, 6 November 1967. 388. National Meteorological Library and Archive, Great Glasgow Storm, Monday, 15 January 1968. 389. Nick Howlett, ‘The Faslane Base (2)’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 183. 390. TNA/T/225/3280, Waller to Adams, 25 November 1968. 391. Henry, ‘A CO’s Story’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 247. 392. Commander Kenneth Frewer, ‘HMS Resolution: First Polaris Firing by the First SSBN’, Naval Review, Vol. 86, No. 4, October 1998, pp. 399–400; a not entirely accurate account can also be found in Louis Le Bailly, ‘HMS Resolution: First Polaris Test Firing by the First SSBN’, Naval Review, Vol. 85, No. 1, January 1997, p. 64. 393. Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 12 February 1968, Vol. 758, Cols. 286–7W. 394. TNA/DEFE/13/548, Begg to Healey, HMS RESOLUTION – DASO Firings, 15 February 1968. 395. TNA/DEFE/13/953, Polaris Progress at Birkenhead – Meeting between Minister (E), Mr Philip Hunter and C.P.E. on Wednesday, 17 May, 1967. 396. TNA/DEFE/13/953, Statem
ent by Minister (E) at Cammell Lairds on Monday, 30 January 1966; Cammell Laird Collection, Polaris Publicity, 003/0006 1316–1317, Mr Mason’s Comments this morning to the Times, u/d. 397. TNA/DEFE/13/953, Mason to Healey, 19 December 1967. 398. TNA/DEFE/13/547, Mason to Horace Law, 6 December 1967. 399. TNA/DEFE/13/953, Private Office (E) Note, Polaris Programme – Delays at Cammell Lairds – Meeting between Minister (E) and P.U.S.(R. N.) on Tuesday, 10 October. 400. TNA/DEFE/13/953, Mackenzie to Mason, 6 October 1967. 401. Mackenzie, Sword of Damocles, p. 238. 402. TNA/DEFE/13/953, Private Office (E) Note, Polaris Programme – Delays at Cammell Lairds – Note of Meeting Held by Minister (E) on 13 December 1968. 403. Mackenzie, ‘Launching the Project’, in Moore, Impact of Polaris, p. 67. 404. ‘… a “tinkling” noise was reported from the port loop and subsequent “search and identify” operations established that the inner thermal shield in the outlet nozzle of the emergency cooler had fractured and that 11 of the 12 “skirt” sections were at large in the primary circuit. The location and removal of these pieces of metal proved a difficult and time-consuming operation, necessitating entrance being established and special tools designed and manufactured.’ TNA/DEFE/69/700, HMS Renown, Emergency Cooler Thermal Sleeve Failure, 23 December 1968. 405. TNA/DEFE/13/953, Horace Law to Mason, 2 December 1968. 406. TNA/DEFE/13/953, Morris to Horace Law, 4 December 1968; TNA/DEFE/13/953, Townsend, HMS Renown, 28 November 1968. 407. TNA/DEFE/69/700, HMS Renown, Emergency Cooler Thermal Sleeve Failure, 23 December 1968. 408. TNA/DEFE/69/700, Telegram, u/d (February 1969). 409. TNA/DEFE/13/953, Defect in HMS Renown, 3 September 1969. 410. Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 3 December 1969, Vol. 792, Cols. 1485–6. 411. Basil Watson, Commander-in-Chief: A Celebration of the Life of Admiral of the Fleet The Lord Fieldhouse of Gosport (Royal Navy Submarine Museum, 2005), p. 73. 412. TNA/DEFE/69/700, Renown Bow Damage, 4 July 1974; Jim Ring, We Come Unseen: The Untold Story of Britain’s Cold War Submariners (John Murray, 2001), p. 152. 413. In 1966 the US announced that the Soviet Union had started to deploy the ‘Galosh’ ABM system around a number of its major cities; John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart, ‘Britain and the Chevaline Project: The Hidden Nuclear Programme, 1967–1982’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 26/4 (2003), pp. 124–55; Kristan Stoddart, ‘The Wilson Government and the British Responses to Anti-Ballistic Missiles, 1964-1970’, Contemporary British History, 23/1 (2009), pp. 1–33; Thomas Robb, ‘Antelope, Poseidon or a Hybrid: The Upgrading of the British Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, 1970–1974’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 33/6 (2010), pp. 797–817; for accounts of British assessments of the Russian ABM see Catherine Haddon, ‘Union Jacks and Red Stars on Them: UK Intelligence, the Soviet Nuclear Threat and British Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1945–1970’ (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Queen Mary University of London, 2008), pp. 253–93; Catherine Haddon, ‘British Intelligence, Soviet Missile Defence and the British Nuclear Deterrent’, in Matthew Grant (ed.), The British Way in Cold Warfare: Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Bomb 1945–1975 (Continuum, 2009); Kristan Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964–70 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 37–55, 118–53. 414. TNA/DEFE/11/437, Wilson to Brown, 24 July 1967; Stoddart, Losing an Empire, pp. 118–53; TNA/PREM/13/1316, Healey to Brown, 26 September 1966. 415. TNA/DEFE/11/437, Note of a Meeting, 8 June 1967. 416. TNA/CAB/148/55, OPDO(DR)(67) 54th Meeting, 24 November 1967; TNA/CAB/134/3120, PN(67) 4th Meeting, 5 December 1967. 417. TNA/CAB/165/600, Trend to Wilson, 4 January 1968. 418. Wilson, Labour Government 1964–1970, p. 479. 419. Sean Straw and John Young, ‘The Wilson Government and the Demise of the TSR2’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 20/4 (1997), pp. 18–44. 420. TNA/CAB/128/43, CC(68) 6th Conclusions, 12 January 1968.
