Complete Works of Tacitus (Delphi Classics) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 24)

by Publius Cornelius Tacitus

  24 1 Flaccus meanwhile, on hearing that the camp was besieged, sent emissaries through the Gallic provinces to call out auxiliary forces, and entrusted troops picked from his two legions to Dillius Vocula, commander of the Twenty-second legion, with orders to hurry as rapidly as possible along the bank of the Rhine; Flaccus himself went by boat, being in poor health and unpopular with the soldiers; for indeed they murmured against him in no uncertain tone, saying that he had let the Batavian cohorts go from Mogontiacum, had concealed his knowledge of the undertakings of Civilis, and was making allies of the Germans. “Neither Primus Antonius nor Mucianus,” they declared, “has contributed more to the strength of Vespasian than Flaccus. Frank hatred and armed action are openly repelled: treachery and deceit are hidden and so cannot be guarded against. Civilis stands before us and forms his battle line; Hordeonius from his chamber and his bed issues orders that are to the enemy’s advantage. All these armed companies of the bravest men are dependent on the whim of one sick old man! Rather let us kill the traitor and free our fortune and bravery from this evil omen!” When they had already roused one another by such exhortations, they were further inflamed by a letter from Vespasian, which Flaccus, being unable to conceal it, read aloud before a general assembly, and then sent the men who had brought it in chains to Vitellius.

  25 1 In this way the soldiers’ anger was appeased and they came to Bonn, the winter quarters of the First legion. There the soldiers were still more threatening and placed the blame for their disaster on Hordeonius: for they declared that it was by his orders that they had given battle to the Batavi, under assurance that the legions were following from Mogontiacum; that by his treachery their comrades had been killed, since no help came to them: that these facts were unknown to the rest of the armies and were not reported to their emperor, although this fresh treachery might have been blocked by a prompt effort on the part of all the provinces. Hordeonius read to the army copies of all the letters that he had dispatched throughout the Gauls, Britain, and the Spains asking for aid. Moreover, he established the worst kind of precedent by turning over all letters to the eagle-bearers of the legions, who read them to the common soldiers before they were disclosed to the commanders. Then he ordered a single one of the mutineers to be arrested, rather to vindicate his authority than because the fault was that of an individual. The army next advanced from Bonn to Cologne, while Gallic auxiliary troops poured in, for the Gauls at first gave vigorous assistance to the Roman cause: later, as the German strength increased, many states took up arms against us, inspired by hope of freedom and by a desire to have an empire of their own, if they once were rid of servitude. The angry temper of the legions increased and the arrest of a single soldier had brought them no fear: indeed this same soldier actually charged the general with being privy to the revolt, claiming that, having been an agent between Civilis and Flaccus, he was now being crushed on a false charge because he could bear witness to the truth. Vocula with admirable courage mounted the tribunal and ordered the soldier to be seized, and, in spite of his cries, directed that he be led away to punishment. While the disloyal were cowed, the best obeyed the order. Then, since the troops unanimously demanded Vocula as their general, Flaccus turned over to him the chief command.

  26 1 But there were many things that exasperated their rebellious temper: there was a lack of pay and grain, and at the same time the Gallic provinces scornfully refused a levy and tribute; the Rhine hardly floated boats, owing to a drought unprecedented in that climate; reprovisionment was hampered; detachments were posted all along the bank of the Rhine to keep the Germans from fording it, and for the same reason there was less grain while there were more to eat it. The ignorant regarded even the low water as a prodigy, as if the very rivers, the ancient defences of our empire, were failing us: what they would have called in time of peace an act of chance or nature, they then called fate and the wrath of the gods.

  When our troops entered Novaesium the Sixteenth legion joined them. Vocula now had Herennius Gallus associated with him to share his responsibilities; and not daring to move against the enemy, they pitched camp at a place called Gelduba. There they improved the morale of their soldiers by drilling them in battle formation, by having them erect fortifications and a palisade, and by all other forms of military training; and to fire their bravery by giving them a chance to pillage, Vocula led a force into the nearest cantons of the Cugerni, who had allied themselves with Civilis; part of the troops remained with Herennius Gallus.

  27 1 Now it happened that not far from camp the Germans started to drag to their bank a ship loaded with grain which had grounded on a bar. Gallus did not wish to allow this and sent a cohort to rescue the ship: the Germans also were reinforced, and as assistance gradually gathered, the two sides engaged in a pitched battle. The Germans inflicted heavy losses on our men and got the ship away. The defeated Roman troops, as had then become their fashion, did not blame their own lack of energy, but charged their commander with treachery. They dragged him from his tent, tore his clothing and beat him, bidding him tell what bribe he had received and who his accomplices were in betraying his troops. Their anger toward Hordeonius returned: they called him the author and Gallus the tool, until, frightened by their threats to kill him, he himself actually charged Hordeonius with treachery; and then Hordeonius was put in chains and only released on Vocula’s arrival. The following day Vocula had the ringleaders in the mutiny put to death, so great was the contrast in this army between unbridled licence and obedient submission. Undoubtedly the common soldiers were faithful to Vitellius, but all the officers inclined to favour Vespasian: hence that alternation of crimes and punishment and that combination of rage with obedience, so that although the troops could be punished they could not be controlled.

  28 1 But meanwhile the power of Civilis was being increased by huge reinforcements from all Germany, the alliances being secured by hostages of the highest rank. He ordered the peoples who were nearest to harry the Ubii and Treviri, and directed another force to cross the Meuse to threaten the Menapii and Morini and the borders of the Gallic provinces. Booty was secured from both districts, but they proceeded with greater severity in the case of the Ubii, because, though a tribe of Germanic origin, they had forsworn their native land and taken the Roman name of Agrippinenses. Some of their cohorts had been cut to pieces in the district of Marcodurum, where they were operating carelessly, being far from the bank of the Rhine. Yet the Ubii did not quietly refrain from making plundering raids on Germany, at first with impunity; but later they were cut off, and in fact throughout this entire war their good faith proved superior to their good fortune. After crushing the Ubii, Civilis became more threatening, and, being emboldened by his success, pressed on the siege of the legions, keeping strict guard to see that no secret messenger should get through to report the approach of assistance. He charged the Batavi with the duty of building machines and siege works: the forces from across the Rhine who demanded battle, he told to go and tear down the Romans’ rampart, and when they were repulsed, he made them renew the conflict, for the number was more than enough and the loss easy to bear.

  29 1 Not even night ended the struggle. The assailants lighted piles of wood about the town, and while they feasted, as man after man became inflamed with wine, they rushed to battle with unavailing recklessness, for their weapons, thrown into the darkness, were of no effect: but the Romans aimed at the barbarians’ line, which they could clearly see, and especially at anyone who was marked by his courage or decorations. Civilis, grasping the situation, ordered his men to put out their fires and to add the confusion of darkness to the combat. Then in truth it was all discordant cries, uncertain chances, no one could see to strike or parry: wherever a shout was raised, there they turned and lunged; courage was of no avail, chance made utter confusion, and often the bravest fell under the weapons of cowards. The Germans obeyed only blind fury; the Roman soldiers, being experienced in danger, did not shoot their iron-tipped pikes and heavy stones at rando
m. When the sound showed them that men were climbing up the walls, or the raising of ladders delivered their foes into their hands, they beat them down with the bosses of their shields and followed this action with their javelins; many who scaled the walls they stabbed with daggers. When the night had been thus spent, the day disclosed a new struggle.

  30 1 The Batavi had built a tower with two stories. This they pushed toward the praetorian gate, as the ground was most level there, but the Romans thrust out against it strong poles, and with repeated blows of beams broke it down, inflicting heavy loss on those who were on it. Then, while their foes were in disorder, they made a sudden and successful sally upon them; and at the same time the legionaries, who were superior in skill and artifices, devised further means against them. The barbarians were most terrified by a well-balanced machine poised above them, which being suddenly dropped caught up one or more of the enemy before the eyes of their comrades and with a shift of the counterweight threw them into camp. Civilis now gave up hope of capturing the camp by storm and again began an inactive siege, trying meanwhile to shake the confidence of the legions by messages and promises.

  31 1 These things took place in Germany before the battle of Cremona, the result of which was learned through a letter from Primus Antonius, to which was added a proclamation issued by Caecina; and a prefect of a cohort from the defeated side, one Alpinius Montanus, acknowledged in person the misfortune of his party. This news aroused different emotions: the Gallic auxiliaries, who felt no party attachment or hatred and who served without enthusiasm, at the instigation of their officers immediately abandoned Vitellius; the veteran soldiers hesitated. But at the command of Hordeonius Flaccus and moved by the appeals of their tribunes, they took an oath which neither their looks nor their wills quite confirmed: and while they repeated the greater part of the usual formula, they hesitated at Vespasian’s name, some murmuring it faintly, most passing it over in silence.

  32 1 Then some letters of Antonius to Civilis, being read before the assembled troops, roused their suspicions, for they seemed to be addressed to an ally and spoke in hostile fashion of the German army. Presently, when the news reached the Roman camp at Gelduba, it caused the same discussions and the same acts; and Montanus was sent to Civilis with orders bidding him give up the war and cease cloaking hostile acts with a false pretext: he was to say that if Civilis had moved to help Vespasian, his efforts had already been sufficient. To this Civilis at first made a crafty answer: afterwards, when he saw that Montanus was of an impetuous nature and inclined to revolt, he began to complain of the dangers which he had passed through for twenty-five years in the camps of the Romans. “A glorious reward indeed,” said he, “have I gained for my labours — my brother’s murder, my own chains, and the savage cries of this army here, demanding my punishment; the right of nations warrants me in demanding vengeance for these things. You Treviri likewise and all the rest of you who have the spirits of slaves, what return do you expect for the blood you have so often shed save an ungrateful service in arms, endless tribute, floggings, the axes of the executioner, and all that your masters’ wits can devise? See how I, prefect of a single cohort, with the Canninefates and Batavi, a trifling part of all the Gauls, have shown their vast camps to be in vain and have destroyed them or am besetting them and pressing them hard with sword and famine. In short, be bold! Either liberty will follow your daring or we shall all be defeated together.” With such words Civilis inflamed Montanus, but he sent him away with orders to make a mild report. So Montanus returned, bearing himself as though he had failed in his embassy, but concealing all that later came to light.

  33 1 Civilis retained part of his troops with him, but dispatched the veteran cohorts and the best of the Germans under the leadership of Julius Maximus and Claudius Victor, his own nephew, to attack Vocula and his army. On their march they plundered the winter quarters of a squadron of cavalry at Asciburgium; and they assailed Vocula’s camp so unexpectedly that he could not address his soldiers or form his men in line; the only advice that he could give in the confusion was to strengthen the centre with the legionaries: the auxiliary troops were scattered about everywhere. The cavalry charged, but, being received by the enemy in good order, fled back to their own lines. What followed was a massacre, not a battle. The Nervian cohorts also, prompted by fear or treachery, left our flanks unprotected: thus the burden now fell upon the legionaries, and they, having lost their standards, were already being cut down inside the palisade, when suddenly unexpected aid changed the fortune of the battle. Some cohorts of the Vascones which Galba had levied earlier and which had now been sent for, approaching camp and hearing the sound of the struggle, assailed the enemy in the rear while they were absorbed in the contest, and caused a more widespread panic than their numbers warranted, some imagining that all the troops from Novaesium, others that those from Mogontiacum,º had arrived. The enemy’s mistake inspired the Romans with courage, and while trusting in the strength of others, they recovered their own. All the best of the Batavian infantry were cut down; their horse escaped with the standards and captives that they had seized at the first onset. The number of the killed on our side that day was larger, but was not made up of the bravest; the Germans lost their very best troops.

  34 1 The generals on both sides by equal faults deserved their reverses and failed to use their success: had Civilis put more troops in line, he could not have been surrounded by so few cohorts, and after breaking into the Roman camp, he would have destroyed it: Vocula failed to discover the enemy’s approach, and therefore the moment that he sallied forth he was beaten; then, lacking confidence in his victory, he wasted some days before advancing against the foe, whereas if he had been prompt to press him hard and to follow up events, he might have raised the siege of the legions at one blow. Meanwhile Civilis had tested the temper of the besieged by pretending that the Roman cause was lost and that his side was victorious: he paraded the Roman ensigns and standards; he even exhibited captives. One of these had the courage to do an heroic deed, shouting out the truth, for which he was at once run through by the Germans: their act inspired the greater confidence in his statement; and at the same time the harried fields and the fires of the burning farm-houses announced the approach of a victorious army. When in sight of camp Vocula ordered the standards to be set up and a ditch and a palisade to be constructed about them, bidding his troops leave their baggage and kits there that they might fight unencumbered. This caused the troops to cry out against their commander and to demand instant battle; and in fact they had grown accustomed to threaten. Without taking time even to form a line, disordered and weary as they were, they engaged the enemy; for Civilis was ready for them, trusting in his opponents’ mistakes no less than in the bravery of his own troops. Fortune varied on the Roman side, and the most mutinous proved cowards: some there were who, remembering their recent victory, kept their places, struck at the enemy, exhorted one another and their neighbours as well; reforming the line they held out hands to the besieged, begging them not to lose their opportunity. The latter, who saw everything from the walls, sallied forth from all the gates of their camp. Now at this moment Civilis’s horse happened to slip and throw him; whereupon both sides accepted the report that he had been wounded or killed. It was marvellous how this belief terrified his men and inspired their foes with enthusiasm: yet Vocula, neglecting to pursue his flying foes, proceeded to strengthen the palisade and towers of his camp as if he were again threatened with siege, thus by his repeated failure to take advantage of victory giving good ground for the suspicion that he preferred war to peace.

  35 1 Nothing distressed our troops so much as the lack of provisions. The legions’ baggage train was sent on to Novaesium with the men who were unfit for service to bring provisions from there overland; for the enemy controlled the river. The first convoy went without trouble, since Civilis was not yet strong enough to attack. But when he heard that the sutlers, who had been despatched again to Novaesium, and the cohorts escorting th
em were proceeding as if in time of peace, that there were few soldiers with the standards, that their arms were being carried in the carts while they all strolled along at will, he drew up his forces and attacked them, sending first some troops to occupy the bridges and narrow parts of the roads. They fought in a long line and indecisively until at last night put an end to the conflict. The cohorts reached Gelduba, where the camp remained in its old condition, being held by a force which had been left there. They had no doubt of the great danger that they would run if they returned with the sutlers heavily loaded and in a state of terror. Vocula reinforced his army with a thousand men picked from the Fifth and Fifteenth legions that had been besieged at Vetera, troops untamed and hostile toward their commanders. More men started than had been ordered to do so, and on the march they began to murmur openly that they would no longer endure hunger or the plots of their commanders; but those who were being left behind complained that they were being abandoned by the withdrawal of part of the legions. So a double mutiny began, some urging Vocula to return, others refusing to go back to camp.