Complete Works of Tacitus (Delphi Classics) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 24)

by Publius Cornelius Tacitus

  [96] Prima Vitellio tertiae legionis defectio nuntiatur, missis ab Aponio Saturnino epistulis, antequam is quoque Vespasiani partibus adgregaretur; sed neque Aponius cuncta, ut trepidans re subita, perscripserat, et amici adulantes mollius interpretabantur: unius legionis eam seditionem, ceteris exercitibus constare fidem. in hunc modum etiam Vitellius apud milites disseruit, praetorianos nuper exauctoratos insectatus, a quibus falsos rumores dispergi, nec ullum civilis belli metum adseverabat, suppresso Vespasiani nomine et vagis per urbem militibus qui sermones populi coercerent. id praecipuum alimentum famae erat.

  96 The first defection reported to Vitellius was that of the Third legion. The news came in a letter sent by Aponius Saturninus before he also joined Vespasian’s side. But Aponius, in his excitement over the sudden change, had not written the whole truth, and the flattery of courtiers gave a less serious interpretation to the news. They said that this was the mutiny of only one legion; that the rest of the troops were faithful. It was to the same effect that Vitellius himself spoke to the soldiers: he attacked the praetorians who had lately been discharged, blaming them for spreading false rumours, and declared that there was no occasion to fear civil war, keeping back Vespasian’s name and sending soldiers round through the city to check the people’s talk. Nothing furnished rumour with more food.

  [97] Auxilia tamen e Germania Britanniaque et Hispaniis excivit, segniter et necessitatem dissimulans. perinde legati provinciaeque cunctabantur, Hordeonius Flaccus suspectis iam Batavis anxius proprio bello, Vettius Bolanus numquam satis quieta Britannia, et uterque ambigui. neque ex Hispaniis properabatur, nullo tum ibi consulari: trium legionum legati, pares iure et prosperis Vitellii rebus certaturi ad obsequium, adversam eius fortunam ex aequo detrectabant. in Africa legio cohortesque delectae a Clodio Macro, mox a Galba dimissae, rursus iussu Vitellii militiam cepere; simul cetera iuventus dabat impigre nomina. quippe integrum illic ac favorabilem proconsulatum Vitellius, famosum invisumque Vespasianus egerat: proinde socii de imperio utriusque coniectabant, sed experimentum contra fuit.

  97 Nevertheless he summoned auxiliaries from Germany, Britain, and the Spains; but he did this slowly and tried to conceal the necessity of his action. The governors and the provinces moved as slowly as he. Hordeonius Flaccusº already suspected the Batavians and was disturbed by the possibility of having a war of his own; Vettius Bolanus never enjoyed entire peace in Britain, and both of them were wavering in their allegiance. Nor did troops hurry from the Spains, for at that moment there was no governor there. The commanders of the three legions, who were equal in authority and who would have vied with each other in obedience to Vitellius if his affairs had been prosperous, now all alike shrank from sharing his adversity. In Africa the legion and the cohorts raised by Clodius Macer, but afterwards dismissed by Galba, resumed their service by order of Vitellius; at the same time the young civilians as well enlisted with enthusiasm. For the government of Vitellius as proconsul had been honest and popular, while that of Vespasian had been notorious and hated; from such memories the allies formed their conjectures as to what each would be as emperor; but experience proved exactly the opposite.

  [98] Ac primo Valerius Festus legatus studia provincialium cum fide iuvit; mox nutabat, palam epistulis edictisque Vitellium, occultis nuntiis Vespasianum fovens et haec illave defensurus, prout invaluissent. deprehensi cum litteris edictisque Vespasiani per Raetiam et Gallias militum et centurionum quidam ad Vitellium missi necantur: plures fefellere, fide amicorum aut suomet astu occultati. ita Vitellii paratus noscebantur, Vespasiani consiliorum pleraque ignota, primum socordia Vitellii, dein Pannonicae Alpes praesidiis insessae nuntios retinebant. mare quoque etesiarum flatu in Orientem navigantibus secundum, inde adversum erat.

  98 At first the commander, Valerius Festus, loyally supported the wishes of the provincials. But presently he began to waver; in his public letters and documents he favoured Vitellius, but by secret messages he fostered Vespasian’s interest and was ready to take whichever side prevailed. Some soldiers and centurions who had been dispatched through Raetia and the Gallic provinces were arrested with letters and proclamations of Vespasian on their persons, sent to Vitellius, and put to death. The majority of the messengers, however, escaped arrest, being concealed by faithful friends or escaping by their own wits. In this way the preparations of Vitellius became known while most of Vespasian’s plans remained secret. This was due first of all to the stupidity of Vitellius, and secondly to the fact that the guards stationed in the Pannonian Alps blocked the messengers. Moreover, as this was the season of the etesian winds, the sea was favourable for vessels sailing to the East, but unfavourable to those coming from that quarter.

  [99] Tandem inruptione hostium atrocibus undique nuntiis exterritus Caecinam ac Valentem expedire ad bellum iubet. praemissus Caecina, Valentem e gravi corporis morbo tum primum adsurgentem infirmitas tardabat. longe alia proficiscentis ex urbe Germanici exercitus species: non vigor corporibus, non ardor animis; lentum et rarum agmen, fluxa arma, segnes equi; impatiens solis pulveris tempestatum, quantumque hebes ad sustinendum laborem miles, tanto ad discordias promptior. accedebat huc Caecinae ambitio vetus, torpor recens, nimia fortunae indulgentia soluti in luxum, seu perfidiam meditanti infringere exercitus virtutem inter artis erat. credidere plerique Flavii Sabini consiliis concussam Caecinae mentem, ministro sermonum Rubrio Gallo: rata apud Vespasianum fore pacta transitionis. simul odiorum invidiaeque erga Fabium Valentem admonebatur ut impar apud Vitellium gratiam virisque apud novum principem pararet.

  99 Finally Vitellius became alarmed by the oncoming of the enemy and by the terrifying messages which reached him from every side, and ordered Caecina and Valens to prepare for war. Caecina was sent on in advance; Valens, who was at that moment just getting up from a serious sickness, was delayed by physical weakness. As the army from Germany left the city it presented a very different appearance from that which it had displayed on entering Rome: the soldiers had no vigour, no enthusiasm; they marched in a slow and ragged column, dragging their weapons, while their horses were without spirit; but the troops who could not endure sun, dust, or storm and who had no heart to face toil, were all the more ready to quarrel. Another factor in the situation was furnished by Caecina’s old ambition and his newly acquired sloth, for an excess of Fortune’s favours had made him give way to luxury; or he may have been already planning to turn traitor and so have made it part of his plan to break the morale of his army. It has been generally believed that it was the arguments of Flavius Sabinus that made Caecina’s loyalty waver, and that the go-between was Rubrius Gallus, who assured him that Vespasian would approve the conditions on which Caecina was to come over. At the same time he was reminded of his hatred and jealousy towards Fabius Valens and was urged, since his influence with Vitellius was not equal to that of his rival, to seek favour and support from the new emperor.

  [100] Caecina e complexu Vitellii multo cum honore digressus partem equitum ad occupandam Cremonam praemisit. mox vexilla primae, quartae, quintaedecimae, sextaedecimae legionum, dein quinta et duoetvicensima secutae; postremo agmine unaetvicensima Rapax et prima Italica incessere cum vexillariis trium Britannicarum legionum et electis auxiliis. profecto Caecina scripsit Fabius Valens exercitui, quem ipse ductaverat, ut in itinere opperiretur: sic sibi cum Caecina convenisse. qui praesens eoque validior mutatum id consilium finxit ut ingruenti bello tota mole occurreretur. ita adcelerare legiones Cremonam, pars Hostiliam petere iussae: ipse Ravennam devertit praetexto classem adloquendi; mox Patavii secretum componendae proditionis quaesitum. namque Lucilius Bassus post praefecturam alae Ravennati simul ac Misenensi classibus a Vitellio praepositus, quod non statim praefecturam praetorii adeptus foret, iniquam iracundiam flagitiosa perfidia ulciscebatur. nec sciri potest traxeritne Caecinam, an, quod evenit inter malos ut et similes sint, eadem illos pravitas impulerit.

  100 Caecina, departing from the embraces of Vitellius with great honours, sent a part of his horse ahead to occupy Cremona. Presently detachments of the First, Fou
rth, Fifteenth and Sixteenth legions followed; then the Fifth and Twenty-second; in the rear marched the Twenty-first Rapax and the First Italic with detachments from the three legions in Britain and with picked auxiliary troops. After Caecina had gone, Fabius Valens wrote to the troops which he had earlier commanded, and ordered them to wait for him on the way, saying that he and Caecina had agreed to this effect. But Caecina, being with the troops and therefore having the advantage over Valens, pretended that the plan had been changed that they might meet the rising tide of war with their whole strength. So the legions were ordered to press on, part to Cremona, part to Hostilia; he himself turned aside to Ravenna under the pretext of addressing the fleet; but presently he retired to the secrecy of Padua to arrange the conditions of betrayal. For Lucilius Bassus, who had previously been only a prefect of a squadron of cavalry, had been placed by Vitellius in command of the fleet of Ravenna along with that of Misenum; but his failure to receive promptly the prefecture of the praetorian guard had roused in him an unjust resentment, which he was now satisfying by a shameful and treacherous act of vengeance. It is impossible to determine whether Bassus drew Caecina on, or whether, since it often happens that is a likeness between bad men, the same villainy impelled them both.

  [101] Scriptores temporum, qui potiente rerum Flavia domo monimenta belli huiusce composuerunt, curam pacis et amorem rei publicae, corruptas in adulationem causas, tradidere: nobis super insitam levitatem et prodito Galba vilem mox fidem aemulatione etiam invidiaque, ne ab aliis apud Vitellium anteirentur, pervertisse ipsum Vitellium videntur. Caecina legiones adsecutus centurionum militumque animos obstinatos pro Vitellio variis artibus subruebat: Basso eadem molienti minor difficultas erat, lubrica ad mutandam fidem classe ob memoriam recentis pro Othone militiae.

  101 The contemporary historians, who wrote their accounts of this war while the Flavian house occupied the throne, have indeed recorded their anxiety for peace and devotion to the State, falsifying motives in order to flatter; but to me it seems that both men, in addition to their natural fickleness and the fact that after betraying Galba they then held their honour cheap, were moved by mutual rivalry and a jealous fear that they would be surpassed by others in the imperial favour, and so overthrew Vitellius himself. Caecina caught up with his legions and began by various devices to undermine the unshaken loyalty of the centurions and soldiers towards Vitellius; Bassus found less difficulty when he attempted the same with the fleet, for the sailors, remembering their recent service to Otho, were ready to shift their allegiance.

  LIBER TERTIVS — BOOK III

  [1] Meliore fato fideque partium Flavianarum duces consilia belli tractabant. Poetovionem in hiberna tertiae decimae legionis convenerant. illic agitavere placeretne obstrui Pannoniae Alpes, donec a tergo vires universae consurgerent, an ire comminus et certare pro Italia constantius foret. quibus opperiri auxilia et trahere bellum videbatur, Germanicarum legionum vim famamque extollebant, et advenisse mox cum Vitellio Britannici exercitus robora: ipsis nec numerum parem pulsarum nuper legionum, et quamquam atrociter loquerentur, minorem esse apud victos animum. sed insessis interim Alpibus venturum cum copiis Orientis Mucianum; superesse Vespasiano mare, classis, studia provinciarum, per quas velut alterius belli molem cieret. ita salubri mora novas viris adfore, ex praesentibus nihil periturum.

  1 The generals of the Flavian party were planning their campaign with better fortune and greater loyalty. They had come together at Poetovio, the winter quarters of the Thirteenth legion. There they discussed whether they should guard the passes of the Pannonian Alps until the whole mass of their forces could be raised behind them, or whether it would not be a bolder stroke to engage the enemy at once and struggle with him for the possession of Italy. Those who favoured waiting for the auxiliaries and prolonging the war, emphasized the strength and reputation of the German legions and dwelt on the fact that the flower of the army in Britain had recently arrived with Vitellius; they pointed out that they had on their side an inferior number of legions, and at best legions which had lately been beaten, and that although the soldiers talked boldly enough, the defeated always have less courage. But while they meantime held the Alps, Mucianus, they said, would arrive with the troops from the east; Vespasian had besides full control of the sea and his fleets, and he could count on the enthusiastic support of the provinces, through whose aid he could raise the storm of almost a second war. Therefore they declared that delay would favour them, that new forces would join them, and that they would lose none of their present advantages.

  [2] Ad ea Antonius Primus (is acerrimus belli concitator) festinationem ipsis utilem, Vitellio exitiosam disseruit. plus socordiae quam fiduciae accessisse victoribus; neque enim in procinctu et castris habitos: per omnia Italiae municipia desides, tantum hospitibus metuendos, quanto ferocius ante se egerint, tanto cupidius insolitas voluptates hausisse. circo quoque ac theatris et amoenitate urbis emollitos aut valetudinibus fessos: sed addito spatio rediturum et his robur meditatione belli; nec procul Germaniam, unde vires; Britanniam freto dirimi, iuxta Gallias Hispaniasque, utrimque viros equos tributa, ipsamque Italiam et opes urbis; ac si inferre arma ultro velint, duas classis vacuumque Illyricum mare. quid tum claustra montium profutura? quid tractum in aestatem aliam bellum? unde interim pecuniam et commeatus? quin potius eo ipso uterentur quod Pannonicae legiones deceptae magis quam victae resurgere in ultionem properent, Moesici exercitus integras viris attulerint. si numerus militum potius quam legionum putetur, plus hinc roboris, nihil libidinum; et profuisse disciplinae ipsum pudorem: equites vero ne tum quidem victos, sed quamquam rebus adversis disiectam Vitellii aciem. ‘duae tunc Pannonicae ac Moesicae alae perrupere hostem: nunc sedecim alarum coniuncta signa pulsu sonituque et nube ipsa operient ac superfundent oblitos proeliorum equites equosque. nisi quis retinet, idem suasor auctorque consilii ero. vos, quibus fortuna in integro est, legiones continete: mihi expeditae cohortes sufficient. iam reseratam Italiam, impulsas Vitellii res audietis. iuvabit sequi et vestigiis vincentis insistere.’

  2 In answer Antonius Primus, the most enthusiastic partisan of war, argued that haste was helpful to them, ruinous to Vitellius. “The victorious side,” he said, “has gained a spirit of sloth rather than confidence, for their soldiers have not been kept within the bounds of camp; they have been loafing about all the municipal towns of Italy, fearful only to their hosts; the savagery that they once displayed has been matched by the greed with which they have drunk deep of their new pleasures. They have been weakened, too, by the circus, by the theatres, and by the delights of Rome, or else exhausted by disease; but if they are given time, even they will recover their strength by preparing for war; Germany, from which they draw their strength, is not far away; Britain is separated only by a strait; the provinces of Gaul and Spain are near: from both they receive men, horses, and tribute; they hold Italy itself and the wealth of Rome; and if they wish to attack they have two fleets and the Illyrian Sea is open. In that case, what will the mountain barriers avail us? What profit shall we find in prolonging the war into another summer? Where shall we meantime find money and supplies? Rather let us take advantage of the fact that the Pannonian legions, which were deceived rather than defeated, are eager to rise in revenge; that the troops in Moesia have contributed their strength, which is quite unimpaired. If we reckon the number of soldiers rather than of legions, we see that we have on our side the greater force and no debauchery; the very shame of the defeat at Bedriacum has helped our discipline. Moreover, the cavalry were not beaten even then, but in spite of the disaster they broke the forces of Vitellius. On that day two squadrons from Pannonia and Moesia pierced the enemy’s line; now sixteen squadrons charging in a body, by the very noise they make and the cloud of dust they raise, will overwhelm and bury the horsemen and horses of our foes, for they have forgotten what a battle is. Unless someone restrains me, I who advise will also perform. Do you, whose fortune is still unblemished, hold back your legions, if you will; for me light cohorts will be enough. Presently you shall hea
r that the gates of Italy are open, that the power of Vitellius is overthrown. Yours will be the delight of following the victor and of treading in his footsteps.”

  [3] Haec ac talia flagrans oculis, truci voce, quo latius audiretur (etenim se centuriones et quidam militum consilio miscuerant), ita effudit ut cautos quoque ac providos permoveret, vulgus et ceteri unum virum ducemque, spreta aliorum segnitia, laudibus ferrent. hanc sui famam ea statim contione commoverat, qua recitatis Vespasiani epistulis non ut plerique incerta disseruit, huc illuc tracturus interpretatione, prout conduxisset: aperte descendisse in causam videbatur, eoque gravior militibus erat culpae vel gloriae socius.

  3 Thus and in like strain, with flashing eyes and in fierce tones that he might be more widely heard (for the centurions and some of the common soldiers had made their way into the council) did he pour forth his words so that he moved even men of caution and foresight, while the general throng, and after them the rest, scorning the cowardly inaction of the other officers, extolled him as the one man and the one leader. This reputation Primus had won in that assembly from the moment in his harangue when, after reading out the letter of Vespasian, he did not talk in equivocal terms, ready to put this or that interpretation on Vespasian’s words to his own advantage, as the others had done; but he seemed to have openly joined Vespasian’s cause; therefore he carried the greater weight with the soldiers, for he was now an accomplice in their fault or a partner in their glory.