SS und Polizei: Myths and Lies of Hitler's SS and Police

by J. Lee Ready

  The 10th SS Frundsberg Panzer Division had not yet finished refitting following its latest action, but its men hoped to catch up before this offensive was over. Currently the divisional panzergrenadiers were at about 75% strength, but as for tanks the division only possessed thirty-five Panthers and thirty-six Mark IVs, and some of the Panthers had not yet arrived. There were also a few Jagdpanzer. The divisional artillery and flak guns had already been sent to the Fifth Panzer Army.

  However, on 9 December 1944, just one week before Hitler’s offensive was to be launched, the Americans launched an offensive of their own with five divisions [3rd and 5th Armored, and 9th, 83rd and 104th Infantry] into the northern half of the Hurtgen Forest, just a few miles north of Dietrich’s springboard position. German Intelligence was alarmed, wondering if the Americans had learned of the coming German offensive. Then four days later the Americans added the 2nd, 8th, 78th and 99th Infantry Divisions to the battle on the south side of the Hurtgen Forest, closer still to Dietrich. Surely this was evidence that the cat was out of the bag. Had American reconnaissance aircraft spotted the concentration of 410,000 men? Most likely. Had Allied spies reported the arrival of SS tanks? Almost certainly. Had deserters talked? Naturally. However, a few intelligence specialists pointed out that the Americans had been trying to cut through this forest since September, and this new attack was probably just another example of Eisenhower’s typical bull-headed strategy. Dietrich was reassured, but he was also perturbed that he had to let go some personnel of the 277th Volksgrenadier Division to fight in the Hurtgen Forest battle even before he made his own attack.

  This was not the only thing to go wrong. With seventy-two hours to go Dietrich’s officers reported to him that several units had yet to reach their jump off positions. There were good reasons for the delays: air raids, derailed trains, the heavy snow, foggy weather, and a lack of spare parts and a shortage of fuel.

  Then came more bad news. At the last moment Hitler withdrew the 272nd and half the 326th Volksgrenadier Divisions from Dietrich to help defend the Hurtgen Forest. Dietrich was dismayed: his army was being drained before he had fired a shot. His attacking infantry had been reduced by almost half!

  While the higher echelons of this offensive were despondent at this siphoning off of their forces, the officers and the rank and file were tense, knowing this was a make or break offensive, and they were scared. But more scared of letting the side down than of death: men such as Heinz Lammerding, who had led a division in Normandy and across France; Adolf Reeb who had already been wounded several times and knew he was pushing his luck; Herbert Kuhlman a well decorated veteran tank tactician, and still only twenty-nine; the tanker Karl Muehleck with three years of combat experience, Heinz von Westernhagen who commanded a Tiger detachment and who therefore knew much was expected of him; Jochen Peiper who had more responsibility than any officer of his rank in Sixth Panzer Army, a fearful weight for a twenty-nine year old; Hugo Kraas, an ‘old hare’ of thirty-three, and one of the youngest divisional commanders on either side in the war; Wilhelm Mohnke, one of the old originals, who had proven invaluable in Normandy; Max Hansen, who had probably lost track of how many times he had been wounded; Willi Bittrich, the hero of Arnhem; Friedrich Bock the policeman and artillery specialist; Rudolf Lehmann a corps chief of staff at age thirty with wisdom way beyond his years; Bernhard Krause, the rearguard specialist from the Normandy campaign, Gustav Knittel who had only just recovered from a nasty wound received in Normandy; Hans Malkomes who had led the Panthers of the SS LAH since Normandy; Arnold Juergensen who had survived everything the Poles, French, Russians and British could throw at him and was now looking forward to testing the ‘Amis’, as the Germans called the Americans; Gerd Bremer an ‘old hare’ from the beginning of the war, multi-wounded and who now controlled a quarter of the SS HJ Division, a dizzy height for a twenty-seven year old; and Frank Hasse a panzergrenadier company commander whose medals told a long history of close and bloody encounters. Each SS soldier had a different reason for being here: perhaps love of the fatherland, loyalty to the Nazi party, adoration of the Fuehrer, a desire to protect his loved ones, an eagerness to fight atheist Communism [and the Anglo-Americans, whom Goebbels had said were the lackeys of the Communists], the spirit of intense competition, the eagerness to prove himself as a man, or the belief that he had no choice in the matter. However, these thoughts were now all pushed into the deep sub-conscious as each man fully concentrated on the mission ahead.

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  Finally the day of the great winter offensive arrived, which Hitler called Operation Watch on the Rhine. At 0530 on the pre-dawn morning of 16 December Dietrich opened the offensive with a massive artillery barrage fired by over a thousand guns and Nebelwerfers, including 280mm railway guns. The noise was deafening and the Germans could just imagine the Yanks huddling in the snow screaming for it to end.

  As the barrage began to roll forward the advance began. Dietrich sent in his infantry first of all, from right to left the 326th [half], 277th [most] and 12th Volksgrenadier Divisions and 3rd Parachute Division, aiming through the Losheim Gap in the Ardennes Forest. The volksgrenadiers encountered surprisingly stiff opposition from the US 99th Infantry Division at Monschau and Hoefen on the right and from the US 2nd Infantry Division at Buchholz in the center, and the paratroopers met tough resistance from the tanks, armored cars and dismounted cavalrymen of the US 14th Cavalry Group on the left at Lanzerath, Roth and Krewinkel.

  By dusk, which came in late afternoon at this time of year, Dietrich’s Germans had been unable to advance anywhere. At least the inclement weather had kept the American planes away, thought Dietrich.

  Fortunately for the Germans Fifth Panzer Army to the south had made some gains.

  Despite the fact that Dietrich’s infantry had failed to break through and create a path for the armor, Gruppenfuehrer Hermann Priess, commander of the I SS Panzer Corps, his chief of staff Obersturmbannfuehrer Rudolf Lehmann and his artillery chief Brigadefuehrer Peter Hansen, became tired of waiting. Their men had been keyed up all day. So Priess gave the order for them to attack early the next morning regardless of the situation on the ground.

  On the 17th Sixth Panzer Army still failed to make any headway in the Monschau sector. At least the 326th Volksgrenadier Division was brought up to full strength again. The US 99th Division had been reinforced by a battalion of the 5th Armored Division, and was now manning the line with every available man including cooks, mechanics, orderlies and engineers, and they were holding their foxholes in the snow with fierce tenacity. Even a parachute drop by 1,200 German paratroopers of Heydte’s Parachute Regiment behind American lines did not seem to have any effect.

  Priess launched his attack in the center, leading with Battlegroup Peiper, which at once bypassed those parts of the 12th Volksgrenadier Division still stuck at Buchholz. Slowly but steadily Peiper approached the lines of the American 2nd Infantry Division. With various types of armored vehicles advancing at a crawl and panzergrenadiers walking behind them, the SS literally rolled right over the GIs, capturing the village of Honsfeld. Then Peiper continued on towards Buellingen. Attached to Peiper’s force were some Luftwaffe flak guns and forty-five Tigers of the 501st SS Heavy Panzer Detachment, now commanded by the excellent Sturmbannfuehrer Heinz von Westernhagen.

  Priess tried to follow as best he could with the SS LAH and SS HJ, several smaller army units and two independent SS artillery battalions, plus the artillery of the SS Hohenstaufen.

  By 0830 hours some of Peiper’s men had advanced five miles through Huenningen and Muerringen and were firing upon Wirzfeldt. Within another half hour Peiper had some people firing on Buellingen, and he soon captured an American fuel dump. The headquarters of the US 99th Division realized they were in danger of being encircled and ordered a withdrawal. The great American retreat had begun.

  However, Peiper’s orders were not just to cut off this American division, but also to advance westwards between Dom Butgenbach and Heppenba
ch and reach the Meuse River. So while he left small detachments to fight the Americans along the way he would carry his main force ever onwards. As soon as these small detachments were replaced by walking German infantry they could catch up to Peiper.

  Though they were liberating the Volksdeutsch district of Belgium the SS troops found it odd that they were not met by cheering crowds. Most civilians hid or fled. Few wanted the Nazis to return. This was especially embarrassing for those soldiers who had grown up in this region.

  By 1015 hours the US 2nd Infantry Division commander had also given orders to retreat.

  Meantime this morning, Max Hansen and his battlegroup of the SS LAH began his attack, and he soon came into contact with the US 14th Cavalry Group at Andler. After a short fight the American dismounted cavalrymen, light tanks and armored cars fell back. This created another gap in the American lines that enabled the 9th SS Hohenstaufen Panzer Division to drive forward between Lanzerath and Krewinkel. Behind Hansen were the remaining battlegroups of the SS LAH: those of Rudolf Sandig and Gustav Knittel. Additionally, the SS LAH had an army Nebelwerfer regiment attached. There was one major change in this division from previous campaigns. Most of the SS LAH’s artillery now consisted of towed guns, for there were just not enough self-propelled guns to go around. Yet, much was expected of the division.

  By noon Peiper was at Thiromont, having passed through the Volksdeutsch district and was now in a French-speaking area of Belgium. Here he found the weather just warm enough that there was no snow and the dirt roads had turned to mud, and mud was the enemy of the vehicle. So he had to pick another route. Once he found one, his column continued on and by mid-afternoon one element had reached Baugnez [near Malmedy] fully fifteen miles behind the front lines. Here some SS men ran into an American truck convoy, which they shot up. More than a hundred Americans surrendered. These prisoners, mostly belonging to B/285th Artillery Observation Battalion, were herded into a field by a few SS, while Peiper and the remainder of his men pushed on aiming for Ligneauville. As time went on the officer commanding the guards of these prisoners became frustrated that he had been left behind and that the army infantry had not caught up to take these prisoners off his hands, so he ordered them shot. [Another testimony is that the Americans tried to escape]. Either way, machine guns suddenly began blazing. There is evidence that the young SS soldiers had no heart in this, namely that of the unarmed 130 Americans in the grassy field, 43 escaped. It was an immoral shooting and a sloppy one.

  By this time Peiper’s column was already at Ligneauville where they shot up the headquarters of the US 49th Anti-Aircraft Brigade, taking many more prisoners. Then his column moved on towards Stavelot. It was after dark when Peiper’s column stealthily approached Stavelot, and he immediately lost a tank to a bazooka. Unable to see how well the town was defended, Peiper called a halt to this momentous day.

  Earlier in the day about noon the 277th Volksgrenadier Division aided by a few tanks had been able to advance and swing northwards towards Krinkelt and Rocherath. They found ad hoc forces of Americans in both villages and a confused fight developed with Americans popping up everywhere. Both opponents were now in each other’s rear. Soon SS Battlegroup Mueller of the SS HJ was trying to move through here, which added to the confusion. The shooting lasted all night.

  And behind Mueller was the remainder of Standartenfuehrer Hugo Kraas’ SS HJ Division spread out in three battlegroups under Bernhard Krause, Gerd Bremer and Herbert Kuhlman. Kuhlman’s battlegroup was light in guns, but it had been reinforced with fourteen Jagdpanthers and twenty-six Jagdpanzers of the 560th SS Jagdpanzer Detachment. Kraas also had an army Nebelwerfer regiment with him. Most of Kraas’ men were eager.

  Throughout the third day of the battle, 18 December, the 326th and 277th Volksgrenadier Divisions attacked the remnants of the US 2nd and 99th Infantry and 5th Armored Divisions on orders from Dietrich, because he demanded a wider gap in the American lines, but the volksgrenadiers failed and suffered bloody losses.

  Dietrich decided to try to outflank these defenders on his northern flank by attacking just above Rocherath, and he unleashed a small task force of the SS HJ to do it. Unfortunately, they ran into a well-organized defense of all-arms and had to stop, though they did overrun one infantry company. Soon the GIs counterattacked aided by four tanks. The SS, losing three tanks, pulled back.

  After a while Priess ordered the SS HJ to move to the south of Rocherath and try to outflank the Americans on that side.

  Meanwhile Peiper was reinforced by a battalion of German paratroopers, and he sent them into Stavelot to test the defenses. They found it defended by American engineers and anti-tank guns. Peiper then ordered his tanks forward and in a short battle he took the town and crossed the bridge over the Ambleve River.

  Peiper reached Trois Ponts only in time to see American engineers blow all three bridges. He was twenty-five miles inside the American lines, but had to pick another route yet again. So he drove on hoping to cross at Habiemont, but here too the Americans had blown the bridge. By dark he was thirty-five miles behind the American lines, but had to halt to await the arrival of bridging equipment.

  It had been a frustrating day for Peiper, but worse news was to reach him, for this evening the US 30th Infantry Division had counterattacked and retaken the bridge at Stavelot. Even more galling was the news that Fifth Panzer Army had broken through and had completely destroyed the US 106th Infantry Division, reaching Gouvy and creating what the Americans called a ‘Bulge’ in their lines fifteen miles deep and getting deeper. Of course Peiper was happy the Germans were winning the battle, but like most commanders he wanted a piece of the action, if not the sole limelight. He did not like being upstaged.

  But Dietrich was honest enough to realize that the main breakthrough was going to come from the Fifth Panzer Army in the St. Vith area, rather than from his own Sixth Panzer Army, and he urged his peers to take St. Vith. To help them he ordered the SS Hohenstaufen to swerve southwest through Poteau to outflank St. Vith from the north.

  However, the SS Hohenstaufen had no sooner taken Poteau than they were counterattacked by the US 7th Armored Division. The SS warriors fell back rather than fight it out, because they knew they could outflank the enemy by going through Recht.

  On the morning of the fourth day, the 19th, Peiper advanced northwards to Stoumont. At first his boys did well, smashing into a battalion of the US 30th Infantry Division, but then an American tank/infantry counter assault pushed his men backwards. Peiper for the first time in this offensive ordered his men to fall back, while he set up his headquarters at La Gleize. At the same time he sent troops to reoccupy Stavelot in his rear. They failed in a bloody battle. Suddenly it dawned on Peiper: he was trapped.

  Furthermore, to Peiper’s east, i.e. his rear, the US 1st Infantry Division was coming down from the north, obviously intending to reinforce the Americans at Stavelot and ensure Peiper remained trapped. Therefore, Priess sent the SS HJ westwards along Peiper’s route with orders to link up with Peiper before the US 1st could get into place.

  On the morning of the 20th Peiper found himself under attack in the La Gleize area by the US 30th Infantry Division reinforced with armor, while to his west the US 82nd Airborne Division was attacking him. His only possible escape route lay to his southeast through the villages of Wanne and Recht, where he might link up with the SS Hohenstaufen. Priess agreed that the remainder of the SS LAH under Oberfuehrer Wilhelm Mohnke should attack Wanne to try to link up with Peiper and the Hohenstaufen.

  But Peiper could no longer move, because his fuel convoy in his rear had been destroyed by an advance party of the US 3rd Armored Division. However, he could still fight and when more American tanks arrived Peiper’s men stopped them cold.

  Meanwhile in the early morning hours of the fifth day, the 20th, the SS HJ ran into the US 1st Infantry Division at Dom Butgenbach. Several times Kraas’ SS tried to break through, but the Americans fought ferociously. [The Big Red One was arguably their best
division]. Furthermore, the Americans appeared to have all the artillery in the world. After the eighth Mark IV was knocked out, Kraas withdrew to ponder.

  A flanking move by part of the SS HJ was stopped at Buellingen.

  The 3rd Parachute Division now swung from behind the SS HJ, diverted southwestwards, and attacked the Americans at Waimes. They too were repulsed.

  This same day Fifth Panzer Army failed to take St Vith.

  Just after midnight [now 21 December] Kraas attacked Dom Butgenbach again with elements of his SS HJ and some paratroopers. The slaughter continued all night into dawn, and only after fourteen and a half hours of murder did Kraas call off the attack.

  This day, the 21st, Fifth Panzer Army launched another all out assault on St Vith, and to aid them Dietrich sent Bittrich’s II SS Panzer Corps of the SS Das Reich and SS Hohenstaufen to the Recht area and ordered them to attack southwards, hoping to cut off St Vith. Bittrich was glad to have Friedrich Bock back as his artillery chief. Bittrich who also had an SS mortar battalion with him ran into part of the US 7th Armored Division at Poteau and was brought to a halt.

  So far Skorzeny’s ‘American-speaking’ soldiers of his reconnaissance force had had little luck. Only about 50 or so had managed to get behind US lines. Dressed as American military police they gave false directions, passed along phony orders and created extreme havoc, but their activities spooked some Americans into asking too many questions. Oddly enough a recent US First Army rule prohibited more than three men from riding in a jeep. Skorzeny’s wolves in sheep’s clothing did not know this and rode around four to a jeep, bringing attention to themselves. Eventually sixteen of these men were ‘uncovered’ and captured. After a little interrogation the Americans killed them.