Soldier, Priest, and God

by F S Naiden

  67. Alexander’s first political maneuvers: DS 17.2.3, 5.2.

  68. Alexander the Lyncestian’s hastily acknowledging Alexander as king paved the way for this bargain between the new ruler and the most senior companion (Arr. An. 1.25.2). Perhaps Antipater coached the Lyncestian, as suggested by Badian (1963), 248. Antipater did not come to the aid of the Lyncestian’s brothers, and Alexander put them to death.

  69. Death of Amyntas within some months: Curt. 6.9.17, Justin 12.6.14. More than a year later: Arr. fr. 1.22. Cf. Plu. Fort Alex. 327c, saying that Amyntas had support throughout Macedon. Yet Amyntas had no military record. Nor was Attalus a candidate for the throne, pace DS 17.2.3.

  70. The Aegae palace had a total of sixteen rooms with space for 224, according to Kottaridi (2011b), 176–77.

  71. This is tomb II at Vergina, identified as the place of burial of Philip II by Andronikos (1984), who at 115 accordingly says Alexander III and Philip II are depicted in the frieze. Bibliography through 2006: Borza and Palagia (2007), who argue that Tomb II holds the remains of Philip Arrhidaeus and his wife Adea Eurydice, and that the frieze accordingly depicts Alexander III and Arrhidaeus, as at 102–3. Bibliography through 2010: Lane Fox (2011a), agreeing with Andronikos. Bibliography through 2011: Carney (2015), 107, 125–26, agreeing with Borza and Palagia. Both interpretations are speculative, as the two figures in the frieze are not identified by name, and only one figure can be identified by role, i.e., the lion-killer, who must be the entombed king. If Philip II was not buried in tomb II, the question arises where he was buried instead. Possibly tomb I at Vergina: Borza and Palagia (2007); Carney (2015), 107. Contra: Lane Fox (2011a), 3–7. The remaining possibility at Vergina, tomb III, is assigned by most writers to Alexander IV.

  Wherever Philip was buried, there was no time to establish a cult in his name, an honor for which funeral games would be only the first step. The putative hērōon found by Andronikos was thus established on some other occasion, if not for some other purpose; see Kottaridi (2011a), 24, and Hammond (1991) connecting it with tomb I, vs. Lane Fox (2011a), 7, connecting it with tomb II.

  72. Fig. 25 in Saatsoglou-Paliadeli (2011), with 284, supposing that Alexander has killed the boar.

  73. The right eye obscured: Lane Fox (2011a), 17. The meaning of the laurel is unknown. Victory is one possibility, but over whom?

  74. Hdt. 7.125, Paus. 6.5.5–6, as at Lane Fox (2011a), 10–11.

  75. Adapted from HR 4–6. Alexander by birth half Egyptian: Ps.-Call. A 1.1–12, Ar. Ps.-Call. 1.4–8. By birth half Persian: Firdausi, as in Ch. 3 below; al-Tabari 697. A Macedonian: al-Tabari, 700; Nizami, 1.15.36.

  Chapter 2

  A Macedonian Priest-King

  1. The first of many rumors of Alexander’s death: Arr. An. 1.7.3. The early campaigns: Arr. An. 1.7, the only account to mention units and the companions commanding them.

  2. The insults: DS 17.9.4–6. Letting a subordinate take the initiative: Arr. An. 1.8.1–4. Doubting the role of Perdiccas: Bosworth (1980) ad Arr. An. 1.8.1, regarding the account in Arrian as distorted by Ptolemy’s bias against a rival general. Yet the report of a Theban mock retreat is credible, given Theban military skill, and independent action by regimental commanders like Perdiccas, or by their subordinates, appears on other occasions, such as Halicarnassus (Arr. An 1.21.1–4, by Perdiccas’s men), Issus (2.11.1, by Coenus and Perdiccas), and Gaugamela (3.14.4, by Simmias). The alternative maneuver, fighting in relays, as at DS 17.12.1, is plausible, for Macedonians used it elsewhere, as shown by Sinclair (1966).

  3. Supplication: App. 2 #1. The romantic scene with Timoclea, one falling just short of supplication: Aristoboulos FGrH 139 F 2 with Plu. Mul. virt. 259d–60d.

  4. The exceptions: Arr. An. 1.9.9–10, DS 17.14.1, Plu. Alex. 11.10. Instinsky (1961), 248, mistakenly supposes that the protection due to suppliants in shrines extended to suppliants removed from shrines and then sold; see Naiden (2009), 120–21. The highest reported total of enslaved persons: see the lists compiled by Ducrey (1999), 74–92, and Volkmann (1961), 14–46.

  5. Medical details: Bliquez (2014), 23–50, especially carrying cases (Hp. Decent. 9.8.8.–9L), sundry iron instruments (Morb. 2.28P), rasps (VC 14.2, 14.7, 14.9 ed. Hanson [1999]), forceps (Medic. 9P, Nat. mul. 8.70.5L), tubes (Morb. 2.59–60P, 2.33, 2.36), and drills (Loc. Hom. 32B). Speculation about anesthetics: Bliquez (2014), 18. Philip: Pl. NH 7.37.37. Few wounded commoners are mentioned by name in the Alexander historians: Arr. An. 1.8.3, Perdiccas, at Thebes; Arr. An. 3.14.3, Curt 4.16.32, DS 17.61.3, Hephaestion, Coenus, and Menidas, at Gaugamela; Arr. An. 6.10.2, Leonnatus and Peucestas at siege of the Malli. An attempt to fill gaps in the evidence: Ruffin (1992).

  6. Macedonian casualties at Chaeronea: DS 17.14.1. Greek casualties, and large numbers of people enslaved: DS 17.41.1, Plu. Alex. 11.12.

  7. Boeotians prevent the engineer, Crates, from proceeding: Str. 9.2.18–20.

  8. The satraps owed the king loyalty enjoined by Mithra, but not any obedience peculiar to slaves: Schmidt (1978), 285, citing a parallel in the Rigveda 29. There is no evidence, however, that they were initiated into any cult of Mithra.

  9. The consensus of Dandamaev and Lukonin (1989), Briant (2002), and the essays in Frei and Koch (1996): considerable control exercised by satraps over provinces, and by generals over garrison towns. Dandamaev and Lukonin also stress local autonomy, whereas the essays in Frei and Koch stress manipulation of local elites.

  10. The doubtful evidence for a recent rebellion in Babylon: Stolper (1994a), 240. If Babylon rebelled, Alexander likely did not know of it, whereas he did know of the Persian difficulties in Egypt.

  11. Darius III in Egypt: DS 17.6.1–3, Justin 10.3.4. Babylonian ancestors: Ktesias FGrH 688 F 15.47–51.

  12. Darius the young soldier: Justin 10.3.4, DS 17.6.1–3. Defending Darius’s legitimacy: Briant (2002), 772, citing DS 17.5.5, which concerns descent through the female line. Alexander rejects this claim at Curt. 6.3.12.

  13. Impressive Babylonian royal titles also made up for the lack of superlative adjectives in Akkadian (the same as in Hebrew).

  14. The alliance between Philip and Persia: Arr. An. 2.14.2, doubted by Bosworth (1980) ad loc., but not so strongly as to deny that Philip was surprised and disappointed when Persian interference made it impossible for him to blockade Perinthus in 340 (Arr. An. 2.14.5, DS 14.75.2, Paus. 1.29.6).

  15. Alexander’s opinion of Darius’s legitimacy: Arr. An. 2.14.4–5, Curt. 6.3.12. A similar formulation: Wilcken (1932), 248. The contrary: Lane Fox (1973), 98, attributing this opinion to “some Greeks,” but not Alexander.

  16. This view of Alexander’s aims reflects the religious rituals performed at the Hellespont and at Troy later in this chapter. Various writers hold that Alexander’s aims evolved, and did not at first include conquering the entire empire. Tarn (1948), 1.8, held that at first Alexander was opportunistic, the same as his father had been. Somewhat similarly, Burn (1963), 64, held that his initial aim was to give his large army employment. Bosworth (1993), 18–19, accepts the language in the ancient sources of a war of revenge. For these and other views, Egypt and Babylon are targets of opportunity, not original objectives.

  17. Cyrus “the Great”: first attested in Agathocles FGrH 472 F 6, fl. 2nd cent. BC. Merely Kurash, son of Kurash: ANET 316. Elamite cultural mixture: Scheil (1905), 59–61, followed by Amiet (1979). The Achaemenid dynasty, merely collateral descendants from Cyrus, changed the name of Anshan to Paruash, later Persia; see Hansman (1972), 106–9.

  18. Hdt. 1.154–56, 61 gives two examples of Cyrus’s recruits, Pactyes and Mazares.

  19. Cyrus the restorer of neglected cults: ABC 104–11, with Jursa (2007). His abundant sacrifices: l. 37, Cyrus Cylinder. His antiquarianism: l. 43, Cyrus Cylinder. His religious policy: Heller (2010), 254–56, expanding on ANET 306. Elamite ceremonial dress: ABC 7 3.26 with George (1996), 379–81. Or perhaps Cambyses wore this dress—a much more pointed gesture. Another view: Waerzeggers, in which the Cyrus Cylinder e
xpresses Babylonian hopes, which would eventually be dashed (lecture delivered June 30, 2010, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, as reported by Van der Spek [2014], 250 n. 140).

  20. Cyrus receives adulation at Is. 44:28–45:1, where Van der Spek (2014), 251, suggests that the Hebrew prophet was attempting to influence the king.

  21. Cambyses thus became šar mātāti like his father: Dandamaev (1990). He was king of Babylon earlier, while crown prince, but only briefly.

  22. Cyrus the diviner: X. Cyr. 1.6.2. Cyrus’s many debts to Assyrian and Babylonian predecessors were unknown to the Greeks, making it all the easier to idealize him; see Van der Spek (2014). The superior diet of the ancient hunter: Hughes (2014), 30–31. No doubt the army of Cyrus enjoyed the same advantage over Levantine opponents.

  23. A violent council meeting: App. 3 #45, one of just five councils of Darius reported in the Alexander historians.

  24. Big battle: App. 3 #13–17. Daily route: App. 3 #35. Battles, or courts-martial, or special sacrifices: App. 3 #1 (Mount Haemus), 3 (Granicus), 7 (Issus), 8 (Tyre), 13–17 (Gaugamela), 18 (Persian Gates); 4, 23–24, 27, 28 (trials of the Lyncestian, Philotas, Hermolaus, and Callisthenes); 11, 26 (sacrifice). Line of march: App. 3 #6 (at Mallus), 20 (at Tabae). Health and safety: 5, 25, 33. Diplomacy 9, 10, 12. Strategy: 8 (Egypt), 29–31 (the line of march to be followed after reaching the Hyphasis, and thus a question of strategy), 36–41 (Arabian expedition).

  25. Seniority as shown by App. 3 under the column “Speakers,” #2, 3, 7 (Curt. 3.7.8–10), 9, 10 (Plu. Alex. 29.7–8), 12, 13, 15, 16, all Parmenio; 15, Polyperchon; 23, 33, Craterus; 26, Erigyius; 29, Coenus. Marriage: App. 3 #2.

  26. So also Squillace (2004), but without reference to any customary procedures in the council of war. For customs with the force of law in ancient or tribal societies, see Pospisil (1971) and Barkun (1968), both omitting military institutions. Skeptical attitudes toward the council of generals: Bosworth (1980) ad Arr. An. 1.25.4; similarly, Atkinson (1980) ad Curt. 3.7.8. Neither writer notices most of the councils listed in App. 3; nor do Atkinson and Yardley (2009) and J. Hamilton (1999). A negative but nuanced view: Errington (1978), 114, saying that the council was only “informal.” Earlier expressions of the idea: Meyer (1910), and Adcock (1957) 74, implying that a council was unnecessary since Alexander was “his own chief of staff and foreign minister.” In contrast, Droysen (1833), 127–28, 132–33, 183, 250, 312–13, 425, regarded the council as an institution comparable to a medieval council of barons.

  27. Reckoning from the fact that later a hypaspist received a drachma a day, or about one-half of 1 percent of a talent per month, and from the assumption that, although many soldiers were paid less, cavalry and officers were paid more, so that one-half of 1 percent is a minimal average. Multiplying by 45,000 yields 225 talents. The drachma a day: IG ii2 329, but see the doubts of Milns (1987), 246–47. Wages implied by contraction of debts by soldiers: Arr. An. 7.10.3. Wages indubitable as of 326: Arr. An. 6.9.3, 10.1. Wages since 334: Milns (1987), 246–47.

  28. Sixty merchant vessels: DS 17.17.2. Some of these were Greek, perhaps reducing Alexander’s burden, but for doubts about financing these ships, see Milns (1987), 246–47, with Arr. An. 1.11.6, 1.18.4. Naval costs: Eddy (1968), 142–43, arguing for a slightly lower cost than this conventional estimate.

  29. Seven thousand talents: Berve (1926), 1.312. Debts: Arr. An. 7.9.6 [-800]; or Onesikritos FGrH F 2 [-200]; perhaps plus Plu. Fort. Alex. 327e, Aristoboulos FGrH 139 F 4 [+70]. Tax relief: DS 17.2.2–3. Plu. Alex. 15.2, Fort. Alex. 327d, not quite admitting the borrowing discerned by Green (1991), 156.

  30. The needed local portent: App. 1b #2. The report of Delphic endorsement at #1 is a doublet as at Ch. 1, n. 55.

  31. The common unit sizes, in a summary view with bibliography: Errington (1990), 242–43, leading to a calculation of 2 officers per file of 16, one in front and one in back, or 32 officers in a lochos of 256, led by a lochagos; 3 commanders called pentakosiarchs, each leading two lochoi; and a taxis commander, or 202 in all, for a notional regiment of some 1,500, or a ratio of 1 to 7. Other accounts of the army: Berve (1926), 1.103–217, Fuller (1958), 39–54, Milns (1968), 194–95, Hammond and Griffith (1979), 405–50, Bosworth (1988a), 273–77. Concentrating on officers: Lazenby (1985), ch. 1, and Wrightson (2010). Cf. the Spartan army of X. Lac. 11, with 169 officers (96 enomotarchs, 48 pentakosiarchs, 24 lochagoi, and a polemarch), for a force of a notional 600 men in each of six morai, or an officer-to-soldier ratio of 1 to 21. (Six hundred: X. HG 4.5.15. Five hundred to 900: Plu. Pel. 17.3.) Add four file leaders per enomoty, and one man in six was an officer. The ratio falls even further if the Spartans had file-closers like the mostly Peloponnesian mercenaries in Xenophon’s Anabasis, as argued at Wheeler (2007), 207. A different organization in the preceding century: Van Wees (2004), app. 2, with bibliography on this long-disputed question. The officers’ corps of Near-Eastern armies ought to be smaller, if we assume that there was an officer for every ten, hundred, and thousand men, as was the common report for Semitic armies; for Assyria, see Malbrat-Laban (1982), 121–23. Besides biblical examples (2 Sam. 18:1, 1 Chron. 26:26), a Persian garrison of Hebrew soldiers at Elephantine organized by hundreds and thousands: Porten (1968), 29–30. For Persia, the Persepolis ration tablets refer to a pascadathapatis, “rear leader of ten,” corresponding to the leader of five at X. Cyr. 2.1.21, 3.3.10. For Egyptian armies, there is very little evidence for unit sizes.

  32. The makeup of the army is more surely known than the precise number, which in the ancient sources varies from 35,000 to 48,500; see Bosworth (1980) ad Arr. An. 1.11.3, with refs. The 45,000 total given below includes the forces already assigned to Parmenio in Asia Minor (the admittedly round figure of 10,000 at DS 17.7.10, Polyaen 5.44.4).

  33. Infantry half from the highlands: i.e., half asthetairoi from Lyncestis, Orestis, and Elimaia, but the first syllable in asthetairoi is of uncertain meaning; see Bosworth (1980) ad Arr. An. 1.25.4. Another view of the Greeks: Kahrstedt (1936), 122, saying that Alexander kept the Greek force small because he thought it disloyal.

  34. Calculations of supplies follow parameters at Sidebotham (2011), Junkelmann (1997), and Roth (1999), used in addition to (or in correction of) Engels (1978).

  35. The festival during Daisios: Hatzopoulos (1996), 1.150, 1.411–12, with sources as at Baege (1913), 226–27.

  36. Antipater’s allotment: DS 17.17.5.

  37. Antipater’s age: Sud. s.v. Ἀντίπατρος and Luc. Macr. 2. Delphi in 342: Liban. 23.1.66. Purple and white: Plu. Reg. apophth. 180e. The suspicions of Olympias: Arr. An. 7.12.5, Plu. Fort. Alex. 332f = Reg. apophth. 180d, Justin 12.14.3. Antipater’s attitude: Arr. An. 7.12.6, Plu. Reg. apophth. 180d.

  38. Parmenio’s act of worship: App. 1a #4, an occasion that would naturally occur at the start of the expedition. The only other conceivable date would be the year before, when he went to Anatolia with a small infantry force that would be much harder to compare to the Argonauts.

  39. Jason: Hegesander apud. Ath. 13.572d. The only comment linking this precedent to Macedon: Stoll (1884).

  40. Dascylium had long been a military headquarters: Bakir (1995), 271–73, (2006), 66.

  41. Memnon thus outgeneraled Parmenio by making use of interior lines. A similar view: Badian (1966), 43. A different view, holding that Parmenio’s main task was to hold Abydos: Anson (1989), 48.

  42. The channel route: Leaf (1912), 400–403. The sacrifices: Arr. An. 1.11.5, sacrificing for greater success than the Achaeans had at Troy; DS 17. 17.2, Justin 11.5.10–11, seeking Asia’s submission (App. 1a #5–6).

  43. A similar view of the Hellespontine sacrifices: Worthington (2014), 131–32, and Cartledge (2004), 165, preceded by Milnes (1968), 56, and Droysen (1833), 24. A less expansive view: Altheim (1953), 62. A fixed but less ambitious aim, to attack the Persian Empire in force: Instinsky (1949), 22–28. An impressionistic but less ambitious aim, to equal Homeric heroes: Lane Fox (1973), 111–12. A caution that Greek hopes of reveng
e did not encompass the conquest of the entire Persian Empire: Atkinson and Yardley (2009) ad Curt. 10.3.7, analyzing statements by Isocrates.

  44. Alexander and Priam: Arr. An. 1.11.7–12.1, DS 17.17.6–7 (App. 1a #7). App. 1b #3 is evidently a post-eventum prophecy, since Aristander does not in any other instance predict the death of an individual.

  45. Troy and Assyria: Pl. Lg. 685c, Ktesias FGrH 688 F 1.22.

  46. Adapted from Ar. Ps.-Call. 1.14.

  Chapter 3

  The S-Curve

  1. Lampsacus: App. 2 #2. Janke (1904), 135, identified the inland route, which passed the inland town of Colossae on the way to Hermotum (Arr. An. 1.12.6). As Bosworth (1980) observes ad Arr. An. 1.12.6, the leader of the delegation of Lampsacene suppliants, Anaximenes, performed well, being rewarded with a commemorative statue—the only known statue of this kind (FGrH ii C. 105).

  2. Local shrines: Paus. 10.31.6–7. The eastern Memnon: Hdt. 5.53 (in Susa); Ktesias FGrH 688 F 1.22 (at Troy), with Drews (1965), 130.

  3. The polis of Zeleia: Arr. An. 1.12.8, Syll. 279. A tyrant in charge, however, in 334: Berve (1926), no. 551. A tributary of the Granicus may have been bridged at the city of Didymateiche, which may be modern Dimetoka, but the army would still have to cross the Granicus afterward. For Didymateiche, see Hasluck (1909), 125, and Robert (1937), 195. The only other possible bridge over the Granicus would have been at Sidene, an upcountry town garrisoned by the Persians; see IMT Gran/Pariane, no. 1097; Jeffery (1961), 372, no. 50. Memnon’s plan: Arr. An. 1.12.9. As Bosworth (1980) ad loc. observes, destruction of food supplies was a common tactic, one used by Persians at X. An. 1.6.2.

  4. Daisios and the harvest: EM. 252.29.

  5. Memnon’s council of war: App. 3 #44. Darius’s orders: Justin 11.6.8. Spitadatha: DS 17.13.1 as explained by 17.20.2, συγγενεῖς, a word that here refers to a unit. Many passages in the Yasna envision war between good and evil, or Ahura Mazda and his enemy, Angra Mainyu: 32.6, 10, 34.8, 44.15, 48.7, and others at Choksy (2012).