Europe's Last Summer

by David Fromkin

  However, Bethmann scored a success in negotiating an agreement with the S.RD. leadership to fall in line behind the government in this moment of national danger.

  Meanwhile, the Kaiser, still unaware that his decision for peace had been sabotaged by his subordinates, confusedly wondered whether he had acted too late. He remarked that "the ball is rolling" and "can no longer be stopped."

  London. Churchill reported to King George V the various measures taken by the Admiralty to place the navy "upon a preparatory precautionary basis." After detailing many of the steps taken, he assured his monarch: "It is needless to emphasize that these measures in no way prejudice an intervention or take for granted that the peace of the great powers will not be preserved."

  At midnight Churchill wrote to his wife: "My darling one and beautiful, everything tends towards catastrophe and collapse." Britain was not, he continued, "in any serious degree responsible for the wave of madness which has swept the mind of Christendom."

  Prime Minister Asquith wrote to his confidante, Venetia Stanley, that he had just been told that the French government was ordering heavy sales of securities on the London Exchange in order to raise cash: "It looks ominous." The English house of Rothschild, with whom the order was placed, refused to execute it. Then Asquith received a cable reporting "that Austria had ordered war!" Venetia Stanley sometimes told the Prime Minister that there were days when she would like to trade places with him; this, he suggested, probably would not be such a day.

  CHAPTER 36: JULY 29

  Potsdam. Willy cabled Nicky that Russia really could stay out of the conflict. "I think a direct understanding between your government and Vienna possible and desirable" and—the Kaiser did not know that this was untrue—"my government is continuing its exertions to promote it." Wilhelm cautioned, however, that if Russia were to take military measures that threatened Austria, such measures would bring war rather than peace.

  Nicky replied, indicating what puzzled him was that what he was hearing from the Kaiser was not what he was hearing from the Kaiser's ambassador. "Please clear up this difference," he wrote. Nicholas urged that the Austro-Serbian conflict be referred to The Hague* for adjudication. "I trust to your wisdom and friendship."

  *His reference would have been to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, established at The Hague by the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1899).

  Questions arose in the minds of Austrian generals now that it was recognized in Vienna that Russia really might intervene if Serbia were threatened with destruction. These questions were directed to German Foreign Minister Jagow. A couple of days before, he had given official assurances to the Russian government that Berlin had no objection to a Russian partial mobilization so long as it was not directed against Germany.

  The Austrians now pointed out to their German colleagues that a partial Russian mobilization had been ordered that was directed against Austria. Were it to remain in effect would that not mean that when Austria sent its armies against Serbia, the Dual Monarchy would be left defenseless against a Russian attack from behind? Conrad still hoped that Germany would deter Russia, and rashly made his dispositions on the assumption that Germany would succeed in doing so.

  In conversation with a Russian envoy, Jagow therefore reversed his position. In view of Russia's partial mobilization, "Germany was likewise obliged to mobilize; there was therefore nothing left to be done and the diplomatists must now leave the talking to the cannon." If this was intended to persuade the Russians to roll back their partial mobilization, it failed of its purpose.

  Moltke delivered to his government a memo he had written on the current situation. He had expected, as had his military colleagues, that Austria would not commence hostilities for another couple of weeks. Like the Kaiser, he had not known that Jagow had been pressuring Vienna to act at once. Therefore Moltke had been taken by surprise by the Austrian declaration of war. In his memo, he analyzed the consequences of Austria's move. When Austria moved, it was bound to initiate a series of events that would bring Germany into a war against Russia. According to Moltke, "the civilized states of Europe will begin to tear one another to pieces." It now would take a miracle to prevent the outbreak of a "war which will annihilate the civilization of almost the whole of Europe for decades to come."

  Yet it was a price he was prepared to pay. His question to his government essentially was, did it still believe that it could localize the conflict and thus avert the dire consequences he foresaw?

  The Kaiser summoned Germany's military leaders to Potsdam to discuss his conversations with Bethmann. The Kaiser said that his Chancellor, in the words of Tirpitz, who was there, "had collapsed completely" and Wilhelm had "expressed himself without reserve regarding Bethmann's incompetence."

  Bethmann, in fact, had set two chief goals for himself. One of them had been to secure acceptance of the war policy by labor and the Left—which he had done. The other was to get Britain's pledge of neutrality—which he had not done. Keeping Britain out of the war was important to Bethmann though not at all important to Germany's military leaders.

  According to Tirpitz, at the Potsdam conference, "The Kaiser informed the company that the Chancellor had proposed that, in order to keep England neutral, we should sacrifice the German fleet for an agreement with England, which he, the Kaiser, had refused."

  It was decided at the conference to do nothing until Vienna responded to the Kaiser's proposal to halt in Belgrade and then stop the war. Bethmann had finally sent the proposal, while sabotaging it. He had forwarded it with instructions to his ambassador to make sure the Austrians understood that Germany did not wish to "restrain" them; he wanted to underline for Vienna that the proposal was only for propaganda purposes.

  But after the Kaiser had upbraided Bethmann at Potsdam and the Chancellor had collapsed emotionally, Bethmann tried desperately to reverse himself. He threw himself into an effort to get Vienna to do precisely what he had let Vienna understand only the day before that it should not do. At 10:18 p.m. he sent an open cable to Austria-Hungary asking if his halt-in-Belgrade message of the day before had been received. Twelve minutes later he impatiently cabled again.

  By now the Chancellor was aware that, independently of one another, both Britain and Italy had proposed plans to keep the peace that were quite similar to the Kaiser's halt-in-Belgrade plan. It now looked as though, if only Bethmann and Jagow had loyally carried out Wilhelm's instructions the day before and brought Germany's full weight to bear upon its ally, the war crisis would have been resolved.

  Instead, on the evening of the twenty-ninth, Bethmann, if he were to escape the Kaiser's wrath, had to hope that Austria-Hungary, too, would be willing to change course.

  To his ambassador in Austria, Bethmann now cabled: "We are, of course, prepared to do our duty as allies, but must decline to let ourselves be dragged by Vienna, irresponsibly and without regard to our advice, into a world conflagration." He told his ambassador to persuade Berchtold that Austria should at least make a show: "In order to prevent general catastrophe, or at any rate put Russia in the wrong, we must urgently advise that Vienna should initiate and pursue conversations."

  But at the same time Moltke was cabling Conrad to urge a full Austrian mobilization. Perhaps this showed Moltke's justified concern that Austria might mobilize against Serbia rather than Russia.

  Yet Berchtold was right to ask, as he did when he saw the Chancellor's message: "Who rules in Berlin—Moltke or Bethmann?" One cabled war while the other cabled peace. In any event, Bethmann was too late. His cable arrived hours after Vienna, responding to Moltke, ordered full mobilization.

  Earlier that day, in London, Grey had asked the German ambassador to come by to see him. The foreign secretary and Lichnowsky conversed as old friends, but in contemplating the outbreak of a European war, Grey "did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside" and that "I did not wish
to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action."

  In diplomatic language, this threatened war. But Grey knew that, at least for the moment, his government was not behind him on this.

  It was in the course of this conversation with Lichnowsky that Grey made his own halt-in-Belgrade proposal, which was so similar to Kaiser Wilhelm's. When Lichnowsky reported this to him, the Kaiser commented: "We have been trying to accomplish this for days, in vain." He did not know that Bethmann and Jagow had undercut him in Vienna on July 27 and 28, and that the proposal had been urged seriously only for hours, not days.

  Lichnowsky reported that London was firmly convinced that "unless Austria is willing to enter upon a discussion of the Serbian question a world war is inevitable." In Grey's view, "If war breaks out it will be the greatest catastrophe that the world has ever seen." The Kaiser's comment on this was that it would be England's fault; all Britain had to do was give the word, he said, and France and Russia would quiet down and there would be no war." "England alone" he wrote, "bears the responsibility for peace and war."

  "It is one of the ironies of the case," wrote Asquith to his friend Venetia Stanley, "that we being the only Power who has made so much as a constructive suggestion on the direction of peace, are blamed by both Germany and Russia for causing the outbreak of war. Germany says: 'if you say you will be neutral, France and Russia wouldn't dare to fight,' and Russia says: 'if you boldly declare that you will side with us, Germany and Austria will at once draw in their horns.' Neither of course is true."

  That day the cabinet approved issuing a general alert, which was sent to British bases around the world. Various and extensive precautions were taken. In technical terms, the "War Book" was opened by the secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence. Yet most cabinet members intended to keep Britain out of the conflict.

  Winston Churchill feared that opinion in the cabinet and in the governing Liberal party was still inclined to neutrality. Secretly he sent word to his closest Conservative friend, F. E. Smith, asking him to sound out his party's leadership on the possibility of forming a coalition government supported by pro-intervention Liberals—in all likelihood a minority within their own party—and all Conservatives. Smith undertook to speak to the other party leaders when he was scheduled to see them two days later for a country weekend.

  Churchill had more pressing concerns. As First Lord of the Admiralty, he worried that the navy was vulnerable to surprise attack. He wanted to move the fleets to their wartime stations in the well-protected north. But, he later recalled, he did not want to ask cabinet approval for such a move, which might be construed as provocative. Instead, he went to see the Prime Minister with his proposal, and decided to construe a sort of grunt from Asquith as approval.

  The move was made in secrecy, and the crucial part of the journey to safety took place at night—in Churchill's account, "as darkness fell, eighteen miles of warships running at high speed and in absolute blackness through the narrow straits, bearing with them into the broad waters of the North the safeguard" of Britain's forces.

  Paris. Jean Jaurès, pacifist idol of the French Left, was assassinated by a nationalist fanatic. For more than a week, Jaurès had been praising the efforts of the Poincaré-Viviani government to keep the peace. Unexpectedly his death unified the country behind its government.

  Berlin. At a late hour—indeed, close to midnight—Bethmann summoned the British ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, to his residence. The Chancellor asked Goschen to transmit an offer to London: if Britain agreed to remain neutral in the war that might soon commence, Germany would respect the independence and integrity of Holland, and would not seek to acquire French territories—a pledge from which the French colonies were excluded. Goschen did convey the message to the Foreign Office, where it was received the following morning and angered Grey when he read it.

  CHAPTER 37: JULY 30

  France's Ambassador Paléologue in St. Petersburg has been blamed for years by historians—wrongly, we now believe—for having failed during the night of July 29–30 to notify his government that Russia was mobilizing. Research by Jean Stengers has shown that the Russians—distrusting Paléologue—did not tell him. When France did learn of the impending move, it was too late to stop the Russians.

  Thursday, July 30, was a day that many historians later were to regard as fateful, and it began badly. The night before, the German government, belatedly falling in with the Kaiser, had sent a message to Vienna telling Austria-Hungary to accept the halt-in-Belgrade formula for pulling back from war—either that or lose Germany's support. But Berchtold claimed to be unable to give a reply for the time being. It was especially frustrating because, as Wilhelm noted, Germany, Britain, and Russia all seemed to agree on the halt-in-Belgrade proposal.

  Wilhelm felt discouraged. News reached him that Austria-Hungary was willing to hold talks with Russia; "all too late, I fear" was his comment. "Begin! Now!" he exclaimed. Interpreting such remarks, in his own fashion, Bethmann urged Berchtold to at least go through the motions of seeking a peaceful settlement, for otherwise—if Vienna said no—Bethmann argued, "It will hardly be possible any longer to place the guilt of the outbreak of a European war on Russia's shoulders." The Kaiser was attempting to mediate an end to the crisis only because "he could not refuse to do so without creating the incontrovertible suspicion that we wanted war." He added that if "Vienna declines everything, Vienna will be giving documentary evidence that it absolutely wants a war . . . while Russia remains free of responsibility. That would place us, in the eyes of our own people, in an untenable position."

  Meanwhile the Kaiser was enraged by the response his mediation efforts were receiving in St. Petersburg because he misunderstood what was happening. At dawn he awakened to find a message from Nicholas informing him that Russia had ordered the partial mobilization decided upon on July 25: the mobilization in four districts facing Austria-Hungary. According to the Czar, "the military measures which have now come into force were decided five days ago." They were, in other words, the measures Russia's Council of Ministers had envisaged but not immediately adopted when informed that Vienna had rejected Serbia's partial acceptance of the Austrian ultimatum. Russia had stood still ever since, giving negotiations a chance. These were not new measures or additional measures; they were the only measures Russia had taken—and they had just been taken. Mobilization was only about to begin.

  Wilhelm misunderstood. He believed the Czar was informing him that Russia had been mobilizing for five days, and therefore was ahead of Germany, which was still hanging back. "So that is almost a week ahead of us," protested the Kaiser. "And these are supposed to be of defense against Austria, who is not attacking him!!! I cannot commit myself to mediation any more, since the Czar, who appealed for it, has at the same time been secretly mobilizing behind my back." To Nicholas's plea, "We need your strong pressure on Austria," Wilhelm scribbled, "No, there is no thought of anything of that sort!!!"

  The Czar, according to Wilhelm, "has simply been acting a part and leading us up the garden path!"—leading the Kaiser to conclude: "That means I have got to mobilize as well!"

  But the Kaiser later replied in a civil tone to the Czar. Wilhelm said: "I have gone to the utmost limits of the possible in my efforts to save peace. . . . Even now, you can still save the peace of Europe by stopping your military measures."

  The German ambassador in St. Petersburg warned the Czar that mobilization by Russia would bring about German mobilization. In this, the German government was overreacting. Russian mobilization did not pose the deadly danger that German mobilization would. For Germany, mobilization meant war; for Russia, as its government explained to the Germans, it did not. "Russia's armies," as an academic authority recently has pointed out, could "remain mobile behind their frontier almost indefinitely." And the German government really knew that.

  St. Petersburg. Sazonov te
lephoned the Czar to ask for an immediate appointment. He then traveled to Tsarskoe Selo, the Czar's palace, where he solemnly advised his monarch that war had become unavoidable and that general mobilization was required. Reluctantly, the Czar agreed and Sazonov gave the necessary orders.

  The German military plenipotentiary at the St. Petersburg embassy reported: "I have the impression that they [the Russians] have mobilized here from a dread of coming events without any aggressive intentions and are now frightened at what they have brought about." To Kaiser Wilhelm, that apparently had the ring of truth. "Right, that is it" was his comment.

  The Czar, reacting to the Kaiser's messages, rescinded full mobilization. He ordered his generals to swing back to partial mobilization. What next? The Russian Council of Ministers did not meet, but individual leaders offered their views to their sovereign. There were persuasive voices on all sides. Sazonov joined with the generals to urge a general mobilization, which the indecisive and unhappy Czar, changing his mind again, finally ordered. The Russian army's chief of staff famously said, "I will. . . smash my telephone" so that he could not "be found to give any contrary orders for a new postponement of general mobilization."

  Bethmann understood that Russia's move was no cause for alarm. He told the Prussian State Ministers that "although the Russian mobilization had been declared, her mobilization measures cannot be compared with those of the West European states . . . Moreover Russia does not intend to wage war, but has only been forced to take these measures because of Austria."

  The German and Austrian chiefs of staff were in touch with one another, and Moltke cautioned the impatient Conrad: "War must not be declared on Russia." Instead the two German-speaking empires should "wait for Russia to attack."