The Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia, 1772-1832

by Taylor, Alan

  Bermuda

  During the war, Bermuda became the primary support base for the British squadron blockading the American coast. A cluster of low-lying islands about 600 miles southeast of Virginia, Bermuda was fourteen miles long, about a mile wide, and covered with cedar trees. From a distance, it made a delightful first impression on naval officers. Lieutenant Scott reported, “Bermuda assumes the aspect of a paradise when approached on a fine day. . . . The numerous islands reposing on its glassy lakes, and reflected as in a mirror by the clear blue sea, lend a degree of enchantment to the scene scarcely credible.” But first impressions proved deceiving, for the ships had to penetrate a long, twisting channel through rocks and around shoals to reach the harbor of St. George’s. And the town quickly depressed the officers as a grubby den of indolence and greed where the merchants and landlords charged exorbitant rates for their goods, provisions, and lodging. Admiral Cockburn dismissed Bermuda as “a vile Place.” Upon sailing away, Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm declared, “Thank God I am clear of Bermuda.” No naval officer would have predicted that Bermuda had a future as a tourist mecca.78

  The refugees saw relatively little of Bermuda because the leading colonists wanted no more blacks, lest they tip the balance in the population, then approximately equal between the races. In August 1813 the legislature’s leaders denounced the “very considerable number of Negroes . . . lately imported into these Islands from the Coast of the United States” by British warships. The legislators feared “the most pernicious effects in this Colony” because “our black population is the principal cause of the Decrease of the white Inhabitants, whose total extinction would be the ultimate consequence.”79

  But the colonial law of Bermuda did not apply to one of the islands—called Ireland—which belonged to the Royal Navy and where most of the refugees had to live and work. During the war the British expanded the fortifications and dockyard to service and repair the many ships operating along the American coast. Because white workers were in short supply, the dockyard hired refugees as laborers and carpenters. Each received a bounty, rations, and two shillings in daily pay, but he had to sign an indenture to serve for at least one year. In October 1813 the dockyard employed 100 black men and about 25 women and children. They lived in huts at the dockyard or on board a hulk anchored in the harbor: HMS Ruby.80

  Some Chesapeake blacks balked at the hard work of the dockyard, which struck them as differing too little from slavery. A British officer concluded that “they considered work and slavery synonymous terms.” Admiral Cockburn informed the newly liberated that they had “a right to the Wages earned by their Labor, yet that they are not on this account to suppose themselves entitled to be maintained in Idleness and to be fed, cloathed, and Lodged without working . . . and that they are in all respects precisely treated herein as His Majesty’s English born Subjects.” The British officers invited the runaways into the partial freedom of the working class.81

  Each dockyard worker received a daily ration which proved inadequate also to feed a wife and children, who demanded their own. A stickler for regulations and hierarchy, the dockyard commander, Andrew Fitzherbert Evans, had scant patience for complaints from blacks. He would provide rations to women and children only if they picked oakum: a tedious task. Work for food without pay seemed too familiar to them as slavery, so the women also demanded $4 a month. Evans nearly burst a blood vessel: “I am sorry to add that they evince a very riotous disposition and appear averse to any kind of Controul, professing as they have been led to believe that they are free men [and women] and subject to no restraint but their own Caprice.” Commiserating with Evans, Cockburn denounced the “riotous and improper Inclinations amongst these foolish and ever discontented People.” But the naval officers eventually compromised, for by April 1814, the women and children were paid as well as fed for picking oakum. The Royal Navy officers had to learn, through trial and error, how to work with the runaways who expected true freedom.82

  Scouts

  Black scouts improved the daring and performance of shore raids and eased the British dread of probing deeper into the countryside. Experienced at dodging slave patrols, the slaves had an intimate knowledge of the intricate Tidewater landscape of swamps, forests, and waterways. Along the James River in 1813, Lieutenant Scott wisely made friends among the enslaved: “Our means of security were afterwards greatly increased by the assistance of the negroes. Though several snares and ambushes were laid for me during our . . . services in the Chesapeake, I escaped them through the agency of my invisible friends.” Black guides also revealed hidden herds of livestock or storehouses filled with provisions and munitions. Masters struggled to keep secrets when runaways flocked to the invaders.83

  With the help of their new guides, the British gained possession of the night. They usually launched their shore raids after dark, while the militia and planters slept and when the slaves were the special masters of the paths. Lieutenant Scott recalled,

  The opportunities afforded us of safely traversing the enemy’s country at night, by means of these black guides, placed a powerful weapon in the Rear-Admiral’s hands. . . . The country within ten miles of the shore lay completely at our mercy. We had no reason to doubt the fidelity of our allies. . . . By their assistance we were enabled to pass the enemy’s patroles, make the circuit of their encampments, and cut off the post beyond it. The face of the country (generally thickly wooded) was propitious to these nightly excursions. . . . Before these useful auxiliaries came over to us, our nightly reconnaissance was necessarily circumscribed.

  Formerly wary of the Chesapeake landscape, the British gained confidence after they recruited runaways for guides.84

  As the land became more visible to Britons, it became murkier to slaveholders. In 1814 on Maryland’s Eastern Shore, a militia officer rued that four local blacks led a British raiding party “into an intricate position at or about midnight,” and we “could not ascertain any other mode by which information so accurate as the enemy certainly evinced, could have been obtained.” In addition to guiding Britons, blacks could mislead Americans. Called out to repel a British raid, a Maryland militia patrol got lost and offered a slave $5 to show them the road back to Baltimore. He promised to do so after first completing his errand “for some gentleman.” When the slave returned, he brought British troops, who surrounded and captured the lost militiamen.85

  Proclamation

  Admiral Warren urged his balky government to permit the recruitment of black troops in the Chesapeake: “The Black force could be augmented to any amount & being organized upon our Modes could be managed & kept within bounds and the Terror of a Revolution in the Southern States increased to produce a good Effect in that Quarter.” While keeping the blacks under military discipline, Warren could intimidate southern whites. With black troops, the British could “penetrate to Washington & Destroy the Dock yard & City.”86

  Sir Charles Napier endorsed and expanded on Warren’s proposal. An especially bold army officer who commanded a regiment in the Chesapeake campaign, Napier wanted to recruit and arm thousands of runaways. Slaves, he insisted, would flock to his standard because they regarded the British as “demigods” and their masters as “devils.” Napier requested weapons for 20,000 recruits, a set of white officers, and 100 drill sergeants. After landing on the Eastern Shore, Napier would “strike into the woods with my drill men, my own regiment, and proclamations exciting the blacks to rise for freedom, forbidding them, however, to commit excesses under pain of being given up or hanged.” Napier planned to establish a free-black colony that would attract runaways from throughout the United States. Then his black army would march on Washington, D.C., to dictate a peace that would abolish slavery in America. Lacking Napier’s romantic imagination and bold optimism, the British rulers in London preferred a smaller black force more closely controlled by naval officers.87

  In September 1813, Earl Bathurst authorized the Royal Navy to enlist Chesapeake runaways “into H[is] M[ajesty]s’s la
nd or sea service.” Although Warren had proposed the new policy, implementation fell to his more aggressive successor, Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, who took command of the North American squadron on April 1, 1814. In operations against the French in the West Indies, he had recruited and armed runaway slaves. Eager to escalate the war in the Chesapeake, Cochrane wanted to vigorously recruit runaways. Recalling a prewar visit to Virginia, he concluded, “From what I saw of its Black Population they are British in their hearts and might be made of great use if War should be prosecuted with Vigor.”88

  Cochrane hated the Americans, in part because they had killed his beloved brother in the battle of Yorktown during the revolution. In 1814 that hatred became an asset to a government resolved to punish the Americans for prolonging the war. “I have it much at heart to give them a complete drubbing before peace is made,” Cochrane promised. “They are a whining, canting race, much [like] the Spaniel and require the same treatment—must be drubbed into good manners.” Humbling American pride remained a top priority.89

  Vice Admiral Sir Alexander F. I. Cochrane, an oil portrait by Sir William Beechey. (Courtesy of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, England)

  A hyperactive schemer, Cochrane suggested bribing some Americans to kidnap Republican congressmen: “A little money well applied will attain almost any object amongst such a corrupt and abandoned race.” He would hold the Republican leaders as hostages until their government released all of their British prisoners. A skeptical Cockburn replied, “I do not think any Yankee Senator or Member of Congress worth half the Money you seem inclined to give for them, but I will try what is to be done in the way you mention.” As with so many of Cochrane’s plans, however, realization lagged far behind his imagination. Sir Pulteney Malcolm complained, “Cochrane is all zeal. His first resolves are generally correct, but . . . his head is so full of schemes that one destroys the other.” Cockburn, however, worked well with a commander who shared his aggressive personality and ambitious goals.90

  To obtain black recruits, Cochrane had to commit to their future as free men. On April 2 he addressed a cleverly worded proclamation to “all those who may be disposed to emigrate from the United States . . . with their Families.” He promised to honor “their choice of either entering into His Majesty’s Sea or Land forces, or of being sent as FREE Settlers to the British Possessions in North America or the West Indies, where they will meet with all due encouragement.” To deny the charge that he promoted a slave revolt, his wording avoided explicitly addressing slaves while emphasizing the word FREE as their future state as British friends. In a private report, Cochrane explained that he sought to harass the masters “and bring the consequences of the War home to their own Doors.”91

  From his headquarters at Bermuda, Cochrane sent 1,000 printed copies of the proclamation to Cockburn for distribution along the shores of the Chesapeake. Incredibly, many American newspapers, including the Madison administration’s own National Intelligencer, also spread the word by reprinting the proclamation, albeit with hostile commentary. The National Intelligencer insisted that the proclamation was a scam to lure credulous slaves away for British sale “to a bondage more galling than the light servitude they now endure.” Whatever masters read, they talked about, which slaves overheard and interpreted in their own way.92

  Cochrane issued the public proclamation on his own authority rather than on behalf of the imperial government: “in it I keep Ministers out of sight and take the odium and responsibility upon myself.” But in January 1814, Henry Goulburn, Bathurst’s undersecretary, privately had authorized Cochrane to welcome runaways “into His Majesty’s Service” or to become “free Settlers in some of His Majesty’s Colonies.” Goulburn sought to entice the many “Negroes and coloured Inhabitants of the United States” who had “expressed a desire to withdraw themselves from their present Situation.”93

  In March, Cochrane had sent an advance copy of the proclamation to the Lords of Admiralty, but they carefully avoided taking a public position, pro or con, lest they bear responsibility for the new policy. In May, Bathurst reminded his Chesapeake commanders that the government opposed any effort to promote a slave revolt. Cochrane replied, “I entirely Agree with your Lordship that no steps should be taken to induce the negros to rise Against their Masters. My views go no farther than to afford protection to those that chuse to Join the British Standard.”94

  Bathurst had preferred to attract only men, but his officers recognized that few would enlist unless promised a haven for their families. Captain Joseph Nourse explained that most of his refugees were women and children, “but there would be no getting the men without receiving them.” Bowing to that reality, the British government authorized the Royal Navy to “receive on board His Majesty’s Ships the families of such Persons, and in no Case to permit their Separation, the Assistance given to their families in the British Service being understood to be one principal Cause of the desire to emigrate, which had been manifested by the Negro population.”95

  In addition to welcoming runaways who reached their ships, the officers aggressively went ashore to entice slaves to come away with them. As a central goal of the 1814 campaign, Cochrane ordered Cockburn to seek out and liberate slaves of both genders and all ages: “Let the Landings you may make be more for the protection of the desertion of the Black Population than with a view to any other advantage. . . . The great point to be attained is the cordial Support of the Black population. With them properly armed & backed with 20,000 British Troops, Mr. Maddison will be hurled from his Throne.” Cockburn promptly directed one captain, “You are to encourage by all possible means the Emigration of Negroes from the United States.”96

  The new strategy reflected the lessons learned by British commanders in the Chesapeake during 1813, when they had struggled to keep white men from deserting and had failed to keep hundreds of slaves from fleeing to their ships. Making a virtue of necessity, the commanders recognized that the runaways offered invaluable local knowledge and potential as sailors and marines. Bending their orders from London, the admirals gradually embraced the many black refugees, including women and children. The commanders then persuaded their government to authorize recruiting blacks for war. By their courage, persistence, and numbers, the runaways enabled the British to adopt a new, far more aggressive strategy for 1814. Black initiative transformed the British conduct of the war in the Chesapeake.97

  In early 1813 the Royal Navy officers did not intend to emancipate more than a few slaves, but scores of Tidewater slaves acted as if the British were liberators, escaping to them in stolen canoes and boats. Put on the spot, the naval officers took in the runaways: reluctantly at first but with growing zeal over time. The officers warmed to their new role as liberators as a chance to highlight American hypocrisy about liberty. By protecting runaways, the officers claimed moral superiority over the enslaving Americans. By the end of 1813 the naval commanders also realized that the blacks could provide invaluable services to the British campaign. The runaways had made themselves essential to the officers’ self-image and to their drive to humble the Americans along the shores of the Chesapeake.

  Lelia Skipwith Carter Tucker, oil painting by an unknown artist, ca. 1815. Lelia Tucker was the second wife of St. George Tucker, the mother of Charles and Mary “Polly” Carter, and the mother-in-law of Joseph Cabell, who married Polly. (Courtesy of the University of Mississippi Museums)

  7

  PLANTATION

  I never did or could pretend to be any Judge of the proper mode of managing a Virginia estate.

  —ST. GEORGE TUCKER, OCTOBER 11, 18071

  AT DAWN on April 22, 1814, Dick Carter, a forty-five-year-old slave at Corotoman Plantation, discovered that his wife and children had boarded a British barge about to depart from the mouth of a nearby creek. Dreading separation from his family, he ran toward the barge, waving his hat and calling on the sailors to wait. Urged to stay by the plantation’s manager, Carter yelled back, “I do not wish, sir, t
o leave my master, but I will follow my wife and children to death.” In the nick of time, he reached the barge, and the sailors hauled him on board and rowed away to the British brig, Jasseur.2

  Explaining Dick Carter’s escape to a British warship certainly involves the grand history of a war: the actions of Congress and Parliament, of president and prince regent, of militia generals and Royal Navy admirals. Their interacting decisions brought warships into Chesapeake Bay and barges to Carter’s Creek and weakened the resistance by the local militia. But Carter made his own decision, which came in response to what his wife and children had already chosen. Their choices derived from the more intimate history of one plantation, which induced many, but not all, of the resident slaves to risk their lives and futures on escaping to the British. Located in Lancaster County on the north shore of the Rappahannock River at its juncture with Chesapeake Bay, Corotoman was an especially large and famous plantation with a substantial slave community. During the preceding decade, however, Corotoman had been roiled by divisions among the owners over how best to exploit the slaves.

  Joseph Carrington Cabell, from Alexander Brown, The Cabells and Their Kin (1895). (Courtesy of the Virginia Historical Society)

  Marriage

  Thanks to his second marriage in 1791, St. George Tucker managed the dower right of his new wife, Lelia Skipwith Carter, on behalf of her two children, Mary (known as Polly to the family) and Charles, by her first husband, George Carter. Once they reached adulthood, the two children would each receive a third of the estate, and when their mother died, they would divide her third. Meanwhile, Tucker remained responsible for the whole. Corotoman had been the palatial headquarters of the colonial era’s premier grandee, Robert Carter, aptly known as “King Carter” for his wealth, power, aggression, and arrogance. By his death in 1732 at the age of sixty-nine, Carter had accumulated multiple plantations, totaling nearly 300,000 acres and employing at least 700 slaves. Thanks to an entail, his eldest son, John, received the core plantations, including Corotoman, which subsequently passed to King Carter’s great-grandson, George, who married Lelia Skipwith, before dying in his prime in 1788.3