Operation Plunder: The British and Canadian Operations

by Tim Saunders

  Lieutenant Robert Henderson, a nineteen-year-old subaltern, volunteered to go out with a fighting patrol to attempt to extricate the lost platoon. Advancing along a hedgerow his patrol came under intense Spandau fire. Virtually pinned down, Lieutenant Henderson ordered his men to remain in cover; along with a Jock armed with a Bren gun, he crawled along a shallow ditch at the foot of an embanked road. A machine-gunner, however, spotted and engaged Henderson, killing the Bren gunner and knocking Henderson’s Webbly revolver out of his hand. The officer seizing his shovel from the back of his pack, charged the Spandau-gunner and sliced his head open with a blow from his shovel. Waving the patrol forward, he led them into a house at the edge of the village, before himself going back some sixty yards under heavy Spandau fire to recover the dead gunner’s Bren gun. Lieutenant Henderson and his patrol were forced to abandon the building, which was on fire, as the Fallschirmjäger counter-attacked. They moved to another house, from which the enemy failed to move them. ‘There it [the patrol] held out all day, and was finally caught up by the advance in the evening.’ Lieutenant Henderson was awarded an immediate Distinguished Service Order for this determined action, which provides an insight into the nature and horror of close quarter battle.

  The loose straggle village of Speldrop from Klein Esserden.

  By 0800 hours, with a very active and determined defence being mounted by the fanatical soldiers of 8th Fallschirmjäger Division, 154 Brigade had a secure bridgehead but had failed to hold both Esserden and Speldrop. The loss of 1 Black Watch’s artillery forward observation officer, without a doubt contributed to this, but immediate and ferocious counter-attacks were always to be expected from the Germans and the Fallschirmjäger in particular.

  153 Brigade

  Also crossing at 2100 hrs, Brigadier Roddie Sinclair was allocated the divisional main effort, the capture of the town of Rees and forming the easterly or right hand sector of the Highland Division’s bridgehead. 5 Black Watch and 5/7 Gordon Highlanders, carried in 4 RTR’s Buffaloes, were to land astride Rees. Crossing with the Brigade and under command, were the 3.7-inch howitzers of Captain McNair’s 454 Mountain Battery RA. These were the only artillery guns that could be transported in the Buffaloes, as they could be dismantled and taken over obstacles, as generations of visitors to military tattoos knew (the Royal Navy gun team race is the only modern equivalent in current British Service). The role of the gunners, brought from training in the Inverness area, was to provide intimate support to 1 Gordons during the battle for Rees.

  5 Black Watch had boarded their Buffaloes in some small woods south of the village of Appeldorn, three miles from the Rhine and had, as far as they were concerned, a good crossing. In fact 4 RTR had difficulty in climbing out of the river because of the stone clad enemy banks that damaged a high proportion of the LVT’s tracks. This event of ‘Clauswitzian friction’ was to have a significant impact on subsequent operations. Debussing on the enemy bank, 5 Black Watch benefited from some very good reporting of likely enemy minefields by 3rd Division, that was based on observations of the areas where the Germans had been moving about without restriction. The Black Watch also benefited from the British barrage, which:

  ... had been murderously heavy; it had included salvos of rockets fired from tanks; much of the kick had been taken out of the defence. The first companies passed over many positions whose garrisons were still dazed; as the succeeding companies reached them they were just coming to life.

  5 Black Watch’s leading pair of companies set off towards their first objective a farm on the Esserden – Rees road. The remaining two companies who were following took over the lead towards the straggling village of Esserden. In close quarter battle they fought from building to building clearing out the Fallschirmjäger as they went. By dawn, they had cleared the southern half of the village of enemy. The regimental historian recorded: ‘Here such few inhabitants as were left were weeping: they had been told by the parachutists that the British butchered all civilians. They went on weeping all night.’ During the course of the early morning, 5 Black Watch forced the Fallschirmjäger out of the northern section of Esserden, completing their tasks.

  Landing with 5 Black Watch were D Company 1 Gordons, who had accompanied them to secure a group of farm buildings which were to be used as a concentration area for the Gordons’ attack on Rees from the west. They were to protect company recce groups and assault pioneers under Major Rae, who were to lift mines, lay out assembly lines and guide the companies forward as they landed. All did not, however, go to plan as the Germans set fire to the farm with incendiary bombs before D Company could secure the buildings, necessitating a change of position for the Forward Assembly Area (FAA) away from the blaze. Even so, D Company suffered casualties from mortar fire.

  Carried across the Rhine by C Squadron 4 RTR, 5/7 Gordons landed on what was in effect an island to the east of Rees, bounded on its far side by a waterway, the Alter Rhine, which was the old course of the river. The battalion’s objective was to clear the farmhouses on the island and hold the ground in order to isolate Rees from the east.

  The Alter Rhine Island was held by a company of infantry, probably from 19 Fallschirmjäger Regiment, supplemented by ersatz infantry. The defences were centred around the farms of van Willichshof in the centre, Steppenhof in the south and Gross Sandenhof in the north, with section posts at key points along the bank.

  The Gordons’ regimental historian wrote:

  B Company, on the right, secured one farm within forty minutes of landing, a number of Germans being killed and forty taken. C Company made for the Alter Rhine to cross it and clear the further bank; but they found that the only bridge had been blown. As they approached they received heavy fire from the enemy beyond the stream. This was the first check. Meanwhile, D Company had arrived and taken another farm without opposition, and still another was captured, with fifteen Germans, by a platoon led by 2nd-Lieutenant Stephen.

  A young Volkssturm (Hitlerjugend) MG 34 crew.

  When day broke on 24th March the Gordons were certainly in possession of the Island, but they spent an uneasy time upon it. From the higher ground beyond the Alter Rhine German snipers and machine gunners commanded the whole expanse of open land: all movement outside the various farm buildings drew fire.

  A view across the Alter Rhine Island showing how unpleasantly open it was for the 5/7 Gordons.

  Landing with the infantry of 153 Brigade were soldiers of the Royal Signals who had dragged an armoured telephone cable across the river, behind their Buffalo, to ensure line communications were maintained. Initially this was to be with the bank control officer and eventually with various headquarters that were to be established astride the Rhine.

  The Attack on Rees

  The third battalion of 153 Brigade was 1 Gordons. They showered praise on ‘1 Royal Ulster Rifles, who held this sector of the near bank of the Rhine, for the Ulstermen not only dug slit trenches for the Gordons just behind the loading area but provided a special ″brew up″ so that every man received a mug of tea well laced with rum before embarking’. Major Martin Lindsay recalled that:

  I shall always remember the scene in the loading area: the massive bulk of the Buffaloes; the long ghostly files of men marching up to them, their flickering shadows and those of a smashed farmhouse and the armoured car at the Royals’ post; a few busy figures darting here and there in the moonlight directing people into this and that Buffalo.

  Then, as recorded by the regimental historian:

  ... came a delay. The first Buffaloes which returned from landing the Black Watch were not ready for the Gordons, for these craft found it difficult to get back out of the river on to the bank which was faced with stone. In attempting to land many of them damaged their tracks, and it was deemed quicker to bring along the Buffaloes which had already carried the 5th/7th Gordons across further up-stream. This check meant that the 1st Gordons could not start to attack Rees until 1 a.m. on 24th March and the respite must have been of value to the enem
y.

  Eventually, 1 Gordons successfully crossed the river without loss by 0050 hours and with a much delayed H Hour, B Company led the Battalion’s advance towards the north west corner of Rees followed by C Company. Crossing three hundred yards of open grassland, the two companies were soon held up by enemy fire from the south west corner of Rees. However, under the cover of an on-call artillery bombardment and a mortar smoke screen, they crossed the open flood plain and cleared the winter dyke at 0153 hours, ‘without further incident’. The winter bund was cleared with grenades and the Gordons pursued the enemy survivors who were falling back into their defensive perimeter in a housing estate.

  Looking due east towards Rees across the open ground that 1 Gordons had to cross.

  At 0215 hours, B Company who were on the left flank, managed to get in amongst the houses and gardens of the estate under cover of darkness. Enemy resistance was very determined. They were in company strength and split up into groups of four to six, with each group occupying individual houses. Due to the dispersed nature of the estate, the enemy did not withdraw but stood and fought hard for each house they occupied and only surrendered when they were overrun. B Company itself only a hundred and twenty strong at the beginning of the battle took seventy Fallschirmjäger prisoner. It is not hard to work out who should have been labelled as ‘elite’ in this fight.

  Meanwhile, at about 0400 hours, Major Lumsden’s C Company had been able to follow a route parallel to the winter dyke south east into the centre of the town. They were, however, soon in trouble as their advance brought them under the fire of snipers and machine guns not easy to locate on the outskirts of the ruin and chaos that was Rees. At 0445 hours, a platoon of C Company had broken into the western outskirts of Rees and was meeting stiff opposition. The enemy were ‘using Panzerfausts at close range’, in an anti-personnel role. Typically, as a section of Gordons entered a house they would be fired on by Panzerfausts from adjoining rooms, through ‘mouseholes’ in the walls. When they rallied and counter-attacked, they would find the defenders had escaped through prepared tunnels in the cellars.

  The area of the Cemetery (left) and the ‘housing estate’ (right) on the north western outskirts of Rees.

  By 0500 hours, both B and elements of C Companies were still spread out in the housing estate and the ground, north of the bund between the estate and the outskirts of the town. Opposition was still resolute and Major Lumsden had an additional problem. His rear platoon had been hit by a salvo of shells as they bunched up whilst crossing the bund. The platoon commander, Lieutenant Titterton, was dead and there were a dozen other casualties. The platoon had split up and dispersed either side of the bund.

  Major Lindsay was monitoring the progress of the battle on the Battalion’s radio net at Main HQ, which was still west of the river and recalled that:

  The first intimation of trouble was Alec [Lumsden] asking the Colonel to send up his spare officer, who had been left on the far bank with the company greatcoats and some other kit which they had taken across and dumped. Then he was telling D Company in the farmhouse area to send up part of one of his platoons, which had not crossed the dyke with the remainder. It was not hard to guess that this meant that the company had been shelled on its way forward, and that a platoon commander had been hit and some of the platoon had in consequence got lost or gone to ground. Meanwhile B and C Companies were fighting in the housing estate and gardens on the far side of the dyke and meeting a good deal of resistance. A little later ...it became apparent that C Company was still fighting in the orchards short of Rees when they came under fire from the Boche holding some of the houses at the outskirts of the town and by this time they were able to see well enough to shoot.

  Major Petrie, OC D Company, eventually gathered the remainder of C Company’s last platoon and pushed up over the bund. When asked how things were going he admitted it was ‘a bit sticky’ but as it would be daylight shortly things might change. At first light, 0537 hours, however, the advantage switched decisively to the enemy who were now able to bring down accurate sniper and spandau fire on both B and C Companies. The penalty of the Gordons’ delayed crossing was now being paid!

  Fallschirmjäger artillery in action.

  At 0600 hours, C Company’s position was being jeopardised by a group of Germans moving onto its left flank. B Company, who was still clearing the housing estate, had been unable to keep up with the C Company advance. Major Lindsay recalled:

  The next thing I heard was an acrimonious conversation between Alec Lumsden (C Company) and George Morrison (B). Alec was telling George that he hadn’t put a platoon where he said he was going to, and that the enemy had in consequence been able to get round his flank [on the dyke]. He then spoke to the Colonel and said he was pinned down in the open with Huns on three sides of him and that he must withdraw on to B Company as he was getting casualties, could not get forward and his position was untenable. Having extracted a reluctant permission from the Colonel [Grant – Peterkin] to withdraw, he decided to hold on for a little longer, and then began to feel his way forward once more.

  About 5 a.m. I heard him [Lumsden] report that he had reached the first row of houses in the town. Later on I heard B Company say they had passed through the cemetery and reached the edge of Rees, having taken about seventy prisoners. An hour or two after that Bowlby said he gathered that D Company had also reached the town, along the water’s edge.

  It was at about this time that Major Morrison, was bursting into a house through the front door, ‘... when I was bowled over by a German who was coming out. He was a giant of a man, a Fallschirmjäger sergeant major, carrying a Schmeisser sub machine gun’. To everyone’s surprise, it was the wiry Scottish major who got up from the ensuing brief but brutal struggle. Soon afterwards, the resistance in the housing estate crumbled and the left flank of C Company was able to break into the edge of the town.

  The face of a Fallschirmjäger soldier fighting the Fatherland’s invaders.

  B Company reported at 0700 hours, that they had reached the Rees-Speldrop road and turning right, had positioned themselves in the Rees cemetery and were deployed to protect the flank of C Company who were to fight their way into the main part of the town. German resistance was, however, far from crushed and the capture of Rees was going to be a protracted affair.

  DD Tanks

  Meanwhile, the two squadrons of DD tanks belonging to Lieutenant-Colonel John Trotter’s Staffordshire Yeomanry, had started the process of crossing the river behind and between the two infantry brigades. Their entry point was near what was referred to as ‘Storm Boat House’. Troop Commander, Lieutenant Sadler, described the operation:

  We sent a recce party over with the Buffaloes, to pick landing spots which were supposed to be lit with green lights, two green lights, one above the other.

  The Staffordshire Yeomanry were responsible for making their own exits and the recce and preparatory work on the banks, the far bank took a considerable amount of time and in many cases, unaided, the tanks found the exit bank to be difficult. However, crossing in one of the Yeomanry’s six Buffaloes was an airborne bulldozer, which was light enough to cross the mud banks. Once ashore, it was able to reduce the bank to a slope and several carpets made of coir matting with scaffolding poles were laid to give rigidity. With the exits made, the tanks could cross. Lieutenant Sadler continued:

  I was first tank into the River. We went down the slope, on the way we had quite a bit of gunfire and one or two of the tanks had their canvas screens holed so they couldn’t do the trip.

  We got into the river, which was quite fast flowing. I seemed to have been there a long time and I didn’t see the two green lights, but suddenly I saw one green light. I thought, well, the other one might have gone out or something, so I started to land and I found out I was on a mud bank. Before I realised where I was (I thought I’d crossed the river), I let the canvas side down and of course my other two tanks, or three in actual fact, came over and one got stuck in the mud. Th
ere was a shellfire going on at that time. It was very uncomfortable and I had to get out of the tank, get the chains out and hook on to the other tank and pull it out. Of course, then I had the problem of whether to risk going from the mud bank to the actual true bank of the river. I probably didn’t have enough air anyway to inflate the screen again, so I took the chance and as it happened, the water didn’t come up above turret level so we were all right. The other three tanks followed.

  Strongly built houses on the edge of town made good strongpoints for the enemy.

  The actual place I landed, of course, was wrong. The correct place was about two hundred yards downstream. I went down and was able to link up with them, by which time, the squadron leader had arrived.

  The difficulty in locating the DD exit point was due to the fact that it was not directly or even obliquely across the river but almost a mile downstream. The 3 ½ knot current swept the ungainly and barely ‘seaworthy’ tanks downstream through the 154 Brigade LVT crossing loop.

  When the first tank was eventually ashore, at the correct point, it was used to help tow other DDs across the soft river mud and onto the ramp over the Rhine dyke. By 0600 hours, two troops of the Staffordshire Yeomanry’s DD tanks were across and ready for action. With the laying of the coir carpets further out into the river and with daylight, the speed of crossing increased markedly and the first squadron was supporting the infantry at 0700 hours. The DD converted Shermans, despite the problems on the exit banks and the loss of three tanks, had been used to help solve the perennial problem of assault crossings of major waterways; being able to get tanks across in time for them to be available to help defeat enemy counter-attacks. The remaining two squadrons would not be able to cross until 13 Army Group Royal Engineers opened their Class 50/60 ferries which would not be before H Hour +12.