by Tim Saunders
General Rennie was buried at the village of Appeldorn on the west bank, with four Black Watch soldiers acting as pallbearers, to the sound of the pipes. Attending were his divisional staff, General Horrocks, his Corps Commander, and the commanders of the 3rd British Division and 3rd Canadian Division. During the post war concentration of graves, his body was moved to the CWGC cemetery in the Reichswald.
CHAPTER 5
Operation WIDGEON
UNDER THE COMMAND of 12 Corps, 1 Commando Brigade was to conduct another important preliminary assault crossing of the Rhine an hour after the initial assault by 51st Highland Division and ten miles up stream. Brigadier Mills-Roberts was given the task of seizing the town of Wesel, an important communications centre on the east bank, which was a strongpoint that, if not captured promptly, would dominate important crossing and bridging points and routes in the centre of 21st Army Group’s area of operations.
Lieutenant General Ritchie, Commander XII Corps:
... had given it as his considered opinion that the whole of the operation as it affected his formation depended on this assault being successful. It was considered too, that the success of the attack on the town depended in turn largely on the success of two very heavy bombing raids on the area.
At Wesel the Rhine was a little narrower than elsewhere, at about two hundred yards wide but the speed through the narrower channel was slightly higher at around five knots. As usual the river was prevented from flooding the surrounding country by dykes, from fifteen to twenty feet in height. While the town was built on the banks of the river behind high dykes, to the north west, there were in the surrounding area the usual several hundred yards of open flood plains. Wesel itself was a medium size town of some twenty-four thousand inhabitants. The old town, much of it medieval, was strongly built, largely of stone, but with a high proportion of wood. Like most towns on the Rhine, Wesel had already received the attentions of the Allied air forces, finally by 77 Lancasters of No. 3 Group on the afternoon immediately before the attack.
Brigadier Mills-Roberts.
There was not much information on the dispositions of the enemy in the town, which was in the sector thought to be held by Major-General Heinz Fiebig’s 84th Volksgrenadier Division. In fact the town had its own garrison of volkssturm, under Major General Deutch, with at least one of the numerous ersatz battalions (probably 317th), made up of administrative troops extracted from the rear areas. Brigadier Mills-Roberts wrote:
When I was eventually told to make my preliminary recce I walked through the small riverside villages, which nestled beneath the enormous flood dyke on our side of the river.... Looking across the river, I saw the town of Wesel, with the tall spires of several churches. It was going to be difficult to marshal our 1,600 men for the crossing without being observed by the Germans.
Using air photographs and maps he and his commanding officers,
... could barely see the enemy defences at this distance but with the help of our marked maps we could see that the flood plain was defended by a trench system close to the river bank itself, while further back were two large isolated waterman’s houses garrisoned by stronger forces. There were even stronger German forces further back, where the flood plain merged with higher ground. And I could see that a frontal assault on the town of Wesel was virtually impossible – the Germans had taken elaborate precautions against such an emergency.
1 Commando Brigade’s Plan
The mission given to 1 Commando Brigade was ‘to seize Wesel and hold the eastern and southern exits bombing raids the Commando brigade was to cross rush into the city while its defences were still ‘punch drunk’; secondly, to achieve surprise, it was decided to cross at the most unlikely spot, some open and the river before the second raid and form up ready to of the town’. Brigadier Mills-Roberts’ recce and appreciation led him to base his brigade plan on five points: first, that to take full advantage of the muddy flood plain two miles west of Wesel; thirdly, there was to be no attempt to secure the entire town, as it would not be possible to clear the whole area, before the inevitable counter-attacks; the brigade would therefore seize a compact area including a large factory area dominating the northern approaches to Wesel; fourthly, there should be no trace of the Brigade on the flood plain at dawn, leaving the Germans unaware of their strength and whereabouts. This meant that the commandos would have to carry their own supplies, as a ferry would not be established until the town was clear. Fifthly, Mills-Roberts knew that by landing across the muddy flood plain he would be unable to take heavy weapons on the crossing. He believed, however, that the German armour would have been drawn away by 51st Highland Division’s landing and that they would wish to avoid the risk of fighting in the rubble of an urban area where they would be vulnerable. Consequently, with limited carrying capacity and the river mud, the anti-tank guns were to be left behind but it was, however, expected that the ubiquitous German Panzerfausts would be captured in large numbers from the defenders, which could be used by the commandos in extremis.
1 Commando Brigade shoulder flash.
The four commando units, 45 and 46 Commandos Royal Marines and Nos. 3 and 6 (Army) Commandos, were joined by, amongst others, 84 Field Company RE and parties from a Mountain Regiment RA. This regiment, the nearest thing to commando gunners at that time, would provide forward observation parties and direct fire support. Their rear link from Brigade HQ, to Regimental HQ and CRA 12 Corps, on whom the commandos relied for their heavy fire support was vital. The LVTs allocated to the Brigade were to be operated by 77 Assault Squadron RE, who had sufficient vehicles to carry a single commando across the river in one lift before returning to collect the next of two waves.
Brigadier Mills-Roberts summarised his plan:
I decided to send 46 Commando over first in the Buffaloes and go with them with a small Brigade Headquarters. No. 46 had to capture the bank of the river and 6 Commando – which would be next ashore from the storm boats – had to sweep up the river bank and enter Wesel. The other two commandos would be brought across the river by the Buffalo ferry.
Having captured much of the town, reenforcement of the lightly armed commandos, was to come in the form of 1 Cheshires being ferried across the river at the earliest opportunity. Meanwhile, 17th US Airborne Division was to drop north of Wesel at 1000 hours and link up with the Commando Brigade in the northern part of the town. The airborne drop would take between three and four hours, during which artillery fire would not be possible. For that period, the Commando Brigade would have to hold on to Wesel without fire support.
Commando qualification badge.
1 COMMANDO BRIGADE’S OPERATION WIDGEON PLAN
LVTs preparing for the Rhine crossing.
The view across the Rhine from Grau Insel.
The Crossing
With the codeword confirming that the operation was on, finally being received at 1715 hours, the battle was started at 1730 hours by the afternoon air raid on Wesel by medium bombers. Mills-Roberts commented that ‘It was a short sharp attack, lasting fifteen minutes’. The Commandos watched from their hide locations, the procession of a hundred aircraft going over to their target in a steady stream. As the drone of aero engines faded ‘a great pall of dust hung over the city’. At 1800 hours, the artillery bombardment started and ‘from that moment the roll of gun fire until long after H-hour was continuous’.
Bill Sadler of No. 6 Commando recalled the march from their Assembly Area down to the Rhine:
After some miles of continuous marching, the packs and equipment began to assume twice their original proportions and weight but shortly before reaching the river, a halt was called to supply the column with some unexpected and welcome refreshment. Our packs and equipment were left in position to move off again, while each man collected his issue of tea, rum (a dessertspoon of rum – a life-giving fluid) and sandwiches – the last bread we would see until the end of the war.
There is some evidence that a mere dessertspoonful of rum, as issued to the comma
ndos, was meagre, when compared with that issued elsewhere to the assault troops.
The loads carried by the Commandos were considerable. For instance, No. 5 (Heavy Weapons) Troop of 6 Commando, manhandled two medium machine guns, along with their tripods, sights, ammunition and three ‘K-guns’, with an ample supply of preloaded reserve magazines, so that each man in the troop was carrying at least 100 pounds.
Meanwhile, Brigadier Mills-Roberts with his tactical HQ, along with Major Ted Rushton of 3rd Mountain Regiment and his signals detachment, embarked in the Buffaloes carrying 46 Commando RM. Time dragged around to H Hour. Mills-Roberts recalled the final wait and the move to the river:
I looked at my watch – ten minutes to go – we were due off at 2200 hours. I said to Donald, ″My watch has stopped.″ We checked. ″No″ he said. ″This is a long ten minutes.″
The Buffaloes were now warming up ... the large vehicles lurched forward. Our driver put his foot down and soon in front of us loomed the dyke. The momentum we carried sent us three quarters of the way and then we slid drunkenly back to the bottom, but the driver took another run and this time there was no mistake.
All accounts of the crossing describe how the 25-pounder shells of 6 Field Regiment, who were firing at a rapid rate for ten minutes, were bursting on the bank opposite and drowning out the sound of everything else. Suddenly the area was lit up by fifteen foot flames from a direct hit from an enemy mortar on one of the Buffaloes ahead on the far river bank. This beaconlike blaze attracted the Germans’ attention and brought further shells and mortar bombs.
Captain Gibbon, an Army commando attached from the Border Regiment, commanding B Troop, was the first man of 46 Commando to leap ashore. The Germans in the trenches on the river bank were stunned by the bombardment and within a few minutes, Captain Pierce RM, at the head of Y Troop, had rounded up sixty-five prisoners. Meanwhile, Captain Gibbon was pushing inland with B Troop. His artillery forward observation officer and his signallers had been in the Buffalo which had been hit, and he was, consequently, unable to call for fire support. Realising this, he led his men close under the preplanned creeping barrage and reached the assault position for their objective, the Wardmann’s Haus, five hundred yards from the river bank, while shells were still bursting around it. So close to their own fire was B Troop that their sergeant major and another man from Troop HQ were killed approaching the building. The fighting around the first Wardmann’s Haus was over quickly, with the defenders, a company HQ and two platoons, being overwhelmed by the Commando’s aggression. The last of them surrendered promptly when their commander was killed and grenades were thrown into the cellar. Some sixty Germans were taken prisoner, including two officers.
Wardmann’s Haus just inland from 46 Commando’s landing point.
Meanwhile, the second flight of Buffaloes, carrying the rest of 46 Commando, had by now landed. A and Z Troops moved across the flood plain to their objective, the second Wardmann’s Haus about a thousand yards from the landing point. It was quickly secured and the A Troop swung left and overran a light flak position that had been causing trouble. Z Troop passed through to consolidate their sector of the perimeter. By 2215 hours, 46 Commando RM had established a bridgehead, into which the remainder of the Brigade would land and assemble for the next phase of the operation. Brigadier Mills-Roberts said ‘We had been ashore for less than a quarter of an hour, but we had no time to lose’.
The other brigade units crossed as planned. No. 6 Commando was allocated storm boats, while No. 45 Commando RM had had the convenience of the Buffaloes. The storm boats were launched in a lagoon some two thousand yards downstream of the crossing place. The boats were to move down the lagoon at full speed, up stream, stop, pick up No. 6 Commando, and then cross the Rhine. The Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Lewis recalls that excessive speed led to an unfortunate incident:
One boat was overloaded. When the driver took off, the thing drove straight under water. Many of the men had their bregans still on their backs (instead of loosening them as they were meant to once they got aboard), and some were drowned with the weight of them.
Out in the main river, the boats were seen almost at once by the enemy, who opened fire. In addition, some storm boats were hit by smallarms fire, and one sank with its motor still running, drowning Lieutenant Hume-Spry and several of his section. RSM Woodcock had three boats shot under him before he landed on the enemy bank.
The difficulties of the crossing were, as predicted, increased by the breakdown of many of the outboard motors. Following similar experiences of mechanical breakdown during training, despite stripping down and thorough servicing, the outboard engines proved to be unreliable as expected. Small Dory craft, used by the commandos in coastal raids, had been brought to the Rhine for use as rescue boats, were soon proving their worth and vindicating Brigadier Mills-Roberts, who had insisted on them. Most of No. 6 Commando, was, however, across the river in fifteen minutes.
Meanwhile, having dropped off 45 Commando, the Buffaloes of 77 Assault Squadron, returned to the home bank and ferried across the final unit of the Brigade, No. 3 Commando. The ferrying operation, which was crucial to the Commando Brigade’s clearance of the open approaches and establishing themselves in the town, was carried out in an exemplary manner.
Canadian BBC reporter Stewart MacPherson before being issued with an army uniform.
BBC correspondent Stewart MacPherson was watching the crossing from the home bank and recorded the following:
I watched the [last] commandos take off for Wesel ... . A few minutes after they were due to arrive on the far side, bomber command were to deliver a crushing blow on the enemy in Wesel, while the commandos lay doggo over there, a bare thousand yards from the bomber target, and waited. Smack on time, Arthur Harris & Company, House Removers, as they were called by the commandos, arrived and delivered a nerve-shaking blow on the former Wesel stronghold. Back at Headquarters, minutes ticked by. Officers waited anxiously for word from the commandos across the river. Suddenly there was a signal, and a voice literally purred over the wireless: ′Noisy blighters, aren’t they?’
The ‘noisy blighters’, 201 RAF heavy bombers, arrived at 2230 hours and dropped 1,100 tons of bombs. The Army had in fact requested a raid of only 300 tons of high explosive. Mills-Roberts described the attack in slightly more technical terms:
We saw the Pathfinder aircraft of Bomber Command drop their red flare markers over the town. These were followed a few seconds later by two hundred Lancasters, each with a double block-buster load. As the bombs dropped, showers of debris flew into the air accompanied by great banks of fire. The noise was colossal and the ground shook under us although we were a thousand yards away – which was the margin allowed by Bomber Command. The whole plain was illuminated by a red, lurid glow.
‘It seemed,’ said Major Bartholomew, ‘as if more than mortal powers had been unleashed.’
While the heavy bombing of the town was in progress, the commandos had waited on the ‘safety line’, with the nearest troops only 1,250 yards away from the aiming point. This precision raid by RAF Bomber Command was the closest ever made to ground troops and quite remarkable when it is recalled that in 1942, the RAF classed as a hit, any bombs on a night raid that landed within five miles of its target!
The devastation of Wesel was almost complete but the rubble provided cover for the enemy.
A member of the Volkssturm armed with a panzerfaust.
As the last bombers approached Wesel at 2230 hours, No. 6 Commando was poised to move forward toward the town. The atmosphere was still laden with dust and smoke, as No. 6 Commando set off, with a sub section of 6 Troop under Lance Sergeant Tonse leading the way, as the bombers were completing their final run. Their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis of the Dorset Regiment, recalled:
They used the same method of marking the route as had been used in Normandy. Behind the leading troop came a tape laying party which laid a trail of white mine tape. This marked the route o
f the leading formation like a paper chase. 6 Troop, under Major Leaphard, led the way in a purposeful arrowhead formation, in three blobs [sections] of twenty men in single file.
The rest of the Brigade simply followed the tape into Wesel, with German prisoners co-opted into carrying some of the commando’s equipment. During this move it was important to avoid contact with the enemy, with whom they may well have become fixed in battle and, consequently, delay the whole operation or, worse, be caught out in the open at first light.
Even though they were trying to avoid contact, when observed, they had to deal with the enemy. En route across the open flood plain to the city, Major Leaphard came under fire from a strongly defended flak position. He attacked straight of the route of march and cutting through the perimeter wire, his men killed or captured all the gun crews. With the enemy dealt with, he then led his troop straight into the city via its north west corner before midnight, ‘through an arch of contorted and buckled railway lines’.
Into Wesel
No. 6 Commando secured an entry point just beyond the smashed railway embankment. Lieutenant Colonel Lewis received the Distinguished Service Order for this action. His citation summarised the action.
