by Tim Saunders
Speed was the vital factor in this operation, as it was necessary to enter the city as soon as possible after the bombing. This was achieved largely by the skill and daring displayed by Lt-Col Lewis who led his troops with such dash that three separate platoon localities were quickly overrun on his way to the city. His entry into the city itself in spite of considerable opposition from small arms and Panzerfausts was affected so quickly that the remainder of the Brigade was enabled to consolidate before the enemy became aware of the situation. Lt-Col Lewis was at all times at the head of his troops, and his trust and courage contributed largely to the success of the whole operation.
Off the flood plain and into the city the ground changed totally. One commando described the scene that greeted them:
The streets were unrecognisable from our briefing material and many of the buildings were mere mounds of rubble. Huge craters abounded and into these flowed water mains and sewers, accompanied by escapes of flaming gas. We were held up in one street because the two leading scouts found great difficulty in making their way between a crater and one of the buildings. It took some minutes before a better route was found further to the right. The scene was well illuminated for the ensuing battle in the streets by the many fires that blazed on all sides. Despite the heavy bombing the Germans were alert and came out of the cellars to fight with a courage and perseverance which did them great credit. The air was full of smoke and dust which was like breathing a particularly nauseous fog.
One of the few surviving period houses in Rees. This example is on the outskirts.
Ruins and rubble of the Wesel battlefield.
Meanwhile, by midnight No. 45 Commando and No. 3 Commando, were following the white mine tape, with 46 abandoning its bridgehead on the riverbank once the wounded had been evacuate and bringing up the rear. The amphibious Weasels that the Brigade Commander had demanded proved their worth, being used to evacuated the wounded. The Commando Brigade and medical detachments left the riverbank just in time as a deluge of shells fell on their vacated position but having been spotted, the commandos suffered further casualties from artillery fire during crossing the open ground to Wesel.
Behind No. 6 Commando, in the order of march were the Royal Marines of 45 Commando, under ‘Lieutenant Colonel Gray, who was following up rapidly behind the leading unit who had broken into the city, he passed through and debouched into the streets’. The commandos fought their way through the rubble towards the factory on the northern edge of the city. Lieutenant Bryan Samain of E Troop 45 Commando RM describes the scene:
We advanced in single file along both sides of a main street running north, which we hoped would bring us to our final positions. There were a lot of supposedly dead Germans lying about here, and just as Colonel Gray and his headquarters party neared the corner of the street to turn north for the wire factory – our final position – a ′dead′ German (we later identified him as belonging to the SS) suddenly rose to his feet and fired a Panzerfaust at point-blank range. The result of this sudden onslaught was that two of the headquarters’ men were killed, Colonel Gray wounded in the arm, and nearly everyone in the immediate vicinity knocked off their feet by the force of the explosion.
Feeling very angry, we emptied a magazine of Tommy gun bullets into the German soldier, and into every subsequent ′corpse’, we saw lying around.
The loss of their commanding officer at a crucial moment would have been severe. As recorded in his DSO citation:
In spite of his wound he refused to be evacuated and completed his important task. Having captured the factory he disposed his troops so skilfully that during the next thirty-six hours they were able to beat off three major counter-attacks by infantry and self-propelled guns with enormous casualties to the enemy. Not until the last counter-attack had been broken, did this gallant officer allow himself to be evacuated.
The factory area along Wesel’s northern edge looking over 45 Commando’s position.
At about 0200 hours, 45 Commando reached their objective and an hour later, were consolidating their positions around the wire factory on the north east corner of the city. Much to their amusement, they discovered the ‘Wire’ factory actually manufactured lavatory pans. Their commanding officer, through he was suffering considerably from the pain of his wounded arm, deployed and encouraged his men, ‘who were inspired by his example’.
Lieutenant Bryan Samain and the men of his section of E Troop were immediately at work.
As soon as we got inside the factory, we set to work feverishly to barricade it as much as possible. Machinery, timber, doors, benches, coils of wire – all were used in an effort to prepare rough defensive positions, blocking windows and the like until they were mere loopholes... . We stood-to throughout the night waiting for an enemy counter-attack that never came.
Lieutenant Colonel Lewis chose a house for No. 6 Commando’s headquarters and ‘going down to a cellar I found seventeen Germans down there, all lying on their bunks. There was no sort of control or command at this stage’. He commented that ‘These people fought as individuals’.
See map on page 111
Lieutenant Colonel Peter Bartholomew’s No. 3 Commando had been last to cross the river using the Buffalo ferry but followed 45 into Wesel. Taking a more westerly route, No. 3. Commando promptly found themselves clearing barricades and attacking defenders who were coming to life in the smoking ruins of Wesel.
46 Commando, bringing up the rear from the bridgehead, took up a position between No. 3 and No. 45 RM Commandos. Thus deployed, the Brigade held the north and north-western outskirts of Wesel and were well positioned to be able to repel enemy counter-attacks and to clear the remainder of the town after dawn. However, the commandos may have secured their objectives but Mills-Roberts wanted to adopt an aggressive posture. He wrote, ‘While the commandos were digging-in, offensive patrols scoured the immediate area and brushes with the enemy were frequent’.
The result of one of these patrols was recorded by the Brigade Commander:
Major-General Deutch, the German Garrison Commander, was found by a patrol of 6 Commando in his headquarters in a cellar. He refused to surrender and was killed by a burst of Tommy gun fire. In his headquarters was a map giving full details of the flak dispositions of the whole area. It was invaluable because next day the 18th Airborne Corps, American and British, was to fly in and before that time it would be possible to get our own artillery on to the German flak positions to hammer them and do as much damage as possible.
What Mills-Roberts does not mention is that Deutch, who was actually commander of 16th Flak Division, as well as garrison commander, had his HQ located in a cellar almost next door to the building where he had established his own tactical HQ. There is also evidence that General Deutch died in more interesting circumstances when he was encountered by a 6 Commando patrol led by RSM Woodcock. Private Prichard recalled how:
In a garden area of Wesel, a Lance Corporal was digging a grave. This seemed strange and we asked him why. It appears that he was one of RSM Woodcock’s patrol searching through the cellars when he was confronted by a German officer. The Lance Corporal immediately said ′Hands up!’ whereupon the German replied, ′I am General von Deutsch and I only surrender to an officer of equal rank’. The Lance Corporal is supposed to have said, ′This will equalise you,’ and fired his Thompson at him with fatal results. The story was that the Brigadier was furious and ordered the Lance Corporal to bury the General as a punishment.
Targeting information was essential if full use was to be made of the mass of artillery such as this 5.5 inch gun.
The Lance Corporal concluded his story by commenting ′That’s the last time I kill a General’.
RSM Woodcock took numerous maps from the German headquarters, which proved to be marked with detailed locations of the flak batteries. To ensure that this vital information reached XII Corps’ Artillery Intelligence Cell, the best swimmer in the Brigade was called for to take the map back across the Rhine in a sealed packag
e. However, the gunner radio nets were working well:
Ted Ruston, my Gunner representative from the Mountain Regiment, was standing by to pass all the information over the R.A. signal net, and our own signallers were ready to pass it over their own net – but it would necessarily be a long and detailed message.
Other prisoners were being brought into Brigade Headquarters, which was ‘in a cellar, with a low archaic catacomb of pillars, lit by dozens of candles provided by the enemy’. Here Mills-Roberts received the surrender of a German colonel:
There was a slight commotion as he went on his way into captivity. He made the fatal mistake of asking Arthur de Jonghe to assist him with his bag. Arthur, in fluent German, advised him that as a member of the Master Race he should be well able to deal with any minor impedimenta, which included a bag. The colonel looked embarrassed and unhappy and I was not sorry to see him go.
The Oberst was added to the mounting number of prisoners and was directed to a large crater near Brigade Headquarters where the PoWs had been gathered in order to control them and give them some cover.
Lieutenant Samain recalled, after a sleepless night that:
When dawn broke the next morning Easy Troop were ′standing-to’ in their positions, which lay in the right-hand corner of the factory, facing east. There was still nothing happening: it seemed, in fact, as if all would be quiet, and that the airborne troops would have nothing at all to worry about ...
Suddenly a marine, looking out of his loophole, saw a dozen rather weary German soldiers wheeling cycles down the road leading back to the town. They were heading straight for the factory. Everyone in the troop waited for them to come closer, their weapons at the ready.
The Germans obviously thought that, wherever the British were they were certainly not in the lavatory pan factory. They chatted amongst themselves quite unsuspectingly as they came towards the men of Easy Troop, all of whom were now in the aim, awaiting orders to open fire.
A few minutes later, the Germans passed within a few feet of Easy Troop: but we held our fire. Then as the last German presented his back we opened. After thirty seconds, there were twelve corpses lying in the road.
The situation did not remain favourable for long, as by 0500 hours, it was obvious to the Germans that Wesel, in the centre of the Allied bridgehead, was their key terrain and that this was the main crossing. Consequently, XLVII Panzer Korps was ordered to counter-attack with all available resources. Shortly after dawn, at 0530 hours the enemy were reported arriving north of the town for the expected counter-attack and before long, there was the sound of tracked vehicles and engines. Brigadier Mills Roberts wrote:
This report came from each of the four Commandos and we asked for map references. The map references were supported by approximate compass bearings: curiously enough these bearings all crossed in the vicinity of a small copse where several roads joined, making it a likely place for armour to concentrate, ...
When this had been verified Ted Ruston said, ′We’ve still got the Corps artillery on call for a bit yet. Shall we give them a pasting?’ ′Yes,’ I said. ′If we can deter this suspected counter – attack it’s going to make quite a difference.’
He laid on the shoot with all speed and a very satisfactory noise followed in due course.
Siegfried Waldenburg commander 116th Panzer Division.
By 1945 the bicycle was a common means of mobility for Germany’s last reserves.
The armoured attack failed to materialise, which is not entirely surprising when one considers the weight of fire provided by a heavy battery (7.2″ guns), two medium regiments and two field regiments of 3 AGRA along with the guns of the mountain artillery.
Particularly well-equipped Hitlerjugend soldiers in 1945 armed with panzerfausts.
As daylight came, further patrols were sent out to scour the town for centres of enemy resistance and according to the Brigadier, ‘small battles were taking place everywhere in the streets’. Both sides used Panzerfausts as an anti-personnel weapon in the absence of tanks in these sharp, if a little one-sided fights.
We also had a number of these weapons which were proving more destructive than accurate. One man was missed by one of these Panzerfausts and, to his amazement, saw a large slice of the building behind him collapse.
Communications
As the commandos were not forming a permanent bridgehead on the riverbank they had not had the opportunity to tow a telephone line across the river as the infantry brigades had been able to do. To ensure communications, as radios were a tenuous link, with battle damage, running out of batteries and jamming just a few of the potential problems, a line was needed from Wesel back to the home bank. This was to be the task of Lieutenant Christie (Royal Signals), the Lines Officer of 1 Commando Brigade Signal Troop. The line was to ‘be laid at the earliest possible moment’ and was considered to be an ‘extremely hazardous task’.
As soon as the Brigade’s initial objective had been captured and a tactical HQ established, Christie took a small hand-picked line party through the city to the demolished railway bridge. At this point, of course, Wesel had not been completely cleared of the enemy and the line party had to work in full view of the enemy, including a machine-gun post sited upstream on the east bank of the river.
Lieutenant Christie’s Military Cross citation reads:
Ordering his small party to pay out the line, Lieut Christie commenced climbing across the twisted bridge spans carrying the line with him. At times he had to climb over girders 100 feet above the river while at other times he picked his path along spans which were partly submerged in the water.
The pull on the quadruple cable whenever it touched the water was tremendous, nevertheless by sheer courage and determination, Lieutenant Christie crossed the full 1,500-ft. length of the demolished bridge under heavy shell fire and spasmodic sniping and machine gun fire, and thus enabled vital communication to be established before the first pontoon bridge had been commenced. This officer’s devotion to duty and complete disregard for his own safety was an inspiration to all who witnessed it.
The line link was duly established and despite needing almost constant repair, provided a speedy method of passing information until the town was secured and the bridges built.
Counter-Attack
The most dangerous period for 1 Commando Brigade was as expected, at 1000 hours, when the copious artillery support from the home bank that the assault formations had hitherto used liberally, had to be checked for three and a half hours during the airborne operation. Unfortunately, this coincided with the likely arrival time of German operational reserves, in the form of armoured counter-attacks. In the seven hours available to them, when not patrolling, the commandos had done their best to dig-in or build sangars in the piles of rubble and had gathered as many panzerfausts as possible from prisoners and defended locations to make up for the lack of their own anti-tank weapons.
As predicted, the pressure against 1 Commando Brigade mounted, just as the artillery check fire came into force. The enemy was a Kampfgruppe of 116th Windhund Panzer Division, consisting of infantry supported by assault guns. This was one of the battle groups that had been held back to counter-attack Allied bridgeheads on the Rhine. Harried by fighter-bombers they had only been able to concentrate in the woods and copses north of Wesel, slowly and with losses to both men and armour. Hitherto, the fire of the Mountain Regiment, supplemented by that of the Army Group’s Royal Artillery, had disrupted the enemy’s assembly but now with further troops arriving the main weight of the attack fell on 45 Commando who struggled to keep the enemy at bay. Waves of grenadiers, supported by Panzer IVs and assault guns, attacked the commandos. Concentrated fire from Bren guns and other small arms fire, however, halted the German infantry assaults and, according to German sources, the attack principally failed because the Panzers were overly cautious. Presumably, deterred by the presence of Allied fighter-bombers and even medium bombers in cab ranks above the battlefield. Also, they would have been at a
considerable disadvantage if they had attempted to fight amongst the rubble of the town.
A Vickers machine gun was the heaviest weapon that the Brigade possessed at Wesel.
A Waffen SS soldier operating a Panzerschrek.
45 Commando’s historian recalled that with the check fire period in force: ‘The Hun chose this moment to launch a counter-attack to regain the all important factory.... the enemy was able to advance across the open ground with infantry and tanks supported by his own sporadic mortar fire’. Colonel Gray without artillery support or other heavy weapons ordered that all PIATs should be used in the unusual ‘mortar’ role. Angled up, these weapons had a range of some three hundred yards – ‘at the receiving end, the effect was very similar to that of an artillery barrage’.
Lieutenant Samain recalled:
... It was not until 1000 hours that they put in their first organised counter-attack; and when it came it seemed to be a most half-hearted affair, consisting of a few waves of infantry, supported by cumbersome Mark IV tanks and self propelled guns. The infantry were easily beaten off, and for some unknown reason the tanks did not attempt to come too close.
There were in fact two really serious attempts to dislodge us later in the day. The first was when a solitary Mark IV, braver than its fellows, started to rumble ominously down the main road towards us. It got to within one hundred and fifty yards of the factory, then became indecisive. Major Beadle, meanwhile had mustered every available PIAT and Panzerfaust, and these were ready. Suddenly, however, the tank stopped, its engines coughing and arguing, then turned around and went back. Discretion being the better part of valour, Easy Troop let it go.
