Operation Plunder: The British and Canadian Operations

by Tim Saunders

  Lance Corporal John Sykes of B Troop 45 Commando RM had an altogether more difficult battle, and received the Military Medal for his action during the battle on 24 March. He commanded the forward Bren group sighted outside the north east corner of the wire factory. What were thought to be two 88 mm self-propelled guns approached to within 500 yards and engaged the troop position with HE and machine gun fire. His citation describes the action:

  A shell-burst four feet above his position on the wall seriously wounded his No. 2 of the Bren. He immediately assisted the medical orderly to remove the casualty and organised a relief and then engaged an enemy machine gun position 250 yards from his right front. Five minutes later another shell burst immediately in front of his trench blowing his Bren gun out of the position. Sykes again left his cover and under machine-gun fire recovered the gun, which was still serviceable, returned to his trench, and again engaged the enemy.

  A third shell hit the wall to the left of his position, this time breaching the barrel of the gun. Sykes jumped from his trench with the damaged gun, ran to Troop HQ for the spare Bren and returned to his post and returned the enemy’s fire. His aggressive spirit and determination to fight back was a shining example of courage during a most trying period...

  A little further along the line another self-propelled gun was ‘sniping’ at E Troop from the cover of a cemetery wall. Lieutenant Samain wrote:

  About half an hour later ... a second Mark IV approached to within 250 yards of the factory and commenced to pump shells into it. As it was out of PIAT range and because the artillery had been forbidden to fire during the airborne operation there was really nothing that could be done about it: so we just lay quietly under what cover we could, enduring a most unpleasant bombardment of 75-millimetre shells, until the German crew finally tired of their party games and withdrew. E Troop suffered six or seven casualties.

  The workhorse of the German army, the Panzerkampfwagen IV, with its 75 mm gun, served on all fronts.

  The area of 45 Commando’s open right flank. The railway now crossed by a road bridge was the site of a level crossing.

  45 Commando’s historian considers that the decision not to bring anti-tank guns across with the Brigade, as ‘there wasn’t a significant tank threat’, was ‘extremely questionable’. Lieutenant Samain, supporting this view, commented that ‘Had the Mark IVs pressed home their attack, of course, they would have caused untold damage, for our defensive positions were far from perfect, and we had nothing more than PIATs and a Panzerfaust or two’.

  Following this incident, Major Beadle received a message from the CO that he could pull E Troop back into less exposed positions in the centre of the factory complex. However, believing that this would allow the enemy to gain a foothold in the area and that ‘getting them out would be a costly business’, he declined to move his troop.

  At about the same time, Brigadier Mills-Roberts redeployed A Troop of No. 3 Commando to join 45 Commando, strengthening the Brigade’s open flank, by covering the remains of a level crossing. Here the Army Commandos found that they were ‘being pestered by enemy self-propelled guns’.

  Meanwhile, a troop of 46 Commando, who were positioned in a builder’s yard on the far side of the road opposite 45 had been ‘conducting a small war of their own against scattered parties of Germans who were scurrying about isolated buildings in a small village three hundred yards to the east of the town’. The Commandos sniped at them throughout the morning with commendable accuracy, ‘and there is no doubt at all that this largely contributed to the enemy’s failure to mount a really large scale attack on them’. Every time they brought up an SP gun, or infantry started forming up in the village for a counter-attack, their arrangements were disrupted by small arms fire.

  The drop of 17th US Airborne Division took place just to the north of Wesel, with the paratroopers of 3rd Battalion 507 Parachute Infantry Regiment landing on DZ W to the north west of Wesel on the self-same open ground that the commandos had crossed the night before. The paratroopers were followed by the Wacos of 2nd and 3rd Battalions 194th Glider Infantry swooping in to land little more than a mile away. The dramatic arrival of the airborne in the middle of the battle caused a noticeable slackening of the Germans’ resolve but due to a combination of mist, smoke and heavy flak 17th US Airborne’s landing had been dispersed and they had suffered heavy casualties in landing, as planned directly on top of the enemy. Consequently it would be some time before the Glidermen whose principal objectives were the bridges on the Issel and Issel Canal would be able to make their presence felt to the benefit of the commandos.

  Colonel Gray who had been wounded during 45’s initial advance into the town, eventually succumbed to the pain of his wound and was forced to hand over command to Major Blake, who in the early afternoon, reported that another enemy attack was coming in. To defeat this attack, which was getting perilously close to his position, Captain Day called for fire from the 3.7-inch guns of the Mountain Regiment, immediately in front of him. ‘The response was so rapid and accurate that a badly shaken Captain Day barely had time to dive into his bunker’. The attack was beaten off.

  By 1300 hours, two sizeable kampfgruppen were forming up east and north-east of 45 RM Commando’s position, supported by self-propelled guns. Brigadier Mills-Roberts recalled:

  We arranged an artillery programme with Ted Ruston but they would not be able to fire before 1.30 p.m. – till then we would have to manage with small – arms fire as no mortars were allowed either.

  At 1.30 p.m. down came the long-awaited artillery support, which we had been unable to get till the Airborne troops were all in. Less than half an hour later the battle in No. 45’s area was well under control.

  This is a graphic example of the power of artillery to swing a battle and the Brigadier considered that this was ‘the turning point of the whole battle and now I felt that the brigade was secure in Wesel’.

  At about 1700 hours, patrols from 2nd Battalion 194th Glider Infantry of 17th US Airborne Division entered the Brigade position through the forward troops of 45 Commando and passed on details of their dispositions along the Issel Canal. At this stage, these were the only patrols that had infiltrated across no-man’s-land and through German-held ground. A proper link up was not made until the following day. However, the presence of the American Glidermen to the north east, did much to prevent the Germans from attacking the Commando Brigade’s defences on the northern perimeter. Consequently, with the situation on the northern outskirts of the town more or less under control, Brigadier Mills-Roberts was able to progressively increase the number of men clearing the town’s central area.

  The Clearance and Occupation of Wesel

  While the battle on the northern edge of the town had been going on, 6 Troop of No. 6 Commando had been tasked to secure a bridgehead on the river bank at the opposite end of Wesel, through which, the Brigade would be reinforced and resupplied. At about 1300 hours they reported that they had cleared the bank of the Rhine in the area of the blown railway bridge. Shortly afterwards Brigade HQ ordered the LVT ferry to be opened, at 1420 hours, at a site upstream side of the demolished bridge.

  There was, however, a delay passing the order to 81 Field Company RE and the first Buffalo, carrying an RE recce party, crossed without incident at 1500 hours. The site had been chosen from air photographs and in the end proved to be too steep for Buffaloes. To make matters worse, the ferry site promptly came under fire from a spandau in the uncleared part of the town. One Buffalo was holed and sank at the foot of the ramp, blocking it. By 1600 hours, however, an alternative landing site was located just downstream of the bridge.

  Meanwhile, 1 Cheshire, the spare battalion of 115 Brigade that was not providing Bank Control Parties for the two assaulting corps, came under command of the Commando Brigade. At 1400 hours, the two commanders of A and B Companies were briefed and shortly afterwards the Battalion left its assembly area in trucks but as the leading vehicle approached the river the column came under fire
from a spandau and the column was halted. It is reported that:

  Mortars of 4/5 Royal Scots Fusiliers laid a smoke screen and put down HE on the enemy position, which was neutralised so that the trucks could proceed back to the Battalion area to pick up the remainder of the troops.

  The ferrying of A and B Companies began at about 1600 hours and the only enemy reaction was intermittent firing by the spandau, which was again temporarily neutralised by mortars of 4/5 RSF. The Cheshires crossed the Rhine without casualties but it was found that the Battalion’s Jeeps and carriers could not be landed at the new ferry site. As a result, A and B Companies moved inland without waiting for them at 1700 hours. As they moved towards their objective, the spandau again came to life and one soldier was wounded and evacuated. No further resistance was encountered and by 1730 hours, both Companies were digging themselves in the north west portion of the green belt in Wesel along with their Tactical HQ.

  At 1800 hours, C and D Companies crossed and moved inland. The spandau that had caused problems earlier was still firing and a second machine gun in the area also opened up, but without causing any casualties to the Cheshires. On the bank, there were still anti-personnel mines and a Sergeant Major was wounded by a Schumine. By 1830 hours, the two companies had reached the south side of the railway embankment and were digging in. The Battalion’s main HQ crossed the river at 1900 hours and joined Tac HQ in the cellar of a house in the battalion area. The Cheshires reported:

  Thus, by 1900 hours 1 CHESHIRE, less Support Company and all the vehicles, had crossed the Rhine and settled for the night in slit trenches and cellars. A firm belt from the river to the 6 Commando bridgehead was held and the supply route to the Commandos was secure. Enemy activity had been limited to intermittent firing from one, and in the later stages two, machine guns and a small amount of shelling and a few AP mines. There was no contact with the enemy on the ground, except that two Germans surrendered to the battalion.

  The bombing, the arrival of the commandos and the moral effect of the airborne drop had together totally dislocated the enemy who were not capable of putting up an organised defence.

  The difficulty that the Cheshires had with the pair of spandaus was replicated on the opposite side of Wesel, where small arms artillery and mortar fire seriously delayed ferrying and bridging operations by 30th US Infantry Division. This was to cause a delay which, in circumstances other than the almost complete collapse of the 180th Grenadier Division, could have been serious. As it was, 116th Panzer Division, committed to battle piecemeal, to stem the tide of the Allied advance, was easily held.

  The Cheshires finally ashore west of the blown bridge at Wesel.

  British troops escorting a column of prisoners.

  While the Cheshires were crossing and occupying the southern portion of Wesel, A Troop of 3 Commando who had been released from their earlier task of reinforcing 45 Commando with the arrival of the Americans, were now clearing their way into the centre of the town. Fighting in light battle order, using No. 38 radio sets for communication, they ambushed several German patrols working their way north through the rubble and developed a technique for dealing with enemy riflemen who wished to fight on, which involved drawing fire and then concentrating several Brens on the snipers’ position.

  Elements of No. 6 Commando who were now fighting in the town were also facing some determined resistance:

  One patrol reported that when a number of the enemy had approached them in apparent surrender, one of them dropped down on his hands and knees with a spandau strapped to his back. The patrol were the ones to return so they must have reacted swiftly.

  The German barrack area across the railway from 45 Commando’s position.

  Troops of 30th US Division on the east bank of the Rhine near Wesel.

  46 Commando RM eventually pushed through the town to link up with the Cheshires, who had deployed to clear and defend the south west part of the town. With pressure from the east reducing, they were able to assist with the aggressive patrolling operations in the main part of the town, where a smoky haze hung over Wesel ‘that got into one’s nostrils and eyes’.

  No. 3 Commando had cleared the centre of the town by late afternoon and Brigade HQ reported the town clear during the evening of 24 March but this is considered ‘to have been a little premature’ by Second Army, as there were a few pockets of resistance still holding and disrupting movement in and around the city.

  The following day (25 March), firm contact was made with 507 Parachute Infantry, to the north west of the town, at 1330 hours. With the link-up made, 1 Commando Brigade was passed from command of XII Corps to that of XVIII US Airborne Corps, for subsequent operations.

  In this final phase of the battle, as planned, 45 Commando was to clear a German barrack area to the south east of their position. B Troop was ordered to send out a patrol to clear some houses on the far side of the railway prior to the attack on the barracks, which was one of the last bastions of resistance.

  The patrol commander, Lt McDonald, with his section cleared the first buildings without difficulty, but further progress was checked by the Germans who were still occupying strong defences near their barracks. The patrol was withdrawn when it was discovered that this phase of the operation was to be undertaken by US Paratroopers. B and D Troops had a ringside seat for the attack by the US paras supported by British self-propelled guns [Archers].

  Later in the afternoon of 25 March, 46 Commando reported a link-up with troops of the Ninth US Army astride the Lippe Canal, south of the town. The clearance of the town was finally completed at 2100 hours and the Commandos were able to ‘sample the contents of captured hock barrels’.

  As a result of the bombing and fighting to clear Wesel, the town had been ‘reduced to a mass of rubble, twisted girders and beams, smouldering fires and precariously balanced walls verging on collapse’. The total number of prisoners taken was over eight hundred and fifty: several hundred enemy lay dead by their slit trenches on the flood plain and in the streets of Wesel. In contrast, commando casualties totalled ninety-seven killed, wounded and missing.

  A Commando patrol combing the ruins for enemy resistance.

  Before leaving 1 Commando Brigade in Wesel, it is worth noting that the large town of Wesel was captured as rapidly as could be expected, and cleared to enable bridging operations by Ninth United States Army to commence. Whereas the smaller town of Rees, which was not attacked by bombers immediately before the assault, was the scene of severe fighting that lasted for over forty-eight hours.

  CHAPTER 6

  Operation TORCHLIGHT 15th (Scottish) Division

  THE SECOND ARMY’S Operation PLUNDER’s main effort lay with XII Corps. In their crossing of the Rhine, XII Corps’ intention was, with or without the drop of XVIII US Airborne Corps, to force a crossing of the Rhine, seize the Issel bridges (if not captured by 6th Airborne), establish ferries and eventually bridge the Rhine. From the resulting lodgement, the Corps was to be prepared to operate eastwards into the heart of Germany. To this end, a Mobile Striking Force based on an armoured regiment and an infantry battalion mounted in Kangaroo armoured personnel carriers, was to be given the highest priority on the ferries and was to be ready for operations by first light on D+2.

  Leading XII Corps’ assault was 15th (Scottish) Division. Their crossing was to take place at 0200 hours on 24 March, some five hours after the attack by 51st Highland Division and four hours after that of 1 Commando Brigade. The crossing was timed to be coordinated with that of the crossing of XVI US Corps to their right (Operation FLASHLIGHT).

  Lieutenant General Ritchie, commander of XII Corps.

  XII Corps’ shoulder flash.

  15th Scottish Division.

  Enemy Forces

  XII Corps, although they were unsure of the exact enemy boundaries, knew that their assault area was opposite elements of 7th Fallschirmjäger Division and 84th Infantry Division, both of which, as already discussed were shadows of their former selves. However, in prepa
red positions they were still expected to give a good account of themselves against the vulnerable Scottish infantry advancing across the river and open flood plain. It was known that the defenders in the 84th Division area now included not only Volkssturm but also, for example, 280 (Ear) Battalion, which was made up of soldiers who were deaf or hard of hearing. These reinforcements on the face of it seem to have been of a very low quality but similar troops had performed surprisingly well during the battle of the Bulge and of course during VERITABLE, when they had already faced 15th Scottish Division.

  An estimate of enemy artillery that XII Corps could face made by gunner intelligence was that:

  84th Inf Div assisted by GHQ and non-divisional resources, was thought to have only about fifty medium guns: in fact there were probably more, and they were in any case very difficult to locate, as they were mostly sited in very enclosed country. To this figure must be added the guns which 7 Para Div might bring to bear against 12 Corps.